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Abstract
Waste is an acute environmental, economic, and social issue in a time of multi-
ple, interconnected resource crises and challenges. One possible strategy capable
of simultaneously addressing multiple of these challenges is industrial symbiosis.
Industrial symbiosis networks engage traditionally separate industries and other
organisations in a collective exchange of waste and by-products. Such exchanges
potentially result in multiple economic, environmental and social benefits. Crit-
ically, waste is thus re-conceptualised as a resource in industrial symbiosis net-
works. However, despite policy documents and academic literature recognising
that industrial symbiosis both complements and supports current policy aims of,
inter alia, sustainable development, green economies, and circular economies,
its level of implementation across the European Union (EU) remains low.
With the aim of supporting more widespread implementation of industrial sym-
biosis networks, the overarching research question underpinning this thesis is:
how can the law enable initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis? This
thesis focuses in particular on assessing how mechanisms of regulations, poli-
cies, and property rights can drive or prevent industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment. Methodologically, a multi-case study approach was used to
evidence and validate analysis, supported by interviews, comparative, and doc-
trinal approaches. The four case studies investigated are located in Kalundborg
(Denmark), Linköping and Norrköping (Sweden), Peterborough (UK), and Rot-
terdam (Netherlands).
The first part of this thesis develops and presents an Industrial Symbiosis De-
velopment Framework (ISDF) to structure the exploration and comparison of
the four case studies across different socio-legal contexts. One of the key ISDF
ii
components includes property rights, so the theoretical implications for differ-
ent property rights in waste are considered. For this contribution of the thesis,
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) theory is used to investigate the identification of
the most appropriate property regime for enabling industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment.
The second part of the thesis explores property rights, regulations, and policies
in practice — first at EU level, and then at local case study levels. It is ar-
gued that it is a mix of indirect regulations and policies with complementary
bottom-up and top-down approaches which create favourable contexts for en-
abling industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. It is further argued that
this regulatory and policy mix needs to be underpinned by the reconceptualisa-
tion of waste as a resource. There is also no absolute support for one particular
property rights regime. The thesis closes by observing that there is no one-size-
fits-all approach to enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
There are growing waste crises as a result of the amount of waste produced and
to be managed.1 In 2014 economic activities and households are estimated2
to have generated in excess of 2.5 billion tonnes of waste in the 28 European
Union (EU) Member States.3 This was a slight increase compared to 2008 and
2010, but lower than in 2004 and 2006, attributed in part to the downturn
in economic activity as a result of the financial and economic crisis.4 At the
same time, it would take 1.5 Earths to produce the resources to support current
human demand.5
This thesis focuses on industrial symbiosis, a particular strategy which can help
mitigate the waste and resource crises through the use of one organisation’s
waste by others within a given network or group. In these symbiotic networks,
waste is diverted from landfill and other forms of disposal, thus lessening the
1Current waste context has been called waste crises by, for example: Richard I Stessel,
Resource Recycling and Recovery Engineering (Springer 1996) 2; Hans Tammemagi, The
Waste Crisis: Landfills, Incinerators, and the Search for a Sustainable Future (OUP 2000);
UNEP, ‘The Global Garbage Crisis: No Time to Waste’ (6 November 2012) 〈unep . org /
newscentre/global-garbage-crisis-no-time-waste〉 accessed 20 October 2014.
2These are estimates as collecting data and statistics on waste production, composition,
transport and treatment remains a key challenge, as they are not all collected using the same
methods or to the same extent across different countries, and municipalities may categorise
waste differently. A programme has been initiated to harmonise data collection. For example:
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, ‘How Much Waste do we Produce?’ (2014)
〈unece .org/statistics/news/newswaste - statistics .html〉 accessed 22 September 2014; The
World Bank, ‘What a Waste: A Global Review of Solid Waste Management’ (March 2012)
〈web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/0,
,contentMDK:23172887~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:337178,00.html〉 accessed
20 October 2014, 4.
3Eurostat, ‘Waste Statistics’ (May 2017) 〈ec .europa.eu/eurostat/statistics - explained/
index.php/Waste_statistics〉 accessed 10 August 2017. Note: this includes Croatia which
joined the EU on 1 July 2013 and also includes the UK.
4ibid.
5WWF, Living Planet Report 2014: Species and Spaces, People and Places (2014) 33.
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impact of the waste on the environment, the economy and society. Despite both
policy documents and academic literature recognising that industrial symbiosis
complements and supports current policy aims and political agendas of, inter
alia, sustainable development, green economy, and circular economy (see Sec-
tion 1.2.2), it is not yet widely implemented within the EU. As such, industrial
symbiosis needs to be encouraged by sympathetic regulatory and legal envi-
ronments.6 This thesis investigates enabling property rights, regulations, and
policies for industrial symbiosis.
This introductory chapter sets out issues surrounding waste in Section 1.1. Sec-
tion 1.2 defines and introduces industrial symbiosis. The research question,
objectives and contributions are then set out in Section 1.3, followed by an out-
line of the research design in Section 1.4, including the approaches and methods
adopted. Section 1.5 then identifies the scope of the research, and finally Sec-
tion 1.6 outlines the structure of the remainder of the thesis.
1.1 Waste
In this section issues surrounding waste are covered, namely how waste is a
sustainable development issue, and how it can be conceived both as a form of
pollution or a resource.
1.1.1 A sustainable development issue
In 2014 the main waste disposal operations were landfill (43.6%), recycling
(39.0%), backfilling (10.8%) and incineration (6.5%), both with and without
energy recovery.7 These operations all highlight the extent to which waste is
6Katrien Steenmans, Rosalind Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, ‘Commodification of Waste:
Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’
(Life-cycle Based Management and Reporting for Sustainable Business, November 2016, Oslo,
Norway) 2.
7Eurostat, ‘Waste Statistics’ (n 3).
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a sustainable development issue, as a result of their economic, environmental
and social impacts.8 Landfill can cause soil, groundwater, surface water, and air
pollution, as a result of methane gas released by waste and the characteristics
of the waste deposited in landfills.9 Additionally, landfill occupies precious land
space, being commonly situated on low-lying and low-value lands, which are
increasingly difficult to find.10 There has been some positive progress; the land-
fill rate of municipal waste in EU-27 almost halved from 63% in 1995 to 34%
in 2012.11 Incineration is often touted as an alternative to address the draw-
backs of landfill and can be used for energy recovery, but it results in emissions
of harmful air pollutants and about a third of the mass burnt turns into ash,
which then needs to be disposed of, often in landfill.12
In addition to these environmental impacts, waste represents an economic loss.
It is estimated that materials sent to landfill in the EU could have a commercial
value of around e5.25 billion per annum,13 excluding the costs of infrastructure
required to collect, sort and manage waste.14
Lastly, waste can affect health both directly and indirectly. Direct impacts in-
clude methane gas released by landfill among other air pollutants released in the
8Steenmans, Malcolm, and Marriott, ‘Commodification of Waste: Legal and Theoretical
Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’ (n 6) 3.
9For example: Kenneth L Mulholland and James A Dyer, Pollution Prevention: Method-
ology, Technologies and Practices (American Institute of Chemical Engineers 1999) 56; Alison
Smith and others, Waste Management Options and Climate Change (European Commission
2001); EEA, Diverting Waste from Landfill: Effectiveness of Waste-management Policies in
the European Union (2009) 15; EEA, Well-being and the Environment: Building a Resource-
efficient and Circular Economy in Europe (EEA 2014) 31.
10John McEldowney and Sharon McEldowney, Environmental Law (Pearson Education
Limited 2010) 217.
11Eurostat, ‘Municipal Waste Statistics’ (March 2014) 〈ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Municipal_waste_statistics〉 accessed 24 September 2014.
12For example: Bernt Johnke and others, ‘Emissions from Waste Incineration’ in J Pen-
man and others (eds), Good Practice Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Institution of Global Environmental Strategies on behalf of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2000); Eurostat, Waste Statistics (July 2013).
For a case study highlighting misconceived perceptions of benefits of energy recovery: Ine
Steenmans, ‘Integrated Infrastructure Systems: Strategic Planning Practice and Problem
Structuring Support’ (EngD thesis, University College London 2017) 92.
13European Commission, Being Wise with Waste: The EU’s Approach to Waste Manage-
ment (2010). Other resources on the potential value of waste include, for example: Stessel
(n 1) chapter 1; UNEP, Converting Waste Plastics into a Resource (2009); WRAP, ‘Waste
as a Resource’ (2014) 〈wrap.org.uk/waste-as-a-resource〉 accessed 20 October 2014.
14EEA, Well-being and the Environment: Building a Resource-efficient and Circular Econ-
omy in Europe (n 9) 27 and 31.
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atmosphere, and risk of contamination of freshwater sources. These pollutants
contribute to climate change, which has independent health impacts.15 Indi-
rect effects include crops growing in contaminated soil and fish ingesting toxic
chemicals, which are then consumed by humans.16 Additionally, contaminated
soil further impacts nutrient uptake in crops, which affects crop yield and, in
turn, food availability.
Set against the negative effects of waste is arguably the beneficial impact of
the waste industry. The waste industry has grown in part because of the reg-
ulatory environment to deal with matters of disposal, which involves transport
operations, disposal, and recycling as well as complex legal and administrative
decision-making around licensing and management. Waste thus has societal
benefits in that it creates jobs and generates profits.17
With these environmental, economic, and social implications, waste is arguably
a sustainable development issue. The term sustainable development was intro-
duced in the 1987 Brundtland Report,18 where it is defined as ‘development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs’.19 This Brundtland definition has been said to
bring ‘together different and conflicting interests, but is vague and imprecise’.20
This concept has been developed at international level by, inter alia, the United
Nations Convention on Earth and Development (Rio Earth Conference 1992),
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and the
2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). Sus-
15For example, Jonathan A Patz and others, ‘Impact of Regional Climate Change on Human
Health’ (2005) 438 Nature 310; A Haines and others, ‘Climate Change and Human Health:
Impacts, Vulnerability and Public Health’ (2006) 120 Public Health 585.
16EEA, Well-being and the Environment: Building a Resource-efficient and Circular Econ-
omy in Europe (n 9) 31.
17The UK market for the collection, treatment, recycling, and disposal of controlled waste
was an estimated £18.9 billion in 2013, with this estimated to increase to £24bn following an-
nual growth rates of between 3-7% per annum by 2018 — AMA Research, Waste Management
Market Report - 2014-2018 Analysis (2014).
18UNWCED: United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future (Brundtland Report) (OUP 1987).
19ibid 43.
20Andrea Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (2009) 36(1) Journal
of Law and Society 32, 34.
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tainable development has also been incorporated at EU level, and is the focus
of this thesis. Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen argue that sustainable develop-
ment has been made a ‘fundamental justification for the existence of the EU’21
through its incorporation in Article 3(3) Treaty on European Union (TEU),22
which states that the EU ‘shall work for the sustainable development of Europe
based on balanced economic growth and price stability’.23 Sustainable develop-
ment as a justification of the EU is further supported by the integration principle
in Article 11 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)24 re-
quiring the integration of sustainable development into the EU’s policies and
activities beyond environmental protection.25
The three sustainable development pillars of economic development, social de-
velopment, and environmental protection were acknowledged in the Johannes-
burg Declaration on Sustainable Development26 as ‘interdependent and mutu-
ally reinforcing pillars of sustainable development’,27 and again in Rio+20. The
outcome document of Rio+20, The Future We Want, states that:
We therefore acknowledge the need to further mainstream sustain-
able development at all levels, integrating economic, social and en-
vironmental aspects and recognizing their interlinkages, so as to
achieve sustainable development in all its dimension.28
21Stuart Bell, Donald McGillivray, and Ole W Pedersen, Environmental Law (8th edn,
OUP 2013) 61.
22Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13 (TEU); Bell, McGillivray, and Pedersen
(n 21) 61.
23Art 3(3) TEU: The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability,
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress,
and a high level of protection and improvements of the quality of the environment. It shall
promote scientific and technological advance.
24Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/49 (TFEU).
25Bell, McGillivray, and Pedersen (n 21) 62; Art 11 TFEU: Environmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies
and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.
26Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (4 September 2002) UN Doc A/
CONF199/20 (1992); Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International Law
and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009) 54; Panos Merkouris, ‘Sustainable Development
and Best Available Techniques in International and European Law’ in Karen E Makuch and
Ricardo Pereira (eds), Environmental and Energy Law (Wiley-Blackwell 2012) 39.
27Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (4 September 2002) UN Doc A/
CONF199/20 (1992), para 5.
28The Future We Want (27 July 2012) A/RES/66/288 (2012), para 3.
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Ross argues that in order for sustainable development to be effective, it needs
to provide guidance as to how these three strands relate to one another.29 The
EU does not clarify how these strands specifically relate to each other, instead
the Commission Communication Mainstreaming Sustainable Development into
EU Policies30 states that ‘economic growth, social cohesion and environmental
protection go hand in hand and are mutually supporting’.31 The three strands
have also resulted in sustainable development being considered a contradiction
in terms, because it is ‘impossible to achieve growth, social justice and envi-
ronmental benefits simultaneously’.32 Waste reflects this contradiction as it is
generally generated as a result of economic growth,33 but this results in envi-
ronmental degradation and social detriments.
1.1.2 Pollution or resource?
As a result of waste management and disposal operations discussed in the pre-
vious section, waste has numerous polluting effects. These effects can operate
as externalities where a consequence (cost or benefit) of an (economic) activity
affects other parties without this being reflected in market prices. Historically,
pollution has operated as an externality, although attempts at taxation in the
form of carbon taxes and landfill taxes alongside emission trading34 have sought
to internalise the costs. These are regulatory approaches but Coase argues that
29Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (n 20) 47.
30European Commission, ‘Mainstreaming Sustainable Development into EU Policies: 2009
Review of the European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ (Communication) COM
(2009) 400 final.
31ibid 2.
32Andrea Ross, ‘Is the Environment Getting Squeezed out of Sustainable Development’
[2003] Public Law 249, 250. Ross has also stated that ‘the term needs to do more than simply
bundle together the economic, environmental, and social strands. The conflicts internal to the
term sustainable development and its imprecise nature have meant it has been manipulated
to support or refute different policy outcomes based on different objectives and the amount
of weight attached to them’ — ibid 47.
33For example: Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-
making (Hart Publishing 2005) 213-214; UNEP, Converting Waste Plastics into a Resource
(n 13).
34For example, Arthur C Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan and Co 1920);
Gary D Libecap, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons: Property Rights and Markets as Solutions
to Resource and Environmental Problems’ (2009) 53(1) The Australian Journal of Agricultural
and Resource Economics 129.
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solutions to externalities lie in transactions where the market can solve exter-
nalities (through an efficient solution) if property rights are clearly assigned and
negotiation is costless.35 What Coase fails to address is that a transaction might
not solve an externality but instead only compensate a private party for a de-
merit that they suffer individually. Coase’s theorem does not challenge climate
change or localised air pollution or the damage to aquatic ecosystems. Hardin’s
tragedy of the unmanaged commons (see Section 3.3) is a Coasian cost problem
where Hardin uses waste specifically as an example of pollution to demonstrate
why privatisation or state intervention are required to internalise externalities.36
From the perspective that waste has polluting effects operating as externalities,
Coase theorem thus highlights the need to examine the structure of (private)
property rights in this thesis, as the solution to such an externality problem
lies in the clarification of property rights.37 A theoretical discussion of property
rights is presented in Chapter 3, with property rights in practice discussed in
Chapters 5 and 6.
At the same time as the polluting effects of waste, waste is also recognised as
a resource.38 The EU’s 2003 Thematic Strategy on waste cemented the shift
in perception that waste is ‘increasingly seen as a valuable resource for indus-
try’.39 Other policies, such as the Integrated Product Policy (IPP)40 and the
Circular Economy Package41, develop this further (see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.4
respectively). More recently, the EU Parliament has proposed an amendment
35Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3(1) The Journal of Law and
Economics 837, 850-851.
36Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243, 1245. See
Section 3.3 for an explanation of the tragedy of the unmanaged commons and also criticism
of Hardin for only suggesting top-down solutions.
37Chris Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai, Property Rights, Planning and Markets:
Managing Spontaneous Cities (Edward Elgar 2003) 144; Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler,
The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (2nd edn, Cambridge University
Press 1996) 43; Thomas J Nechyba, Microeconomics: An Intuitive Approach with Calculus
(2nd edn, Cengage Learning 2016) 757.
38For example: Steenmans, Malcolm, and Marriott, ‘Commodification of Waste: Legal and
Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’ (n 6).
39European Commission, ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Prevention and Recycling
of Waste’ (Communication) COM (2003) 301 final 7.
40European Commission, ‘Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-cycle
Thinking’ (Communication) COM (2003) 302 final.
41European Commission, ‘Closing the Loop - an EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy’
(Communication) COM (2015) 614 final.
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to the Waste Framework Directive (WFD)42 — the main EU legislation exam-
ined in Chapter 4 — to include the phrase ‘by ensuring waste is valued as a
resource’43 in the overarching objective of the Directive (see Section 4.2). This
thesis focuses on one particular strategy where waste is conceived as a resource:
industrial symbiosis.
1.2 Industrial symbiosis
Industrial symbiosis is a sub-field of Industrial Ecology (IE). This field was
popularised in 1989 by Frosch and Gallopoulos in their development of the con-
cept of industrial ecosystem.44 They developed this concept as analogous to
biological ecosystems, with the use of ‘ecology’ to reflect the aims of conserving
and reusing resources in biological ecosystems.45 This idea of cycling resources
is implicit in Frosch and Gallopoulos’s definition, which is a system in which
the ‘consumption of energy and materials is optimized, waste generation is min-
imized and the eﬄuents of one process . . . serve the raw materials for another
process’.46 This ideal of cyclisation of resources like natural ecosystems was de-
veloped at the same time as policies such as sustainable development, giving
traction to the development of IE.47 Section 1.2.2 outlines how these concepts
42Council Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on waste and repealing certain
Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (WFD).
43European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 14 March
2017 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (COM(2015)0595 - C8-0382/2015 - 2015/0275(COD))
(P8_TA-PROV(2017)0070, 14 March 2017) 1. Note that these are the amendments that were
proposed at the first reading of Parliament as part of the ordinary legislative procedure.
44Robert A Frosch and Nicholas E Gallopoulos, ‘Strategies for Manufacturing’ (1989) 189
Scientific American 152, 152. IE was first coined in 1972 by the Tokyo Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, and ‘industrial ecosystems’ was coined in a paper presented at the 1977
annual German Geological Association meeting: P Cloud, Geologische Rundschau (Band 66,
Heft I 1977) 678-696; Suren Erkman, ‘Industrial Ecology: An Historical View’ (1997) 5 Journal
of Cleaner Production 1, 2 and 4.
45For example: Braden R Allenby andWilliam E Cooper, ‘Understanding Industrial Ecology
from a Biological Systems Perspective’ (1994) 3(3) Environmental Quality Management 343;
Thomas E Graedel, ‘On the Concept of Industrial Ecology’ (1996) 21 Annual Review of Energy
and the Environment 69; Erkman (n 44).
46Frosch and Gallopoulos (n 44) 152.
47Dominique Bourg, ‘Introduction’ in Dominique Bourg and Suren Erkman (eds), Perspec-
tives on Industrial Ecology (Greenleaf Publishing 2003) 14.
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are linked. The development of IE was further supported by the establishment
of the Journal of Industrial Ecology in 1997, and the setting up of the Interna-
tional Society for Industrial Ecology in 2001. In the literature, IE still embodies
this same aim of achieving cyclisation of resources, and is generally defined as
the interdisciplinary study of the relations between industrial systems and their
natural environment. For example, Allenby defines IE as ‘the multidisciplinary
study of industrial systems and economy activities, and their links to funda-
mental natural systems’,48 Bourg considers IE ‘an important source of concepts
for interdisciplinary study’,49 and Graedel states that in the field of IE indus-
trial activity ‘in its ideal form . . . strive toward integration of activities and
cyclization of resources, as do natural ecosystems’.50
IE is concerned with global and national level as well as local and regional, while
industrial symbiosis within the field of IE focuses on exchanges of materials, en-
ergy, and water at local or regional level.51 The term industrial symbiosis was
first coined in 1989 by a power station manager in Kalundborg about a devel-
oped network of resource exchanges exemplifying IE in Kalundborg52 — the
Kalundborg Industrial Symbiosis (KIS) is one of the selected case studies (see
Section 1.4.1). There is no single agreed definition for industrial symbiosis, but
most definitions incorporate the exchange of resources between industrial firms
or facilities and the benefits of these exchanges.53 For example, van Berkel and
48Braden R Allenby, Industry Ecology: Policy Framework and Implementation (Prentice
Hall 1999) 12.
49Bourg (n 47) 14.
50Graedel (n 45) 70. For other examples of authors describing IE as interdisciplinary see
also: Michael Allen, ‘Ecosystems for Industry: Taking their Cue from Nature, Industries
could Work Together to Benefit Themselves and the Environment’ (1994) 1911 New Scientist
〈newscientist.com/article/mg14119113.900-ecosystems-for- industry-taking-their-cue-from-
nature- industries- could-work- together- to- benefit- themselves- and- the- environment.html〉
accessed 7 July 2014; John Ehrenfeld, ‘Industrial Ecology: A Framework and Process Design’
(1997) 5(1) Journal of Cleaner Production 87, 87; Allenby (n 48) 33; Rene van Berkel and
others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-
2006’ (2009) 90(3) Journal of Environmental Management 1544, 1544.
51Marian R Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis’ (2004) 3 Encyclopedia of Energy 407, 407.
52Marian R Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’ (2000) 25 Annual
Review of Energy and the Environment 313, 316.
53For example: Anna Wolf, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the Swedish Forest Industry’ (PhD
thesis, Linköping University 2007); Rene van Berkel and others, ‘Quantitative Assessment of
Urban and Industrial Symbiosis in Kawasaki, Japan’ (2009) 43(5) Environmental Science &
Technology 1271; Gary Watkins and others, ‘Overcoming Institutional Barriers in the Devel-
opment of Novel Process Industry Residue Based Symbiosis Products - Case Study at EU
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others defined industrial symbiosis as being ‘concerned with closing materials’
cycles by using wastes from one facility as an alternative input for another facil-
ity’,54 while Costa, Massard and Agarwal defined it as ‘a self-organising business
strategy among firms that are willing to cooperate to improve their economic
and environmental performance’.55 The definition used in this research adapts
Chertow’s definition of industrial symbiosis as ‘engaging traditionally separate
industries in a collective approach to competitive advantage involving physical
exchange of materials, enery, water and by-products’.56 This definition is se-
lected because it is the most commonly accepted one.57 Taking into account
this definition, the definition proposed and adopted in this thesis is:
Industrial symbiosis engages traditionally separate industries and
other organisations in a collective exchange of waste and by-products
resulting in economic, environmental, and social benefits.
This builds on the definition of industrial symbiosis published in Science for
Policy, the environment news alert service of the Directorate-General for the
Environment of the European Commission, which used a similarly worded defi-
nition to Chertow’s: ‘the exchange of material and energy between traditionally
separate industrial organisations in a way that benefits all those involved and
potentially the environment’.58 The proposed definition for this thesis extends
Level’ (2013) 41 Minerals Engineering 31.
54Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town
Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1544 (emphasis added).
55Ine˜s Costa, Guillaume Massard, and Abhishek Agarwal, ‘Waste Management Policies for
Industrial Symbiosis Development: Case Studies in European Countries’ (2010) 18(8) Journal
of Cleaner Production 815, 815 (emphasis added).
56Marian R Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (2007) 11(1) Journal of Industrial
Ecology 11, 13.
57This definition is used, for example, by: Joshua M Pearce, ‘Industrial Symbiosis of Very
Large-scale Photovoltaic Manufacturing’ (2008) 33 Renewable Energy 1101, 1105; Peter Lay-
bourn and Maggie Morrissey, National Industrial Symbiosis Programme: The Pathway to a
Low Carbon Sustainable Ecology (Ignition DG 2009) iii; Rene van Berkel, ‘Comparability of
Industrial Symbioses’ (2009) 13 Journal of Industrial Ecology 483, 484; Berkel and others,
‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Symbiosis in Kawasaki, Japan’ (n 53) 1279;
Costa, Massard, and Agarwal (n 55) 815; Frank Boons, Wouter Spekkink, and Yannis Mouza-
kitis, ‘The Dynamics of Industrial Symbiosis: A Proposal for a Conceptual Framework Based
upon a Comprehensive Literature Review’ (2011) 19(9-10) Journal of Cleaner Production 905,
905.
58European Commission DG Environment News Alert Service, Regulatory Barriers to In-
10
1. Introduction
the benefits beyond environmental as the economic and social benefits are also
drivers of industrial symbiosis and are often interrelated with environmental
benefits (see Chapter 5). This proposed definition also covers the definition set
out in the EU Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe,59 which states ‘where
the waste of some firms is used as a resource for others’.60 The adopted def-
inition includes by-products in addition to waste — see Section 4.4.1 for the
definitions of these terms. The next few paragraphs set out and argue for the
various elements of the definition, and provide a literature review of industrial
symbiosis in doing so.
a) Traditionally separate. Industrial symbiosis is, similarly to IE, analogous
to a biological concept.61 Symbiosis was originally coined by de Bary in his
monograph62 to describe any association between two or more different species
of organisms. The ‘traditionally separate’ element reflects the biological re-
quirement of different species. This aspect of the biological analogy has not
translated clearly into research on industrial symbioses, as there is uncertainty
in the literature whether this refers to separate in terms of industry sectors, own-
ership, facilities, or activities and processes.63 For the purposes of this thesis,
the separation can take any form as long as the other definitional requirements
are met.
b) Industries and other organisations. Industries have been extended to include
other organisations, such as municipalities.64 Arguably, this does not alter the
dustrial Symbiosis in Metal Sector (5 July 2012). This news alert does have a caveat at the
bottom that the contents and views included in Science for Environment Policy publications
are based on independent, peer-reviewed research and do not necessarily reflect the position
of the European Commission.
59European Commission, ‘Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe’ (Communication) COM
(2011) 571 final. See also Section 4.3.1.
60ibid 6.
61See n 45.
62Heinrich Anton de Bary, Die Erscheinung der Symbiose: Vorlag (Verlag von Karl J
Trübner 1879).
63Berkel (n 57) 485; D Rachel Lombardi and Peter Laybourn, ‘Redefining Industrial Sym-
biosis’ (2012) 16 Journal of Industrial Ecology 28, 29.
64Laybourn extended Chertow’s definition to include ‘other organisations’ in Peter Lay-
bourn, ‘The Development of the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) - a Case
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definition of industrial symbiosis, as organisations such as the Kalundborg Mu-
nicipality have been included in previous industrial symbiosis studies.65 Graedel
and Allenby stated that industries should be interpreted in the broadest sense
covering the sum total of human activity,66 while industrial symbiosis has been
stated to include all types of human activity.67 The terms facility and firm have
been used interchangeably with industry in the literature (and even by the same
authors).68
By defining industrial symbiosis to cover industries and other organisations,
industrial symbiosis incorporates urban symbiosis, which is sometimes used in
conjunction with industrial symbiosis.69 Urban symbiosis was introduced by
van Berkel and others as an extension for industrial symbiosis in 2009.70 It has
been defined as referring ‘specifically to the use of by-products (wastes) from
cities (or urban areas) as alternative raw materials or energy source in indus-
trial operations’.71 The main difference between industrial symbiosis and urban
for Publicly Funded Macro Industrial Networks’ (Intellegant: Made for the Future, March
2006, Cambridge, UK). See also: Reid Lifset, ‘Why Industrial Ecology’ (1998) 2(1) Journal
of Industrial Ecology 1, 1.
65See Chapters 5 and 6 for discussion of KIS in Denmark.
66Thomas E Graedel and Braden R Allenby, Industrial Ecology (2nd edn, Prentice Hall
2003) 19.
67Charles W Powers and Marian R Chertow, ‘Industrial Ecology: Overcoming the Policy
Fragmentation’ in Marian R Chertow and Daniel C Esty (eds), Thinking Ecologically (Yale
University Press 1997) 23.
68The term facility is used in, for example: R van Berkel, E Willems, and M Lafleur,
‘Development of an Industrial Ecology Toolbox for the Introduction of Industrial Ecology
in Enterprises, Part I’ (1997) 5(1-2) Journal of Cleaner Production 11; Leo Baas, ‘Cleaner
Production and Industrial Ecosystems, a Dutch Experience’ (1998) 6(3-4) Journal of Cleaner
Production 189; Marian R Chertow and D Rachel Lombardi, ‘Quantifying Economic and En-
vironmental Benefits of Co-located Firms’ (2005) 39(17) Environmental Science & Technology
6536; Pearce (n 57). The term firm is used in, for example: Michael T Peddle, ‘Industrial
Park Location: Do Firm Characteristics Matter?’ (1990) 20 Regional Science Perspectives 26;
David Gibbs, ‘Trust and Networking in Inter-firm Relations: The Case of Eco-industrial De-
velopment’ (2003) 18(3) Local Economy 222; Chertow and Lombardi (n 68); Berkel and others,
‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Symbiosis in Kawasaki, Japan’ (n 53).
69For example: Berkel and others, ‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Sym-
biosis in Kawasaki, Japan’ (n 53); Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in
Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50); Yong Geng, Fujita Tsuyoshi,
and Xudong Chen, ‘Evaluation of Innovative Municipal Solid Waste Management through Ur-
ban Symbiosis: A Case Study of Kawasaki’ (2010) 18(10-11) Journal of Cleaner Production
993; Laura Sokka, Suvi Pakarinen, and Matti Melanen, ‘Industrial Symbiosis Contributing
to More Sustainable Energy Use - an Example from the Forest Industry in Kymenlaakso,
Finland’ (2011) 19(4) Journal of Cleaner Production 285.
70Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town
Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1545; Geng, Tsuyoshi, and Chen (n 69) 994.
71Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town
Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1545.
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symbiosis recognised in the literature is that industrial symbiosis focuses on
traditionally separate industries and other organisations, while urban symbiosis
specifically focuses on municipal solid wastes as inputs to industries that do not
traditionally accept such waste.72 Municipal solid wastes come from ‘other or-
ganisations’ which are ‘traditionally separate’ and therefore are encompassed by
industrial symbiosis. For example, Kalundborg can be considered an example of
urban symbiosis as sludge from the municipality’s wastewater treatment is used
in another industry’s production process.73 The term industrial rather than
urban symbiosis is used in this research as industrial symbiosis can encompass
urban symbiosis, despite having been introduced as an extension of industrial
symbiosis. Industrial symbiosis is also the adopted term at EU and national
Member State levels,74 the focus of this thesis, while urban symbiosis tends to
refer to Japanese Eco-Town programmes.75
c) Exchange of by-products and waste. Inclusion of by-products and wastes is
in contrast to Chertow’s definition which covers exchanges of materials, energy,
water and by-products. Materials can however be construed too widely for the
purposes of industrial symbiosis; the Oxford English Dictionary defines mate-
rial as ‘[t]he matter or substance from which a thing is or may be made’.76 This
72Xudong Chen and others, ‘The Impact of Scale, Recycling Boundary, and Type of Waste
on Symbiosis and Recycling: An Empirical Study of Japanese Eco-towns’ (2012) 16(1) Journal
of Industrial Ecology 129, 130.
73Bioteknisk Jordrens SOILREM purchases sludge from the Kalundborg Municipality’s
wastewater treatment. VEKS, ‘District Heating, Industrial’ (3 March 2005) 〈veks.dk/en/
focus/district-heating-industrial〉 accessed 16 June 2014. See Chapters 5 and 6 for discussions
on KIS in Denmark.
74In research, publications on and using the term industrial symbiosis outnumber urban
symbiosis related publications. EU policy documents refer to industrial symbiosis rather
than urban symbiosis. See Section 4.3.1 for EU documents referring to industrial symbiosis.
Similarly, at national level there are more references to industrial symbiosis. For example,
this is evident in the UK where there is a National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP).
See Chapter 5 for discussion on NISP.
75The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, Eco-Town Projects/
Environmental Industries in Progress (2006); Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Sym-
biosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50); Berkel and others,
‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Symbiosis in Kawasaki, Japan’ (n 53);
Chen and others (n 72). The concept is also used in a research project called EUDYSÉ
funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research. See: Leibniz-Institute für Ökol-
ogische Raumentwicklung, ‘EUDYSÉ’ (2014) 〈veks.dk/en/focus/district-heating-industrial〉
accessed 20 July 2014.
76OED Online, ‘Material, adj., n., and adv.’ (September 2014) 〈oed . com〉 accessed
17 September 2014.
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definition includes virgin materials, which would undermine the particular aims
and intended benefits of industrial symbiosis. The term by-product is also in-
cluded as this covers those materials that are produced as part of the production
process which were not the intended product, but not waste either.77
Different categories of exchanges have been proposed: by-product synergies,
utility synergies and supply synergies.78 By-product synergies involve use of
by-products disposed by one facility by another facility. Utility synergies involve
the shared use of utility infrastructure. Supply synergies involve co-location of
firms with its customer. This thesis focuses on by-product synergy and extends
it to include waste. The term by-product synergy is not adopted for a similar
reason as urban symbiosis is not — industrial symbiosis is more commonly
adopted in both the literature and EU,79 and by-product synergies have been
more commonly used in relation to Australia.80
d) Economic, environmental, and social benefits. Benefits that industrial sym-
biosis has achieved can be categorised as economic, environmental, and social,
where these benefits are also interlinked. These benefits mirror the three sus-
tainable development (economic development, environmental protection and so-
cial development) pillars, resulting in industrial symbiosis being identified as a
strategy for sustainable development.81
Identified economic benefits of industrial symbiosis include: resource security
as a result of increasing availability of critical resources, such as water and en-
77See Chapter 4.
78Albena Bossilkov, Rene van Berkel, and Glen Corder, Regional Synergies for Sustain-
able Resource Processing: A Status Report (Centre for Sustainable Resource Processing June
2005); J Altham and Rene van Berkel, ‘Industrial Symbiosis for Regional Sustainability: An
Update on Australian Initiatives’ (International Sustainable Development Research Confer-
ence, 2004, University of Manchester, UK); Dick van Beers and others, ‘Industrial Symbiosis
in the Australian Minerals Industry: The Cases of Kwinana and Gladstone’ (2007) 11(1)
Journal of Industrial Ecology 55, 57. By-product, utility and supply synergies were referred
to as ‘three primary means of resource sharing’ by Marian R Chertow, Weslynne S Ash-
ton, and Juan C Espinosa, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in Puerto Rico: Environmentally Related
Agglomeration Economies’ (2008) 42(19) Regional Studies 1299, 1301.
79See Section 4.3.1 for the references to industrial symbiosis at EU level.
80See n 78 for the Australian literature referring to by-product synergies.
81See Sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.2 for discussions on sustainable development and how sustain-
able development is relevant to industrial symbiosis respectively.
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ergy, by using waste or by-products as raw materials in production processes,
and reduced costs and/or increased revenues as a result of resource sharing,
material efficiencies in production and compliance with environmental respon-
sibilities.82 In an industrial symbiosis instantiation in Guayama, Puerto Rico,
treated wastewater was used instead of freshwater resulting in both reduced
operating costs and savings of scarce freshwater,83 while in Kawasaki, Japan,
much of the economic gains were from securing jobs, providing taxes and com-
munity investments.84 Some of the environmental benefits have already been
mentioned in relation to the economic benefits, such as resource savings. In
Guayama, the resource savings amounted to 4 million gallons of freshwater per
day.85 Other environmental benefits include reduced greenhouse gas emissions,
materials diverted from landfill, improved air and water quality, and reduction of
some potentially toxic materials.86 The social benefits are also intertwined with
economic and environmental benefits. For example, the environmental bene-
fits of improved air and water quality have resulted in improved public health.
Other social benefits include strengthened community relations, new business
and employment opportunities to local communities, and revitalisation of ur-
ban and rural sites.87 Some of these benefits listed have been quantified in past
studies.88 The benefits are context specific, and thus the non-exhaustive list
82Ernest A Lowe and Laurence K Evans, ‘Industrial Ecology and Industrial Ecosystems’
(1995) 3 Journal of Cleaner Production 47, 48; Daniel C Esty and Michael E Porter, ‘Indus-
trial Ecology and Competitiveness’ (1998) 2 Journal of Industrial Ecology 35, 37; D Rachel
Lombardi and Peter Laybourn, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in Action’ (Report on the Third Interna-
tional Industrial Symbiosis Research Symposium, August 2006, Birmingham, UK) 23; Yong
Geng and others, ‘Assessment of the National Eco-industrial Park Standard for Promoting
Industrial Symbiosis in China’ (2009) 13(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 15, 19. See also:
Tim Jackson and Roland Clift, ‘Where’s the Profit in Industrial Ecology?’ (1998) 2(1) Journal
of Industrial Ecology 3.
83Chertow and Lombardi (n 68) 6540.
84Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town
Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1553.
85Chertow and Lombardi (n 68) 6539.
86Lowe and Evans (n 82) 52; Lombardi and Laybourn, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in Action’
(n 82) 23; Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 12-13; Beers and others (n 78)
61; Geng and others (n 82) 19; Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan:
Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1553.
87Lowe and Evans (n 82) 52; Murat Mirata, ‘Experiences from Early Stages of a National In-
dustrial Symbiosis Programme in the UK: Determinants and Coordination Challenges’ (2004)
12 Journal of Cleaner Production 967, 967; Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’
(n 56) 13; Geng and others (n 82) 18-19; Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis
in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1553.
88For example: Erling Pedersen, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Kalundborg Region Denmark’ (De-
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of examples of benefits provided here are potential benefits and not necessarily
present or possible in each industrial symbiosis.
In addition to industrial symbiosis being a possible strategy for sustainable
development as a result the economic, environmental, and social benefits,89
industrial symbiosis has been described as the ‘science of sustainability’.90 Sus-
tainability needs to be distinguished from sustainable development, as the in-
terchangeable use of these terms results in vague and imprecise meanings.91
Sustainability essentially means the ‘maintenance of the integrity of the Earth’s
ecological systems’.92 Sustainable development as defined in Section 1.1.1 is
often referred to as ‘weak sustainability’.93 ‘Strong sustainability’ can be de-
scribed as:
limiting the extent to which environmental capital may be substi-
tuted by man-made capital and defining certain environmental as-
sets that are critical to our well-being and survival as critical natural
capital.94
But, Ross argues that ecological sustainability is a more helpful concept than
‘strong sustainability’ as ‘critical natural capital’ is not defined. Ecological
cember 2003) 〈teollinenekologia.fi/pdf/Rantas06/Pedersen.pdf〉 accessed 16 June 2014; Berkel
and others, ‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Symbiosis in Kawasaki, Japan’
(n 53); Sokka, Pakarinen, and Melanen (n 69).
89See Section 1.1.1 on the three-pillared approach to sustainable development.
90Graedel (n 45) 70; John Ehrenfeld, ‘Can Industrial Ecology be the “Science of Sustain-
ability”?’ (2004) 8 Journal of Industrial Ecology 1, 1; David Gibbs, ‘Eco-industrial Parks and
Industrial Ecology: Strategic Niche or Mainstream Development?’ in Frank Boons and Jen-
nifer Howard-Grenville (eds), The Social Embeddedness of Industrial Ecology (Edward Elgar
2011) 90. See also: Allen (n 50); Graedel and Allenby (n 66); R van Berkel, D van Beers, and
A Bossilkov, ‘Regional Resource Synergies for Sustainable Development’ (2006) 30 Materials
Forum 176.
91Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance
(Ashgate 2008) 2; Andrea Ross, ‘The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and
Governance. By Klaus Bosselmann’ (2010) 22(3) Journal of Environmental Law 509, 509.
92Bosselmann (n 91) 5.
93Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (n 20) 33. See also: Andrew
Blower, ‘Planning a Sustainable Future: Problems, Principles and Prospects’ (1992) 61 Town
and Country Planning 132.
94Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (n 20) 37. See also: Blower
(n 93); Andrea Ross, Sustainable Development in the UK: From Rhetoric to Reality? (earth-
scan 2011); Margaret Robertson, Sustainability: Principles and Practice (2nd edn, earthscan
2017).
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sustainability ‘imposes a duty on everyone to protect and restore the integrity
of the earth’s ecological systems’.95 Industrial symbiosis does not impose such a
duty, as it does not address, for example, the issues of high rates of consumption
(see Section 1.2.1), but advocates the substitution of natural resources with
man-made resources (ie waste and by-products).
1.2.1 Critiques and limitations
There are three possible critiques of the proposed definition related to its sci-
entific basis and its practical operations. First, the use of the term industrial
symbiosis is arguably not strictly linguistically correct.96 Industrial symbiosis
is analogous to the biological concept of symbiosis. Some biologists argue that
symbiosis is restricted to persistent mutualisms,97 where all symbionts (the or-
ganisms forming part of the symbiosis) benefit from the relationship but not
necessarily to the same extent. Others argue that there are two further types
of symbiosis: commensalism (one symbiont benefits) and parasitism (one sym-
biont benefits at the expense of the other). A fourth type of obligate symbiosis,
where a symbiont cannot live outside symbiotic existence due to its adaptations,
is also sometimes considered.98 In industrial symbiosis, only commensalism and
mutualism are present. Therefore, this thesis either covers less than the biolog-
ical concept if all symbiosis types are part of the concept, or covers more than
the biological concept if symbiosis is restricted to mutualism. Usually in indus-
trial symbiosis there will be mutualism, as an industry or other organisation is
unlikely to participate if there is no benefit in its participation.
The second criticism is linked to the practical operation of industrial symbiosis;
geographic proximity has not been included as a criterion. Whether or not firms
95Ross, ‘Modern Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (n 20) 37-38.
96Allen (n 50).
97For example: Angela E Douglas, The Symbiotic Habit (Princeton University Press 2010).
98For example: Surindar Paracer and Vernon Ahmadijan, Symbiosis: An Introduction to
Biological Associations (OUP 2000) considers all four types of symbiosis; Douglas (n 97)
discusses three main types of symbiosis, while arguing that symbiosis should be restricted to
persistent mutualisms.
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need to be co-located has been a key difference between other definitions.99 Co-
location can result in lower costs, decreased complexity of logistic questions and
lower maintenance costs.100 These benefits have resulted in the development of
the concept of Eco-Industrial Parks (EIPs), which is used interchangeably with
the term industrial symbiosis when firms are co-located.101 An industrial park
has been defined as ‘a large tract of land, sub-divided and developed for the
use of several firms simultaneously, distinguished by its shareable infrastructure
and close proximity of firm’.102 An EIP narrows this definition to only include:
[an] industrial system which conserves natural and economic re-
sources; reduces production, material, energy, insurance and treat-
ment costs and liabilities; improves operating efficiency, quality,
worker health and public image; and provides opportunities for in-
come generation from use and sale of wasted materials.103
This definition mirrors some of the principles of industrial symbiosis, but EIPs
additionally require geographical proximity. EIPs are therefore considered to
be a subset of industrial symbiosis in this thesis.
99For authors that have considered geographical proximity a necessity see for example:
John Ehrenfeld and Nicholas Gertler, ‘Industrial Ecology in Practice: The Evolution of Inter-
dependence at Kalundborg’ (1997) 1(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 67; Chertow, ‘Industrial
Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’ (n 52); Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Sym-
biosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50). For authors who do not
consider geographical proximity a necessity see for example: Paul D Jensen and others, ‘Quan-
tifying “Geographic Proximity”: Experiences from the United Kingdom’s National Industrial
Symbiosis Programme’ (2011) 55(7) Resources, Conservation and Recycling 703; Lombardi
and Laybourn, ‘Redefining Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 63).
100Ehrenfeld and Gertler (n 99) 75; Baas, ‘Cleaner Production and Industrial Ecosystems,
a Dutch Experience’ (n 68) 195; Thomas Sterr and Thomas Ott, ‘The Industrial Region as
a Promising Unit for Eco-industrial Development - Reflections, Practical Experience and Es-
tablishment of Innovative Instruments to Support Industrial Ecology’ (2004) 12(8-10) Journal
of Industrial Ecology 947, 955.
101For example: Mirata considers industrial symbiosis, EIPs and industrial ecosystems to
be synonymous concepts — Mirata, ‘Experiences from Early Stages of a National Industrial
Symbiosis Programme in the UK: Determinants and Coordination Challenges’ (n 87) 967. Van
Berkel and others, however, state that this interchangeable use of terms ignores differences in
development and implementation resulting from the different geographical proximity require-
ments for EIPs and industrial symbiosis — Berkel, Beers, and Bossilkov (n 90) 178; Berkel
and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan: Analysis of the Eco-town Program
1997-2006’ (n 50) 1544.
102Peddle (n 68) 27.
103R Côté and J Hall, ‘Industrial Parks as Ecosystems’ (1995) 3(1) Journal of Cleaner Pro-
duction 41, 42.
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There are disadvantages to including a geographical proximity requirement such
as decreasing available knowledge, number and variety of actors, and economies
of scale.104 In the literature there has also been a shift away from requiring
geographical proximity.105 Proximity is also not a required characteristic in
EU documents. The European Resource Efficiency Platform (EREP)106 even
refers to a ‘pan-European network of industrial symbiosis initiatives . . . includ-
ing across borders and beyond the EU’.107 Its advantages are still recognised
with it being considered an enabler.108 Disadvantages of increased distances be-
tween participating industries and other organisations should be addressed in
the planning stages of industrial symbiosis by assessing factors such as economic
and environmental benefits.109 The definition in this thesis therefore considers
geographical proximity neither necessary nor sufficient as requiring proximity
limits the scale of symbiotic exchanges unnecessarily by restricting it to indus-
tries located closely together.110
The practical disadvantages to companies involved in industrial symbiosis are
another related operational criticism. The main disadvantages to the industries
and other organisations involved include economic concerns, risks of unstable,
low, and inconsistent quality of supplies, and vulnerability as a result of the
104Sterr and Ott (n 100) 955.
105Desrochers argues that past attempts to develop industrial symbiosis have been too nar-
row in geographical scope — Pierre Desrochers, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: The Case for Market
Coordination’ (2004) 12 Journal of Cleaner Production 1099, 1106. Chertow also does not con-
sider geographical proximity a necessity (Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 51) 407), though
in her earlier work she had (Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’ (n 52)
314). Boons and Janssen consider geography as a possible boundary of industrial symbiosis.
Other boundaries are, for example, the sector of industry, or part of life cycle of product —
Frank Boons and Marco A Janssen, ‘The Myth of Kalundborg: Social Dilemmas Stimulating
Eco-industrial Parks’ in Jeroen van den Bergh and Marco A Janssen (eds), Economics of
Industrial Ecology: Materials, Structural Change, and Spatial Scales (The MIT Press 2004)
337.
106European Commission, European Resource Efficiency Platform: Manifesto and Policy
Recommendations (2012).
107ibid 7.
108Marian R Chertow and John Ehrenfeld, ‘Organizing Self-Organizing Systems: Toward a
Theory of Industrial Symbiosis’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 13, 22.
109Côté and Hall (n 103) 45; Donald Lyons, ‘A Spatial Analysis of Loop Closing Among
Recycling, Remanufacturing, and Waste Treatment Firms in Texas’ (2001) 11(1) Journal of
Industrial Ecology 43, 51; Lombardi and Laybourn, ‘Redefining Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 63)
31.
110This is supported by Jensen and others (n 99); Lombardi and Laybourn, ‘Redefining
Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 63).
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interdependence of firms.111 The economic concerns include: sharing economic
gains; costs of setting up exchanges may exceed other benefits; and participating
organisations may find their competitive position reduced as a result of the
current environmental regulatory system.112 The risks and vulnerability can
be circumvented to an extent through contracts or other forms of agreements.
The regulatory issues and other concerns are examined in Chapter 4 for the
EU context, and Chapters 5 and 6 for the case studies. The value of industrial
symbiosis on its own is also limited as a company strategy for competitiveness,113
and as a sole strategy to achieve sustainable development, a circular economy
or green economy. Instead, industrial symbiosis should be used in conjunction
with other strategies.114 There is even concern that industrial symbiosis may
deter industries and organisations from decreasing pollution by finding ways to
exchange it rather than cutting it out of processes.115
Another practical limitation is that industrial symbiosis is not yet widely im-
plemented with only modest success of government programmes in encouraging
industrial symbiosis.116 In response to this, it is increasingly recognised in the
literature, that legal mechanisms have a potential role in supporting industrial
symbiosis implementation and development.117 This has also been recognised
more widely in relation to IE. Tibbs, a pioneer of the IE concept, stated that
if IE ‘is to achieve its full impact, it will certainly need to be backed up by in-
111Karen Schmidt, ‘The Zero Option’ (1996) 1911 New Scientist 〈newscientist.com/article/
mg15020324.400-the-zero-option.html〉 accessed 7 July 2014; Marcus G van Leeuwen, Walter
J V Vermeulen, and Pieter Glasbergen, ‘Planning Eco-Industrial Parks: An Analysis of Dutch
Planning Methods’ (2003) 12 Business Strategy and the Environment 147, 153; R R Heeres,
W J V Vermeulen, and F B de Walle, ‘Eco-industrial Park Initiatives in the USA and the
Netherlands: First Lessons’ (2004) 12(8-10) Journal of Cleaner Production 985, 987 and 994.
112Esty and Porter (n 82) 40 and 41.
113ibid 40.
114See Section 1.2.2.
115Schmidt (n 111).
116For example: Pauline Deutz and David Gibbs, ‘Eco-industrial Development and Economic
Development: Industrial Ecology or Place Promotion’ (2004) 13 Business Strategy and the
Environment 362, 359; Heeres, Vermeulen, and Walle (n 111) 992; Chertow, ‘“Uncovering”
Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 15; Berkel and others, ‘Industrial and Urban Symbiosis in Japan:
Analysis of the Eco-town Program 1997-2006’ (n 50) 1545.
117For example: Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 24-25; David Gibbs and
Pauline Deutz, ‘Reflections on Implementing Industrial Ecology through Eco-industrial Park
Development’ (2007) 15 Journal of Cleaner Production 1683, 1692-1693; Ine˜s Costa and Paulo
Ferrão, ‘A Case Study of Industrial Symbiosis Development Using a Middle-Out Approach’
(2010) 18(10-11) Journal of Cleaner Production 984, 992.
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novative new policies that coherently align financial, economic, and regulatory
score-keeping on an international basis’.118 The possible roles of legal mecha-
nisms, specifically of property rights, regulations, and policies, are one of the
foci of this thesis (see Section 1.3).
1.2.2 Policy context
As a result of the economic, environmental, and social benefits, industrial sym-
biosis has become recognised as a strategy for sustainable development.119 In-
dustrial symbiosis cannot alone result in sustainable development because there
are many issues that industrial symbiosis does not address, such as food secu-
rity,120 but it can complement other strategies to support policy aims of sus-
tainable development. Similarly to industrial symbiosis advancing sustainable
development, Balkau argues that sustainable development can provide a useful
framework for industrial symbiosis.121
The concept of green economy has been proposed as a means to achieving
sustainable development through transforming the economy.122 The working
definition of the green economy proposed by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) is a ‘low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive’
economy that ‘results in improved human well-being and social equity, while sig-
118Hardin Tibbs, Industrial Ecology: An Environmental Agenda for Industry (Global Busi-
ness Network 1993) 22.
119See Section 1.1.1 on the three-pillared approach to sustainable development.
120Food security is part of sustainable development — United Nations, ‘Food Security and
Sustainable Agriculture’ (2014) 〈un.org/en/sustainablefuture/food.asp〉 accessed 20 July 2014;
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Food Security and Nutrition
and Sustainable Agriculture’ (2014) 〈sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/foodagriculture〉
accessed 20 July 2014.
121Fritz Balkau, ‘Industrial Estates as Model Ecosystems’ in Robert U Ayres and Leslie W
Ayres (eds), Handbook of Industrial Ecology (Edward Elgar 2002) 490.
122For example: Alex Bowen, ‘‘Green Growth’: What Does it Mean?’ [2012] Environ-
mental Scientist; United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, A Guidebook to the
Green Economy (August 2012); Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘The Circle Economy Princi-
ple’ (8 July 2013) 〈ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular- economy/circular- economy/the-
circular-model- an- overview〉 accessed 21 July 2014; Eurostat, Sustainable Development in
the European Union: 2013 Monitoring Report of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy
(2013) 25 and 29; EEA, Resource-Efficient Green Economy and EU Policies (Rosendahls-
Schultz Grafisk 2014) 11.
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nificantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities’.123 The term
green growth is a term that is often used in conjunction or interchangeably with
green economy.124 ‘Green growth means fostering economic growth and develop-
ment, while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and
environmental services on which our well-being relies’.125 Industrial symbiosis
has also been identified as a green growth strategy by institutions including the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)126 for reasons echoing why it is also considered
a sustainable development strategy.
Another related concept which has gained prominence is the circular economy.
Even though resource prices constantly decreased in the previous century, Stahel
argues that prices will continually increase in the 21st century.127 In response
to this, Stahel proposes an economy that focuses on maximising resource us-
age rather than consumption,128 an idea echoed by Jackson.129 The circular
economy achieves this as it
refers to an industrial economy that is restorative by intention; aims
to rely on renewable energy; minimises, tracks, and hopefully elimi-
nates the use of toxic chemicals; and eradicates waste through careful
123UNEP, ‘What is the “Green Economy”?’ (2014) 〈unep.org/greeneconomy/AboutGEI/
WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/Default.aspx〉 accessed 16 June 2014.
124EEA, Resource-Efficient Green Economy and EU Policies (n 122) 11.
125OECD, Towards Green Growth (2011).
126Industrial symbiosis was identified as one of 50 innovations to inspire business transfor-
mation in the WWF 2011 ‘Green Game-Changers’ report — WWF, Green Game-Changers
(2011) 42-60. The concept was again included in the 2012 and 2013 reports. In the former, the
term ‘industrial symbiosis’ was not used, but an exchange in Kalundborg (one of the case stud-
ies discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) was used as an example — WWF, Green Game-Changers
(2012) 34-35; WWF, Green Game-Changers (2013) 12. The OECD has identified industrial
symbiosis as an eco-innovative business model — OECD, Sustainable Manufacturing and
Eco-Innovation: Framework, Practices and Measurement (2009) 11; OECD, ‘The Future of
Eco-Innovation: The Role of Business Models’ (OECD/European Commission/Nordic Innova-
tion Joint Workshop, January 2012, Copenhagen, Denmark) 11, 13, 16, 18 and 19. Industrial
symbiosis has also been argued by Lombardi and Laybourn, ‘Redefining Industrial Symbiosis’
(n 63) 11.
127Walter Stahel, The Performance Economy (2nd edn, Palgrave MacMillan 2010) 5 and 51;
Walter Stahel, ‘Policy for Material Efficiency - Sustainable Taxation as a Departure from the
Throwaway Society’ (2013) 371 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 1, 16.
128Stahel, The Performance Economy (n 127) 202.
129Tim Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth (Routledge 2008).
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design.130
This is narrower than the green economy; it focuses on resource efficiency sim-
ilarly to the green economy, but not on the social dimensions that sustainable
development and the green economy emphasise. Again, industrial symbiosis can
be considered a strategy for achieving a circular economy as it aims to close the
loops.131 This closing of loops requires a shift in thinking from seeing products
as the end of the line, to viewing products as temporary embodiments of mate-
rials.132 IE has been considered as a school of thought that has developed the
concept.133 The concept of the circular economy is revisited in Chapter 4 within
the EU context (see Section 4.3.1).
1.3 Research question and contributions
The overarching research question framing this thesis is: How can the law en-
able initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis? In particular, this thesis
examines property rights, regulations, and policies within industrial symbiosis
contexts in order to assess drivers and barriers to reconceptualiseing waste as a
resource while protecting the environment and human health. The overarching
question distinguishes between initiation and sustainment to highlight the tem-
poral and process dimensions of industrial symbiosis.134 The relevance of these
dimensions has been reflected in extant literature. For example, Chertow and
130Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘The Circle Economy Principle’ (n 122).
131For example: Paul Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce: A Declaration of Sustainability
(Phoenix 1993) 63; Pierre Desrochers, ‘Market Processes and the Closing of “Industrial Loops”:
A Historical Reappraisal’ (2000) 4(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 29; European Commis-
sion, ‘Towards a Circular Economy: A Zero Waste Programme for Europe’ (Communication)
COM (2014) 398 final; EEA, Environmental Indicator Report 2014: Environmental Impacts
of Production - Consumption Systems in Europe (2014); EEA, Multiannual Work Programme
2014-2018: Expanding the Knowledge Base for Policy Implementation and Long-Term Tran-
sitions (2014).
132Schmidt (n 111).
133Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘The Circle Economy Principle’ (n 122).
134Leenard Baas and Frank A Boons, ‘An Industrial Ecology Project in Practice: Exploring
the Boundaries of Decision-making Levels in Regional Industrial Systems’ (2004) 12 Journal
of Cleaner Production 1073, 1075; Frank Boons, Wouter Spekkink, and Wenting Jiao, ‘A
Process Perspective on Industrial Symbiosis: Theory, Methodology, and Application’ (2014)
18(3) Journal of Industrial Ecology 341, 341.
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Ehrenfeld describe a three-stage model for the development of industrial sym-
biosis: (1) sprouting, (2) uncovering, and (3) embeddedness and institutionali-
sation,135 Domenech and Davies instead refer to (1) emergence, (2) probation,
and (3) development and expansion.136 and Paquin and Howard-Grenville fo-
cusing on pre-, earlier and later network development stages.137 In contrast,
this thesis adopts a two-stage approach, of initiation and sustainment, which
encompasses the other terms. Initiation can be through sprouting and subse-
quent uncovering, as well as emergence, while part of sustainment is embedding,
development and expansion. Similarly to Chertow and Ehrenfeld’s stages, the
boundary between initiation and sustainment is fuzzy,138 as the development of
industrial symbiosis is continuous.
The overarching research question is exploratory and evaluative, with some sup-
portive explanatory and descriptive elements.139 In exploring legal mechanism
drivers and barriers of industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment, this the-
sis has the following research objectives, which result in the corresponding main
contributions listed after each objective:
1. Development of an evaluation tool to assess the drivers and bar-
riers of industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.
An interdisciplinary conceptual framework is developed to evaluate incen-
tives and barriers of industrial symbiosis.
2. Investigation of the property rights in waste.
The purpose of this objective is to explore both theoretical implications
135Chertow and Ehrenfeld (n 108) 19. Uncovering was a term that Chertow had first coined
in 2008 to describe industrial symbiosis being unconsciously developed, and then consciously
discovered and revealed — Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 19.
136Teresa Domenech and Michael Davies, ‘The Role of Embeddedness in Industrial Symbiosis
Networks: Phases in the Evolution of Industrial Symbiosis Networks’ (2011) 20 Business
Strategy and the Environment 281, 288-291.
137Raymond L Paquin and Jennifer Howard-Grenville, ‘The Evolution of Facilitated Indus-
trial Symbiosis’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 83, 87.
138Chertow and Ehrenfeld (n 108) 19.
139Most scholars focus on three main research purposes: exploratory, explanatory and de-
scriptive. For example: Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (11th edn, Wadsworth
2007) 87-89. Blaikie, for example, identified eight purposes: exploratory; explanatory; de-
scriptive; understanding; predictive; evaluative; assessment; and change — Norman Blaikie,
Designing Social Research (2nd edn, Polity 2010) 69-74.
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of various property rights in waste as well as effects of property rights in
practice within the case studies.
3. Exploration and evaluation of the current roles and functions of
regulation and policy in enabling industrial symbiosis at local,
national, and supranational level.
Regulatory and policy incentives and barriers for initiating and sustaining
industrial symbiosis are described and explored.
4. Examination of how waste is and can be managed to enable in-
dustrial symbiosis.
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) theory is used to evaluate the current man-
agement of waste to enable industrial symbiosis and make observations.
This provides insight into another kind of CPR. In addition, New Collab-
orative Governance (NCG) theory is used to underpin the link between
CPR theory and waste management.
Section 1.6 sets out where these objectives are addressed in this thesis.
1.4 Research approach
The main focus of this thesis is on the discipline of law with some interdisci-
plinary insights.140 This is because industrial symbiosis is a complex adaptive
system141 and the nature of the thesis topic, the role of property, regulation,
and policy of industrial symbiosis, warrants an interdisciplinary approach.142
140Allen F Repko, Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory (2nd edn, SAGE 2011);
Allen F Repko, ‘The Interdisciplinary Research Progress’ in Allen F Repko, William H Newel,
and Rick Szostak (eds), Case Studies in Interdisciplinary Research (SAGE 2011).
141For example: Weslynne Ashton, ‘The Structure, Function, and Evolution of a Regional
Industrial Ecosystem’ (2009) 13(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 228; Kai Cao, Xiao Feng,
and Hui Wan, ‘Applying Agent-based Modeling to the Evolution of Eco-industrial Systems’
(2009) 68(11) Ecological Economics 2868; Chertow and Ehrenfeld (n 108); Elena Romero and
M Carmen Ruiz, ‘Framework for Applying a Complex Adaptive System Approach to Model
the Operation of Eco-Industrial Parks’ (2013) 17(5) Journal of Industrial Ecology 731.
142For example: Elinor Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the In-
stitutional Analysis and Development Framework’ in Paul A Sabatier (ed), Theories of the
Policy Process (Westview Press 2007) 22. Ostrom states that ‘[t]o develop a coherent ap-
25
1. Introduction
In particular, an integrationist interdisciplinary approach is taken. This ap-
proach has integration of disciplines as its goal in order to address complex
challenges.143 The research considers both law, as it is a legal thesis, and IE
as industrial symbiosis is within this field (see Section 1.2). Some economic,
political, social, and technical insights,144 as well as elements of planning and
innovation, are also integrated where relevant to understand the role of regu-
lation and policy in supporting industrial symbiosis. Interdisciplinary research
has been critiqued for often only focusing on the ‘fringes of a field’.145 This is
avoided by focusing on the discipline of law with theories or insights from other
disciplines only integrated and then examined in depth where relevant.
Complementary to this interdisciplinary research is the socio-legal approach146
adopted throughout this thesis by examining the law within the wider social
context and looking beyond legal doctrine by drawing on insights from other
disciplines, including economics and social policy.147 The reasons for adopting
a socio-legal approach therefore mirror those of employing an interdisciplinary
approach. In this thesis, it is an approach rather than method as it provides
the perspective taken rather than the particular methodological steps to be
followed.148
proach to studying diverse types of institutional arrangements, . . . one needs multiple inputs
from diverse disciplines’. See also: Elinor Ostrom, The Future of the Commons: Beyond Mar-
ket Failure and Government Regulation (The Institute of Economic Affairs 2012) 69. Two of
these drivers of interdisciplinary research overlap with the drivers identified in the National
Academies report: (1) the inherent complexity of nature and society; (2) the desire to ex-
plore problems and questions not defined to a single discipline; (3) the need to solve social
problems; and (4) the need to produce revolutionary insights and generative technologies —
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine,
Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research (The National Academies Press 2004) 30-39.
143Repko, Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory (n 140) 4.
144Ostrom, The Future of the Commons: Beyond Market Failure and Government Regula-
tion (n 142) 69.
145Casey Jones, ‘Interdisciplinary Approach - Advantages, Disadvantages, and the Future
Benefits of Interdisciplinary Studies’ (2009) 7(26) ESSAI 76, 79.
146For example: Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of
Sociolegal Studies’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 632; Reza Banakar and Max Travers
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005).
147For example: Sally Wheeler and Phil Thomas, ‘Socio-legal Studies’ in David Hayton (ed),
Law’s Future(s) (Hart Publishing 2000) 271; Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law
Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies’ (n 146) 638; Fiona Cownie, Legal Academics: Culture
and Identities (Hart Publishing 2004) 50-51; Banakar and Travers (n 146) 1; Caroline Morris
and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 35.
148For example, Morris and Murphy consider it a methodology —Morris and Murphy (n 147)
37.
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Objective Contribu-
tion
Collection
method
Analysis
method
Theory
used
Chapter
Development of an eval-
uation tool to assess the
drivers and barriers in
industrial symbiosis ini-
tiation and sustainment.
Development
of frame-
work
Literature
review
Coding / 2
Investigation of the
property rights in waste.
Identification
of prop-
erty rights
in waste
Literature
review,
case
studies,
interviews,
coding
Comparative Property
rights
3 (the-
ory), 4, 5,
and 6 (in
practice)
Exploration and evalua-
tion of the current roles
and functions of regula-
tion and policy in en-
abling industrial sym-
biosis at local, national,
and supranational level.
Identification
of regula-
tion and
policy
roles and
functions
Case
studies,
interviews,
coding
Doctrinal,
compara-
tive
CPR,
NCG
4 (EU
level),
5, and 6
(national
and local
levels)
Examination of how
waste is and can be
managed to enable
industrial symbiosis.
Recommen-
dations for
managing
waste to
enable
industrial
symbiosis
Case stud-
ies, inter-
views
Coding,
evaluation
CPR,
NCG,
property
rights
4, 5, and 6
Table 1.1: Overview of research approach. All analysed data will be corroborated and triangulated
where possible to ensure validity.
The remainder of this section explains the methods used to select, collect, and
analyse the data, followed by validity and reliability considerations. Table 1.1
provides an overview of the research objectives presented in Section 1.3, the
corresponding contribution which highlights the information required to achieve
these objectives, and methods used to collect and analyse the required data.
1.4.1 Data collection
The research adopts a mixed-methods approach as different data collection
methods are employed149 — empirical research (which underpins the socio-legal
approach) is combined with doctrinal research. This approach is applied for
149For example: John W Creswell and Vicki L Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed
Methods Research (2nd edn, SAGE 2011) 1; Max M Bergman, ‘Introduction: Whither Mixed
Methods?’ in Max M Bergman (ed), Advances in Mixed Methods Research: Theories and
Applications (SAGE 2008) 1; Matthew B Miles, Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldãna,
Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook (3rd edn, SAGE 2014) 43.
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three reasons: triangulation, facilitation, and complementarity.150 Triangulation
facilitates validation of findings as data from different data collection sources
are corroborated. In this research, interviews validate theoretical application.
Second, the mixed methods facilitate explanation, for example, interviews may
explain and enhance understanding. Third, different methods complement each
other and offset some weaknesses of individual methods. The main weakness
and critique of a mixed-method approach is that it can result in all methods
being done at sub-standard, instead of one high-quality data collection method.
This is addressed by focusing on each method separately and adopting a rig-
orous, clear, and structured research approach for each method. The collected
data was then corroborated at the data analysis stage.
Case studies
A multi-case study method is used to explore whether or not, and how, prop-
erty rights, regulation, and policy can enable industrial symbiosis initiation and
sustainment. In particular the focus will be on the property rights, and regula-
tory and policy contexts of industrial symbiosis as case studies can help identify
characteristics that have incentivised or prevented industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment in the past. Case studies have been chosen instead of solely
survey-based or other experimental approaches as case studies allow the in-depth
study of the particularity and complexity of a contemporary phenomenon, in
this thesis industrial symbiosis, within a real-life context.151
The selected case studies are KIS in Denmark, Peterborough Industrial Symbio-
sis (PIS) in England, Rotterdam Industrial Symbiosis (RIS) in the Netherlands,
and Linköping and Norrköping Industrial Symbiosis (LNIS) in Sweden. The
150Martyn Hammersley, ‘The Relationship between Qualitative and Quantitative Research:
Paradigm Loyalty versus Methodological Eclecticism’ in John T E Richardson (ed), Handbook
of Qualitative Research in Psychology and the Social Sciences (BPS Books 1996) 170; Alan
Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 608-609.
151Robert E Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (SAGE 1995) xi; Robert K Yin, Case
Study Research: Design and Methods (4th edn, SAGE 2009) 2 and 20.
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particular boundaries of the case studies are set out in Chapter 5. In general,
the symbiotic exchanges themselves are bounded, but the regulatory and policy
contexts are not as these cannot be isolated. The case study selection criteria
were: location, exemplary outcome, access, and language. First, the cases se-
lected are within the EU.152 This provides some uniformity in the regulatory
and policy frameworks as a result of the harmonising effect of EU law. Second,
the cases were selected using replication logic instead of representation. Replica-
tion logic requires every chosen case to demonstrate the occurrence of exemplary
outcomes.153 For the purposes of this research, cases with exemplary outcomes
were defined as those meeting Chertow’s 3-2 heuristic. This heuristic requires
a minimum of three different entities, of which none are engaged primarily in
a recycling-oriented relationship, exchanging at least two different resources.154
The scope of this research has been limited to exchanges of non-hazardous solid
waste or by-products.155 This heuristic is not necessary for industrial symbio-
sis,156 but is applied here as Chertow argues this heuristic starts recognising
complex relationships rather than linear one-way exchanges.157 Third, access
was based on availability of resources on the case studies and access to possi-
ble interview participants. Finally, cases were selected in countries where the
researcher has the requisite language skills to read policy and regulatory docu-
ments. These selection criteria were applied to previously identified industrial
symbiosis examples, as the aim of this research is to focus on the regulatory
and policy frameworks rather than establishing the existence of and identifying
symbiotic exchanges. There are a couple of clear limitations to these case stud-
ies, namely that they are all located in north-western Europe and have all been
152The United Kingdom (UK) voted in favour of leaving the EU in a referendum on 23 June
2016 by 51.9%. The process to leave the EU was started on 29 March 2017 (with the triggering
of Article 50 TEU), with the process being allowed to take up to two years. At the time of
writing this thesis, the UK is still a Member State of the EU.
153Robert K Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (2nd edn, SAGE 2003) 12.
154Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 12.
155See Section 1.5.
156For example: Robin Branson, ‘Bilateral Industrial Symbiosis: An Assessment of its Po-
tential in New South Wales to Deal Sustainably with Manufacturing Waste’ (PhD thesis, The
University of Sydney 2011) 57-74.
157Chertow, ‘“Uncovering” Industrial Symbiosis’ (n 56) 12.
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members of the EU for more than two decades158 resulting in limited transpo-
sition issues of EU law. The study of these cases are still useful, however, as
they offer insight into the role of the EU in relation to industrial symbiosis for
established Member States.
There are three main sources of data for the case studies that are triangulated for
the purposes of analysis: previous case studies, interviews, regulations, and poli-
cies. Previous case studies are primarily consulted for their analysis of waste and
by-product exchanges in the industrial symbiosis networks, and the role of reg-
ulation and policy in initiating and sustaining industrial symbiosis. Interviews
are discussed in the next section. There are two considerations in collecting
data on and from regulations and policies. First, the temporal boundary of how
far back historically to examine regulations and policies was decided using data
on any identified triggers initiating industrial symbiosis from interviews and in
case studies. Secondly, there are translation issues for data collected for the
Danish, Dutch, and Swedish case studies. The three-stage model of translation
set out by Alcaraz and Hughes is applied:159
1. Thoroughly understand the ideas of the source text and the means by
which these ideas have been achieved and expressed;
2. Attempt to express these ideas in linguistically equivalent terms in English;
and
3. Re-write these ideas with the criterion of ‘naturalness’, where naturalness
is the avoidance of strain or the forcing of sense or syntax.
The main limits and issues of translation are: ambiguity of terms, lexical vague-
ness, and rarely one-to-one correspondence in translation. Three strategies are
employed to address these issues. First, the national legal context and its vo-
158The Netherlands joined the EU in 1952, Denmark and the UK in 1973 and Sweden in
1995.
159Enrique Alcaraz and Bryan Hughes, Legal Translation Explained (St Jerome Publishing
2002) 23.
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cabulary in law were studied. Second, the researcher started with small units of
text and carefully pieced these together until the entire text could be compre-
hended to facilitate bottom-up linguistic processing. This was then combined
with top-down linguistic processing for the third step, which comprises starting
with interpreting large blocks of text and then working down to small units of
text.160
Interviews
Interviews were employed for a dual purpose: to deepen understanding of the
case studies, particularly of barriers and incentives of industrial symbiosis initi-
ation and sustainment from stakeholders’ point of views, and to have stakehold-
ers’ perspectives on theoretical recommendations. Interviews rather than other
methods, such as questionnaires, are employed for this as other methods do not
allow for and facilitate the ability to deepen understanding of stakeholders’ per-
spectives to the same extent. The interviews were semi-structured, facilitated
by open-ended questions, to allow interview subjects to choose the most relevant
issues to them. Where possible, at least one interview was held within the geo-
graphic location of the relevant case study as site visits can provide additional
information.161
Interview subjects were selected using the following criteria:
• English speaking so that the interviews could be conducted in English and
avoid translation issues;
• Knowledge of industrial symbiosis at one of the four case studies; and
• Based at an organisation involved in industrial symbiosis in some capacity.
160Alcaraz and Hughes (n 159) 23-24.
161Ostrom stated that ‘obtaining information about rules-in-use [see Section 2.3.5] requires
spending time at a site and learning how to ask non-threatening, context-specific questions
about rule configurations’ — Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom, ‘The Quest for Meaning in
Public Choice’ (2004) 63(1) Americal Journal of Economics and Sociology 105, 127.
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Case study Total Face-to-face Skype Symbiont Third party Site visit
KIS, Denmark 8 5 3 1 7 Yes
LNIS, Sweden 7 7 0 2 5 Yes
PIS, UK 5 3 2 1 4 Yes
RIS, Netherlands 3 2 1 1 2 No
Table 1.2: Overview of interviews.
In as far as possible, participants were selected of similar capacity and levels
across the four case studies to allow for comparison. 21 subjects were inter-
viewed in total. This number of participants was interviewed as it is qualitative
research, so thoroughness is key rather than quantity.162 When interview partic-
ipants started repeating the same information as other interview participants,
this indicated that sufficient interviews had been conducted. Table 1.2 provides
an overview of the interview participants for each case study. Interview partici-
pants are not named in order to maintain their anonymity. The table highlights
the limits of the interviews: mainly third parties to industrial symbiosis (see
Section 2.3.5) were interviewed, and the number of interview partcipants in-
volved in RIS is significantly lower than in the other case studies. The former
was intentional because in the extant literature, where interviews have been
conducted, these have been with mainly symbionts (see Chapter 5). Third par-
ties are focused on in this thesis, as they are able to provide an overview of the
whole symbiosis network, while still conducting at least one interview with a
symbiont to enable to identification of any third party bias. The low number of
RIS interview participants is as a result of practical obstacles: many symbionts
and third parties were either unwilling to participate in an interview or did not
respond to the researcher’s communications.
Before the interviews, participants were sent an information sheet, attached as
Annex A, outlining the purpose of the project and addressing possible ethical
concerns. An interview schedule is attached as Appendix B. As it is a semi-
structured interview, this schedule includes the topics covered with suggested
questions rather than precise questions asked in each interview. The topics cov-
162Svend Brinkmann, Qualitative Inquiry in Everyday Life (SAGE 2012) 55.
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ered incentives and barriers for industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment,
focusing particularly on the role of regulation and policy, and interactions be-
tween the EU, national, and local levels. Each interview started with a briefing
of the purpose of the interview and asking participants’ consent for audiorecord-
ing the interview and using the interview data in this thesis and other research
publications. This consent form is attached as Appendix C. Throughout the in-
terview, interpretations were verified by using interpreting or leading questions
to clarify and attempt disambiguation of interviewees’ statements based on the
interviewee’s responses, and thereby enhance the reliability of interviews.163 At
the end of the interview, interviewees were debriefed and given an opportunity
to add anything before finishing the interview.
Following the interview, the audio recordings were transcribed. Transcription
is an ‘interpretative process’.164 It translates ‘from one narrative mode — oral
discourse — into another narrative mode — written discourse’.165 Some of the
issues related to translation discussed in Section 1.4.1 thus also apply here. The
interpretational process required the transcriber to, for example, decide where
to place commas and full-stops. This was not a major concern as it is the
content of the interviews rather than the discourse itself that was analysed.
A favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics Commit-
tee was received, attached as Annex D. Fog stated that the central ethical
dilemma of the interviewer is that the researcher wants the interview to be as
deep and proving as possible which risks trespassing the interviewee, while re-
maining respectful of the interviewee risks only obtaining superficial data.166
The confidentiality of the interviewee and of persons mentioned in the interview
are protected. Transcripts are stored securely, with the original recording hav-
ing been erased once transcribed and ensured that interviewees considered the
163Steinar Kvale and Svend Brinkmann, Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Re-
search (3rd edn, SAGE 2014) 159, 162 and 200.
164ibid 203.
165ibid 204.
166Jette Fog, Med Samtalen som Udgangspunkt (2nd edn, Akademisk Forlag 2004) 176.
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transcription to be a correct representation of the interview.
1.4.2 Data analysis
This section presents the different types of analysis techniques that were adopted.
Data is first analysed using the different techniques, and then triangulated and
corroborated. The final step is the evaluation of the analysed data. The findings
of the analyses are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Coding
The collected interview data was analysed through coding. Coding is used
in qualitative inquiry to organise, sort, and analyse data.167 A code is often
a word or short phrase that ‘assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing,
and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data’.168
An inductive approach was used to develop the codes through identifying key
and repeated themes and terms across the text analysed. This coding process
was aided by MaxQDA software,169 which enables coding through the creation
of ‘nodes’. The codes used are set out in Annex E.
Doctrinal law
The doctrinal research method is used in the research, but this thesis cannot
be categorised as a piece of doctrinal research as case studies and interviews
are also employed. Morris and Murphy state that in its purest form, doctrinal
analysis
does not subscribe to any overarching theoretical perspective, nor
167Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative
Analysis (SAGE Publications 2006) ch 3.
168Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (SAGE Publications
2012) 3.
169www.maxqda.com.
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does it concern itself with policy interests. Instead, the black letter
method focuses almost entirely on law’s own language of statutes
and case law to make sense of the legal world.170
Doctrinal research comprises identifying, analysing, and synthesising the content
of law, including the identification and exposition of ambiguities and inconsis-
tencies.171 This process is mainly applied in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 to primary
sources, including EU and national legislation and case law in order to assess
how current EU and national contexts support or hinder industrial symbiosis
initiation and sustainment.
Comparative method
There is no single approach to comparative methods in legal research, but the
scholarly consensus is that similarities and differences are explored.172 Compar-
ative law is not the underpinning method of this thesis.173 Instead, elements of
170Morris and Murphy (n 147) 31. For an overview of the doctrinal method, see: Ian Dobin-
son and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing H Chui
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 21; Terry Hutchinson,
‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Re-
search Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 7-34.
171Richard A Posner, ‘The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) 90(5) The Yale
Journal of Law 1113, 1113; Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ (n 170) 9;
Terry Hutchinson, ‘Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries, and Legal Research
in the Post-Internet Era’ (2014) 106(4) Law Library Journal 579, 584.
172For example: Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities and Differ-
ences?’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Com-
parative Law (OUP 2006) 384; Nils Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge’
in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative
Law (OUP 2006) 306; Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Routledge 1999)
1; Bram Akkermans, ‘The Comparative Method in Property Law’ in Susan Bright and Sarah
Blandy (eds), Researching Property Law (Palgrave 2016) 91. See also: Pierre Legrand and
Roderick Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge
University Press 2003).
173Comparative law has been described as a method by, for example: Harold C Gutteridge,
Comparative Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949) 1; Peter Layland, ‘Oppositions
and Fragmentations: in Search of a Formula for Comparative Analysis?’ in Andrew Hard-
ing and Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International
2002) 215-221; Bernhard Grossfeld, An Introduction to Comparative Law (V G Curran tr,
Carolina Academic Press 2005); George Mousourakis, Perspectives on Comparative Law and
Jurisprudence (Pearson Prentice Hall 2006) 1; Edward J Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of
Comparative Law’ (2009) 93 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 451; Ugo Mat-
tei, Teemu Ruskola, and Antonio Gidi, Schlesinger’s Comparative Law (7th edn, Foundation
Press 2009) 1; Simone Glanert, ‘Method?’ in Pier G Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative
Law (Edward Elgar 2012). Others have argued that comparative law is a science rather than
a method. Örücü describes comparative law as a ‘science of knowledge with its own separate
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it are used as an approach to support the comparison of the case studies. This
comparison has two purposes:174 to deepen understanding and solve particu-
lar problems,175 and unification and harmonisation.176 The first purpose helps
describe the property, regulatory, and policy contexts of industrial symbiosis.
The comparison supports the description because identifying similarities and
differences can help induce strengths and weaknesses of the contexts, as well
as indicate those characteristics supportive of industrial symbiosis. The second
purpose is relevant because the WFD — the main EU focus of this thesis (see
Chapter 4) — aims to harmonise waste law.177 The comparison also benefits
the second purpose as it is considered whether enabling industrial symbiosis ini-
tiation and sustainment can be harmonised at EU level, or if there are too many
contextual differences to allow for a unified regulatory and policy approach and
should have general EU incentives with the particulars specified at a more local
level.
A number of steps are followed in comparing the case studies. First, what
is to be compared is identified, which in this thesis is set out in the research
aim: legal mechanisms, in particular property rights, regulations, and policies
(see Section 1.3). The case study selection criteria provide the required tertium
comparationis, ie the common denominator facilitating comparison.178 The next
sphere; an independent science, producing theoretical distillate’ in Esin Örücü, ‘Developing
Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook
(Hart Publishing 2007) 44. Zweigert and Kötz state that comparative law is ‘closely in tune’
with legal science trends in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative
Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 44. Akkerman refers to it as a series of approaches:
Akkermans (n 172) 91.
174Many other purposes have also been identified, including: general education, understand-
ing own legal system better; and informing courts/judges. For example: Michael Bogdan,
Comparative Law (Kluwer 1994) 28; Akmal Kh Saidov, Comparative Law (William E But-
ler tr, Wildy, Simmonds and Hill Publishing Ltd 2003) 88-98; Mousourakis (n 173) 24-25;
Akkermans (n 172) 91-93.
175Peter de Cruz, A Modern Approach to Comparative Law (Kluwer 1993) 16-19; Bogdan
(n 174) 28; Dannemann (n 172) 403; Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve, ‘Intent on Mak-
ing Mischief: Seven Ways of Using Comparative Law’ in Pier G Monateri (ed), Methods of
Comparative Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 57; Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge
University Press 2014) 2-3.
176For example: Bogdan (n 174) 30-32; Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (n 172)
29; Dannemann (n 172) 402; Esin Örücü, ‘A Project: Comparative Law in Action’ in Esin
Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 436;
Siems (n 175) 4-5.
177WFD, preamble 14.
178Jansen (n 172) 314; Esin Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a
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step is formulating a flexible system to support analysis and explanation of
the similarities and dissimilarities.179 The Industrial Symbiosis Development
Framework (ISDF), developed for this purpose (see Chapter 2), focuses on a
micro-comparison of relevant property rights, regulations, and policies within
industrial symbiosis contexts rather than the entire legal systems of the case
studies.180 The socio-legal approach supports the contextual understanding of
the mechanisms by describing any differences in politics, ideologies or economics
within the empirical case studies181 — as enabled by the ISDF. These differences
and embeddedness of legal systems within their specific political, moral and
cultural context do not discredit comparison as the contextual differences are
made explicit in the socio-legal approach.182
Some of the weaknesses of comparative methods reflect and are linked to the
weaknesses of the general case study method, including translation issues and
socio-legal issues requiring a wide-ranging study resulting from the inability to
isolate legal studies.183 Despite these weaknesses and the inability of compar-
isons to provide causal links, the case studies are still compared as it produces
more evidence of such links than a study limited to one system.184
In this thesis, there is a comparison of civil and common law case studies: the
UK has a common law system, while Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands
have civil law systems.185 It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to ex-
Theme for the Twenty-first Century (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004) 21.
179Zweigert and Kötz (n 173) 44; Jansen (n 172) 306 only consider description and analysis,
but it is implied that selection is required: Dannemann (n 172) 407-417.
180Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (n 172) 37. Micro-comparison is also studied
by Saidov (n 174) 41.
181Jansen (n 172) 306.
182Bogdan (n 174) 61; Zweigert and Kötz (n 173) 37; Mousourakis (n 173) 43. Some socio-
legal scholars have disagreed with the comparatist approach, for example, by stating that
comparatists adopt a formalistic, microscopic and rule-based approach, rather than problems:
David Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’ in Andrew Harding and
Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International 2002)
21. Other work on combining the socio-legal approach with comparative law: Annelise Riles,
‘Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 799; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Com-
parative Sociology of Law’ in David S Clark (ed), Comparative Law and Society (Edward
Elgar 2012) 41.
183Bogdan (n 174) 42-54.
184Dannemann (n 172) 399.
185More specifically, Denmark and Sweden are Scandinavian civil law systems, while the
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amine the similarities and differences of theses systems, as this is not necessary
according to traditional mainstream comparative methods in legal research.186
One particular dimension of the comparison between the civil and common law
case studies that does require attention is the element of property law. Tradi-
tionally, not much comparative property law research was undertaken because
it was assumed to be too different, largely as a result of the different historical
roots.187 Recently though there is a shift towards more comparative property
law in order to harmonise certain aspects of property law for purposes of interna-
tional business transactions188 and to increase understanding of the ‘evolution-
ary and mutable nature’ of property rights.189 Additionally, legal economists are
also devoting more attention to comparative law as a result of Coase’s research
(see Section 1.1.2) — legal economists are assessing the extent to which certain
aspects of property law are more or less efficient across different jurisdictions.190
Civil and common law property systems are ‘coherent within themselves but
difficult to reconcile’.191 Some of the key differences identified in the literature
are, for example: in their approach to ownership and title;192 in civil law there
is a strict separation of property from obligations while in common law ‘many
of the lesser estates look something like very long-term relational contracts’;193
Netherlands is based on Napoleonic civil law.
186Siems (n 175) 43. For comparisons of civil and common law systems see, for example:
Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’ (1966)
15(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 419; Thomas Lundmark, Charting the
Divide between Common and Civil Law (OUP 2012).
187Sjef van Erp, ‘Comparative Property Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmer-
mann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 1044-1046.
188ibid 1046.
189Jerry L Anderson, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The Right to Exclude’
(2006) 56(3) Journal of Legal Education 1, 12.
190Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Economic Analysis and Comparative Law’ in Mauro
Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (Cambridge
University Press 2012) 60.
191Erp, ‘Comparative Property Law’ (n 187) 1048.
192For example: ‘For the civil, . . . it is always important as a matter of theory to identify, as
far as possible, the owner of a thing. By contrast, common law notions of ownership are looser
and sometimes extend to the holder of any interest’. Additionally ‘the common law defines
ownership as a robust and enduring form of possession (possession plus), whereas civil law
defines ownership directly in terms of “full rights” to things, in terms of which lesser interests
of a possessory sort can be defined’ — Yun-Chien Chang and Henry E Smith, ‘Structure and
Style in Comparative Property Law’ in Theodore Eisenberg and Giovanni B Ramello (eds),
Comparative Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2016) 139.
193ibid 139.
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common law systems arguably have a larger and more open-ended set of prop-
erty rights;194 and common law still differentiates between land law, personal
property law and trust law, whereas in civil law, a system of property law ap-
plying to all forms of property (immovables, movables and claims) with general
principles and rules exists.195
Despite the differences between the details and appearance of civil and common
law property regimes, there is increased recognition that the leading principles,
underlying policies, fundamental concepts, and basic rules of the civil law and
common law traditions are quite similar:196
although civilian property law is generally laid down in statutes, yet
considerable changes take place through case law, whereas in com-
mon law systems, property is often deeply affected by the enactment
of statutes.197
In this thesis, the comparison is limited to identifying the property rights in each
case study, but it is not an in-depth comparison of the construction of property
rights in each of the legal systems of the case studies. Chapter 3 outlines how
property rights will be evaluated across the case studies in this thesis, while
acknowledging the differences between civil and common property law, and the
limitations of the comparison in this thesis.
194Chang and Smith (n 192) 149.
195Sjef van Erp, European and National Property Law: Osmosis or Growing Antagonism
(Europa Law Publishing 2006) 15.
196Ugo Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Intro-
duction (Praeger 2000) 13; Erp, ‘Comparative Property Law’ (n 187) 1049 and 1050; 263 Erp,
European and National Property Law: Osmosis or Growing Antagonism (n 195) 16; John H
Dalhuisen, Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law. Volume 2
(5th edn, Hart Publishing 2013). For example, Mattei writes that in the property-theory
literature, civil and common law have ‘a much more uniform language than the one used by
practical lawyers is spoken’.
197Erp, ‘Comparative Property Law’ (n 187) 1049.
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Evaluation
All collected data was triangulated, corroborated, analysed, and then evaluated.
Evaluation assesses whether outcomes, and the process and interactions that
lead to these outcomes, are satisfactory or need improvement by reference to
some pre-determined data.198 Evaluation in this thesis helps determine whether
particular external variables, discussed in Section 2.3.5, to industrial symbiosis
drive or impede industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.
Evaluation research gained prominence following Martinson’s 1974 article en-
titled ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reforms’.199 Eval-
uation research now aims to go beyond examining what does and does not
work, by investigating why and how the components of a system have their
effects.200 This ‘why’ question is particularly essential as without knowing what
explanation applies, it would be ‘grossly premature’ to adapt or retarget pro-
grammes.201 Additionally, evaluation research also aids learning, understanding,
and knowledge-building,202 and provides information on how the governance
processes can be improved and developed.203 These purposes are all pertinent
198Peter H Rossi, Howard E Freeman, and Mark W Lipsey, Evaluation: A Systematic
Approach (6th edn, SAGE 1999) 40; Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
(Princeton University Press 2005) 13; Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, ‘A Framework for
Analyzing the Knowledge Commons’ in Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Understand-
ing Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (The MIT Press 2007) 62; Michael D
McGinnis, ‘An Introduction to the IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple
Guide to a Complex Framework’ (2014) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 169, 176; Elinor Os-
trom, ‘Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (2011) 39(1)
The Policy Studies Journal 1, 15; Barbara Rosenstein, ‘Evaluation’ in David Coghlan and
Mary Brydon-Miller (eds), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research (SAGE 2014) 315.
199Robert Martinson, ‘What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform’ (1974)
35 The Public Interest 22. For a detailed history of evaluation, see: Ray Pawson and Nick
Tilley, Realistic Evaluation (SAGE 1997) ch 1.
200Pawson and Tilley (n 199) 56; Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, Research Methods: A Practical
Guide for the Social Sciences (Pearson 2010) 133; Ray Pawson, Science of Evaluation: A
Realist Manifesto (SAGE 2013) 14.
201Pawson (n 200) 17.
202Elinor Ostrom and others, ‘The Public Service Production Process: A Framework for
Analyzing Police Services’ (1978) 7 Policy Studies Journal 381, 385 and 389; Joan L Herman,
Lynn Lyons Morris, and Carol Taylor Fitz-Gibbon, Evaluator’s Handbook (2nd edn, SAGE
1988) 10; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 42; Tinneke Abma and Thomas A Schwandt,
‘The Practice and Politics of Sponsored Evaluation’ in Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin
(eds), Research Methods in the Social Sciences (SAGE 2005) 105-106; Jackie Green and Jane
South, Evaluation (Open University Press 2006) 5; Felix Rauschmayer and others, ‘Examin-
ing Processes or/and Outcomes? Evaluation Concepts in European Governance of Natural
Resources’ (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and Governance 159, 160.
203Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 35; Abma and Schwandt (n 202) 105-106;
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to supporting the research questions of this thesis (see Section 1.3). Evalua-
tions are also relevant in the wider context as evaluations are a natural part of
policymaking, policy cycles and, effective government,204 and good evaluation
is ‘fundamental to the principles of good government [and] supports democratic
accountability’.205
There is no single simple definition of evaluation.206 In general, the literature
describes evaluation research as being concerned with: (1) the effectiveness of
interventions, policies or social programmes;207 (2) whether or not interventions
have achieved their goals or objectives;208 (3) the study of change;209 (4) the
merit, worth, significance, or value of a programme, policy, or project;210 or
(5) the efficiency of a programme, policy or project.211 These concepts are not
necessarily distinct. Some literature describes evaluation research as examining,
Rauschmayer and others (n 202) 19; Matthews and Ross (n 200) 133.
204Christopher James McGrath, ‘How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of an Environmental
Legal System’ (PhD thesis, Queensland University of Technology 2007) 17; HM Treasury,
The Magenta Book: Guidance for Evaluation (April 2011) 12.
205HM Treasury (n 204) 12.
206Alan Clarke, Evaluation Research: An Introduction to Principles, Methods and Practice
(SAGE 1999) 4; Oran R Young and Marc A Levy, ‘The Effectiveness of International Envi-
ronmental Regimes’ in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (The MIT Press 1999) 3; Melvin
M Mark, Jennifer C Greene, and Ian E Shaw, ‘The Evaluation of Policies, Programs, and
Practices’ in Ian Shaw, Jennifer Greene, and Melvin Mark (eds), The SAGE Handbook of
Evaluation (SAGE 2006) 6.
207Clarke, Evaluation Research: An Introduction to Principles, Methods and Practice
(n 206) 2; Pawson and Tilley (n 199) 11; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 23 and 35;
Green and South (n 202) 4; Matthews and Ross (n 200) 57; W Edwards Deming, ‘The Logic
of Evaluation’ in Elmer L Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of Evaluation
Research Volume I (SAGE 1975) 53; Carol H Weiss, ‘Evaluation Research in the Political
Context’ in Elmer L Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of Evaluation Re-
search Volume I (SAGE 1975) 13; Juan C Nunnally, ‘The Study of Change in Evaluation
Research: Principles Concerning Measurement, Experimental Design, and Analysis’ in Elmer
L Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of Evaluation Research Volume I (SAGE
1975) 101; HM Treasury (n 204) 14.
208Carol H Weiss, Evaluation Research: Methods of Assessing Program Effectiveness (Pren-
tice Hall 1972) 4; Weiss, ‘Evaluation Research in the Political Context’ (n 207) 13; Clarke,
Evaluation Research: An Introduction to Principles, Methods and Practice (n 206) 36; Matt
Henn, Mark Weinstein, and Nick Foard, A Critical Introduction to Social Research (2nd edn,
SAGE 2009) 67-68; Matthews and Ross (n 200) 133; Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods
(4th edn, OUP 2012) 57.
209Nunnally (n 207) 109; Pawson and Tilley (n 199) 11; Clarke, Evaluation Research: An
Introduction to Principles, Methods and Practice (n 206) 36.
210Abma and Schwandt (n 202) 105; Clarke, Evaluation Research: An Introduction to Prin-
ciples, Methods and Practice (n 206) 3; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 2.
211Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 4; Young and Levy (n 206) 4-5; HM Treasury (n 204)
12; Herman, Morris, and Fitz-Gibbon (n 202) 10; Elinor Ostrom and others, ‘Evaluating
Police Organization’ (1979) 3(3) Public Productivity Review 3, 21.
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for example, the effectiveness of change, the effectiveness in achieving goals or
whether change resulted in the achievement of goals.212 Note that in this thesis,
goals and objectives are used interchangeably, as they often are in literature.213
For the purposes of this research, the main focus is on evaluating the effectiveness
of property rights, regulation, and policy enabling industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment, and how any changes in these mechanisms have affected, or are
likely to affect, industrial symbiosis. The latter two descriptions of evaluations
focus on economic efficiency, which includes exploring how costs and benefits
were generated214 and whether or not the benefits justify the costs.215 The
economic perspective is crucial to industrial symbiosis as evidenced in Chapter 5,
but a detailed cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this legal research.
Effectiveness, similarly to evaluation, has various meanings instead of a single
conclusive definition. The focus in this thesis is on the most common definitions
of effectiveness.216 These incorporate the other descriptions of evaluation. It
is also predominantly described as being concerned with determining whether
goals and objectives have been achieved;217 Trubek states that the ‘more law
212For example: Bryman, Social Research Methods (n 208) 57; Henn, Weinstein, and Foard
(n 208) 67-68; Nunnally (n 207) 101.
213Some distinguish between goals and objectives by describing goals as short-range, open
and broad in scope, and providing direction, and objectives as precise, time-based and mea-
surable actions — George A Steiner, Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must Know
(The Free Press 1979) 163-164.
214Matthews and Ross (n 200) 133; HM Treasury (n 204) 17.
215Ostrom and others, ‘Evaluating Police Organization’ (n 211) 27; HM Treasury (n 204) 20.
216Other definitions of effectiveness include: the extent of problem solving (Young and Levy
(n 206) 4; Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell (n 26) 12); the measure of the state’s capacity to exert
power (David M Trubek, ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development’ (1972) 82(1) The Yale Law Journal 1, 7); the legal status of rules; the quality
and extent to which they are binding (Ronald B Mitchell, ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’
in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, and Peter Roderick (eds), Improving Compliance with
International Environmental Law (Earthscan 1996) 5; John Vogler, The Global Commons:
Environmental and Technological Governance (2nd edn, Wiley 2000) 155); the extent of
conformity with judicial decisions; the extent of conformity with legislation (Donald J Black,
‘The Boundaries of Legal Sociology’ (1972) 81 The Yale Law Journal 1086, 1087-1089); the
extent to which the work of an international organisation proceeds as scheduled; and the
speed and rate of ratifications — Underdal considers these ‘crude and unreliable indicators’
of substantive effectiveness (Arild Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness”’ (1992)
27(3) Cooperation and Conflict 227, 228).
217For example: Amatai Etzioni, ‘Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique
and a Suggestion’ (1960) 5(2) Administrative Science Quarterly 257, 262; Trubek (n 216) 8;
Malcolm M Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an
Expanded View’ (1976) 10 Law & Society Review 497, 233; Ostrom and others, ‘Evaluating
Police Organization’ (n 211) 11; Anthony Allott, ‘The Effectiveness of Law’ (1981) 15(2) Val-
paraiso University Law Review 229, 233; Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness” ’
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becomes a mechanism or an instrument to advance rationally toward specified
goals, the more effective it will become’.218 Other scholars support the notion
that effectiveness is the study of change, with particular focus on behavioural
impact.219 This is considered under goals and objectives in this thesis, because
if change is required to be effective, then change will be a defined objective
or goal. Goals of behavioural change include, for example, changing behaviour
to enhance cooperation, facilitate learning, and to define roles.220 Effectiveness
is also described as enhancing compliance,221 which again will be considered
under goals and objectives as compliance can be a goal or objective in itself.
For example, if a law is preventive or curative in purpose, then the effectiveness
of law is measured by the extent to which behaviour has been discouraged, or
injustice or disputes have been rectified respectively.222
The first step of the evaluation is thus to identify the goals and objectives,223
and those characteristics that indicate whether or not goals and objectives have
been accomplished.224 The overarching goals examined in this thesis are the
initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis, with the indicative charac-
teristics including the exchange of waste and by-products, and the presence of
economic, environmental, and social benefits (see Section 2.3.2). In particular,
(n 216) 228.
218Trubek (n 216) 8.
219For example: Lawrence M Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law
Review 11, 59; Allott (n 217) 233; David G Victor, Kal Rausiala, and Eugene B Skolnikoff,
The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: The-
ory and Practice (MIT Press 1998) 6; Olav Schram Stokke, Lee G Anderson, and Natalia
Mirovitskaya, ‘The Barents Sea Fisheries’ in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of In-
ternational Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (The
MIT Press 1999) 115-138. Levy, Young and Zürn go as far to state that effectiveness without
considering behavioural changes would be pointless for international environmental regimes
— Marc A Levy, Oran R Young, and Michael A Zürn, ‘The Study of International Regimes’
(1995) 1(3) European Journal of International Relations 267, 267 and 274; Young and Levy
(n 206) 1. Vogler is more restrained and instead states that effectiveness would be incomplete
without a focus on behavioural modification, implying that effectiveness is not limited to just
this — Vogler (n 216) 153-154.
220Young and Levy (n 206) 21 and 23-25.
221Friedman (n 219) 61; Allott (n 217) 234; Francis Snyder, New Directions in European
Community Law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1990) 3 and 22-25; Stokke, Anderson, and Mirovit-
skaya (n 219) 115-138.
222Allott (n 217) 234.
223Also advocated as the first step by Green and South — Green and South (n 202) 68.
224Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded
View’ (n 217) 497.
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the focus is on the processes that have resulted in the initiation and sustain-
ment of industrial symbiosis rather than focusing on the outcome of industrial
symbiosis itself.225 The following chapter, Chapter 2, sets out the framework
(ie the ISDF) adopted in this thesis to support evaluation.
There are limitations to evaluation methods. First, there is no single method to
evaluate,226 which can result in outcomes of evaluations differing depending on
the criteria used.227 Second, whether and the extent to which goals and objec-
tives have been achieved may be incidental, the result of ‘background “noise” of
other changes and trends’, or as a result of other processes taking place simul-
taneously at different levels and in different sectors,228 rather than the result
of the studied property rights, and regulatory and policy frameworks. Related
to this is the third limitation of the tendency to oversimplify the power of law
when evaluating.229 These limitations are addressed by using a framework —
the ISDF (see Chapter 2); clear and focused questions are set out for each frame-
work component so the research is replicable and thus valid (see Section 1.4.3),
thereby addressing the first limitation, and the inclusion of contextual and ex-
ternal variables in the framework (see Section 2.3) addresses the second and
third limits.
1.4.3 Validity and reliability
Four tests commonly used in social science methods to support high quality
case study research are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity,
225The evaluation of process and outcome is the examination of what the outcomes were, and
how they were delivered. For example: Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness” ’
(n 216) 230; Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 22.
226Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (n 198) 38.
227Young and Levy (n 206) 1.
228Juan C Nunnally and William H Wilson, ‘Method and Theory for Developing Measures
in Evaluation Research’ in Elmer L Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of
Evaluation Research Volume I (SAGE 1975) 230; Jonathan D Casper and David Brereton,
‘Evaluating Criminal Justice Reforms’ (1984) 18(1) Law & Society 121, 121-122; Green and
South (n 202) 24; Rauschmayer and others (n 202) 166.
229Austin Sarat, ‘Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: on the Unfortunate Persis-
tence of a Research Tradition’ (1985) IX(1) Legal Studies Forum 23, 29.
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and reliability.230 Construct validity tests the overall validity of the case study,
that is, whether or not the ‘real’ meaning of concepts is investigated.231 This is
achieved in this thesis by cross-referencing between multiple data sources. Tri-
angulation and corroboration of the data from the different data sources support
the internal validity of this case study research. External validity is addressed
by applying replication logic to the multi-case selection. The external validity
is further underpinned as understanding and addressing rival explanations to
supportive property, regulatory, and policy mechanisms are a key focus of this
research. Finally, reliable measurement procedures are replicable in that they
consistently produce the same results regardless of researcher.232 A structured
and rigorous research approach is adopted by following the same data collection
procedure for each case study with a consistent set of questions asked.
Generalisability is a common criticism of case study research. As industrial
symbiosis is highly contextual, this research does not suggest that the resulting
regulatory and policy recommendations are generalisable or representative, and
will result in exemplary outcomes of industrial symbiosis in each case. Nonethe-
less, lessons learnt from the case studies are described, and case studies can also
provide a helpful starting point in developing recommendations.233
1.5 Scope and limitations
This thesis focuses on the EU context in order to address the research questions
because of the uniformity of EU waste regulation. Within this context, the
230These tests have been summarised in many textbooks. For example: Louise H Kidder,
Charles M Judd, and Eliot R Smith, Research Methods in Social Relations (5th edn, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston 1986) 26-29; Stake (n 151) 40; Yin, Case Study Research: Design and
Methods (n 151) 24.
231Russell K Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The Process and the Practice of Re-
search (4th edn, SAGE Publications 2004) 134-135; Babbie (n 139) 152 and 550.
232Schutt (n 231) 135-137; Babbie (n 139) 148-151.
233Hammersley, Foster and Gomm state that denying possibility of generalisations is ‘too
readily’ accepting criticisms, and that some form of generalisability is possible —Martyn Ham-
mersley, Peter Foster, and Roger Gomm, ‘Case Study and Generalisation’ in Roger Gomm,
Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (eds), Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts
(SAGE 2000) 98.
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research is restricted to exchanges of non-hazardous, solid waste that are covered
by the WFD. This is in order to limit the scope of relevant waste regulations and
exchanges within industrial symbiosis are generally focused on non-hazardous
waste. The research also does not address issues of transboundary movement of
materials of industrial symbiosis.
Other limits of the research include the methodological limits discussed in the
previous research design section (see Section 1.4). Even though recommenda-
tions are based on academic research and empirical findings, a final limitation
is that recommendations cannot be fully evaluated until they are implemented
and in practice.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 develops an evaluation tool to assess the drivers and barriers of
industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment (research objective 1). For this
purpose an overview of the ISDF, which was developed to structure the research,
facilitate understanding, and provide the comparative framework for the case
studies, is provided. First, it is explained how the ISDF was developed. Then an
overview of each framework component is provided, including a set of questions
that are investigated for each component in each case study. This chapter thus
sets out the methodology for approaching the overarching research question of
how the law can enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment, and the
rationale for focusing particularly on regulations, policies, and property rights.
Chapter 3 is a theoretical chapter examining the second research objective:
investigation of the property rights in waste. Property rights are identified
as a key component of the ISDF in the preceding chapter for the purposes of
this research. First, the focus is on property rights theory, in particular on
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the bundle of rights metaphor. These discussions are then applied to waste,
with explanations and suggestions for possible implications of various property
rights in waste. This leads to the question of how to manage property rights
in waste. CPR theory is introduced to study management of waste as it is
argued that industrial symbiosis is a CPR system, which helps support the
conceptualisation of waste as a resource. Eight design principles, also described
as best practices, for CPR management are then reviewed which are examined
within the context of each case study. Some of these principles can be supported
through regulations and policies. These design principles thus link the property
rights to the regulations and policies discussions.
The remaining three chapters also investigate the second research objective,
but within the context of the EU and selected case studies to examine the
implications in practice of the theoretical discussions presented in Chapter 3.
These chapters also address the final two research objectives: exploration and
evaluation of the current roles and functions of regulation and policy in enabling
industrial symbiosis at local, national and supra-national level, and examination
of how waste is and can be managed to enable industrial symbiosis.
Chapter 4 describes relevant regulations and policies at the EU level for indus-
trial symbiosis. First, a brief overview of the international context is provided as
EU and international conventions influence each other. The underpinning EU
environmental objectives and principles are then set out to identify how indus-
trial symbiosis fits in with the overarching environmental aims of the EU. The
remainder of this chapter then focuses on non-hazardous waste and by-product
regulations and policies, with a focus on the WFD, IPP and Circular Economy
Package, and investigates whether they are incentives for, or barriers to, indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. There is only a brief discussion of
property rights and implications in this chapter as these are mainly decided at
case study level.
Chapter 5 examines the KIS, LNIS, PIS and RIS, framing them within the
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ISDF introduced in Chapter 2. Each of the ISDF components are explored
and classed as drivers of or barriers to industrial symbiosis initiation and sus-
tainment. The main focus is on the framework component covering regulations,
policies, and property rights. Regulations and policies are examined at local and
national level, as well as at EU level to assess whether or not the anticipated
incentives and barriers set out in Chapter 4 resonate with the actual perceived
incentives and barriers in practice across the case studies. Property rights are
explored within the context set out in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 first sets out the main lessons learnt from examining and compar-
ing the four case studies, followed by recommendations for enabling industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment. The three main sets of observations and
recommendations relate to rules-in-use (ie regulations, policies, and property
rights), CPRs, and third parties (in which NCG theory is discussed). Before
concluding the chapter, the interrelationships between the three main areas are
examined.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summarising the research contributions and
identifying possible directions for future research.
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Evaluating industrial symbiosis: a conceptual framework
This chapter introduces and outlines the conceptual framework, the Industrial
Symbiosis Development Framework (ISDF), developed and adopted for the pur-
pose of investigating the overarching research question set out in Chapter 1 (see
Section 1.3): how can the law enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustain-
ment? The ISDF builds on elements identified in previous enquiries by Ostrom
and her colleagues,1 who developed the Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (IAD) (see Section 2.1) to analyse a range of empirical settings.2
This IAD provides the structure, or ‘skeletal framework’,3 which is then made
context specific to industrial symbiosis.
A framework is used to structure this research for two reasons. First, frame-
works facilitate understanding4 by providing a general form of theoretical anal-
ysis, because they identify the elements affecting industrial symbiosis and the
general relationships among these elements.5 Using a framework also avoids a
one-dimensional picture of the system, and prevents undue emphasis on the law
1Text to n 9 — n 11.
2See n 8.
3Janice M Morse and others, ‘Symposium Conclusion — Issues of Validity: Behavioral
Concepts, their Derivation and Interpretation’ (2002) 1(4) International Journal of Qualitative
Methods 68, 69.
4Yosef Jabareen, ‘Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Proce-
dure’ (2009) 8(4) International Journal of Qualitative Methods 49, 51; Matthew B Miles, A
Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook
(3rd edn, SAGE Publications 2014) 20.
5Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games & Common-Pool Re-
sources (The University of Michigan Press 1994) 25; Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom,
‘The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice’ (2004) 63(1) Americal Journal of Economics and
Sociology 105, 112; Edella Schlager, ‘A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of
Policy Process’ in Paul A Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process (Westview Press 2007)
294; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’
(2011) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 1, 8.
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and its effectiveness without considering other relevant characteristics.6 The
ISDF thus facilitates understanding of key factors affecting industrial symbiosis
initiation and sustainment, and the interrelationships between these factors. In
doing so, this chapter addresses the first research objective (see Section 1.3):
development of an evaluation tool to assess the drivers and barriers of indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. The second, but equally important,
function of the conceptual framework is to provide the comparative framework
for comparing the selected case studies (see Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2).
This chapter begins with a section reviewing the IAD (Section 2.1), including
the rationale for selecting this particular framework as the skeletal framework. It
is then explained in Section 2.2 why and how the IAD is adapted and developed
for the purposes of this research. This explanation also includes an overview of
the limitations of frameworks, both generally and specifically. Section 2.3 then
sets out the ISDF by reviewing each of its components and highlighting the
differences with the IAD where relevant. For each component an explanation of
how it is evaluated in the remaining chapters of this thesis, underpinned by the
evaluation and other methods outlined in Section 1.4.2. This chapter thus sets
out the methodology for approaching the research question.
6Lawrence M Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’ (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, 59;
Donald J Black, ‘The Boundaries of Legal Sociology’ (1972) 81 The Yale Law Journal 1086,
1090; Malcolm M Feeley, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational
Perspective’ (1972) 7 Law & Society Review 407, 412; Malcolm M Feeley, ‘The Concept of
Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View’ (1976) 10 Law & Society
Review 497, 500.
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2.1 The IAD
The IAD is a ‘multitier conceptual map’7 which can be used to analyse a diverse
range of empirical settings.8 The IAD has its analytical roots in Buchanan and
Tullock’s Calculus of Consent,9 and was developed using concepts from game
theory by Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis at Indiana University.10 The first attempt of the IAD was
published by Kiser and Ostrom in 1982.11
As implied by the name of the framework, the IAD facilitates analysis of insti-
tutions. There is no single agreed definition of institutions; definitions include
‘humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social in-
teractions’,12 ‘rules about behavior, especially about making decisions’,13 and
‘the rules for individual expression, information transmittal, and social choice’.14
Similarly, examples range from the specific organisations in a particular country
to the established human relations in a society, such as the family structure, to
the rules that individuals use to order specific relationships with one another.15
7Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press 2005)
14; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis
and Development Framework’ in Paul A Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process (West-
view Press 2007) 27; Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox, ‘Moving Beyond Panaceas: A Multi-
tiered Diagnostic Approach for Social-Ecological Analysis’ [2010] Environmental Conservation
5, 5; Ostrom, ‘Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (n 5)
9.
8For examples of diverse settings in which the IAD has been applied, see for example:
Ostrom and Ostrom, ‘The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice’ (n 5) 133 and 145; Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 9; Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An
Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (n 7) 52.
9James M Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (first published 1962,
Liberty Fund 1999). Elinor and Vincent Ostrom stated it provided them with the ‘basic tools’
— Ostrom and Ostrom, ‘The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice’ (n 5) 106.
10This research programme has now been renamed the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom in Po-
litical Theory and Policy Analysis. See: http://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/tocqueville/
welcome.php.
11Larry L Kiser and Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Syn-
thesis of Institutional Approaches’ in Elinor Ostrom (ed), Strategies of Political Inquiry (Sage
Publications 1982).
12Douglas C Booth, ‘Institutions’ (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, 97.
13William H Riker, ‘Implications for the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of
Institutions’ (1980) 74(2) The American Political Science Review 432, 432.
14Charles R Plott, ‘The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice’
in Clifford S Russell (ed), Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice The-
ory (Resources for the Future 1979) 156.
15Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (ICS Press
1992) 19.
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The latter is an example of the definition adopted for the purposes of the IAD.
Ostrom states that an ‘institution is simply the set of rules actually used . . . by a
set of individuals to organize repetitive activities that produce outcomes affect-
ing those individuals and potentially affecting others’.16 She echoes variations of
this definition in her other work on the IAD.17 The institutions studied in this
research are the sets of rules (see Section 2.3.5) used by, and affecting, organ-
isations in the selected case studies that initiated and are currently sustaining
industrial symbiosis.
The IAD is used as the skeletal framework for three reasons. First, the purpose
of the IAD is to enable scholars from different disciplines to discuss case studies
using a common framework.18 Industrial symbiosis is an interdisciplinary topic
(see Sections 1.2 and 1.4), therefore using such a framework also enables the ex-
ploration of industrial symbiosis in the wider context using common language to
support further research efforts into industrial symbiosis. Second, the IAD aims
to understand institutions through examining what they are, and how and why
they are initiated and sustained, including incentives for initiation and sustain-
ment, as well as their impacts.19 This is particularly relevant to the overarching
research question as it investigates how to enable industrial symbiosis initia-
tion and sustainment (see Section 1.3). Third, the IAD has previously been
16Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (n 15) 19.
17Variations of the definition of institutions have included, for example: ‘the prescriptions
that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those
within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sport leagues, churches, private associations,
and governments at all scales’ — Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 3;
‘many different types of entities, including both organizations and the rules used to structure
patterns of interaction within and across organizations’ — Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational
Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (n 7) 22;
‘formal and informal rules that are understood and used by a community’ — Elinor Ostrom
and Charlotte Hess, ‘A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons’ in Charlotte Hess
and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice
(The MIT Press 2007) 42. See also: Elinor Ostrom, ‘Institutional Analysis and Development:
Elements of the Framework in Historical Perspective’ in Charles Crothers (ed), Historical
Developments and Theoretical Approaches in Sociology. Volume II (EOLSS Publishers Co
Ltd 2010) 262-263.
18Alison Clarke, ‘How Property Works: The Complex World View’ (2013) 22 Nottingham
Law Journal 143, 150.
19Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (n 15) 24; Ostrom,
Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 3.
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Figure 2.1: The IAD.25
recognised by Levänen and Hukkinen,20 and Yu,21 as potentially beneficial in
underpinning industrial symbiosis research. Levänen and Hukkinen considered
applying it, but instead used a system resembling the IAD with a looser notion
of interactions for the purposes of their research.22 Importantly, they recognised
that the IAD may be well-suited to industrial symbiosis research.23 Yu uses it
to inspire the theoretical foundation to guide policy analysis of Eco-Industrial
Park (EIP) formation and development in China.24 This research similarly uses
it as the foundation, with a framework similar to the IAD adopted.
The IAD, as introduced by Ostrom and her colleagues, is presented in Fig-
ure 2.1. The framework proposes three broad clusters of external variables to
analyse institutional design and the patterns of interaction occurring within ac-
tion arenas.27 Action arenas are viewed as comprising a similar set of seven
components: participants in positions who must decide among diverse actions
20Jarkko O Levänen and Janne I Hukkinen, ‘A Methodology for Facilitating the Feedback
between Models and Institutional Change in Industrial Ecosystem Governance: A Waste
Management Case-study from Northern Finland’ (2013) 87 Ecological Economics 15.
21Chang Yu, ‘Eco-transformation of Industrial Parks in China’ (PhD thesis, Technische
Universiteit Delft 2014).
22Levänen and Hukkinen (n 20) 16.
23ibid 16.
24Yu (n 21) 55-56. See Section 1.2.1 for more on EIPs.
25Adopted from: Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 37; Ostrom, Understanding Institu-
tional Diversity (n 7) 15.
26Adopted from Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 37[14 and 33]Ostrom-2005.
27Ostrom and Hess (n 17) 44. See also: Brett M Frischmann, ‘Two Enduring Lessons from
Elinor Ostrom’ (2013) 9(4) Journal of Institutional Economics 387, 395.
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Component Sub-component Explanation
External variables Biophysical conditions The physical qualities of a natural resource
rather than the social institutions attached to
them.
Attributes of community The values of behaviour generally accepted in
the community; the level of common under-
standing that potential participants share or
do not share about the structure of particu-
lar types of action arenas; the extent of ho-
mogeneity in the preferences for those living
in a community; the size and composition of
the relevant community; and the extent of in-
equality of basic assets among those affected.
Rules-in-use Generally known and enforced working rules
that individuals use in making decisions, but
not limited to formal laws or procedures.
Action arena Participants The decision-making entities, which have
preferences, information-processing capabili-
ties, selection criteria, and resources, that are
assigned to a position and capable of selecting
actions at different stages of a process.
Actions The set of actions that participants can take
at the different process stages.
Positions The placeholders of or roles by actors played
in the action arena which link the participants
to a set of actions in a process. The actions
participants can take also affect positions, as
a participant may have a certain label or ti-
tle, but not necessarily have the power to take
certain actions as implied.
Information The set of information available to partici-
pants at various stages in the process, as well
as how participants acquire, process, retain,
and use such information.
Control Level of control that each participant has over
action in the action arena.
Costs and benefits Also known as payoffs or the external in-
centives and deterrents to a situation. The
method of assigning positive and negative
weights to outcomes and actions leading to
outcomes.
Outcomes Potential and actual, where the former are
outcomes that participants can potentially af-
fect through their actions and the latter those
that participants have affected through their
actions.
Evaluative criteria Used to judge the action arena performance
by examining the interactions and outcomes.
Table 2.1: Overview of the IAD components.30
in light of information they possess about how actions are linked to potential
outcomes and costs and benefits,28 where each emphasised component is a vari-
able as presented in Figure 2.2. External variables affect the action arena, where
participants and an action interact, resulting in outcomes that affect the par-
ticipants and the action situation.29 An explanation of what each component
comprises is provided in Table 2.1.
28Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 14, 29 and 30; Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity (n 7) 16.
29Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 13.
30Adapted from: Joan Safran Ganz, Rules: A Systematic Study (Mouton 1971) 134; Os-
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2.2 Adapting the IAD
The IAD remains under ‘active construction’,31 as the framework is still di-
versifying in its application. The framework is not intended to provide a rigid
research approach, which is one of its strengths. The IAD is versatile, enabling
researchers to organise their enquiries into a set of variables relevant to their
research.32 Research into other fields has resulted in scholars often altering the
IAD, for example, by including additional components or by shifting the fo-
cus.33 This thesis contributes to this diversification by applying it to industrial
symbiosis.
The ISDF was developed by following Jabareen’s general steps to create a con-
ceptual framework.34 First, a systematic and extensive literature search focus-
trom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (n 15) 19 and 23; Ostrom,
Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 29-33 and 36; Margaret M Polski and Elinor Ostrom, ‘An In-
stitutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design’ (Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis, June 1999, Indiana, USA) 20-21; Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Di-
versity (n 7) 13, 16, 19, 26-27 and 32; Ostrom and Hess (n 17) 50; Ostrom, ‘Background
on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (n 5) 12; Margaret A McKean,
‘Building Common Property Regimes to Deter Resource-wrecking’ in Takeshi Murota and
Ken Taakeshita (eds), Local Commons and Democratic Environmental Governance (United
Nations University Press 2013) 378.
31William Blomquist and Peter deLeon, ‘The Design and Promise of the Institutional Anal-
ysis and Development Framework’ (2011) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 1, 5. See also:
Michael D McGinnis, ‘Introduction to Part I’ in Michael D McGinnis (ed), Polycentric Games
and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (The
University of Michigan Press 2000).
32Michael J Madison, Brett M Frischmann, and Katherine J Strandburg, ‘Constructing
Commons in the Cultural Environment’ (2010) 95 Cornell Law Review 657, 678; Blomquist
and deLeon (n 31) 1.
33For example: James T Thomson and Karen Schoonmaker Freudenberger, Crafting Institu-
tional Arrangements for Community Forestry (FAO 1997); Anke Fischer and others, ‘Sustain-
able Governance of Natural Resources and Institutional Change - an Analytical Framework’
(2007) 27 Public Administration and Development 123; William Blomquist, Ariel Dinar, and
Karin E Kemper, ‘A Framework for Institutional Analysis of Decentralization Reforms in Nat-
ural Resource Management’ (2010) 23 Society and Natural Resources 620; Floriane Clement,
‘Analysing Decentralised Natural Resource Governance: Proposition for a “Politicised” Insti-
tutional Analysis and Development Framework’ (2010) 43(2) Policy Science 129; Madison,
Frischmann, and Strandburg (n 32); Brenda K Bushouse, ‘Governance Structures: Using IAD
to Understand Variation in Service Delivery for Club Goods with Information Asymmetry’
(2011) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 147; Ronald J Oakerson and Rober B Parks, ‘The
Study of Local Public Economies: Multi-organizational, Multi-level Institutional Analysis
and Development’ (2011) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 147; Luke Whaley and Edward K
Weatherhead, ‘An Integrated Approach to Analyzing (Adapative) Comanagement Using the
“Politicized” IAD Framework’ (2014) 19(1) Ecology and Society 10.
34Jabareen (n 4) 53-55. The particular steps Jabareen highlights: (1) mapping the selected
data sources; (2) extensive reading and categorising of selected data; (3) identifying and
naming concepts; (4) deconstructing and categorising concepts; (5) integrating concepts; (6)
synthesis and resynthesis until the concepts make sense together; (7) validating the conceptual
framework; and (8) rethinking the conceptual framework.
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ing on industrial symbiosis case studies was undertaken. The inclusion criterion
was case studies of industrial symbiosis or EIPs.35 Even though this thesis only
focuses on selected European Union (EU) case studies (see Section 1.4.1), no
geographical boundary was applied because recommended further research in-
cludes comparing the outcomes of this research to other global case studies (see
Section 7.2). The literature was also not limited to a particular discipline, as
industrial symbiosis is an interdisciplinary topic (see Sections 1.2 and 1.4), and
the purpose of this framework is to facilitate communication across disciplines
about industrial symbiosis, rather than the research outcomes being solely in-
tended for legal scholars, as highlighted earlier.36 This search yielded 73 journal
articles,37 each of which was examined and coded for the components studied
in the industrial symbiosis case study.38 Coding is an iterative process, so codes
were constantly revisited and re-labelled throughout the process. Each of the
articles was coded on two separate occasions to increase reliability.39 The de-
tailed process of coding is set out in Section 1.4.2. Appendix F outlines the
codes, their frequencies and the literature identifying these codes.
The ISDF was then constructed by triangulating the codes with the components
of the IAD. This triangulation of data addresses validity concerns.40 Table 2.2
provides an overview of the codes used, and how these align with the components
of the IAD. Note that these alignments indicate that these concepts are similar
rather than implying strict equivalence. The resulting conceptual framework,
the ISDF, is set out in Figure 2.3.
The main limitation of conceptual framework analysis is that different research-
ers may have different conceptions of the same phenomenon, and therefore create
35Section 1.2.1 discusses why EIPs are considered part of the industrial symbiosis discussion
in this thesis.
36Text to n 18.
37There are more journal articles than this, but as the codes started repeating, the search
was not extended.
38Interview data is not triangulated with this, as coding of the interviews is driven by the
ISDF components.
39See Section 1.4.3 for a detailed discussion on reliability.
40See Section 1.4.3 for a detailed discussion on validity.
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IAD framework Codes Sub-codes
External variables Biophysical condi-
tions
Geographic context
Attributes of commu-
nity
Social context
Rules-in-use Regulations, policies
& strategies
Economic context
Third parties
Action arena Participants Symbionts
Positions
Actions Resource exchanges
Information Information sharing
systems
Technology
Control
Costs and benefits Drivers & barriers Economics, environ-
mental, institutional,
regulatory, social,
technical and other
Development
Outcomes Outcomes
Evaluative criteria Solutions/responses
Scale
Table 2.2: Overview of the IAD components aligned with the codes developed from reviewing
journal articles.
Figure 2.3: The ISDF.
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different conceptual frameworks.41 This thesis therefore does not argue that the
ISDF is the only approach for analysing networks of industrial symbiosis, but
instead proposes the ISDF as one possible approach to facilitate this analysis.
The second limitation is that, similarly to the IAD, the ISDF treads the diffi-
cult line between simplistic models and fragmented taxonomies of diverse and
complex situations.42 Not all interactions between the components have thus
been illustrated in Figure 2.3 as this would have resulted in the diagram being
too complicated, but are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.3 Conceptual framework: the ISDF
As explained in Chapter 1, the ISDF is adopted to support evaluation of in-
dustrial symbiosis systems, in particular to evaluate whether certain variables
are drivers or barriers (see Section 1.4.2). This approach is mirrored by the
literature; in the review of 72 journal articles (see Section 2.2), components are
often categorised as drivers or barriers (see Appendix F). Commonly identified
types of drivers and barriers include: trust, risk, and uncertainty, and informa-
tional, regulatory, economic, technological, cultural, and environmental drivers
and barriers.43 Having identified this, it should be noted that the focus is not
on introducing or testing general categorisations of drivers and barriers, but
instead on investigating whether the various classes of variables are drivers or
barriers.
This section sets out the components of the ISDF, highlighting differences with
the IAD where relevant. The following sub-sections discusses each component,
why it is relevant to industrial symbiosis and this research in particular, and
41Jabareen (n 4) 58.
42Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (n 32) 677; Frischmann, ‘Two Enduring Lessons
from Elinor Ostrom’ (n 27) 393-394.
43For example: David Gibbs, Pauline Detuz, and Amy Proctor, ‘Industrial Ecology and
Eco-industrial Development: A Potential Paradigm for Local and Regional Development?’
(2005) 39(2) Regional Studies 171, 175-179; Teresa A Domenech Aparisi, ‘Social Aspects of
Industrial Symbiosis Networks’ (PhD thesis, UCL 2010) 85-90.
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how the component is examined at EU level in Chapter 4 and for the case
studies in Chapters 5 and 6. The action arena and outcomes are however not
examined at EU level in Chapter 4 as these are specific to industrial symbiosis
which occurs at the local level. To facilitate the comparison of the components
between the case studies, a set of questions to be investigated is listed in relation
to each component, as these provide a common denominator (see Section 1.4.2).
Ostrom similarly devised a list of questions for each IAD component.44
By considering each component separately, they seem distinct. As stated in
Section 2.2, this is a limitation of frameworks. There are many feedback loops,
as well as many other interactions between the ISDF components that are not
illustrated in Figure 2.3. These further interactions and feedback loops between
components are highlighted where relevant in the following sub-sections.
2.3.1 Action arena
The action arena comprises symbionts, resource exchanges, and development,
where development covers initiation and sustainment.45 These components pro-
vide the starting point when examining the selected case studies, as the actions
of initiating and sustaining industrial symbiosis are the central focus of the
research question (see Section 1.3), and the case study selection criteria are
based on the existence of symbionts exchanging a number of resources (waste
or by-products) (see Section 1.4.1). They are often considered fundamental in-
formation in presenting industrial symbiosis case studies, as evidenced by the
symbionts and their exchanges being the most common codes.46 The level of
detail of symbionts and resources exchanged however varies. Some case studies
provided the names of symbionts whereas others refer to general sectors, and
44For example: Polski and Ostrom (n 30); Ostrom, ‘Background on the Institutional Anal-
ysis and Development Framework’ (n 5).
45See Section 1.3 for a discussion on the meaning of the terms initiation and sustainment,
why these terms are selected, and how they form part of the development of industrial sym-
biosis.
46For code frequencies, see Annex F.
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similarly for resources exchanged some refer to the specific resources exchanged
while others to the type of resources to which the resources belong.47
The inclusion of development is one difference with the IAD. In the IAD it
is recognised that actions can be taken at different stages of a process by par-
ticipants,48 but there is no explicit temporal component. Instead of focusing
on either initiation or sustainment as separate action arenas, both are included.
The ability to sustain the resource exchange is an important consideration when
initiating industrial symbiosis, and there can still be initiation of additional re-
source exchanges with other existing or new symbionts within the industrial
symbiosis when sustaining industrial symbiosis.49 Additionally, the develop-
ment component is central to the research, as the overarching research question
is concerned with the drivers and barriers for the initiation and sustainment
of industrial symbiosis, particularly in terms of the external variables (see Sec-
tions 1.3 and 2.3.5).
The questions answered for the action arena are:
1. Who participates in industrial symbiosis; that is, who are the symbionts?
2. What resources do the symbionts exchange?
3. How has the industrial symbiosis developed?
4. How is the industrial symbiosis continuing to develop?
47For example the following for those focusing on sectors: Dick van Beers and others, ‘In-
dustrial Symbiosis in the Australian Minerals Industry: The Cases of Kwinana and Gladstone’
(2007) 11(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 55, 58; Shizuka Hashimoto and others, ‘Realizing
CO2 Emission Reduction Through Industrial Symbiosis: A Cement Production Case Study for
Kawasaki’ (2010) 54(10) Resources, Conservation and Recycling 704, 705-706; Han Shi, Mar-
ian Chertow, and Yuyan Song, ‘Developing Country Experience with Eco-industrial Parks: A
Case Study of the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area in China’ (2010) 18(3)
Journal of Cleaner Production 191, 193. For example the following for those focusing on the
particular resources: Qinghua Zhu and others, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in China: A Case Study
of the Guitang Group’ (2007) 11(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 31, 34; Qiang Liu and oth-
ers, ‘Life Cycle Assessment of an Industrial Symbiosis Based on Energy Recovery from Dried
Sludge and Used Oil’ (2011) 19 Journal of Cleaner Production 1700, 1702; Xudong Chen and
others, ‘The Impact of Scale, Recycling Boundary, and Type of Waste on Symbiosis and Recy-
cling: An Empirical Study of Japanese Eco-towns’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology
129, 135. Note that this does not mean that these articles do not address the other approach;
the other approach is just not their predominant focus.
48Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 30.
49See Chapter 5 for specific examples of this.
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2.3.2 Outcomes
The IAD is concerned with actual and potential outcomes (see Section 2.1),
whereas this research only focuses on actual outcomes as a result of the selection
criteria (see Section 1.4.1). This research focuses only on examples where a
functioning industrial symbiosis has been achieved, ie where there are three
symbionts with at least two different resources exchanged (see Section 1.4.1).
This research focuses on economic, environmental, and social benefits and lim-
itations as these are central to the definition of industrial symbiosis (see Sec-
tion 1.2). Through interviews, the emphasis on and perceived importance of
these benefits and limits by stakeholders is investigated (see Section 1.4.1). The
benefits and limits are thus discussed qualitatively rather than quantitatively,
though where they have been examined quantitatively by other researchers they
are referenced. There are also other outcomes that are considered in the indus-
trial symbiosis literature through life-cycle assessments.50
There is only one question asked in relation to this component:
1. What are the economic, environmental, and social outcomes?
2.3.3 Context
Context is included as industrial symbiosis systems are not found in isolation.
There are many other action arenas that may affect the action of industrial
symbiosis, or the external variables affecting industrial symbiosis. Some of the
50For example: Tuomas J Mattila, Suvi Pakarinen, and Laura Sokka, ‘Quantifying the
Total Environmental Impacts of an Industrial Symbiosis - a Comparison of Process-, Hybrid-
and Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment’ (2010) 44(11) Environmental Science & Technology
4309; Liu and others, ‘Life Cycle Assessment of an Industrial Symbiosis Based on Energy
Recovery from Dried Sludge and Used Oil’ (n 47); Tuomas Mattila and others, ‘Methodological
Aspects of Applying Life Cycle Assessment to Industrial Symbioses’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of
Industrial Ecology 51; Laura Sokka and others, ‘Analyzing the Environmental Benefits of
Industrial Symbiosis: Life Cycle Assessment Applied to a Finnish Forest Industry Complex’
(2011) 15(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 137; Matthew J Eckelman and Marian R Chertow,
‘The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment’ (2013) 18(8) Environmental Science &
Technology 1524.
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components are as a result of other action arenas, such as the creation of regu-
lations or some of the third parties.
There is no particular set of questions for this component. Instead it will be
evaluated through interviews on a case-to-case basis whether or not there are
other contextual factors that do not fall under the listed components of the
ISDF, which affect industrial symbiosis. This additionally tests the ISDF within
practice.
2.3.4 Scale
Many of the components and interactions can be identified at different levels,
such as the international, EU, national, regional or local levels.51 Ostrom also
addressed issues of scale — stating that humans establish institutional arrange-
ments that operate at multiple scales.52 This thesis considers the EU level in
Chapter 4, and national and local levels in Chapter 5. The incentives and bar-
riers at various levels are investigated, as well as how these levels interact and
the effects of these outcomes. This is not represented in Figure 2.3 as it is
diagrammatically difficult to represent.
Interlinked with issues of scale is the concept of ‘nestedness’, which is also used
by Ostrom.53 The nestedness she was concerned with in relation to the IAD
was the ‘nested structure of rules within rules, within still further rules’.54 This
51This is linked to the concept of polycentricity. Polycentric systems are overlapping multi-
level systems. This concept of polycentricity is beyond the scope of this thesis. For example:
Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic
Systems (Nobel Prize in Economics documents, 2009-4, Nobel Prize Committee 2009) ; Paul
D Aligica and Vlad Tarko, ‘Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond’ (2012)
25(2) Governance 237; Michael D McGinnis, ‘Polycentric Governance in Theory and Practice:
Dimensions of Aspiration and Practical Limitations’ (The Ostrom Polycentricity Workshop,
December 2016, Indiana, USA).
52Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Sys-
tems (n 51) 408; Ostrom, ‘Institutional Analysis and Development: Elements of the Frame-
work in Historical Perspective’ (n 17) 264.
53For example: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action (Cambridge University Press 1990) 90; Ostrom, ‘Institutional Analysis and
Development: Elements of the Framework in Historical Perspective’ (n 17).
54Ostrom, ‘Institutional Analysis and Development: Elements of the Framework in Histor-
ical Perspective’ (n 17) 264.
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also applies in the context of this thesis. Local rules are examined within the
context of national and EU levels, as described in the previous paragraph.
2.3.5 External variables
The central focus of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 is on the external variables, and in
particular the rules-in-use component with evaluations of regulations, policies,
principles, and property rights (see See Section 2.3.5).
Unlike the IAD, the ISDF does not include a biophysical characteristics com-
ponent. This component has been subsumed by the property discussion within
rules-in-use, as in some analyses, biophysical characteristics are simplified to dis-
cussions of the resource subtractability and excludability,55 which are covered
in the property rights discussion in Section 3.4. The ISDF includes additional
components specific to industrial symbiosis, which are detailed below.
Geographic location
Geographic proximity is a key area of discussion in the literature, and is dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 as a contentious element of the definition of industrial
symbiosis (see See Section 1.2.1). Geographic location may affect the outcomes,
such as, when symbionts are very closely located then this may increase the
environmental benefits through, for example, by reducing the greenhouse gas
emissions from transport. A life-cycle assessment is required to evaluate this,
but is beyond the scope of this research.56 The discussion of geographic location
in this thesis is limited to the proximity of the symbionts.
55Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic
Systems (n 51) 646; Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’
(2011) 5(1) International Journal of the Commons 10, 13; McKean (n 30) 378.
56For example: Sokka and others (n 50); Sara González-Garcia, Blas Mola-Yudego, and
Richard J Murphy, ‘Life Cycle Assessment of Potential Energy Uses for Short Rotation Willow
Biomass in Sweden’ (2013) 18(4) International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 783; Ben Zhu,
‘Life Cycle Assessment and Simplified Life Cycle Costing on Industrial Symbiosis’ (MSc thesis,
Delft University of Technology 2013).
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There is therefore only one question asked in relation to this component:
1. Where are the symbionts located in relation to each other?
Economic conditions
Industrial symbiosis is affected by the economic conditions, including the indus-
trial context,57 such as whether or not industries are thriving, or other market
conditions.58 Some of the economic conditions are affected by economic poli-
cies.59 Furthermore, economic conditions are also likely to affect the attributes
of the community. For example, if industries are struggling financially, there is
likely to be less interest in environmental policies as the priority may instead
be to become more profitable. This also provides an example of how economic
conditions may be linked to rules-in-use.
The following questions are asked to examine the economic conditions:
1. What are the current economic conditions?
2. How have the economic conditions affected initiation and sustainment of
industrial symbiosis?
Third parties
Third parties include organisations that have a role in the initiation and sus-
tainment of industrial symbiosis, but are not symbionts themselves. For exam-
ple, third parties may support industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment
57For example: Guillaume Massard and Suren Erkman, ‘A Regional Industrial Symbiosis
Methodology and its Implementation in Geneva, Switzerland’ (3rd International Conference
on Life Cycle Management, August 2007, University of Zurich, Switzerland).
58For example: Weslynne Ashton and Ariana Bain, ‘Assessing the “Short Mental Distance”
in Eco-industrial Networks’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 70.
59Rene van Berkel and others, ‘Quantitative Assessment of Urban and Industrial Symbiosis
in Kawasaki, Japan’ (2009) 43(5) Environmental Science & Technology 1271, 1274; Yiping
Fang, Raymond P Côté, and Ron Qin, ‘Industrial Sustainability in China: Practice and
Prospects for Eco-Industrial Development’ (2007) 83(3) Journal of Environmental Manage-
ment 315, 326.
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through information sharing, such as the Symbiosis Center Denmark in Den-
mark or the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) in the UK (see
Chapter 5). These third parties can be government or non-governmental. This
is an example of another interaction within the external variables, where there
may be rules-in-use that provide for the establishment of particular third parties
or provide that existing third parties support the initiation and sustainment of
industrial symbiosis.
The questions that are answered for this component are:
1. Are third parties involved in supporting industrial symbiosis?
2. What are the roles of third parties in initiating and sustaining industrial
symbiosis?
Community attributes
In addition to community being identified as a component of the IAD and ISDF
(see Sections 2.1 and 2.2), the concept is also important to this research because
community is an essential element in determining communal property. Commu-
nal property is discussed as a possible property regime for enabling industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment (see Section 2.3.5 and Chapter 3).
The definition of community is contentious.60 The definition adopted for the
purposes of this research is provided by Kiser and Ostrom61 as their work forms
the basis of the IAD literature, which provides the skeletal framework for the
ISDF (see Section 2.1). It also does not contradict other relational concepts of
community,62 which generally agree that community develops around common-
60Les Hepple, ‘Community’ in Derek Gregory and others (eds), The Dictionary of Human
Geography (5th edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 103.
61Kiser and Ostrom (n 11).
62Gusfield distinguished between relational, and geographical and territorial notions of com-
munity, where the latter notion is dependent on a geographical or territorial link. Joseph R
Gusfield, Community: A Critical Response (Blackwell 1975) xv-xvi. See also: David W
McMillan and David M Chavis, ‘Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory’ (1986) 14
Journal of Community Psychology 6, 8.
66
2. Evaluating industrial symbiosis: a conceptual framework
alities such as shared interests and values,63 or shared production practices.64
Their definition is that community ‘includes all individuals directly or indirectly
affected by the decision situation’.65 Individuals here refer to both symbionts
(see Section 2.3.1) and third parties (see Section 2.3.5), as they may be involved
with various aspects of governance, regulation, enforcement, education, or other
activities, and affect strategies adopted within action arenas and the resulting
patterns of interactions.66
The attributes of the community relevant to this thesis are the level of common
understanding and the similarity in individuals’ preferences.67 In the context
of this research, this may include, for example, the relative importance of eco-
nomic benefits compared to environmental benefits when deciding whether to
initiate or sustain the industrial symbiosis. These preferences are notoriously
difficult to measure and investigate, as well as it being difficult to ensure the
validity and reliability of any findings.68 Nevertheless, these are included, as it
is considered ‘imperative that policy analysts make an effort to understand the
cultural context of policy activity as participants themselves understand it’.69
Interviews will be used in this research to investigate preferences, and triangu-
lated with indicators, such as the importance of environmental regulations and
policies within case studies, in order to address validity and reliability of the
preferences (see Section 1.4.3).
The questions answered in relation to the community attributes are:
63For example: Durkheim refers to ‘community of ideas, feelings and interests’ — Émile
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (first published 1893, Free Press 2014) 19; Hepple
also uses community to refer to a ‘group of people who share common culture, values and/or
interests, based on social identity and/or territory, and who have some means of recognizing,
and (inter)acting upon, these commonalities — Hepple (n 60) 103.
64See, for example, Joseph who argues that community is a concept related to production
and consumption practices under capitalism rather than social identity — Miranda Joseph,
Against the Romance of Community (University of Minnesota Press 2002) 1. See also Cot-
terrell who understands community in terms of four ideal types of collective involvement —
Roger Cotterrell, ‘A Legal Concept of Community’ (1997) 12(2) Canadian Journal of Law and
Society 75.
65Kiser and Ostrom (n 11) 201.
66Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 26-27; Ostrom and Hess (n 17) 49.
67Kiser and Ostrom (n 11) 201; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 45; Ostrom, Under-
standing Institutional Diversity (n 7) 26.
68Polski and Ostrom (n 30) 14.
69ibid 14.
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1. How long has the Member State of the case study been part of the EU?
2. What is the priority of the environmental policies and regulations in the
case study?
3. What are the individuals’ values and preferences in relation to industrial
symbiosis?
Rules-in-use
There exists much discussion on the topic of rules.70 Rules are not only impor-
tant in law, but also in fields such as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, educa-
tion, psychology, and philosophy, because most aspects of human behaviour are
governed in some way, or at least guided, by rules.71 There are many kinds of
rules, such as legal rules and social rules, and many ways of classifying rules into
types.72 Rules can be categorised by their source or by their form (ie written,
spoken, unspoken, and so on).73 This section presents Hart’s perspective only,
rather than an extensive review and exposition of Hart’s work and Dworkin’s
critique of it.74 Such a review is beyond the scope of this chapter and this thesis,
70For example: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray
1832); Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81(5) The Yale Law
Journal 823; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977); E
Philip Soper, ‘Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute’ (1977)
75(3) Michigan Law Review 473; Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical
Examination of Rule-based Decision-making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press 1993);
Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government (Clarendon Press 1995); Larry Alexander and Ken
Kress, ‘Against Legal Principles’ (1997) 82 Iowa Law Review 739; William Twining and David
Miers, How to Do Things with Rules (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010); H L A Hart,
The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012).
71Twining and Miers (n 70) 94; Hart, The Concept of Law (n 70) 9 and 255.
72Schauer (n 70) vii; Twining and Miers (n 70) 95; Hart, The Concept of Law (n 70) 9.
73Twining and Miers (n 70) 95.
74Hart’s most famous work is: H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 1961).
This was the target of Dworkin’s main critique of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin, ‘The
Model of Rules’ (1967) 35(1) The University of Chicago Law Review 14, 22. Hart’s response
was published in H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1997). In the
Postscript of this edition, Hart states ‘Much credit is due to Dworkin for having shown and
illustrated [the] importance [of legal principles] and their role in legal reasoning, and certainly
it was a serious mistake on my part not to have stressed their non-conclusive force’, but adds
that ‘I certainly did not in my use of the word “rule” claim that legal systems comprise only “all
or nothing” standards or near conclusive rules’ — ibid 263. There has been much published
on the Hart-Dworkin debate. For example: Soper (n 70); John W Van Doren, ‘Theories of
Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin - A Critique’ (1980) 29 Cleveland State Law
Review 279; Brian Leiter, ‘Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methology Problem in
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as the purpose is to provide a sufficient overview of the ISDF to structure the
examination of the case studies. Additionally, these debates warrant at least a
full chapter in themselves for which there is insufficient space.
The particular rules relevant to the IAD are rules-in-use, which are generally
known and enforced working rules75 that ‘individuals use in making decisions’,76
but are not limited to formal laws or procedures.77 For the purposes of the
ISDF a similar approach is adopted. Any enforcement mechanisms of rules-in-
use are also examined under this components, as rules require enforcement to
be effective, though it does not follow that enforcement is the only reason that
individuals follow rules.78
There is no consensus on the definition of a rule, but for the purposes of this
research it is defined as
a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given
type of situation. A typical rule in this sense prescribes that in
circumstances X, behaviour of type Y ought, or ought not to be, or
may be, engaged in by persons of class Z.79
Using Hart’s categorisation, the focus is on primary rather than secondary rules,
where primary rules require humans to do or abstain from certain actions,
whereas secondary rules are parasitic upon the first as they provide for how
new rules of the primary type can be introduced, extinguished or modified.80
Jurisprudence’ (2003) 48 Am. J. Juris. 17; Scott J Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A
Short Guide for the Perplexed (Working paper, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series Working Paper, 77, Michigan Law, University of Michigan Law School 2007).
75Ganz (n 30) 134; Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems
(n 15) 19; Ostrom and Hess (n 17) 50.
76Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 19.
77Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (n 15) 23.
78Kiser and Ostrom (n 11) 192.
79Twining and Miers (n 70) 6. See also: John R Commons, Legal Foundations of Capi-
talism (The Macmillan Company 1924) 6; Vincent Ostrom, ‘Culture, Liberation Movements,
and Human Development’ (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, January 1986,
Indiana, USA) 9; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 5) 38; Sue E S Crawford and Elinor Os-
trom, ‘A Grammar of Institutions’ (1995) 89(3) American Political Science Review 583, 594;
Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 7) 18.
80Hart, The Concept of Law (n 70) 81.
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The particular rules-in-use examined in this research are principles, property
rights, regulations,81 and policies. Principles are considered within rules in
this thesis, as they are found in some of the regulatory and policy documents
(see Section 4.2). Additionally, Hart includes principles in his idea of rules,82
rejecting Dworkin’s distinction between principles and rules.83
Property rights are explored as a result of discussions of externalities and Coase
theorem in Section 1.1.2 with this rationale further clarified in Chapter 3. Prop-
erty rights are under-explored in Industrial Ecology (IE) and industrial symbio-
sis literature. Most literature referring to IE or industrial symbiosis and property
rights are focused on economic dimensions with property rights mentioned in
relation to underpinning markets.84 Giurco, Prior and Boydell investigate the
potential for property rights in carbon to affect IE opportunities by examining
a particular Australian case study.85 They conclude that carbon property rights
might act as a barrier to IE as a result of uncertainty surrounding how IE is
affected by carbon property rights.86 The purpose of their work mirrors one of
81Schauer sub-divides regulative rules into prescriptive and descriptive rules, which can both
be broken down further — Schauer (n 70) 4-6. These different types of regulative rules are
alluded to, but theses particular classifications of rules are not adopted.
82Hart, The Concept of Law (n 70) 261-263.
83Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 70) 26-28. Dworkin recognised that the distinction
in some cases may be difficult to make. He distinguishes between them because principles
have the additional dimension of weight or importance that rules do not. He provides the
example of when two principles intersect, they might be given different weight, while when
two rules conflict, one must not be a valid rule. Others have also criticised Dworkin for his
distinction. For example: Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (n 70) 825-829; Soper
(n 70) 476-478; Alexander and Kress (n 70) 743-744 and 758.
84For example: Sathre and Grdzelishvili state the role of government interests in develop-
ing industrial symbiosis is a ‘question of public versus private responsibility for waste and
pollution, and intrinsically linked to the issue of property rights’ but do not ellaborate on
this further - Roger Sathre and Inga Grdzelishvili, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the Former So-
viet Union’ (2006) 3(4) Progress in Industrial Ecology - An International Journal 379, 387.
Desrochers only mentioned property rights in as much that his paper discusses the market
economies, but this is not linked to IE specifically — Pierre Desrochers, ‘Freedom Versus
Coercion in Industrial Ecology: A Reply to Boons’ (2012) 9(2) Econ Journal Watch 78, 85.
Laybourn identified property rights as one of the challenges to extended producer responsibil-
ity (see Section 4.3.2) to support delivery of the circular economy (see Sections 1.2.2 and 4.3.1)
— Peter Laybourn, ‘Delivering the Circular Economy’ (Seeding the BioEconomy, March 2015,
Edmonton, Canada). Behne only mentions property rights in relation to underpinning the
economic dimension, which is a major driver of industrial symbiosis — Bradley A Behne,
‘Industrial Ecology Analysis of the Potential for an Eastern Nebraska Industrial Symbiosis
Network (ENISN): A Comparative Study’ (Masters thesis, University of Nebraska 2016) 83.
85Damien Giurco, Jason Prior, and Spike Boydell, ‘Industrial Ecology and Carbon Property
Rights’ (2014) 80 Journal of Cleaner Production 211.
86ibid 213.
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the research aims of this thesis. In examining property rights in waste within
the context of industrial symbiosis, it is explored how these rights affect indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment, particularly in terms of whether they
drive or prevent industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.87
In contrast to property rights, regulations and policies have been referred to
much more often in IE and industrial symbiosis literature as evidenced by the
literature review of 72 articles (see Section 2.2).88 Similarly to property rights
though is that this external variable needs further investigation. The literature
has often identified the value of examining the regulatory and policy context
without examining the effects and implications of regulation and policy.89 Reg-
ulations and policies are distinct sub-components within this thesis, with regu-
lations covering acts or other statutory instruments passed by legislation, while
policies are rules not enacted by legislation to achieve certain goals. There is a
distinction to this limitation in that there are often overlaps and links between
regulations and policies — for example, regulations may require policies to be
implemented.
In order to evaluate whether regulations and policies are possible drivers or
barriers (see Section 1.4.2), their goals and objectives are examined. It is con-
sidered if these goals and objectives align or contradict the goals and objectives
of industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. Trubek argues that ‘[m]odern
law . . . is conscious and rational; and since it has been consciously constructed,
modern law must necessarily have some self-conscious purpose’.90 Despite hav-
87The second research objective listed in Section 1.3. The theoretical dimension is discussed
in Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.2. Empirical findings of the effects of property rights in
waste in the selected case studies is discussed in Chapters 5 (Sections 5.1.4, 5.2.4, 5.3.4,
and 5.4.4) and 6 (Section 6.1.1).
8820 of the 72 articles referred to regulations and policies — see Appendix F.
89For example: Holgado, Morgan and Evans stated that ‘[r]egulatory measures could sup-
port IS implementation and create higher awareness among companies’ top management’ —
Maria Holgado, Dai Morgan, and Steve Evans, ‘Exploring the Scope of Industrial Symbio-
sis: Implications for Practitioners’ (2016) 52 Sustainable Design and Manufacturing 169, 175.
Malcolm and Clift, and van Beers and others have identified the regulatory definition of waste
as a barrier to industrial symbiosis — Rosalind Malcolm and Roland Clift, ‘Barriers to Indus-
trial Ecology: The Strange Case of “the Tombesi Bypass”’ (2002) 6(1) Journal of Industrial
Ecology 4, 4; Beers and others (n 47) 67 (see Section 4.4.1).
90David M Trubek, ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development’ (1972) 82(1) The Yale Law Journal 1, 5.
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ing a conscious purpose construction, the identifying of goals and objectives of
regulations and policies is not self-evident and can be problematic.91 Feeley ar-
gues that goals are rarely clearly identified.92 Even where goals or objectives are
written, they may be subject to general lack of clarity and defects of linguistic
messages,93 as many are formulated in very general, vague or abstract terms.94
Arguably, the ambiguities may be intentional so that the laws are ‘capable of
pursuing a variety of diverse purposes simultaneously’.95 Uncertainties may also
be attributed to goals and objectives being cultural entities,96 and the product
of living and developing law,97 possibly resulting in a difference between what
has been adopted and the intended pre-adoption rhetoric or manifest policy
content.98 Despite the difficulties, this thesis offers an interpretation of the ob-
jectives and goals of regulations and policies examined. These come with a
caveat that goals and objectives may be construed differently in other contexts
or by other individuals. Any of the implicit goals or objectives that become
evident during interviews will also be identified where relevant.99
One of the key questions is then, can change be attributed to the particular
regulations and policies?100 In the context of this thesis, the question is how
91Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded
View’ (n 6) 499; Arild Underdal, ‘One Question, Two Answers’ in Edward L Miles and others
(eds), Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (The MIT
Press 2002) 5.
92Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded
View’ (n 6) 499.
93Explored by Glanville Williams, ‘Language and the Law’ [1945] Law Quarterly Review
61, 61; Anthony Allott, ‘The Effectiveness of Law’ (1981) 15(2) Valparaiso University Law
Review 229, 236.
94Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded
View’ (n 6) 498-499; Allott (n 93) 233; Jonathan D Casper and David Brereton, ‘Evaluating
Criminal Justice Reforms’ (1984) 18(1) Law & Society 121, 121-123, 126, 129-130 and 142;
Peter H Sand, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of
Existing Legal Instruments (Grotius Publications Limited 1992) 8.
95Feeley, ‘The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded
View’ (n 6) 511.
96Amatai Etzioni, ‘Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Sugges-
tion’ (1960) 5(2) Administrative Science Quarterly 257, 258.
97For example: David Nelken, ‘Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning
in Sociology of Law’ (1984) 4(2) Legal Studies 157, 166-167; Stefan Vogl, ‘Eugen Ehrlich’s
Linking of Sociology and Jurisprudence and the Reception of his Work in Japan’ in Marc
Hertogh (ed), Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Hart Publishing 2009) 106-107.
98Allott (n 93) 233; Casper and Brereton (n 94) 142.
99Jackie Green and Jane South, Evaluation (Open University Press 2006) 68.
100Similar questions, but phrased differently as a result of other research contexts, have been
found in for example: W Edwards Deming, ‘The Logic of Evaluation’ in Elmer L Struening
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to determine whether regulations or policies actually drive or prevent indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. The method used to ascertain this
is through triangulating the researcher’s own analysis of the literature and in-
terviews with stakeholders in industrial symbiosis.101
To examine the rules, the following questions are asked:
1. What are the property rights in waste?
2. What are the implications of existing property rights in waste?
3. What regulations, policies, and principles affect industrial symbiosis initi-
ation and sustainment?
4. Do these regulations, policies, and principles drive or prevent industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment?
2.3.6 Solutions and responses
Solutions and responses are usually needed as a result of evaluating the pro-
cess. For the purposes of this thesis, the case studies selected are examples of
functioning industrial symbiosis (see Section 1.4.1). Therefore, the main focus of
Chapter 6 in this thesis is on general observations arising from the lessons learnt
from the industrial symbiosis examples, and some particular recommendations
in relation to identified barriers.
and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of Evaluation Research Volume I (SAGE 1975) 46;
Juan C Nunnally and William H Wilson, ‘Method and Theory for Developing Measures in
Evaluation Research’ in Elmer L Struening and Marcia Guttentag (eds), Handbook of Evalu-
ation Research Volume I (SAGE 1975) 229; Casper and Brereton (n 94) 130; Arild Underdal,
‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness”’ (1992) 27(3) Cooperation and Conflict 227, 230 and
234; Oran R Young and Marc A Levy, ‘The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes’ in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes:
Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (The MIT Press 1999) 16.
101For more details on interviews see Section 1.4.1.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the conceptual framework adopted in this thesis,
the ISDF, to facilitate the investigation of how regulations, policies, and prop-
erty rights can enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. The ISDF
identifies the relevant components requiring examination to understand indus-
trial symbiosis, and indicates how these components interact. The action arena
consists of the symbionts and resource exchanges which comprise industrial sym-
biosis, as well as the development of industrial symbiosis. This action arena of
industrial symbiosis results in benefits and limits. In order to understand what
enables the initiation and sustainment of the industrial symbioses examined in
Chapters 5 and 6, the main focus of this thesis is on what has been termed
the external variables. The external variables comprise community attributes,
economic conditions, geographic location, rules-in-use, and third parties. The
external variables either drive or inhibit industrial symbiosis initiation and sus-
tainment. These are the foci for the remainder of this thesis.
A set of questions is listed for each component to provide the common denom-
inator to enable comparison. In the next chapter, Chapter 3, property rights
in relation to industrial symbiosis are unpacked from a theoretical perspective.
Chapter 4 then examines the EU level, focusing particularly on the regulatory
and policy driver and barriers. The final two substantive chapters (Chapters 5
and 6) then present empirical findings, lessons learnt, and observations. The
action arenas of the selected industrial case studies are first introduced. Finally
the external variables, particularly rules-in-use, are assessed on the local level,
with interactions with the national and EU level examined as well.
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CHAPTER 3
Managing property rights in waste
As noted in Chapter 1, the overarching research question of this thesis examines
how to enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment (see Section 1.3).
This chapter contributes to this research question by setting out the theoret-
ical framing of this investigation: property rights theory and Common-Pool
Resource (CPR) theory. Property rights were identified as key to this research
first in Chapter 1 as a result of Coase Theorem, which states that the solution
to the externality problem of polluting effects of waste lies in the clarification of
property rights (see Section 1.1.2). Second, property rights are also included in
the Industrial Symbiosis Development Framework (ISDF), set out in Chapter 2,
as part of rules-in-use component within external variables (see Section 2.3.5).
Additionally, there are increasing discussions on property rights for environ-
mental management of resources.1 These are often dominated by discussions of
using private property rights: some argue that private property is a key tool,2
while others raise a number of concerns3 — in general, the most appropriate
property regime depends on context.4 Therefore, property rights in waste need
investigation to determine the most appropriate regime which will enable indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. This is particularly apt, as there is
1Ben France-Hudson, ‘Surprisingly Social: Private Property and Environmental Manage-
ment’ (2017) 29 Journal of Environmental Law 101, 101.
2Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architec-
tures’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environmental Law 179, 185; France-Hudson (n 1) 101.
3Issues raised in different contexts and in relation to different resources in: David Grinlinton
and Prue Taylor (eds), Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of Property Rights
to Meet Ecological Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011).
4Jean-Marie Baland and Jean-Philippe Platteau, Should Common Property Resources be
Privatized? A Re-examination of the Tragedy of the Commons (Discussion Paper, Développe-
ment 143, Center for Research in Economic Development, Namur University 1995) 21.
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already a trend towards the reuse of waste as a replacement for a virgin material
which may be more expensive in both economic and environmental terms (see
Chapter 1). The industry surrounding waste in those instances is often based on
private property concepts just like any other tradable product within the econ-
omy.5 It is thus necessary to consider property rights where waste is abandoned
as res nullius into the environmental media or is traded for disposal purposes
only — both undesirable outcomes on sustainable development principles (see
Section 1.1.1).
The contribution of the property rights discussion is the identification of the
possible different property rights in waste and their theoretical implications.
One of the key questions arising from the property rights discusssion is how to
manage property rights in waste, for which CPR theory is identified as a useful
tool. The wider contribution of applying CPR theory to this research is that it
provides insight into another kind of CPR, the role of links across institutions,
and the effects of context — all identified as ‘major key understudied issues of
common-pool resources’.6 The contribution to the latter issue focuses on the
particular role and effects of regulation and policy.
Chapter 3 begins with an overview of property rights theory, with a focus on
the Hohfeld-Honoré conception of the bundle of rights metaphor. The Schlager-
Ostrom bundle of rights taxonomy is then introduced and linked to the Hohfeld-
Honoré approach. This taxonomy is relied upon in the remainder of this thesis.
These property rights discussions are then examined in relation to waste within
the industrial symbiosis context. The questions arising out of this are how
should waste be managed and how is waste currently managed to enable in-
dustrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment — the latter question is discussed
5For example: Katrien Steenmans, Rosalind Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, Commodification
of Waste: Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular
Economy (Working paper, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies 2017-26, University
of Oslo 2017).
6Xavier Basurto, ‘Common-pool Resource: Natural Resources’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica,
29 December 2015) 〈britannica.com/science/common-pool- resource〉 accessed 10 February
2016. See also: Fred P Saunders, ‘The Promise of Common Pool Resource Theory and the
Reality of Commons Projects’ (2014) 8(2) International Journal of the Commons 636, 637.
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in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Hardin’s tragedy of the unmanaged commons, which
argues for privatisation or government intervention, is reviewed. It is set out
why, in agreement with a number of other scholars, these are not necessarily the
most appropriate property regimes and that instead it depends on context. To
support evaluations and investigations of most appropriate regimes in industrial
symbiosis contexts, CPR theory is introduced, followed by explanations of why
and how it applies to this research.
3.1 Property rights theory
Proudhon famously asked ‘What is property?’ 7 His reply of ‘It is robbery’ 8
is paradoxical as it presupposes the institution of property.9 Property is an
‘abstract and difficult concept’,10 which has been described as ‘a man-made
institution’.11 Clarke and Kohler identify three perspectives of the property
relationship: property to describe the nature of the right, property to describe
the nature of the relationship, and property used to describe the thing itself.12
This chapter focuses on the nature of the right in waste, particularly in relation
to the bundle of rights metaphor.
7P J Proudhon, What is Property: An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Govern-
ment (Benjamin R Tucker tr, The New Temple Press 1876) 37.
8ibid 37. The original French phrasing is ‘Propriété, c’est le vol’, which has also been
translated as ‘property is theft’.
9Edward Jenks, ‘Origins of Property’ (1933) 15(1) Journal of Comparative Legislation and
International Law 54, 54; Alan Carter, The Philosophical Foundations of Property Rights
(Harvester Wheatsheaf 1989) 1.
10F H Lawson and Bernard Rudden, The Law of Property (3rd edn, OUP 2002) 199.
11Crawford Brough Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’ in Crawford Brough Macpher-
son (ed), Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Basil Blackwell 1978) 1. See also, for
example: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16, 21; Gary D Libecap, Contracting for Property
Rights (Cambridge University Press 1989) 1; Daniel W Bromley, ‘The Commons, Common
Property, and Environmental Policy’ (1992) 2(1) Environmental and Resource Economics 1,
2; C M Hann, Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1998) 112; Alison Clarke and Paul Kohler, Property Law: Commentary and
Materials (Cambridge University Press 2005) 17.
12Clarke and Kohler (n 11) 17.
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3.1.1 Property: a bundle of rights?
Property is often conceived as a ‘bundle of rights’,13 or the similar but some-
what less popular metaphor, a ‘bundle of sticks’.14 Many property scholars’
histories of the bundle of rights metaphor begin with Hohfeld and his analysis
of rights, even though it is acknowledged that he neither originated nor used
the metaphor.15 Hohfeld criticised the assumption that all legal relations may
be reduced to ‘rights’ and ‘duties’,16 and instead distinguished four kinds of
entitlement that are commonly and indiscriminately subsumed under ‘right’:
right, privilege, power and immunity.17 He expresses these in a scheme of oppo-
sites (no-right, duty, disability and liability respectively) and correlatives (duty,
no-right, liability and disability respectively).18
1. Rights and duties: A synonym for ‘right’ in the context of property is
‘claim’.19 To avoid confusion, this right is referred to as ‘claim-right’ in
the remainder of this thesis, and the general term ‘right’ is a right that
has not yet been put in Hohfeldian terms. If X has a claim-right against
13For example: Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57(2) Amer-
ican Economic Association 347, 347; Lawrence C Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foun-
dations (Routledge & Kegan 1977) 11-12; Jeremy Waldron, Right to Private Property (OUP
1988) 22; Stephen R Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press 1990) 22-36;
Denise R Johnson, ‘Reflections on the Bundle of Rights’ (2007) 32 Vermont Law Review 247,
248.
14Robert C Ellickson, ‘Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for
Merrill and Smith’ (2011) 8(3) Economic Journal Watch 215, 215; Anna di Robilant, ‘Property:
A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree’ (2013) 66(3) Vanderbilt Law Review 869, 871. Smith also coined
the concept of a bundle of things — Henry E Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (2012)
125 Harvard Law Review 1691, 1725-1726; Yun-Chien Chang, ‘The Economy of Concept
and Possession’ in Yun-Chien Chang (ed), Law and Economics of Possession (Cambridge
University Press 2015) 109.
15Michael A Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’ (1999) 108 The Yale Law Journal
1163, 1191; Gregory S Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property
in American Legal Thought 1776-1970 (University of Chicago Press 2008) 319-320; Jane B
Baron, ‘Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law’ (2014) 82(1) University of
Cincinnati Law Review 57, 62.
16Hohfeld (n 11) 28.
17ibid 30.
18ibid 30.
19ibid 32. ‘Rights are most often thought of as claims to something or alternatively as
protected options to act. By “claim”, I do not mean that anyone does (or even is permitted
to) engage in the act of claiming; only that someone is entitled to something. That someone
has a right can provide a unique reason for action on the part of the rightholder or others’
— F M Kamm, ‘Rights’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 476.
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Y to, for example, not use X’s waste, then the correlative and equivalent
is that Y has a duty to not use X’s waste, ie Y has no-right against X in
relation to X’s waste;
2. Privileges and no-rights: Privilege is the opposite of duty. If X has the
privilege of using waste herself, the correlative is that Y has no-right to
exclude X from X’s waste;
3. Power and liabilities: If X has the ability to change a given legal relation
(eg a contract) by her own will; and
4. Immunities and disabilities: If Y has no power to stop X producing waste,
then X has immunity in that respect and Y a disability.
One of the main limitations of Hohfeld’s cluster of rights is that he does not
state which conceptions are involved in property — his system could also apply
to, for example, laws of tort and contract.20 These criticisms, whilst not un-
founded, might arguably be based on the critics demanding rather more speci-
ficity from Hohfeld’s scheme than Hohfeld himself intended to offer. To address
this limitation, Hohfeldian rights are often combined with Honoré’s analysis of
ownership to help shape the concept of property rights,21 as property rights
can be defined as the rights of ownership.22 Honoré’s list is ‘commonly accepted
by property theorists as a starting point for describing the core bundle of . . .
property rights’.23
20Hohfeld (n 11) 19; Munzer (n 13) 22.
21Munzer (n 13) 22; Donald C Hubin, ‘Human Reproductive Interests: Puzzles at the
Periphery of the Property Paradigm’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D Miller Jr, and Jeffrey Paul
(eds), New Essays in Political and Social Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2013) 107.
22Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (n 13) 18; Hubin (n 21) 108.
23Michael A Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111(3) Harvard Law Review 621, 663. The original quotation refers
to ‘bundle of private property rights’ (emphasis added), but this has been excluded from
the quotation because Honoré’s work is not limited to private property (as discussed in the
following paragraph). Honoré states that for a bundle of rights approach, ‘at least two items
in the list would have to be omitted’ — AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in Patricia Smith (ed), The
Nature and Process of Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (OUP 1993) 370. See also:
Munzer (n 13) 23.
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Honoré’s work focuses on private ownership, but he explicitly states that other
forms of ownership, ‘either primitive or sophisticated’, are not precluded.24 Hon-
oré introduced eleven standard incidents of ownership.25 The incidents are listed
below in the form they were introduced by Honoré, followed in parentheses by
Munzer’s and Barbanell’s suggestions of the incident in terms of the Hohfeldian
cluster of rights, where relevant.26
1. The right to possess (claim-right to possess): to have exclusive physical
control, or such control as the nature of the thing admits, of a thing;
2. The right to use (claim-right to use): to be able to personally use and
enjoy the thing owned;
3. The right to manage (claim-right to manage): to be able to decide who is
allowed to use the thing, and how;
4. The right to income (claim-right to receive income): to the fruits, rents
and profits arising from possession, use and management of the thing;
5. The right to the capital (privileges to consume or destroy; powers to waive,
exclude, and abandon): the power and liberty to alienate, consume, waste
or destroy the whole thing or part of it;
6. The right to security (immunity from expropriation): to remain owner
indefinitely if he so chooses and he remains solvent;27
7. The incident of transmissibility (power to transfer): to transfer the interest
to the holder’s successors and so on ad infinitum;
8. The incident of absence of term (immunity from expropriation): to be
entitled to the endurance of the entitlement over time;
24AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Clarendon
Press 1961) 113. See also: Clarke and Kohler (n 11) 193.
25Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 24) 112-113; Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 23) 370.
26Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 24) 113-128; Munzer (n 13) 22; Edward M Barbanell, Common-
Property Arrangements and Scarce Resources: Water in the American West (Greenwood
Press 2001) 58-61.
27Note: Barbanell does not consider duty to prevent harm as an element of ownership —
Barbanell (n 26) 60.
80
3. Managing property rights in waste
9. The prohibition of harmful use (duty not to use harmfully): forbids the
use of the thing in ways that are harmful to other members of society;
10. Liability to execution (liability for execution): the owner’s interest may
be taken away from him in case of debt or insolvency; and
11. Residuary character (immunity from expropriation): to ensure that own-
ership returns to vest in the owner after the laps of everyone else’s enti-
tlements, such as when a lease runs out.
These incidents are not ‘individually necessary conditions’.28 Honoré’s analysis
incorporates the Wittgensteinian concept of family resemblance.29 Wittgenstein
uses the example of games to show that rather than there being a single charac-
teristic or group of characteristics, there is ‘a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities’.30 While the open
and flexible nature of this approach has been identified as advantageous,31 Hon-
oré’s incidents have also been critiqued for being vague, existing in degrees, and
for including some of the incidents, particularly the duty to prevent harm.32
The malleability of the rights has resulted in Smith arguing that the metaphor
‘explains everything and so explains nothing’.33
The bundle metaphor has been further criticised despite wide acceptance.34
Gray argues that the conceptualisation of property as a bundle of rights is just
an attempt ‘to sidestep the unattainable quality inherent in the notion of pri-
vate property’ — property ‘does not really exist: it is mere illusion. It is a
28Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 24) 112-113; Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 23) 370.
29The first explicit link to Wittgenstein made by Richard E Flathman, ‘Impossibility of
an Unqualified Disjustificatory Theory’ in J Roland Pennock and John W Chapmen (eds),
Nomos XII: Property (New York University Press 1980) 69. See also: Carter (n 9) 5; Muireann
Quigley, ‘Property and the Body: Applying Honoré’ (2007) 33(11) Journal of Medical Ethics
631, 632.
30Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (GEM Anscombe tr, Basil Blackwell
1958) 32 (s 66).
31Quigley (n 29) 632.
32For example: Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (n 13) 19; Waldron,
Right to Private Property (n 13) 49; Carter (n 9) 5; Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’ (n 23) 663; Barbanell (n 26) 60; Hubin
(n 21) 108.
33Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (n 14) 1697.
34See n 13.
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vacant concept’.35 Ellickson, Chang and Smith find the metaphor misleading
or at least incomplete as it does not discuss the unifying threads in property
law.36 The metaphor also reduces property to nothing more than ‘a list of use
rights’,37 even though bundling and unbundling sticks affects the value of your
rights as the value of all sticks combined exceeds the value of its parts.38 Grey
criticises the ‘shadowy’39 bundle of rights metaphor for being politically moti-
vated because the bundle of rights theoretical analysis of property ‘can be seen
as entirely internal to the capitalist market system.40 Merrill and Smith echo
this sentiment of a politically driven concept; they argue it is in the political
interest to have no fixed meaning of property, because this results in an increase
in state intervention.41 Ellickson rebuts Merrill and Smith’s work: (1) for not
referring to a person’s rights in his own body, labour, and reputation as prop-
erty; (2) at times overstating the role of private property in the overall system of
resource management; and (3) rarely discussing, or oversimplifying when they
do, the affirmative duties that may automatically attach to private ownership.42
This thesis argues, similarly to Ellickson,43 that even though there are limita-
tions of the metaphor that should be acknowledged, it is nonetheless useful in
highlighting important features of property. Despite his critical position of the
bundle of rights metaphor, Smith also recognises its value as a useful analytical
tool.44
35Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) The Cambridge Law Journal 252, 252.
36Henry E Smith, ‘The Thing about Exclusion’ (2014) 3 Property Rights Conference Journal
95, 95; Yun-Chien Chang and Henry E Smith, ‘Structure and Style in Comparative Property
Law’ in Theodore Eisenberg and Giovanni B Ramello (eds), Comparative Law and Economics
(Edward Elgar 2016) 152. The metaphor implies that there is no rationale for unifying the
sticks in a particular resource in a single private owner — Ellickson (n 14) 217.
37Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘What Happened to Property in Law and Eco-
nomics?’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 357, 359.
38Ellickson (n 14) 217.
39Thomas C Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ (1980) 22 Nomos 69, 69.
40ibid 76.
41Merrill and Smith (n 37) 365.
42Ellickson (n 14) 219-220.
43ibid 216.
44Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (n 14) 1696.
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In common law, the bundle of rights metaphor has been increasingly used since
the late nineteenth century.45 This is a key difference between civil and common
law systems as the bundle of rights conception is not widely accepted in civil law
systems.46 For example, in Romanist civil law the metaphor of a ‘box’ is used
to explain the unitary and indivisible character of ownership.47 Nonetheless,
in this thesis, the bundle of rights metaphor is adopted for both common law
and civil systems because, as Mattei argues, civil and common law have a more
uniform language in property theory literature.48 Further,
[t]he bundle metaphor can easily be adapted to describe any tech-
nical notion of property. It will be enough to clarify that different
sticks might be missing in different legal systems.49
The bundle of rights metaphor is also appropriate because almost all economists
treat property as a bundle of rights,50 and CPR theory is part of economic theory
(see Section 3.4).
45Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, ‘Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the
Property Symposium’ (2011) 8(3) Economic Journal Watch 193, 194. Early examples of
‘bundle of rights’ being used include: ‘Property is, therefore, not a single absolute right but a
bundle of rights’ — John R Commons, The Distribution of Wealth (Macmillan 1893) 92; ‘we
must think of private property not as a single right but as a bundle of rights’ — Richard T Ely,
‘Political Economy’ in Richard T Ely (ed), Political Economy, Political Science and Sociology
(The University Association 1899) 543-544.
46Chang (n 14) 109.
47Merryman states: ‘Romanist ownership can be thought of as a box, with the word ‘own-
ership written on it. Whoever has the box is the owner . . . as long as he keeps the box he
still has ownership even if the box is empty. The contrast with the Anglo-American law of
property is simple. There is no box. There are merely various sets of legal interests’ — John
H Merryman, ‘Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson)’ (1974) 48 Tulane
Law Review 916, 927. See also: Ugo Mattei, The Common Core of European Private Law
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 116.
48Ugo Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic In-
troduction (Praeger 2000) 13.
49ibid 24. Mattei also states in other works that: ‘The common core of European property
law is . . . understood to be in boxes and bundles rather than bound up in the words of
any one language’ — Mattei, The Common Core of European Private Law (n 47) 119. See
Section 1.4.2 for discussions on comparative property law in this thesis.
50Cole writes that ‘no economists to my knowledge argue that the “bundle” approach is
contrary to both legal history and a due respect for property’ — Daniel H Cole, ‘The Law and
Economics Approach to Property Law’ in Susan Bright and Sarah Blandy (eds), Researching
Property Law (Palgrave 2016) 108. See also: Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics
(The University of Michigan Press 1997) 28.
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3.1.2 Schlager-Ostrom’s bundle of rights
Honoré recognises that there are alternative ways of classifying incidents.51 One
such alternative is the Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy, which Clarke recognises
may not precisely match the common law property rights taxonomy.
However, it does reflect the complexity of real-world relationships
at least as well as the common law does . . . If it has also developed
a vocabulary which can be used to identify property rights within
different property rights systems across the world, that would be a
significant step forward.52
A similar sentiment is echoed by Bouriaud and Smithüsen who state that Schla-
ger and Ostrom offer the possibility of using language that has more tangible
significance than those terms currently used in certain civil law systems.53 This
thesis explores the possibility of using the Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy to provide
a common vocabulary for comparing the selected case studies.
Schlager and Ostrom subscribe to the bundle of rights metaphor.54 Fennell
argues that the Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy of property rights avoids Ellickson,
Chang, Merrill and Smith’s criticism that the metaphor presents property as
just a list of rights,55 as the rights are ‘cumulative in nature and available only
in functional combinations’.56 Despite a key criticism addressed by the Schlager-
Ostrom taxonomy, Orsi identifies a further inherent limitation of relying on the
bundle of rights metaphor: the bundle of rights is not widely accepted in civil
51Honoré, ‘Ownership’ (n 23) 370.
52Alison Clarke, ‘How Property Works: The Complex World View’ (2013) 22 Nottingham
Law Journal 143, 154.
53Laura Bouriaud and Franz Smithüsen, ‘Allocation of Property Rights on Forests Through
Ownership Reform and Forest Policies in Central and Eastern European Countries’ (2005)
156(8) Swiss Forestry Journal 297, 298.
54References are made to the ‘bundles of rights’ metaphor at Edella Schlager and Elinor
Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1992)
68(3) Land Economics 249, 249, 252, 253, 254 and 255.
55See text to n 36 — n 37.
56Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’ (2011) 5(1) Interna-
tional Journal of the Commons 10, 14-15. See also: Schlager and Ostrom (n 54) 252.
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law.57 Orsi however only asks what the implications for this are on Ostrom’s
theory for French and EU law rather than suggesting possible or identifying
actual impacts.58 This has been ignored in other literature, as there are a num-
ber of examples where Schlager-Ostrom’s taxonomy of rights are applied in civil
law systems without acknowledgement of the possible ingrained conflict.59 Mat-
tei’s argument used in the previous section, Section 3.1.1, to justify the use of
bundle of rights metaphor for all the case studies is again relied upon here; dif-
ferent sticks of the Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy may be present in different legal
systems.60
Schlager and Ostrom, drawing on Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop61 and Com-
mons,62 identify five separate bundles. They relied upon empirical evidence,
including from studies on fisheries, and tested the framework on the Maine
lobster industry:63
1. Access: the right to enter a defined property;
2. Withdrawal: the right to obtain the ‘product’ of a resource;
3. Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform
the resource by making improvements;
4. Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right, and how
that right may be transferred; and
57See text to n 46.
58Fabienne Orsi, ‘Elinor Ostrom et les Faisceaux de Droits: l’Ouverture d’un Nouvel Espace
pour Penser la Propriété Commune’ (2014) 14 Revue de la Régulation, para 86.
59For example: Elias N Stebek, ‘Rethinking de facto Rural Open Access to Common-Pool
Resources in Ethiopia’ (2011) 5(1) Mizan Law Review 1; Ivo Baur and Claudia R Binder,
‘Adapting to Socioeconomic Developments by Changing Rules in the Governance of Common
Property Pastures in the Swiss Alps’ (2013) 18(4) Ecology and Society 60. Bouriaud and
Smithüsen, in examining a number of civil law case studies, discuss the concept of bundles
but do not explicitly address the issue of it not being widely accepted in civil law — instead
it is implicit that it does apply — Bouriaud and Smithüsen (n 53). For an example of applied
in a communist system which has elements of the civil system, see: Sonja Schiller, ‘Avoiding
the Problem of the Commons in a Communist Society: The Role of Water Rights in the
Enforcement of Environmental Law in China’ (2009) 29 Journal of Law & Policy 349.
60Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Introduc-
tion (n 48) 13 and 24.
61Siegfried V Ciriacy-Wantrup and Richard C Bishop, ‘“Common Property” as a Concept
in Natural Resource Policy’ (1975) 15 Natural Resources Journal 713.
62John R Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (University of Wisconsin Press 1968).
63Elinor Ostrom and Edella Schlager, ‘The Formation of Property Rights’ in Susan Hanna,
Carl Folke, and Karl-Gorän Mäler (eds), Rights to Nature (Island Press 1996).
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5. Alienation: the right to sell or lease either or both of the management and
evolution rights.64
These bundles are not limited to these five, and can vary depending on context.
For example, Ostrom and Hess expanded this to seven bundles by including
removal and contribution for the digital knowledge commons,65 and Galik and
Jagger include alteration.66
Similarly to Honoré, the Schlager-Ostrom framework does not require all these
rights to be simultaneously present. They arrange these bundles across five
classes of user: full owner, proprietor, authorised claimant, authorised user, and
authorised entrant, as shown in Table 3.1. The focus of this research is on
regulatory and policy frameworks, so it is important to consider how governing
entities fit into this framework. Van de Griendt and Ruys introduced an ad-
ditional user, a ‘trustee’, to represent governmental (the state and its entities)
and non-governments (non-governmental organisations) entities.67 Trustees are
able to manage, exclude and alienate (see Table 3.1).
The Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy is often mentioned alongside Hohfeld-Honoré
analysis, but there are few attempts to link these two approaches in the wider lit-
erature.69 Cole and Ostrom recognise that there are significant overlaps between
64Schlager and Ostrom (n 54) 250-251.
65Removal is the right to remove one’s artifacts from the resource, and contribution is the
right to contribute to the content — Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, ‘A Framework for
Analyzing the Knowledge Commons’ in Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Understand-
ing Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (The MIT Press 2007) 52-53. This
is not relevant in the context of industrial symbiosis, as the aim is not to remove some waste
or by-products, but all of the waste or by-product (covered by withdrawal).
66Galik and Jagger place alteration between management and exclusion. This is the right
to change the set of goods and services provided by a resource. Only owners and proprietors
can alter. The main difference with management is that there is no emphasis on improvement.
Christopher S Galik and Pamela Jagger, ‘Bundles, Duties and Rights: A Revised Framework
for Analysis of Natural Resource Property Rights Regimes’ (2015) 91(1) Land Economics 76,
78. This is not required within the industrial symbiosis context, as the waste or by-product
(ie the good) is the resource — so this is covered by management. See also: Thomas Sikor,
Jun He, and Guillaume Lestrelin, ‘Property Rights and Regimes and Natural Resources: A
Conceptual Analaysis Revisited’ (2017) 93 World Development 337.
67Wim van de Griendt and Theo Ruys, ‘New Approach and Tools for Comparative Institu-
tional Analysis of Legal Regimes Used for Integrated Resources Management’ (11th Conference
of the IASCP, June 2006, Bali, Indonesia) 13.
68Adapted from: Ostrom and Schlager (n 63) 133; Griendt and Ruys (n 67) 13.
69Hohfeld-Honoré analysis is linked with Schlager and Ostrom in: Wim van de Griendt, ‘A
Law & Economics Approach to the Study of Integrated Management of Estuaries’ (Spring
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Full owner Proprietor Authorised
claimant
Authorised
user
Authorised
entrant
Trustee
Access X X X X X
Withdrawal X X X X
Management X X X X
Exclusion X X X
Alienation X X
Table 3.1: Schlager-Ostrom’s bundles of rights associated with users including Van de Griendt and
Ruys’ trustee addition.68
Honoré’s and Schlager-Ostrom’s lists of rights, but state that the differences may
be more important because there is no cross-disciplinary agreement on the term
‘property right’.70 There are, however, no agreed definitions of property rights
within either law or economics,71 yet property relations are still studied within
these respective disciplines. Galik and Jagger agree that there are similarities,
but state that the works are talking about different things, or at the very least
have different emphases within a related whole; Honoré is concerned with the
elements of full ownership, Schlager and Ostrom focus on individual rights ar-
rangement, and Hohfeld emphasises the incentives that are transmitted between
right holders.72 These differences result in there being a different level of detail.
Despite these differences, Galik and Jagger concede that the Schlager-Ostrom
framework needs to be placed within other works in order to be relevant, and
can benefit from studying bridges between the works.73 Table 3.2 shows how Ho-
hfeldian rights, Honoré’s incidents, and Schlager-Ostrom’s bundle of rights can
be aligned, thereby rephrasing the Schlager-Ostrom framework in Hohfeldian
terms.74
Conference of the Institute for Governance Studies, May 2015, Enschede, the Netherlands);
Griendt and Ruys (n 67); Galik and Jagger (n 66) 79. Example of being used alongside each
other without a link being made: Prakashan Chellattan Veettil, Darley Jose Kjosavik, and
Arathy Ashok, ‘Valuing the “Bundle of Land Rights”: On Formalising Indigenous People’s
adivasis Land Rights in Kerala, India’ (2013) 30(1) Land Use Policy 408.
70Daniel H Cole and Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Variety of Property Systems and Rights in Natural
Resources’ in Daniel H Cole and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Property in Land and Other Resources
(Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2012) 40-41; Daniel H Cole and Peter Z Grossman, ‘The
Meaning of Property Rights: Law Versus Economics?’ (2002) 78(3) Land Economics 317, 325.
71The discussion in this section has illustrated that there is no single conception of ‘property
rights’ in law. In economics, ‘property’ rights are also ‘defined variously and inconsistently’,
despite them being ‘fundamental’ — Cole and Grossman (n 70) 317.
72Galik and Jagger (n 66) 80.
73ibid 79, 80 and 87.
74See Section 3.1.1 addressing the misuse of the term of ‘right’.
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Hohfeld Honoré Schlager-Ostrom
Claim-right Claim-right to possess
Claim-right to manage Management (claim-right to regulate
internal use patterns and transform the
resource by making improvements)75
Claim-right to receive income
Duty Prohibition of harmful use (duty not to
use hamfully)
Privilege Right to capital (privileges to consume
or destroy)
Access (privilege to enter a defined
physical property)76
Withdrawal (privilege to the products
of an object)77
No-right
Power Right to capital (powers to waive, ex-
clude and abandon)
Incident of transmissibility (power to
transfer)
Alienation (power to transfer rights)
Exclusion (power to determine ac-
cess to object and power to transfer
rights)78
Liability Liability for execution
Immunity Right to security; incidence of ab-
sence; residuary character (immunity
from expropriation)
Disability
Table 3.2: Alignment of Hohfeldian rights, Honoré’s incidents, and Schlager-Ostrom’s rights.79
The focus now shifts to exclusion on which much discussion in literature has
focused.
75Galik and Jagger consider this a power — Christopher S Galik and Pamela Jagger, ‘Bun-
dles, Duties and Rights: A Revised Framework for Analysis of Natural Resource Property
Rights Regimes’ (2015) 91(1) Land Economics 76, 80. Management can also be considered
a power to determine usage of an object — Wim van de Griendt and Theo Ruys, ‘New Ap-
proach and Tools for Comparative Institutional Analysis of Legal Regimes Used for Integrated
Resources Management’ (11th Conference of the IASCP, June 2006, Bali, Indonesia) 12.
76Galik and Jagger consider this a right — Christopher S Galik and Pamela Jagger, ‘Bun-
dles, Duties and Rights: A Revised Framework for Analysis of Natural Resource Property
Rights Regimes’ (2015) 91(1) Land Economics 76, 80.
77Galik and Jagger consider this a right — Christopher S Galik and Pamela Jagger, ‘Bun-
dles, Duties and Rights: A Revised Framework for Analysis of Natural Resource Property
Rights Regimes’ (2015) 91(1) Land Economics 76, 80.
78Balganesh states that exclusion can have the following possible formulations: the claim-
right to exclude, the privilege-right to exclude, the right to vindicate one’s ownership through
enforcement, the right to an exclusionary remedy. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Demystifying
the Right to Exclude: of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions’ (2008) 31(2)
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 593.
79Adapted from Section 3.1.1 for the alignment of Hohfeldian rights and Honoré’s incidents,
and Griendt and Ruys (n 67) 9 for the alignment of the Schlager-Ostrom framework and
Hohfeldian rights.
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3.1.3 Right to exclude
There is no scholarly consensus on the role of the right to exclude in property80
— Table 3.2 highlights how right to exclude can be a power, claim-right or
privilege in Hohfeldian terms. Some argue that exclusion is fundamental to the
concept of property. For example, Merrill argues that the right to exclude is a
necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property:
Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, ie
a resource that is scarce81 relative to the human demand for it, and
you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they
do not have property.82
Similarly, Penner has stated ‘the right to property should be conceived as the
right of exclusive use’.83 Merrill does acknowledge that other rights exist, such
as the rights to consume, transfigure and bequeath, but that these are not as
essential as the right to exclude.84 Balganesh echoes this sentiment in stating
that even though property consists of more than the right to exclude, in order
to be meaningful, property must at least contain some element of exclusion.85
These exclusion theorists have been critiqued for the same reason as the bundle
of rights theory — it provides a fragmented view of property, as well as adopt-
ing an ‘excessively narrow approach’.86 Katz introduces the notion of ‘agenda
setting’ in relation to the right to exclude, stating that it means that the owner
80Thomas W Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review
730, 731 and 734; Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’ (2008) 58(3)
University of Toronto Law Journal 275, 280-281; Smith, ‘The Thing about Exclusion’ (n 36)
96.
81Scarce in Merrill’s work seems to be used to mean subtractable. Merrill provides the
example of a book to illustrate the concept of scarcity. Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to
Exclude’ (n 80) 732.
82ibid 730-731. See also: Thomas W Merrill, ‘The Property Strategy’ (2012) 160(7) The
University of Pennsylvania 2061, 2067-2068.
83James E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Clarendon Press 1997) 103.
84Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (n 80) 730-731.
85Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Demystifying the Right to Exclude: of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions’ (2008) 31(2) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 593, 600.
86Adam Mossoff, ‘What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together’ (2003) 45 Arizona
Law Review 371, 375 and 376.
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is in ‘a special position to set the agenda for a resource’.87 This is comparable
to Smith’s notion of the ‘gatekeeper right’,88 and does not contradict Merrill as
he characterises the right to exclude as having ‘residual managerial authority
and residual accessionary rights over the thing’.89
Other scholars thus acknowledge the importance of the right to exclude but
do not consider it the sine qua non of property, as Merrill does; the widely
accepted view among property theorists is that ‘property’ should not be limited
to absolute exclusionary private ownership and private use rights.90 This view
recognises that the concept of property is broad and fluid and evolves with
society meaning that there may be a need to recognise new types of property
rights.91
87Katz (n 80) 276.
88Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (n 14) 1709.
89Merrill, ‘The Property Strategy’ (n 82) 2068.
90For example: Waldron states that the ‘right of exclusion is not all there is to ownership’
— Waldron, Right to Private Property (n 13) 265; Harris argues that property ‘comprises
many elements, from determinate prescriptive or permissive rules to open-ended principles
of exclusive use and allocation’ — Jim W Harris, Property and Justice (Clarendon Press
1996) 3; Katz argues that ‘ownership is an exclusive right that does not always depend for its
exclusivity on protecting the boundaries of the thing — Katz (n 80) 289-290; Smith does not
think the right is the sine qua non of property that Merrill thinks it is, but does acknowledge
and emphasise its importance — Smith, ‘The Thing about Exclusion’ (n 36) 96-97. For
analysis of the literature see: Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann,
and Melanie Wiber, ‘The Properties of Property’ in Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Franz
von Benda-Beckmann, and Melanie Wiber (eds), Changing Properties of Property (Berghahn
Books 2006) ch 1; Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different Views of the
Cathedral: The Literature on Property Law Theory’ in Aileen McHarg and others (eds),
Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (OUP 2010) ch 2. From a law
and economics perspective see: Bruce Yandle and Andrew P Morriss, ‘The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alterantive Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons’ (2001) 28
Ecology Law Quarterly 123, 129. In the context of CPR: Schlager and Ostrom (n 54) 249-262.
For a discussion of property rights in water, see: Alison Clarke and Rosalind Malcolm, ‘The
Role of Property in Water Regulation: Locating Communal and Regulatory Property Rights
on the Property Rights Spectrum’ in Christine Godt (ed), Regulatory Property Rights: The
Transforming Notion of Property in Transnational Business Regulation (Brill Nijhoff 2016)
121-140; Rosalind Malcom and Alison Clarke, ‘Water: A Common Treasury’ in Ting Xu
and Alison Clarke (eds), Legal Strategies for the Development and Protection of Communal
Property (OUP 2017).
91Clarke and Malcolm (n 90) 121-140.
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3.2 Property rights in waste
The remainder of this chapter first focuses on the particular property rights in
waste part of industrial symbiosis systems, and then on how they should be
managed as a result of it. By-products are also integral to industrial symbiosis,
but they can be treated as primary products so these are not subject to the
same discussions, but by-products will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In
discussing property right in waste, the two critical questions explored are: who
owns waste and when does waste change hands.
3.2.1 Who owns waste?
Waste is traditionally subject to disposal operations and, depending on the na-
ture of the waste, it is flushed through sewerage systems or into a watercourse,
removed by vehicular transport for ultimate disposal elsewhere, or emitted as
an atmospheric emission through a chimney. The ownership of waste in these
different scenarios is mixed. When waste leaves the premises in the form of an
atmospheric or aqueous emission, or is flushed into a watercourse, then nobody
owns it — it is the ultimate externality.92 The waste is thus res nullius (also
known as ‘no-property’ or ‘open-access’). In Hohfeld’s terminology, everyone is
at liberty to use it but has no enforceable claim-rights to the use of it against
others or the state (see Section 3.1.1). There may be regulation that controls
these types of emissions forcing the transactional cost of disposal on the man-
ufacturer. The problem with such waste is not that everyone wants it when it
is floating in the air or the river but that no-one wants it, so the challenge is to
persuade others of its value and to create a desire for ownership and/or control.
Often, when waste is discarded93 and transported elsewhere, there is a transfer
92See Section 1.1.2 for discussion on externalities.
93See Chapter 4 for discussion of ‘discard’. Discard does not necessarily mean throwing
away in traditional sense. As part of the definition of waste, discard can still result in use in
industrial symbiosis.
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of ownership. ‘Discarded’ in the Waste Framework Directive (WFD)94 waste
definition can be understood as the cessation of ownership by its owner,95 which
may in turn be equated with the abandonment of ownership. This is however
not permitted under Article 36(1) WFD, which states that ‘Member States shall
take the necessary measures to prohibit the abandonment . . . of waste’ (emphasis
added). What happens instead is that there may be a transfer of ownership
following the discarding of waste. To whom this ownership transfers depends on
the waste management procedure. For households, ownership is likely to pass on
collection to municipal authorities where they have been assigned responsibility.
In those cases, ownership is not as straightforward, as municipalities often have
contracts with waste management companies. Industries may for example have
a permit to store waste or transfer waste elsewhere, or have a contract with
a waste collection company or another company to transport waste to their
premises. This raises interesting questions where collection might be delayed —
such as a bank holiday or strike. If ownership remains with the manufacturer,
responsibilities (or duties in Hohfeldian terms) will also follow. Alternatively,
ownership may pass when a contractual relationship is entered into between
the manufacturer and the disposal organisation in which case claim-rights and
duties are established at that point.
As abandonment is not permitted, waste in these scenarios is often private prop-
erty. Central to the western model of property ownership is the Blackstonian
absolute dominion perspective, where property is ‘that sole and despotic domin-
ion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’.96 There is
therefore the power to exclude, which Merrill argues is a necessary and sufficient
94Council Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on waste and repealing certain
Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (WFD). See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the WFD.
95Eva Prongrácz and Veikko J Pohjola, ‘Re-defining Waste, the Concept of Ownership and
the Role of Waste Management’ (2004) 40 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 141, 145.
96William Blackstone, II Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press 1765)
ch 1, 2. Note that this is only a short quotation from a much longer text, and therefore it can
be quoted out of context: Frederick G Whelan, ‘Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone’
in J Roland Pennock and John W Chapmen (eds), Nomos XXII: Property 1010 (New York
University Press 1980) 1980; Clarke and Kohler (n 11) 183.
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condition of identifying the existence of property (see Section 3.1.3).97
Waste is currently treated within such classic forms of property ownership, but
the basis of this notion of property is that it tends to commodification and is
designed to aid trade and transactions in a linear economy. But, a Blackstonian
reading of waste as private property, albeit culturally embedded in Western
legal culture, is argued to lack the transformative power to achieve what this
thesis believes is required — namely a conception of property that is capable
of envisaging waste as a resource and not merely an asset. That conception
must be readily adaptable to the mutuality of circular systems (and therefore
industrial symbiosis — see Section 1.2.2) and flexible enough to accommodate
the uncertainties present in current regulatory definitions and interpretations of
waste and the activities associated with it. A Blackstonian legal conception of
property, which is concerned with rights in rem, property belonging to a single
individual and the right to exclude other individuals,98 is suggestive of rigid
norms articulating property rights that are, in the modern context, designed to
be exercised in support of a well-functioning market aimed at economic growth.
That is not, necessarily, what industrial symbiosis drives at. As such, it may
be argued that a Blackstonian approach to property in waste is too narrowly
tailored for the purposes of this research since those traditionally posited and
understood facets of the legal ownership of property — exclusion, transfer, alien-
ation — aim more squarely at wealth maximisation99 than at the preservation,
augmentation and recycling of resources undertaken in industrial symbiosis net-
works. In industrial symbiosis, wealth maximization might be a consequence of
those activities but is not a reason for them. For this reason, too, and because
of its orientation toward single ownership, envisaging property as a ‘bundle of
rights’ does not meet the purpose either.100
97Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’ (n 80) 730-731.
98Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘A Theory of Property’ (2005) 90 Cornell Law
Review 531, 543-544.
99Ting Xu and Jean Allain, Property and Human Rights in a Global Context (Hart Pub-
lishing 2016) 4-5.
100For example, Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (n 13); Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions’ (2008) 75 University of
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Fortunately, the widely accepted view amongst property theorists is that ‘prop-
erty’ should not be limited to absolute exclusionary private ownership and pri-
vate use rights.101 This view recognises that the concept of property is broad
and fluid and evolves with society meaning that we may need to recognise new
types of property rights.102 It is becoming necessary to consider waste in such
a way where the desire is to abandon this piece of property and the necessity is
to encourage its evolution as the lynchpin of an industrial symbiosis.
Waste as communal property would apply to waste in the sky or the river. This
is distinguished from no-property, as with communal property every member
of the community has the privilege to use the thing and a claim-right not to
be excluded from it. Consequently, everyone else in the world has a correlative
duty not to interfere with their access to it. This type of property in waste could
be open access (where everyone in the world is a member of the community) or
limited access communal property (where there is closed or restricted access to
a limited community). Each member of the community has the privilege to use
the resource (everyone else in the world, whether a member of the community
or not, has no right to object), and have the right to exclude all non-members
of the community. For waste, limited access communal property may be more
appropriate to apply more widely (beyond waste in the sky or river) in that
members of a network or group can pool their waste, which is then used by
others. This will only work if waste is perceived to have value. Thus, with this
type of property there is again the need to drive waste reuse and recovery. If
waste was open-access, well-intended individuals, in terms of re-using, recovery
and recycling waste in an environmental manner, can interfere with others’
waste to ensure that it is managed properly, with others having no right to
complain. Simultaneously, this means others could use or manage waste in
Chicago Law Review 1015.
101For analysis of the literature see Benda-Beckmann, Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber (n 90)
ch 1; Hamilton and Bankes (n 90) ch 2. See aksiL Schlager and Ostrom (n 54) 251-254
(CPR context); Yandle and Morriss (n 90) 129 (from a law and economics perspective). For a
discussion of property rights in water, see: Clarke and Malcolm (n 90) 121-140; Malcom and
Clarke (n 90).
102Clarke and Malcolm (n 90) 121-140.
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a manner detrimental to the environment. It might, of course, be thought
appropriate to impose duties on waste, but as there is no property in waste, a
significant difficulty arises in how to impose or enforce those duties.
Waste could also be owned by the state in a structure where individuals can
still be allocated use rights of various types, or even limited management or
control rights, but not property rights in the sense that such rights would be
personal to holders and not transmissible. If the municipality owns waste, then
questions occur such as at what point do they own it — once it is discarded?
Or is it once created (ie the discard has not yet taken place, but waste may
be stored)? Or is it once bins are collected by waste management companies
acting on behalf of the municipality? These questions are only part of the puzzle.
There are further questions to be asked in relation to what the incentive would
be for local authorities to be owners, or whether this should be part of their
responsibilities? These questions do not even touch upon questions of resources
and costs.
3.2.2 When is waste transferred?
Throughout the discussions on actual and possible property rights in waste, the
issue of transferring waste has emerged.103 If dealing with waste as private prop-
erty, then the point at which it changes hands will be stipulated in contracts
and agreements. If not, then this thesis proposes to look at Locke. Locke fits
with the Hohfeldian conception of property, because Hohfeldian terms have been
used to clarify and tighten Locke’s theory,104 and beyond the terminological ap-
plication have been used substantially together in some of the literature.105 The
103This section is based on the work of the co-authors of Katrien Steenmans, Rosalind
Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, ‘Commodification of Waste: Legal and Theoretical Approaches
to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’ (Life-cycle Based Management and
Reporting for Sustainable Business, November 2016, Oslo, Norway).
104Matthew H Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical
Explorations of Individualism, Community, and Equality (Cambridge University Press 1997)
74.
105For example, A John Simmons, ‘Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Treatises’ (1983) 12(3)
Philosphy & Public Affairs 175, 177 and 194; Eric R Claeys, Locke Unlocked: Productive Use
95
3. Managing property rights in waste
suggestion made in this thesis is that adopting a Lockean perspective on prop-
erty firstly enables the establishment of waste as a common resource. Secondly,
a Lockean perspective helps to resolve a number of difficulties associated with
the way in which waste is envisaged by positive law and, thirdly, may provide
a more appropriately adapted means of dealing with the concept of waste in
industrial symbiosis networks. Due to its contestability, it is not advocated that
Locke’s theory of property provides a complete solution to each of the issues
identified in this chapter.106 But, it is suggested that approaching those issues
from a Lockean perspective might promote the cultural shift that is necessary
to effect the transition towards a circular economy (and strategies of industrial
symbiosis) and respect for the environment as societal goods.
Locke’s starting point is that the earth and everything on it has been given ‘to
mankind in common’;107 ‘no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive
of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state’,
and there must ‘of necessity be a means to appropriate them’.108 The means
identified by Locke is a person’s labour. He states that:
every man has a property in his own person . . . The labor of his body
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever
then he removes out of the state that Nature has provided and left
it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that
is his own, and thereby makes it his property.109
in Trespass, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory (Working Paper, Law and Economics
Research Paper 12-21, George Mason University 2012) 18 and 44. Note that there has been
some critique of using Locke and Hohfeld together: Kramer (n 104) Part III.
106For example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974); Jeremy Wal-
dron, ‘Enough and as Good Left for Others’ (1979) 29(117) Philosophical Quarterly 319;
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Enough and as Good Left for Others’ (1984) 32(1) Political Studies 98;
Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Prince-
ton University Press 1986); Richard J Arneson, ‘Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demo-
lition’ (1991) 39(1) Political Studies 36; Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in
Property (OUP 1995). For an overview of the principal critiques of Locke see Karl Widerquist,
‘Lockean Theories of Property: Justifications for Unilateral Appropriation’ (2010) 2(1) Public
Reason 3.
107John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing Company 1980) ch 5,
‘On Property’, s 25.
108ibid s 26.
109ibid s 27.
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Locke’s concern here is the original acquisition of property rights from the stock
of goods held in common,110 rather than the transfer or redistribution of exist-
ing property. In broad terms, therefore, Locke’s claim is that the application of
labour to ‘unowned’ property transforms common property into private prop-
erty, enabling the acquisition of property and forming a legitimate right to it.111
The idea of labour is, thus, essential to the establishment of ownership since it
is a means of exploiting a resource, adding to its value and, ultimately, taking
ownership of it. Clarke and Kohler state that Locke’s requirement of labour
‘provides a justification for giving property rights in newly created things to the
creator rather than to anyone else’.112 This is highly significant since, in the
circular economy scenarios, the ‘treatment’ of waste may be seen in exactly this
way: the exploitation of an unowned resource for benefit, that benefit being felt
across a range from the individual to community, but where property is argued
to remain in the creator — the one who treated the waste. This serves the dual
purpose of enabling the ‘creator’ to use the waste for her own purposes and
placing responsibility on her to treat the waste in accordance with any envi-
ronmental regulations that may exist. From being unowned and unwanted, the
waste has been transformed through labour into property, with its associated
benefits and burdens. Naturally, there have been criticisms of the labour theory
of property.113
As noted by Judge, ‘absent an organizing telos that establishes a social objec-
tive, a labor-theory of property is prejudiced against awarding rights to those
naturally occurring goods, like biodiversity, the ozone layer, or clean air and
water, which exist independent of human action’.114 The point is well taken but
need not concern us since, in the circular economy setting, it is waste that is
subjected to labour, rather than anything naturally occurring. Moreover, there
110Rebecca P Judge, ‘Restoring the Commons: Toward a New Interpretation of Locke’s
Theory of Property’ (2002) 78(3) Land Economics 331, 331.
111Locke (n 107) s 45.
112Clarke and Kohler (n 11) 91.
113A John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton University Press 1992) 268.
114Judge (n 110) 334.
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is an organising telos which has established the social objective of environmen-
tal protection. That objective is expressed in society’s norms governing the
treatment, handling and disposal of waste.
Locke’s theory, in embracing both common and individual or private forms of
ownership, comports with the idea of the circular system since, as noted by Xu
and Allain, it is arguably able to contemplate group access common property
or limited access common property where a group of commoners can exclude
outsiders but cannot exclude each other within that group.115 In terms of the
internal workings of the closed system, and the distribution of property inside,
Locke’s theory maintains that communities, by agreement, will settle the rights
to the property that their labour has produced.116
Locke’s theory of property has been criticised for its inability to impose con-
straints on ownership, and for justifying extensive property rights117 but, in
the context of the circular economy, the network and extent of those rights are
naturally bounded by the closed system in which the waste is being ‘exploited’.
There is, therefore, an inherent, structural limit on the creation of property
rights, which may be argued to avoid those dangers.
Having identified possible theoretical implications of property rights in waste
for industrial symbiosis, the next section reviews the tragedy of the unmanaged
commons, which helps explain the rationale for using CPR theory. The theo-
retical implications of property rights in waste as discussed in this section are
revisited in Chapter 5 where it is assessed whether these have the anticipated
effects in practice.
115Xu and Allain (n 99) 8-9.
116ibid 8-9.
117Helena Howe, ‘Lockean Natural Rights and the Stewardship Model of Property’ (2013) 3
Property Law Review 36, 36.
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3.3 Tragedy of the unmanaged commons
Hardin argues for two top-down solutions considered in the previous section,
privatisation or government intervention,118 to avoid the tragedy of the unman-
aged commons. The term ‘commons’ is ‘ambiguous and comprehensive’,119 with
a generic definition ‘almost impossible to formulate’.120 Holder and Flessas at-
tribute this definitional difficulty to the continuous change in shared interests
and values that produce commons.121 This has resulted in both an evolution of
the concept, as well as differences in the current understanding of the commons.
Historically, the commons was used in Europe to describe rights to enclosed
agricultural fields, grazing lands, and forests granted to specific persons, but
burdened with rights that could be exercised by others regardless of the wishes
or financial interests of the owner.122 Such rights in commons probably antedate
the modern concept of private property.123 The modern notion of the commons
is not ‘precisely defined’,124 with many meanings in existence and scholars at
times confounding the commons with other concepts, adding to definitional con-
fusion.125 Holder and Flessas suggest a tentative description of the commons as
118Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243, 1245.
119Margaret A McKean, ‘Building Common Property Regimes to Deter Resource-wrecking’
in Takeshi Murota and Ken Taakeshita (eds), Local Commons and Democratic Environmental
Governance (United Nations University Press 2013) 375.
120Jane B Holder and Tatiana Flessas, ‘Emerging Commons’ (2008) 17(3) Social & Legal
Studies 299, 300.
121ibid 300.
122For example: G Shaw Lefevre, English Commons and Forests (Cassell and Company 1894)
1-2; ECK Gonner, Land and Inclosure (Macmillan and Co 1912) 3; WG Hoskins, ‘Common
Land and its Origin’ in WG Hoskins and L Dudley Stamp (eds), The Common Lands of
England & Wales (Collins 1963) 5-6; Susan JB Cox, ‘No Tragedy of the Commons’ (1985) 7
Environmental Ethics 49, 53; Martina De Moor, Leigh Shaw-Taylor, and Paul Warde, ‘Com-
paring the Historical Commons of North West Europe. An Introduction’ in Martina De Moor
and Leigh Shaw-Taylor (eds), The Management of Common Land in North West Europe, c.
1500-1850 (Brepols Publishers 2002) 15-17; Charlotte Hess and Ostrom, ‘Introduction: An
Overview of the Knowledge Commons’ in Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Under-
standing Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice (The MIT Press 2007) 12.
These (except the latter) include more detailed discussions on the historic use of the term
‘commons’, particularly in England and Wales.
123Lefevre (n 122) 1-2; Hoskins (n 122) 6.
124Erling Berge and Frank van Laerhoven, ‘Governing the Commons for Two Decades: A
Complex Story’ (2011) 5(2) International Journal of the Commons 160, 161.
125John M Anderies and Marco A Janssen, Sustaining the Commons (Center for the Study
of Institutional Diversity 2013) 3. For example: Ostrom defined the commons broadly and
vaguely to informally refer to public goods, CPRs or any area with uncertain property rights
(Michael D McGinnis, ‘An Introduction to the IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Work-
shop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework’ (2014) 39(1) The Policy Studies Journal 169,
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a type of ownership: ‘the collective and local ownership of land, resources, or
ideas, held in an often communal manner, sometimes in opposition to private
property’.126 Other scholars have similarly stated that the term generally refers
to a natural or man-made resource that is, or could be, shared by a commu-
nity or group of people.127 Waste and by-products fall within this definition as
man-made resources. For the analytical purposes of this research, this definition
of commons is thus sufficient, as the commons is used to illustrate some of the
general issues related to waste and by-products rather than a central concept
in this thesis.
Hardin argued that the commons are inherently tragic,128 though he later re-
vised and limited this argument to unmanaged commons following criticism.129
The tragedy of the unmanaged commons is an economic theory, in particular a
174-175). Other scholars refer to commons as public goods: For example: Cox (n 122) 53;
Stanley R Carpenter, ‘Sustainability and Common-Pool Resources: Alternatives to Tragedy’
(1998) 3(4) Society for Philosophy and Technology. Ostrom herself has described the com-
mons as referring to public goods: Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources’
(2008) 50(4) Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 8, 10-11. Others
equate the commons with CPRs, see for example: James M Acheson, Capturing the Com-
mons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Maine Lobster Industry (University Press of New
England 2004); McGinnis, ‘An Introduction to the IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework’ (n 125) 174-175. Section 3.4 sets out
why CPRs and public goods are not equivalent.
126Holder and Flessas (n 120) 300.
127For example: Ronald J Oakerson, ‘Analyzing the Commons: A Framework’ in Daniel W
Bromley (ed), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy (ICS Press 1992)
41-42; Paul Seabright, ‘Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design’
(1993) 7(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 113, 113; Hess and Ostrom (n 122) 3 and 4;
Berge and Laerhoven (n 124) 161.
128Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118) 1244.
129Garrett Hardin, ‘An Ecolate View of the Human Predicament’ (1981) 7(2) Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political 242, 243. Detail of these criticisms and Hardin’s revision is provided in
text to n 129 — 151. Hardin introduced his work as tragedy of the commons, even though he
was discussing open-access (res nullius), rather than managed commons — see for example:
Hess and Ostrom (n 122) 11; Jonathan Mitchell, ‘What Public Presence? Access, Commons
and Property Rights’ (2008) 17(3) Social & Legal Studies 351, 352; Ostrom, ‘The Challenge
of Common-Pool Resources’ (n 125) 11; Brett M Frischmann, ‘Two Enduring Lessons from
Elinor Ostrom’ (2013) 9(4) Journal of Institutional Economics 387, 289.. Hardin addressed this
criticism when he rephrased the tragedy: ‘As a result of the discussions carried out during the
past decade, I now suggest a better wording of the central idea: . . . freedom in an unmanaged
commons brings ruin to us all’ — Hardin, ‘An Ecolate View of the Human Predicament’
(n 129) 243 (emphasis added). Note: the quotation is in relation to overpopulation, but it
is also more generally applicable as he introduces unmanaged in response to criticism of the
resources metaphor. This redress has however not yet widely caught on with recent references
to the tragedy not including ‘unmanaged’ — see for example: Gary D Lynne and others,
‘A Theoretical Foundation for Empathy Conservation: Toward Avoiding the Tragedy of the
Commons’ (2016) 3(3=4) Review of Behavioral Economics 243; Jason Oakes, ‘Rent-seeking
and the Tragedy of the Commons: Two Approaches to Problems of Collective Action in
Biology and Economics’ (2016) 18(2) Journal of Bioeconomics 137.
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Coasian cost problem,130 that stipulates that every individual, acting indepen-
dently and rationally according to their own self-interests, will try and reap the
greatest benefit from a resource, thereby depleting the resource and behaving
contrary to the best interests of the whole group:
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that com-
pels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the free-
dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to us
all.131
Hardin acknowledged that this idea can in embryonic form be found as far back
as Aristotle: ‘That which is common to the greatest number gets the least
amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for
what is common’.132 The more recent works of Hobbes, Lloyd, Gordon, Scott,
and Dales have also been identified as preceding Hardin’s work.133 Hobbes,
Lloyd, and Dales propounded the same logic as the tragedy of the unmanaged
commons. Hobbes argued that men seek their own good and end up fighting
each other;134 Lloyd presented a theory predicting wasteful use of property
owned in common;135 and Dales identified that unrestricted common property
130Ie a standard externality problem: each individual rationally maximises their own wel-
fare without accounting for costs imposed on others (ie external costs) — Frischmann, ‘Two
Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom’ (n 129) 389; Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social
Cost’ (1960) 3(1) The Journal of Law and Economics 837, 1. See Section 1.1.2.
131Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118) 1244.
132Aristotle, Book II (1952) ch3 A74 cited in Hardin, ‘An Ecolate View of the Human
Predicament’ (n 129) 243.
133For example: David Feeny and others, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-two Years
Later’ (1990) 18(1) Human Ecology 1, 2; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press 1990) 2-3; John
Baden and Douglas S Noonan (eds), Managing the Commons (2nd edn, Indiana University
Press 1998) 96. Note: Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118) 1244 does mention
Lloyd but not the other works. Demsetz also echoed the logic of the tragedy of the commons,
but this publication preceded Hardin’s article only by a year and by this time Hardin had
lectured on it so difficult to ascertain whether Demsetz actually preceded Hardin: ‘If a person
seeks to maximize the value of his communal rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork
the land’ — Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (n 13) 354.
134Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, OUP 2008) Part 2 (XXXI.1 and 5).
135William Foster Lloyd, ‘Two Lectures on the Checks to Population’ (1980) 6(3) Population
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resources will be over-used, and thus lead to their depletion and destruction.136
Gordon and Scott provided a preliminary version. Gordon stated that
[w]ealth that is free for all is valued by none because he who is
foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use will only find
that it has been taken by another.137
Scott, continuing Gordon’s discussion in 1955, stated that no one will husband
and maintain a resource unless they have some property right in the yield,
and the property must be allocated on a scale sufficient to ensure that one
management has complete control of the asset.138
Hardin’s tragedy of the unmanaged commons provides seminal insights into
issues faced in many resource situations, and demonstrates the conflict between
individual and group rationality.139 These issues are transferable to the focus of
this thesis: waste and by-products exchanged in industrial symbiosis. Hardin
considered waste pollution and applied his tragedy of the unmanaged commons
to waste:
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his
wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are
locked into a system of “fouling our own nest,” so long as we behave
only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.140
The argument is thus that individuals, acting independently and rationally,
and Development Review 473, 495. Reprint of the lectures first delivered and published in
1833.
136John H Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay in Policy-making and Economics
(first published 1968, Edward Elgar 2002) 63.
137H Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of Common-Property Research: The Fishery’
(1954) 62(2) The Journal of Political Economy 124, 135.
138A D Scott, ‘The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership’ (1955) 63 Journal of Political
Economy 116, 116.
139Cox (n 122) 50; Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, Rules, Games &
Common-Pool Resources (The University of Michigan Press 1994) 5.
140Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118) 1245.
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Waste By-products 
Industrial symbiosis 
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Figure 3.1: Tragedy of the unmanaged commons scenarios in relation to industrial symbiosis waste
and by-products.
will not recover or prevent production of waste if it is more expensive than
discarding the waste.141 This logic can also be applied to conceptualisation
of waste as a resource. This is an example of the traditional tragedy of the
unmanaged commons; waste as a resource is appropriated from the system.
Waste as a resource can result in over-production of waste as there is then
neither an incentive to reduce waste nor to pursue the most resource-efficient
system in terms of input and output of resources, resulting in waste reverting to
the first example of waste as pollution and being discharged into the commons.
By-products are another example of the traditional perspective of appropria-
tion from the unmanaged commons. It however cannot revert to pollution (as
waste as a resource arguably can) as a result of the definition of by-product:
there needs to be certainty of use of all the by-product (see Section 4.4.1).
These tragedy of the unmanaged commons scenarios in relation to waste and
by-products are diagrammatically presented in Figure 3.1.
Scholars have identified a number of criticisms and limits of the tragedy theory
(beyond his initial exclusion of ‘unmanaged’).142 Even though the dominant
legacy of Hardin’s work is the implications for resources, his focus was actually
on overpopulation.143 His work on overpopulation has not stood the test of
141See Chapter 4 where prevention, recovery and discarding of waste are defined.
142See n 129.
143Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118). See also: Feeny and others (n 133) 1-2;
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time.144
Secondly, scholars have illustrated that Hardin’s work is based on a number of
assumptions. As soon as one of the conditions is not met, Hardin’s predicted
behaviour may not hold. These assumptions are: resource users are anony-
mous; no communication between resource users; no established set of rules or
self-regulating capabilities; no foundation of trust and reciprocity between the
resource users; and users act selfishly and only in their immediate self-interest
rather than assuming that some individuals take joint benefits into account, at
least to some extent.145 In the context of this research not all these assump-
tions are upheld: resource users need to be identified for industrial symbiosis,
and communication and trust have been identified as crucial factors (see Chap-
ters 5).
The final criticism identified is that Hardin only offered two top-down solutions
to correct the tragedy and prevent ‘the destruction of the commons’,146 pri-
vatisation or government intervention.147 Other scholars have come to similar
David Harvey, ‘The Future of the Commons’ (2011) 109 Radical History Review 101, 101.
144Bob Lloyd, ‘The Commons Revisited: The Tragedy Continues’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy
5806, 5807; Tim Harford, ‘Do You Believe in Sharing?’ (Financial Times, 30 August 2013)
〈ft.com/cms/s/2/afc5377e-1026-11e3-a258-00144feabdc0.html〉 accessed 1 March 2016.
145Fikret Berkes and others, ‘The Benefits of the Commons’ (1989) 340 Nature 91, 92;
Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (n 133)
24-25; Baland and Platteau (n 4) 21; David Feeny, Susan Hanna, and Arthur F McEvoy,
‘Questioning the Assumptions of the “Tragedy of the Commons” Model of Fisheries’ (1996)
72(2) Land Economics 187, 193-194; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Coping with Tragedies of the Commons’
(1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 493, 503; Elinor Ostrom and others, ‘Revisiting
the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges’ (1999) 284(5412) Science 278, 279; Thomas
Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C Stern, ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’ (2003)
302(5652) Science 1907, 1907; 15183 Hess and Ostrom (n 122) 11; Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Diagnostic
Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas’ (2007) 104(39) Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 1581; Hess and Ostrom (n 122) 11; Xavier Basurto
and Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin’ (2009) 1(3)
Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 255, 255; Ugo Mattei, ‘Providing Direct Access
to Social Justice by Renewing Common Sense: The State, the Market and Some Preliminary
Questions about the Commons’ in Council of Europe (ed), Redefining and Combating Poverty:
Human rights, Democracy and Common Goods in Today’s Europe (Council of Europe 2012)
315.
146Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (n 118) 1245.
147ibid 1245. For criticisms, see for example: Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (n 61) 714; Bonnie
J McCay and James M Acheson, ‘Human Ecology of the Commons’ in Bonnie J McCay and
James M Acheson (eds), The Question of the Commons: Culture and Ecology of Communal
Resources (The University of Arizona Press 1987) 30-32; Berkes and others (n 145) 92; Hess
and Ostrom (n 122) 11; Amy Sinden, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private
Property Solution’ (2007) 78 University of Colorado Law Review 533, 538.
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conclusions based on arguments of incentives.148 Hardin and these other schol-
ars rely on a number of implicit assumptions outlined in the previous paragraph.
Implicit in these solutions is the notion that individual property rights are es-
sential to provide an incentive for the stewardship of resources,149 but there are
numerous successful institutions that manage the commons that fall between
individual and state property.150 There is thus no most appropriate property
regime and instead depends on the precise context.151 Therefore, the tragedy
theory does not help identify the most appropriate property regimes to enable in-
dustrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. The next section focuses on CPR
theory, which observes that there are conditions under which self-interested ac-
tors use resources sustainably even where there is neither privatisation nor gov-
ernment intervention.152 Ostrom additionally argued that ‘particular processes
can be studied more effectively using [CPR theory] than using another’.153 The
148For example: Smith states that ‘[b]oth the economic analysis of common property re-
sources and Hardin’s treatment of the tragedy of the commons in natural resources and
wildlife is to end the common property system by creating a system of private property rights’
— Robert J Smith, ‘Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property
Rights in Wildlife’ (1981) 1(2) Cato Journal 439, 467. Welch states that ‘the establishment of
full property rights is necessary to avoid the inefficiency of overgrazing’ — W P Welch, ‘The
Political Feasibility of Full Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of Pollution and Fisheries’
(1983) 16 Policy Sciences 165, 171. Townsend and Wilson stated that ‘[w]hen [a private]
owner faces a decision about alternative uses of a particular resource, he or she has economic
incentives to put the resource to its most productive use . . . When anyone may use a resource
. . . [t]he incentives created are extremely destructive — Ralph Townsend and James A Wil-
son, ‘An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons’ in Bonnie J McCay and James M
Acheson (eds), The Question of the Commons: Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources
(The University of Arizona Press 1987) 312. Lloyd and Demsetz, preceding Hardin’s work
on the tragedy of the commons, had also identified privatization as the solution; Lloyd wrote
that ‘[t]he common reasons for the establishment of private property in land are deduced
from the necessity of offering to individuals sufficient motives for cultivating the ground, and
of preventing the wasteful destruction of the immature products of the earth’ (Lloyd, ‘Two
Lectures on the Checks to Population’ (n 135) 495), with Demsetz identifying the benefits of
private ownership over communal ownership (Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’
(n 13) 354-356).
149Christopher Rodgers, ‘Reversing the “Tragedy” of the Commons? Sustainable Manage-
ment and the Commons Act 2006’ (2010) 73(3) The Modern Law Review 461, 485.
150For example: in the medieval manor and open field system — Carl J Dahlman, The
Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution
(Cambridge University Press 1980); the lobster industry — James M Acheson, The Lobster
Ganges of Maine (University Press of New England 1988); Ostrom, Governing the Commons:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (n 133) 139.
151Baland and Platteau (n 4) 21.
152McCay and Acheson (n 147) 5-6 and 27-34; Elinor Ostrom, ‘The Rudiments of a Theory of
the Origins, Survival and Performance of Common-Property Institutions’ in Daniel W Bromley
(ed), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy (Institute for Contemporary
Studies 1992) 295; Pär Blomkvist and Jesper Larsson, ‘An Analytical Framework for Common-
Pool Resource-Large Technical System (CPR-LTS) Constellations’ (2013) 7(1) International
Journal of the Commons 113, 117.
153Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
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benefits of using CPR theory for this research are set out in the next section.
3.4 Managing property of waste: CPRs
CPRs are one of four types of economic goods. The other three are public,
private, and club (or toll)154 goods. Traditionally only private and public goods
were distinguished. Samuelson is usually credited as the economist to first de-
velop the theory of public goods.155 Pure public goods are very rare in compar-
ison to the other types of goods,156 and cannot be supplied to anyone without
being available to everyone.157 Beyond this economists tend to vary the exact
definition of public goods.158 Often cited examples include: national defence,
street lighting and lighthouses.159 Buchanan in the 1960s then developed club
theory160 because ‘[n]o general theory ha[d] been developed which covers the
(n 133) 26. Ostrom also considered Olson’s logic of collective action (Mancur Olson, The
Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press
1965)) and the prisoner’s dilemma game to provide similar insights — Ostrom, Governing the
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (n 133) 2-7. Dawes had shown
that Hardin’s tragedy of the commons is equivalent to a prisoner’s dilemma game — Robyn
M Dawes, ‘Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision-Making’ in Martin F Kaplan and
Steven Schwart (eds), Human Judgment and Decision Processes (Academic Press 1975) 88.
154Ostrom and Ostrom prefer the term ‘toll’ to ‘club’ as many of these goods are provided by
small-scale public as well as private associations — Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, ‘Public
Goods and Public Choices’ in ES Savas (ed), Alternatives for Delivering Public Services:
Toward Improved Performance (Westview Press 1977) 7-49.
155Samuelson referred to ‘collective consumption goods’ rather than ‘public goods’: Paul A
Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’ (1954) 36(4) The Review of Economics
and Statistics 387, 387. For authors crediting Samuelson as the first economist to develop
the theory of public goods, see for example: Paul McNutt, The Economics of Public Choice
(2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2002) 239; Katharina Holzinger, Transnational Common Goods:
Strategic Constellations, Collective Action Problems, and Multi-level Provision (Palgrave
Macmillan 2008) 12; Avinash Dixit, ‘Paul Samuelson’s Legacy’ (2012) 2(1) Annual Review
of Economics 1, 18.
156John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance
(2nd edn, Wiley 2000) 5; McNutt, The Economics of Public Choice (n 155) 239.
157Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: The-
oretical Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government (Palgrave Macmillan 1994)
54.
158Vogler (n 156) 5.
159For example: Vogler (n 156) 5; Stretton and Orchard (n 157) 54. Note that Coase argued
that lighthouses are more aligned with club goods — Ronald H Coase, ‘The Lighthouse in
Economics’ (1974) 17(2) Journal of Law and Economics 357, 359-360. This has however
recently been criticised by van Zandt (David E van Zandt, ‘The Lessons of the Lighthouse:
“Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods’ (1993) 22(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 47)
and Bertrand (Elodie Bertrand, ‘The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and
Realities’ (2006) 30(3) Cambridge Journal of Economics 389) as a result of how Coase framed
the non-excludability dimension of public good.
160James M Buchanan, ‘An Economic Theory of Clubs’ (1968) 32(125) Economica 1.
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whole spectrum of ownership-consumption possibilities’.161 The purpose of a
club is to gain economics of scale in the provision of local public goods and to
share the costs of its provisions.162 Examples of toll goods include local radio,
community radio, theatre performances, and untelevised sports events.163 CPRs
and private goods are discussed in more detail in this section.
Characteristics of excludability and subtractability were introduced and devel-
oped by Samuelson,164 Musgrave,165 Olson,166 and the Ostroms,167 and have
since been relied upon by many economists and political scientists,168 to dis-
tinguish between the four types of goods, as depicted in Table 3.3. A good is
subtractable (also known as rivalrous), if once a good has been exchanged, it is
no longer available for others to use.169 Exclusion, or control of access, ‘relates
to the difficulty of restricting those who benefit from a good or service’.170 This
can both be in terms of physical exclusion devices or derive from other sources
including the law of property,171 and its arguably constituent right to exclude
(see Section 3.1.3). If there is a problem of exclusion, there is no legal entity that
has the right to exclude others from accessing the resource.172 Difficult or costly
161Buchanan (n 160) 1.
162Patrick McNutt, ‘A Note on Club Theory as Applied to Community and Rural Develop-
ment’ (1992) 27(1) Community Development Journal 75, 76.
163Patrick McNutt, ‘Public Goods and Club Goods’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de
Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 1999) 928.
164Samuelson (n 155) 387.
165Richard A Musgrave, Theory of Public Finance (McGraw-Hill 1959) 9-12.
166Olson (n 153) 14-15.
167Ostrom and Ostrom, ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’ (n 154) 12.
168For example: Dina Umali-Deininger and Lisa A Schwartz, Public and Private Agricultural
Extension: Beyond Traditional Frontiers (World Bank Publications 1994) 16-17; McNutt,
The Economics of Public Choice (n 155) 238; Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity (Princeton University Press 2005) 24; Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory
of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1996) 9.
For how this typology was initially developed see: Elinor Ostrom, ‘How Types of Goods and
Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action’ (2003) 15(3) Journal of Theoretical Politics
239, 239-243.
169Fikret Berkes and M Taghi Farvar, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Fikret Berkes
(ed), Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development
(Behlhaven Press 1989) 7.
170Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 23; Berkes and Farvar (n 169) 7;
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 139) 24.
171Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, Institutional Incentives and Sustain-
able Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective (Westview Press 1993) 81; Brett M
Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources (OUP 2012) 26.
172Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 24.
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Low subtractability High subtractability
Non-excludable Public goods Common-pool resources
National defence, knowledge,
weather forecasts, etc.
Groundwater basins, lakes, fish-
eries, irrigation systems, forests,
etc.
Excludable Club goods Private goods
Theaters, private clubs, daycare
centers
Food, clothing, automobiles, etc.
Table 3.3: Four types of economic goods.175
exclusion provides a strong incentive for potential beneficiaries to free-ride.173
The free-rider problem occurs when those who benefit from goods or services
do not contribute to their provision or maintenance.174
The characteristics of subtractability and excludability vary in degree and are on
a spectrum, rather than existing in the simplistic and neat analytical divisions
shown in Table 3.3.176 Using subtractability and excludability to distinguish
between the four types of goods has been criticised for being difficult to grasp
and conceptually weak.177 Helfrich has stated that ‘[a]nyone attempting to apply
[the subtractability and excludability classification] in order to organize real-
world objectives will achieve one thing above all: their own confusion’.178 This
has been demonstrated by, for example, the atmosphere as a commons; the
atmosphere is a subtractable resource but its atmospheric capacity to absorb
pollution is not wholly subtractable.179 To further complicate matters, the
atmosphere itself is composed of subtractable and non-subtractable resources
173Olson (n 153) 14; Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 24.
174Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 24; Frischmann, ‘Two Enduring
Lessons from Elinor Ostrom’ (n 129) 399.
175Adopted from: Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 24; Elinor Ostrom,
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Nobel
Prize in Economics documents, 2009-4, Nobel Prize Committee 2009) 413.
176Ostrom and Ostrom, ‘Public Goods and Public Choices’ (n 154) 9; Richard Cornes, The
Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (Cambridge University Press 1986) 9;
153 Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources (n 171) 25; Clarke,
‘How Property Works: The Complex World View’ (n 52).
177Silke Helfrich, ‘Common Goods Don’t Simply Exist - They Are Created’ in David Bollier
and Silke Helfrich (eds), The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond State and Market
(Levellers Press 2012) 61-62; James B Quilligan, ‘Why Distinguish Commons Goods from
Public Goods?’ in David Bollier and Silke Helfrich (eds), The Wealth of the Commons: A
World Beyond State and Market (Levellers Press 2012) 74.
178Helfrich (n 177) 61.
179John Harrison and Paula Marson, ‘The Atmospheric Commons’ in Joanna Burger and oth-
ers (eds), Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas
(Island Press 2001) 222. See also: Marvin S Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving
a Global Commons (University of South Carolina Press 1997) 1-2.
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— the former include the space atmosphere occupies and the gases of which it
is composed, and the latter includes services such as air purification and water
transport that the atmosphere provides.180
The goods exchanged in industrial symbiosis, wastes and by-products, are both
subtractable; once wastes or by-products are used by one organisation, they are
no longer available for other organisations to use in their production processes.
Wastes and by-products in this sense can therefore only be CPRs or private
goods. There are additional arguments that complicate this subtractability
statement, similarly to the atmosphere example. Waste and by-products, from
another perspective, can arguably also be described as not subtractable as one
organisation producing waste or by-products does not limit another organisa-
tion’s ability to produce them. Similarly, many of the wider economic, environ-
mental, and social benefits resulting from industrial symbiosis (see Section 1.2)
are not subtractable. For example, reduced greenhouse gas emissions and more
job opportunities benefit others, such as the wider community, beyond the or-
ganisation reducing their emissions and providing the opportunities. This thesis
is concerned with the use, rather than the product, of waste and by-products,
and thus the focus is on subtractable economic goods, which are CPRs or private
goods.
If waste is conceived as pollution which is being discharged, there are problems
of exclusion. Even though there are mechanisms that can be used to incentivise
decreased production of waste, for example through the waste hierarchy or Ex-
tended Producer Responsibility (EPR), as discussed in Chapter 4, there are no
mechanisms yet which exclude organisations from producing waste. These also
have cost implications — such as implementation costs (both of more efficient
systems and of related regulations) to enforcement costs. There is likely though
to always be some production of waste as a result of physics (thermodynam-
ics). Waste conceived as a resource may also have problems of exclusion as it is
180Harrison and Marson (n 179) 222.
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difficult to prevent an organisation producing waste or using waste as a virgin
material in a production processes — though again there may be mechanisms to
encourage or discourage this respectively with subsequent implementation and
enforcement costs.
Beyond the determining characteristics of subtractability and non-excludability,
CPRs have been defined as comprising ‘resource systems and a flow of resource
units or benefits from these systems’.181 Examples of CPR systems include lakes,
rivers, irrigation systems, and forests, with water and timber as the resource
units or benefits from the CPR.182 Even though examples of CPR systems
are typically natural resource systems, CPR systems can also be man-made.183
Industrial symbiosis is a man-made system with waste and by-products the
resource units or benefits from the CPR. One of the aims of this thesis is
identifying the implications, both positive and negative, of casting industrial
symbiosis as a man-made CPR system.
There are two main motivations for defining industrial symbiosis and the ex-
changed waste and by-products as a CPR system and CPR units. First, the
characteristics of CPRs match those of industrial symbiosis and waste, as de-
scribed in previous paragraphs. Salmi and others184 have recommended that
industrial by-products in the industrial symbiosis between heavy industries in
the Gulf of Bothnia, in Finland, should be redefined as CPRs.185 The authors
describe the problem of exclusion as:
by-products would also be public goods in the sense that it is difficult
181Elinor Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights Regimes and Common Goods: A Complex Link’ in
Adrienne Héritier (ed), Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002) 39.
182William Blomquist and Elinor Ostrom, ‘Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a
Commons Dilemma’ (1985) 5(2) Policy Studies Review 383, 383; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Reformulat-
ing the Commons’ in Joanna Burgur and others (eds), Protecting the Commons: A Framework
for Resource Management in the Americas (Island Press 2001) 15; Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights
Regimes and Common Goods: A Complex Link’ (n 181) 39.
183Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133) 30.
184Olli Salmi and others, ‘Governing the Interplay between Industrial Ecosystems and En-
vironmental Regulation’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 119.
185ibid 121 and 124-5.
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to exclude a plant in the industrial symbiosis from the utilization of a
nonwaste by-product (or, conversely, from the generation of a waste
by-product).186
Waste has been described as a CPR by Cavé.187 His arguments mirror those in
this chapter in relation to subtractability and non-excludability:
[The concept of CPR] converges with our characterisation of [solid
waste] deposit: we have observed both eviction effects (within the
service modernisation process) and resource overuse problems (of
which appropriation conflicts are the symptom).188
There is however some disagreement in the limited literature on whether waste is
a CPR.189 Park and Louka both argue that waste is not a CPR because waste
is generally perceived to be of low value, an externality to society, and ‘one
could hesitate to call waste a resource’.190 Park and Louka have misinterpreted
Ostrom; non-excludability and subtractability are the determining definitional
characteristics, rather than value and whether an externality or a resource.
Value may influence subtractability and excludability. For example, Ostrom
recognised the effect of value in relation to CPRs as the incentive to appropriate
high value resources from an unregulated, open-access CPR system may be
higher than low-value goods.191 This however does not affect the material’s
subtractability. It may affect excludability in that if the incentive is higher to
appropriate, then excludability may be more costly or difficult, but this affects
the extent of the problem of excludability rather than whether excludable or not.
186Salmi and others (n 184) 125.
187Jérémié Cavé, ‘A Political Economy of Urban Solid Waste Management in Emerging
Countries: Learning from Vitória (Brazil) and Coimbatore (India)’ in Olivier Coutard and
Jonathan Rutherford (eds), Beyond the Networked City: Infrastructure Reconfigurations and
Urban Change in the North and South (Routledge 2016) 173.
188ibid 174.
189Elli Louka, International Environmental Law: Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 77-78; Patricia Park, International Law for Energy and
the Environment (2nd edn, CRC Press 2013) 4.
190Louka (n 189) 77-78; Park (n 189) 4.
191Ostrom, ‘Reformulating the Commons’ (n 182) 18.
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In relation to the final argument, waste can both be considered as a resource
and externality (see Section 1.1.2).
Secondly, some of the benefits of a CPR governance system have been identi-
fied by Salmi and others,192 and Schiller and others.193 These benefits include
reliability of flows, costs, and clear definitions. The discussions of these benefits
are however limited to their identification, and neither unpack the particular
benefits and their implications, nor explain whether or how these benefits are
being achieved in any case studies. Lombardi and others stated that
[i]f it can be shown that the benefits . . . of a CPR system are indeed
greater than dependence upon open market systems, CPR may be-
come another useful tool for the [industrial symbiosis] community to
employ.194
One of the aims of this thesis is thus addressing this gap by evaluating whether
these benefits of CPR systems exist.
There are also some general advantages of CPRs that may prove useful for
industrial symbiosis. In Ostrom’s Governing the Commons,195 joint use of
the CPR resulted in communication between individuals and establishment of
agreed-upon rules and strategies, which combined resulted in improved joint
outcomes.196 Communication and agreement are essential to industrial symbio-
sis as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, CPR theory introduces the
design principles, which may provide a valuable comparison for this research, as
discussed below.
Even though Mattei acknowledges that Ostrom’s work ‘undeniably marks a crit-
192Salmi and others (n 184).
193Frank Schiller, Alexandra Penn, and Lauren Basson, ‘Analyzing Networks in Industrial
Ecology - a Review of Social-Material Network Analyses’ (2014) 76(1) Journal of Cleaner
Production 1.
194D Rachel Lombardi and others, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Testing the Boundaries and Ad-
vancing Knowledge’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 5, 5.
195Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133).
196ibid 138, 164-165, 171 and 211.
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ical turning point in economic theory’,197 he criticises it for falling in the same
trap as the tragedy of the unmanaged commons. Mattei states that Ostrom’s
work
remains trapped between the state versus private property dichot-
omy. Without consideration of the historical, political and legal
context of the fierce public and private debate, Ostrom’s findings
remain limited in their applicability.198
Ostrom has however clearly stated that there is no most appropriate property
regime for CPRs, and that this instead depends on the particular case study.199
3.4.1 Design principles
The Ostrom research programme and Institutional Analysis and Development
framework (IAD)200 generated eight design principles that were first introduced
in Ostrom’s Governing the Commons.201 These principles are important to the
success of local CPRs, and have been described by Berge and van Laerhoven as
‘probably the most useful generalisations of observations on the commons’.202
Ostrom describes a design principle as
an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success
of . . . institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance
of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use.203
197Mattei, ‘Providing Direct Access to Social Justice by Renewing Common Sense: The
State, the Market and Some Preliminary Questions about the Commons’ (n 145) 317.
198ibid 317.
199See text to n 151.
200The IAD is described in Section 2.1.
201Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133).
202Berge and Laerhoven (n 124) 163.
203Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133) 90.
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The design principles are meant to be neither prescriptive nor used as models,204
where models ‘make explicit assumptions about the elements and structure of
a particular situation and use the logical tools of a theory to derive predictions
about the likely outcomes of a particular set of parameters’.205 Ostrom suggests
an alternative labelling of ‘best practices’ would have reduced the number of
readers confused.206
When Ostrom first introduced the design principles, she presented seven, with
eight design principles relevant for CPRs that are parts of larger systems.207 Cox,
Arnold and Tomás reviewed these principles, investigated the empirical support
for the principles, and reformulated them to eleven principles.208 The principles
have generally been positively received in the literature,209 with Cox, Arnold
and Tomás’s study finding that the principles are robust and well-supported in
their analysis of 91 studies.210 The critiques found were abstract rather than
empirical.211 The principles themselves were largely unchanged following Cox,
Arnold and Tomás’s analysis, bar some principles being split into two for clarity.
Ostrom herself has stated Cox, Arnold and Tomás have ‘suggested a better way
of framing the design principles than [she] had done originally’.212
The design principles are used in three ways in this thesis. First, the robustness
of the principles in the context of a man-made CPR system is tested,213 thereby
204Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 257; Hess and Ostrom (n 122) 7.
205Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (n 139) 23. In this instance, the design principles do not
provide a model as applying the design principles does not necessarily result in an efficient
and effective CPR.
206Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic
Systems (n 175) 422.
207Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133) 90-101.
208Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold, and Sergio Villamayor Tomás, ‘A Review of Design Principles
for Community-based Natural Resource Management’ (2010) 15(4) Ecology and Society 38.
Note: Agrawal separately identified and set out a brief argument that Ostrom’s design princi-
ples could be formulated as ten rather than eight separate principles — Arun Agrawal, ‘Com-
mon Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources’ (2001) 29(10) World
Development 1649, 1652.
209Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 260-261.
210Cox, Arnold, and Tomás (n 208) 38, 52 and 53.
211ibid 52.
212Elinor Ostrom, The Future of the Commons: Beyond Market Failure and Government
Regulation (The Institute of Economic Affairs 2012) 78.
213They are referred to throughout Chapter 4 at European Union (EU) level and then sum-
marised in Section 6.2 for EU level and the case studies in Figure 6.1.
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contributing to CPR theory. Fleischman and others identified some limitations
of the design principles for studies with large spatial extent and large numbers
of users, but still showed that there is still some value in it.214 The industrial
symbioses selected are closely located and with smaller number of users than
those CPR systems studied by Fleischman and others, so this limitation of
the design principles should not apply. The second application of the design
principles is that they may provide explanations for effectiveness (or reduced
effectiveness) of industrial symbiosis systems and underpin assessments of the
law (property rights, policies, and regulations) supporting the design principles.
The design principles are also explored as potential recommendations where
not all the principles are present in a case study. Third, in Chapter 6 it is
examined how the different property rights may operationalise and affect the
design principles. An overview of this is provided in Figure 6.2 in Section 6.2.
The reformulated design principles are:215
1. Defined boundaries
(a) User boundaries: boundaries between legitimate users and non-users
must be clearly defined.
(b) Resource boundaries: clear boundaries define a resource system and
separate it from the larger biophysical environment.
If the boundaries are unclear, no one knows what is being managed or for
whom. This risks benefits being reaped by those who do not contribute:
the free-riding problem.216
2. Congruence with local conditions: Appropriation and provision rules must
reflect the particular resource characteristics, and local social and envi-
214Forrest D Fleischman, Brent Loken, and Gustavo A Garcia-Lopez, ‘Evaluating the Utility
of Common-pool Resource Theory for Understanding Forest Governance and Outcomes in
Indonesia Between 1965 and 2012’ (2014) 8(2) International Journal of the Commons 304,
328-329; Forrest D Fleischman and others, ‘Governing Large-scale Social-ecological Systems:
Lessons from Five Cases’ (2014) 8(2) International Journal of the Commons 428, 452-453.
215Adopted from: Cox, Arnold, and Tomás (n 208) 52, supplemented by other sources.
216Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 260.
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ronmental conditions.217
3. Appropriation and provision: The benefits obtained by users from CPR,
as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of
inputs required in the form of labour, material, or money, as determined
by provision rules.218
4. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the opera-
tional rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. The ad-
vantage of such arrangements is that rules can be better tailored to local
circumstances and be devised so that participants consider them fair.219
5. Monitoring
(a) Monitoring users: monitors who are accountable to the users monitor
the appropriation and provision levels of the users.
(b) Monitoring the resource: monitors who are accountable to the users
monitor the condition of the resource.
Effective monitoring by officials and users is an essential element of sus-
tainable CPR institutions as ‘[f]ew long-surviving resource regimes rely
primarily on endogenous levels of trust and reciprocity among appropri-
ators to keep rule breaking levels down’.220 Without monitoring, there
is also an incentive to free-ride, and this can result in a tragedy of the
commons.221
6. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness
and the context of the offence) by other appropriators, by officials ac-
countable to the appropriators, or by both.
217Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(n 133) 92; Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 259.
218Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 259.
219ibid 263.
220Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 265; Ostrom, ‘The Challenge of
Common-Pool Resources’ (n 125) 17.
221Ostrom, ‘The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources’ (n 125) 17.
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7. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have
rapid access to low-cost mechanisms to discuss and resolve what is or
is not a rule infraction.222
8. Minimal recognition of rights to organise: The rights of appropriators to
devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental
authorities. Local users are more able to develop effective regimes if they
have at least minimal recognition of the right to organise by a national
or local government.223 Without such official recognition, it is difficult to
hold either users or officials accountable for their actions.224
9. Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement,
conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple lay-
ers of nested enterprises.
3.5 Conclusion
The main outcome of Chapter 3, for the purposes of this thesis, was identifying
the theoretical framing for this thesis: property rights theory and CPR theory.
The Schlager-Ostrom bundle of rights taxonomy was introduced and linked to
Hohfeld-Honoré analysis. Property rights discussions focused on how different
rights may drive or prevent symbiotic waste or by-product exchanges. CPR
theory was then introduced to support the investigation of the most appropriate
property regime to enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment, with
the help of design principles developed by Ostrom and others as best practices
for managing CPRs.
The focus in the remaining chapters is on assessing these theoretical discussions
in practice: Chapter 5 sets out the property rights in practice, and Chapter 6
222Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (ICS Press
1992) 74.
223Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (n 168) 268.
224Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-governing Irrigation Systems (n 222) 75.
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evaluates their impact and the applicability of CPR theory. The next chapter,
Chapter 4 sets out the EU regulatory and policy context. The focus is on
identifiying which regulations and policies are drivers and barriers for industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment. This context is also relevant to property
rights, as even though an organisation may have a claim-right to its own waste,
there is a duty to comply with EU law that may affect their claim-rights.
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CHAPTER 4
EU regulatory and policy context of industrial symbiosis
As set out in Section 1.3, the research question is how can the law enable indus-
trial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. This chapter in particular addresses
the third research objective by identifying the current roles and functions —
including evaluating whether drivers or barriers — of European Union (EU)
regulations and policies using mainly the doctrinal research method (see Sec-
tion 1.4.2). The central focus of this chapter is thus the rules-in-use compo-
nent of the Industrial Symbiosis Development Framework (ISDF) introduced
in Chapter 2. The action arena, limits, and benefits are not examined at EU
level as industrial symbiosis and its benefits and limits occur and affect the
local case study level (discussed in Chapter 5). Similarly, the external vari-
able of geographic level is not discussed in this chapter. The other external
variables (community attributes, economic conditions, and third parties - see
Section 2.3.5) are briefly examined at the end of this chapter. The hypothesised
EU regulatory and policy drivers and barriers of industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment are then compared to perceptions in practice within case stud-
ies in the next chapter, Chapter 5. Sections 5.3 and 6.1 briefly address the
implications of the intended withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the
EU (Brexit).
This chapter first provides an overview of the relevant wider international con-
text in Section 4.1. The main focus throughout the remaining sections is on
the EU Waste Framework Directive (WFD)1 as the scope of this thesis is the
1Council Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on waste and repealing certain
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non-hazardous, solid waste covered by the WFD (see Section 1.5).2 Section 4.2
examines the overarching EU environmental objectives and principles, and how
these are incorporated in the WFD. The following two sections, Sections 4.3
and 4.4, identify and assess the EU incentives for, and barriers to, industrial
symbiosis respectively. Throughout these two sections, how the identified EU
regulations and policies embody the design principles is highlighted where rel-
evant, as: (1) the principles can help further understand and unpack their in-
centivising or inhibiting role, and (2) test the relevance of the principles in the
context of a man-made Common-Pool Resource (CPR) system (ie industrial
symbiosis) (see Section 3.4.1). Section 4.5 then addresses external variables
that have not yet been addressed. The final section, Section 4.6, concludes.
Throughout this chapter, only the terms waste, by-product and non-waste are
used as definitive classifications. Waste and by-product are defined in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. The terms object, substance, and material are used interchangeably
to indicate that these have not yet been classed as waste, by-product or non-
waste.
4.1 International context
The international context is briefly considered as the EU, the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and international conven-
tions are ‘mutually influential’, and this inter-relationship will continue influenc-
ing future developments in waste law.3 The OECD, in whose work the European
Commission takes part,4 initiated a programme on waste prevention and minimi-
sation in 1994. This project resulted in a Reference Manual on Strategic Waste
Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (WFD).
2Note that the WFD does apply to hazardous waste. The exclusions from the scope of the
WFD are set out in WFD, art 2.
3Stephen Tromans, ‘EC Waste Law - a Complete Mess?’ (2001) 13 Journal of Environ-
mental Law 133, 140.
4The European Commission’s participation goes ‘well beyond’ that of an observer, but it
does not have the right to vote on decisions or recommendations — OECD, ‘Members and
Partners’ (2013) 〈oecd.org/about/membersandpartners〉 accessed 7 August 2014.
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Prevention.5 In this manual, the value of waste prevention is recognised as a key
element of supporting sustainable development through resource savings, min-
imising human and ecological practices, reducing social conflict associated with
siting new landfill and incineration facilities, increasing availability of financial
resources by lowering waste management costs, and changing production and
consumption patterns.6 These benefits can be achieved by using industrial sym-
biosis as a waste prevention strategy, which has been recognised by the OECD as
discussed in Chapter 1.7 Following the publication of the Reference Manual of
Strategic Waste Prevention, the OECD is now undertaking work on addressing
the lack of internationally accepted waste indicators, response indicators and
material flow accounts.8
There are international conventions on waste including, inter alia, the Basel
Convention9 and the Stockholm Convention.10 These focus on hazardous waste
and persistent organic pollutants respectively, which are both beyond the scope
of this thesis (see Section 1.5). The definitions of waste provided in these con-
ventions do not contribute to or clarify the discussion on the definition of waste
in Section 4.4.1 as the conventions rely on national implementation for the def-
inition of waste.11
5OECD Working Party on Pollution Prevention and Control, Strategic Waste Prevention:
OECD Reference Manual (OECD 2000).
6ibid 10.
7For example: the OECD has identified industrial symbiosis as an eco-innovative model:
OECD, Sustainable Manufacturing and Eco-Innovation: Framework, Practices and Mea-
surement (2009) 11; OECD, ‘The Future of Eco-Innovation: The Role of Business Models’
(OECD/European Commission/Nordic Innovation Joint Workshop, January 2012, Copen-
hagen, Denmark) 11, 13, 16, 18 and 19. See Section 1.2.2.
8OECD, ‘Waste Prevention and Minimisation’ (2014) 〈oecd.org/env/waste/prevention-
minimisation.htm〉 accessed 30 April 2017.
9Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (22 March 1989) 28 ILM 649.
10Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (22 May 2001) 40 ILM 532.
11Basel Convention, art 2(1) defines wastes as: ‘substances or objects which are disposed
of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of
national law’. The preamble to the Stockholm Convention refers to the definition of waste
used in the Basel Convention.
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4.2 EU objectives and principles
The legislation and policies discussed in this chapter are underpinned by the
EU environmental objective set out in Article 191(1) Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU):12
Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the
following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the qual-
ity of the environment; protecting human health; prudent and ra-
tional utilisation of natural resources; promoting measures at in-
ternational level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental
problems, and in particular combating climate change.
These objectives are reflected in the WFD which
lays down measures to protect the environment and human health
by preventing or reducing the adverse impacts of the generation and
management of waste, and by reducing overall impacts of resource
use and improving the efficiency of such use.13
Industrial symbiosis is a measure that can help pursue these aims through its
benefits of improving resource efficiency and reducing waste impacts by, for
example, diverting waste from landfill and reducing greenhouse gas emissions
(see Section 1.2). This has been recognised by the EU Parliament indirectly by
recently proposing an amendment to the objective to add ‘and by ensuring waste
is valued as a resource with a view to contributing to a circular economy in the
Union’14 to the end of the objective — by highlighting the circular economy as
12Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/49 (TFEU).
13WFD, art 1.
14European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 14 March
2017 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Directive 2008/98/EC on waste (COM(2015)0595 - C8-0382/2015 - 2015/0275(COD))
(P8_TA-PROV(2017)0070, 14 March 2017) 1. Note that these are the amendments that were
proposed at the first reading of Parliament as part of the ordinary legislative procedure.
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part of this objective, industrial symbiosis as a circular economy strategy would
support the aim.
Actions for achieving these environmental objectives should be based on the
polluter-pays principle, the proximity principle, the precautionary principle, and
the principle of preventive action.15 These principles guide and influence law
both at EU and national level by providing common ground, while allowing some
flexibility.16 They are also all included in the WFD,17 and can affect industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment. An overview of each of the principles is
therefore set out below.
4.2.1 Polluter-pays principle
The polluter-pays principle is patently that the polluter should pay. It is in-
cluded in Article 14(1) WFD: ‘In accordance with the polluter-pays principle,
the costs of waste management shall be borne by the original waste producer or
by the current or previous waste holders’. Waste producer and waste holder are
defined in Article 3(5) and (6) WFD respectively — these provisions resonate
with Design Principle 1(b) on user boundaries (see Section 3.4.1). The waste
holders are subject to this financial obligation as a result of their contribution of
that waste.18 In residential waste management, for example, householders often
pay an obligatory tax to have their waste collected and subsequently managed.
There are varying approaches to this tax — in Denmark the tax varies depend-
ing on the amount of waste produced,19 while in England it is a set amount
15Article 191(2) of the TFEU states: Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high
level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the
Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source
and that the polluter should pay.
16UNEP, Training Manual on International Environmental Law (UNEP/Earthprint 2006)
23; John McEldowney and Sharon McEldowney, Environmental Law (Pearson Education
Limited 2010) 11; Stuart Bell, Donald McGillivray, and Ole W Pedersen, Environmental Law
(8th edn, OUP 2013) 56-57.
17See respective sub-sections below.
18Case C-335/16 VG Cistoća doo v Duro Vladika and Ljbuica Vladica [2017] OJ I/296,
para 24.
19This is not dependent on exact weight, but in some municipalities different bin sizes exist.
Depending on the number and size of bins that a household has, their tax either increases or
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of tax.20 Such a tax is a manifestation of the polluter-pays principle in waste
management.
Industrial symbiosis arguably supports and upholds the polluter-pays principle,
as symbionts are financially responsible for enabling exchanges by investing in
the required infrastructure and logistics. There are uncertainties and weaknesses
of the polluter-pays principle,21 including uncertainty as to who the producer
is when several organisations are included in the production process and how
costs should be apportioned. Waste producer has been defined in Article 3(5)
WFD as ‘anyone whose activities produce waste (original waste producer) or
anyone who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other operations resulting in a
change in the nature of composition of this waste’. There may be a situation in
industrial symbiosis where waste is, for example, produced by an industry and
then passed to another industry who pre-processes the waste in order to use
it in its production process. This results in two waste producers being present
according to the WFD definition, resulting in the question which of the two
producers is responsible for the cost?22 These uncertainties can be circumvented
in the context of industrial symbiosis in an agreement23 or by assigning clear
property rights (see Chapter 3 — particularly Locke’s argument in relation to
labour in Section 3.2.2).
The polluter-pays principle in the WFD can be considered an inverse mani-
festation of Design Principle 3 (see Section 3.4.1). Instead of benefits being
proportional to labour, material, or money, the polluter bears the cost of waste
management.
decreases.
20The amount of council tax paid is dependent on factors such as location, size of property,
etc.
21Damien Chalmers, ‘Community Policy on Waste Management - Managing Environmental
Decline Gently’ (1995) 15(1) Yearbook of European Law 257, 271.
22See also: ibid 271-273.
23The type of agreement, whether private, contractual or of another form, may vary de-
pending on what the symbionts have agreed. This is examined in Chapter 5 for the case
studies.
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4.2.2 Proximity principle
The proximity principle requires environmental damage to be rectified at source
as a priority.24 The question is what is environmental damage — waste can be
a form of pollution (see Section 1.1.2), and in this way can cause damage. This
principle is covered in Article 16(3) WFD which states that ‘[t]he network shall
enable waste to be disposed of or waste . . . to be recovered in one of the near-
est appropriate installations’. This requirement may be a barrier to industrial
symbiosis initiation as ‘nearest appropriate installations’ mean those closest in-
stallations that can manage waste, rather than those with recovery operations
that make most economic, environmental, and social sense according to a life
cycle assessment. This discussion mirrors the arguments presented for the re-
jection of the geographical proximity requirement for industrial symbiosis in
Section 1.2.1. If ‘nearest appropriate installations’ depends on the most appro-
priate recovery operation according to the WFD waste hierarchy, then whether
or not this principle incentivises industrial symbiosis requires a discussion of the
waste hierarchy (see Section 4.2.3).
4.2.3 Preventive and precautionary principles
The preventive and precautionary principles should be implemented in waste
management by setting general environmental objectives for the EU.25 The
preventive principle was introduced in the first Environment Action Programme
(EAP): ‘The best environmental policy consists in preventing the creation of
pollution or nuisances at source, rather than subsequently trying to counteract
24art 191(2) TFEU.
25WFD, preamble, recital 30 which states: In order to implement the precautionary principle
and the principle of preventive action enshrined in Article 174(2) of the Treaty [now Article
191(2) TFEU], it is necessary to set general environmental objectives for the management
of waste within the Community. By virtue of those principles, it is for the Community and
the Member States to establish a framework to prevent, reduce, and, in so far as is possible,
eliminate from the outset the sources of pollution or nuisance by adopting measures whereby
recognised risks are eliminated.
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their effects’.26 For the precautionary principle, the EU Commission produced a
communication setting out guidelines for the principle, and referred to Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration,27 which set out the principle:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The preventive and precautionary principles are discussed concomitantly, as
Krämer argues that, in practice, they are almost always used together, and there
seems to be no EU action which would be possible under one of the principles
but not under the other.28 Arguments exist against this,29 but the principles
are nevertheless addressed together in this thesis because they are considered
together in the WFD.
De Sadeleer considers the preventive principle enunciated in Article 191(2)
TFEU ambiguous as it may refer to two layers of the principle: prevention
at the source or prevention at the place of impact.30 The waste hierarchy set
out in Article 4(1) WFD31 incorporates both and prioritises the former of the
two layers of the preventive principle, where waste is the source of pollution,32
26Council Declaration of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European
Communities on the Environment [1973] OJ C112/1 (First EAP) Title II, 1.
27Rio Declaration on Sustainable Development (12 August 1992) UN Doc A/CONF151/26
(1992).
28Ludwig Krämer, EU Environmental Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 24. See also:
Arie Trouwborst, ‘Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship Between the
Precautionary Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated
Questions’ (2009) 2(2) Erasmus Law Review 105, 126.
29For example: Nicholas de Sadeleer, ‘The Principles of Prevention and Precaution in In-
ternational Law: Two Heads of the Same Coin’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong, and
Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 197.
30Nicholas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules
(OUP 2002) 72.
31WFD, art 4(1): The following waste hierarchy shall apply as a priority order in waste
prevention and management legislation and policy: (a) prevention; (b) preparing for re-use;
(c) recycling; (d) other recovery, eg energy recovery; and (e) disposal.
32Eloise Scotford, ‘Trash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste Regulation’ (2007) 17(3)
Journal of Environmental Law 367, 370 and 374. In Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement
Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne [1997] ECR I–07411, para 30 it was acknowledged that
there is a risk of polluting by waste.
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by listing prevention first.33 The remainder of the hierarchy, which sets out the
priority order to be applied to waste prevention and management legislation and
policy, is: preparing for reuse, recycling and other recovery. These operations
minimise the amount of pollution at points of impact34 by preventing material
from becoming waste through, for example, extending its usable lifespan.35 The
manifestations of the two layers of the preventive principle are now assessed in
the context of industrial symbiosis.
Prevention is defined in Article 3(12) WFD:
measures taken before a substance, material or product has become
waste, that reduce:
(a) the quantity of waste, including through the re-use of products
or the extension of the life span of products;
(b) the adverse impacts of the generated waste on the environment
and human health; or
(c) the content of harmful substances in materials and products.’
First, industrial symbiosis may result in more substances being classed as by-
products resulting in the reduction of substances classed as waste without an
actual physical decrease in the amount of substances produced.36 This first op-
tion also allows for the reuse of products to be considered a preventive measure.
Reuse is defined in Article 3(13) WFD as ‘any operation by which products or
components that are not waste are used again for the same purpose for which
they were conceived’. This can apply if a by-product rather than waste is pro-
duced. It is, however, highly unlikely that these by-products will be used again
for the same purpose, as the symbionts are traditionally separate and there is
33WFD, art 4(1): The following waste hierarchy shall apply as a priority order in waste
prevention and management legislation and policy: (a) prevention; (b) preparing for re-use;
(c) recycling; (d) other recovery, eg energy recovery; and (e) disposal.
34Scotford (n 32) 374.
35AndrewWaite, ‘Waste and theWaste Hierarchy in Europe’ (2012) 26(3) Natural Resources
and Environment 53, 53.
36Definitions of waste and by-products are discussed in Section 4.4.1.
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no example of reuse for the same purpose by another organisation in the case
studies described in Chapter 5. Therefore, the reduction of waste produced will
most likely be through classifying the substances as by-products rather than
waste. Industrial symbiosis can also promote option (b). The benefits of indus-
trial symbiosis identified in Chapter 5 include environmental advantages and
improved health. Option (c) does not fall under the scope of this thesis, as
harmful is a property which renders waste hazardous under H 5 of Annex III of
the WFD (see Annex G).
Annex IV of the WFD (see Annex G) provides some examples of waste preven-
tion measures. Industrial symbiosis could fall under the first example of the use
of planning measures promoting the efficient use of resources because it plans
for exchanges which result in resource savings. Industrial symbiosis could on the
basis of these preventive measures help achieve waste prevention if substances
produced are by-products rather than waste. This indicates that industrial sym-
biosis supports at least the top level of the hierarchy, and therefore prevention
could incentivise organisations to initiate and sustain industrial symbiosis in
order to uphold the hierarchy. Prevention is also beneficial to industrial sym-
biosis, as it is not a waste management operation (— it concerns substances
or materials before they become waste),37 and therefore waste requirements,
explored in Section 4.4.2, do not apply.
The remaining operations, those making up the second layer of the preventive
principle, require the substance to be classed as waste. The next management
option in the hierarchy is preparing for reuse, defined in Article 3(16) WFD as:
checking, cleaning or repairing recovery operations, by which prod-
ucts or components of products that have become waste are prepared
so that they can be re-used without any other pre-processing.
37European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (June 2012) 28.
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Whether industrial symbiosis includes reuse depends on the particular process
employed by the symbionts. As stated previously, there is no example of reuse in
the industrial case studies, and therefore it is unlikely that industrial symbiosis
supports and promotes this level of the hierarchy (though it does not prevent
re-use).
According to Article 3(17) WFD, the third best option of recycling:
means any recovery operation by which waste materials are repro-
cessed into products, materials or substances whether for the original
or other purposes. It includes the reprocessing of organic material
but does not include energy recovery and the reprocessing into ma-
terials that are to be used as fuels or for backfilling operations.
By including ‘other purposes’ in addition to ‘original purpose’, it widens the
scope of the concept of recycling compared to reuse, and thereby making recy-
cling more ameable to industrial symbiosis. Recycling is a form of recovery.38
Recovery is the fourth option in the hierarchy, which is defined in Article 3(15)
the WFD as:
any operation the principal result of which is waste serving a useful
purpose by replacing other materials which would otherwise have
been used to fulfil a particular function, or waste being prepared to
fulfil that function, in the plant or in the wider economy. Annex II
sets out a non-exhaustive list of recovery operations.
38Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd and Environment Agency, Secretary of State
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] ECR I–6163, Opinion of AG Alber,
para 158 states that recycling aims ‘to recover starting materials’. Additionally, the definition
of recycling refers to it as ‘any recovery operation’.
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This requirement of substitution for recovery was developed in ASA39 and Ce-
ment Kiln,40 and is also included in the WFD as one of its goals is moving
closer to a ‘recycling society’.41 Both recovery and recycling resonate with the
benefits of industrial symbiosis, and capture the essence of industrial symbiosis,
as industrial symbiosis is concerned with using waste instead of raw materials.
Case studies of industrial symbiosis have included some of the recovery opera-
tion examples provided in Annex II of the WFD (see Annex G), such as using
waste as a means of retaining energy or recycling of metals.42 Recycling and re-
covery are thus one dimension of industrial symbiosis, but are still distinguished
from it because industrial symbiosis comprises a network whereas recycling and
recovery require just one exchange.
The last resort in the hierarchy, disposal, means:
any operation which is not recovery even where the operation has
as a secondary consequence the reclamation of substances or energy.
Annex I sets out a non-exhaustive list of disposal operations.43
Disposal is not a preventive measure nor is it part of industrial symbiosis as the
definition and biological analogy of industrial symbiosis indicates that industrial
symbiosis seeks a circular, rather than linear, system, as set out in Chapter 1.
The hierarchy is ‘not without its controversies’,44 mainly as a result of the bal-
ance of benefit and burden between different waste management options varying
from sector to sector, and from place to place.45 For example, recycling can have
environmental benefits, including resource efficiency, but in some circumstances
39Case C-6/00 Abfall Service AG (ASA) v Bundesminister für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie
[2002] ECR I–01961, para 69. Incineration of waste was held to be a recovery application if
the principal objective of incineration is that the waste can fulfil a useful function, replacing
the need to use a primary source of energy.
40Case C-228/00 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany
[2003] ECR I–0149.
41WFD, recital 28.
42For example the case studies presented in Chapter 5.
43WFD, art 3(19).
44Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (Hart
Publishing 2005) 219.
45ibid 219.
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these benefits may be outweighed by the amount of greenhouse gas emissions
emitted in transporting the waste to a recycling centre, the energy used to re-
cycle, the storage required, and the quantity of clean water used.46 In general,
however, the hierarchy is ‘extremely valuable as an overall guide’ as prevention
and recycling in most circumstances are preferable to disposal.47 The critique
is also arguably unfounded as the WFD does permit a departure from the hi-
erarchy when ‘this is justified by life cycle thinking on the overall impacts of
the generation and management of such waste’.48 This permitted deviation has,
however, been said to add uncertainty and weakens the hierarchy as a policy
instrument.49 This critique does not materialise or impede industrial symbiosis
in the in case studies, as examined in Chapter 5 - the deviation arguably bene-
fits the initiation of industrial symbiosis. Furthermore, it is an example of one
of the ’best practice’ design principles of CPR systems, Design Principle 2, in
that a deviation is permitted where there is consideration of local conditions
(see Section 3.4.1).
In conclusion, industrial symbiosis supports the first layer of the preventive
principle if by-products are exchanged, resulting in the preferred hierarchy op-
tion of prevention. If, however, waste is produced, then industrial symbiosis
focuses on the middle to bottom of the priority order, the second layer of the
preventive principle. The hierarchy could therefore arguably be considered a
barrier to industrial symbiosis as prevention and reuse would be the preferred
options for organisations to pursue. If industrial symbiosis is an economically,
environmentally, and socially attractive option, this barrier is unlikely as the
overarching objective is to protect the environment and human health. So, if
industrial symbiosis is the better option in this respect, then deviation from the
46Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (n 44) 220; David
Pocklington, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box - the EU Review of the Definition of “Waste”’ (2003)
12(7) 204, 210.
47Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (n 44) 220.
48WFD, art 4(2).
49Stijn Van Ewijk and Julia A Stegemann, ‘Limitations of the Waste Hierarchy for Achieving
Absolute Reductions in Material Throughput’ (2016) 132 Journal of Cleaner Production 122,
126-127.
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hierarchy is permitted.
4.2.4 Self-sufficiency principle
The WFD also requires application of the self-sufficiency principle, which is not
a requirement of the TFEU. Article 16(2) WFD states that
[t]he network shall be designed to enable the Community as a whole
to become self-sufficient in waste disposal as well as in the recovery
of waste . . . and to enable Member States to move towards that aim
individually.
The purpose of this principle is unclear. If it is defined along state or internal
administrative boundaries, then the purpose could be based on the concept of
cost internalisation.50 In Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom
of Belgium,51 the self-sufficiency principle and proximity principle were used,
while relying on the Basel Convention,52 to justify Belgian legislation banning
the deposit or discharge in Wallonia of waste originating in other Member States
or other regions of Belgium.53 Industrial symbiosis could support this principle if
the residue material produced is classed as waste, as then industrial symbiosis is
a strategy that includes recovery operations; pursuing industrial symbiosis and
its circularity can help the Member State achieve self-sufficiency. This would
also avoid transboundary transport of waste, and thereby avoid the regulatory
requirements of, inter alia, the Basel Convention. This principle therefore can
incentivise initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis.
50Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (n 44) 219.
51Case C-2/90 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1992]
ECR I–4471.
52The Basel Convention was unratified at this time. Wheeler considers this approach ‘puz-
zling’ — Marina Wheeler, ‘The Legality of Restrictions on the Movement of Wastes under
Community Law’ (1993) 5(1) Journal of Environmental Law 133, 147. The proximity princi-
ple is defined in Section 4.2.2. The principles are related as both have geographical aspects:
the proximity principle requires treatment at the nearest appropriate installation, while the
self-sufficiency principle promotes national or Community treatment. The proximity principle
appears to be narrower as the focus is more local, while the self-sufficiency principle applies
broadly to treatment within a Member State or the EU.
53Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium (n 51) para 35.
132
4. EU regulatory and policy context of industrial symbiosis
4.2.5 Integration principle
The integration principle is set out in Article 11 TFEU: ‘Environmental pro-
tection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation
of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting
sustainable development’. Sustainable development (see Section 1.1.1) is inte-
grated in the WFD through Article 4(2) WFD, which states that when applying
the waste hierarchy, the focus of Article 4 WFD (see Section 4.2.3):
Member States shall take into account the general environmental
protection principles of precaution and sustainability, technical fea-
sibility and economic viability, protection of resources as well as the
overall environmental, human health economic and social impacts,
in accordance with Articles 1 [subject matter and scope] and 13
[protection of human health and the environment].
These various components have all been previously discussed in relation to in-
dustrial symbiosis, though whether they drive or prevent industrial symbiosis
depends on contextual factors.
4.3 EU incentives
Incentives for industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment are construed
widely in this section. Incentives range from legislation and policies that support
industrial symbiosis to those that are a manifestation of industrial symbiosis.
The order of the incentives addressed reflects the direct relation between indus-
trial symbiosis and the incentive. First, EU policy documents are examined that
explicitly reference industrial symbiosis. This is followed by incentives in the
WFD, Integrated Product Policy (IPP), and its first manifestation in ecodesign.
This section concludes by briefly mentioning other relevant legislation.
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4.3.1 EU policies
Industrial symbiosis is identified as a supportive strategy in the 2011 Roadmap
to a Resource Efficient Europe,54 2012 European Resource Efficiency Plat-
form (EREP)55 and 2015 Circular Economy Package.56 EAPs guide the de-
velopment of EU environmental policy but do not imply any legal obligation for
Member States.57 The seventh EAP,58 for the period 2013-2020, developed the
main ideas of the 2011 Roadmap.59 The 2011 Roadmap outlines how the EU
economy can be transformed into a sustainable one by 2050. The EU Commis-
sion identified that industrial symbiosis could support sustainable production
and consumption, and that Member States should continuously work together
to make the best use of wastes and by-products they produce by, for example,
‘exploring’ industrial symbiosis.60 While the Roadmap specifically identified in-
dustrial symbiosis as a supportive measure of sustainable production and con-
sumption, the seventh EAP does not specifically refer to industrial symbiosis.
Instead it sets out general objectives and guidance. Two priority objectives to
which industrial symbiosis can contribute are: turning the EU into a resource-
efficient, green and competitive low-carbon economy,61 and enhancing the sus-
tainability of EU cities.62 The links between industrial symbiosis and these aims
are discussed in Section 1.2. The seventh EAP, similarly to previous EAPs,63
54European Commission, ‘Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe’ (Communication) COM
(2011) 571 final.
55European Commission, European Resource Efficiency Platform: Manifesto and Policy
Recommendations (2012).
56European Commission, ‘Closing the Loop - an EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy’
(Communication) COM (2015) 614 final.
57For a discussion of all the previous EAPs see: Krämer, EU Environmental Law (n 28)
329-334.
58Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November
2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the
limits of our planet’ [2013] OJ L354/171 (Seventh EAP).
59European Commission, Progress Report on the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe
(Commission Staff Working Document (Working Document) SWD 206, 2014) 1.
60European Commission, ‘Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe’ (Communication) COM
(2011) 571 final, 6-7.
61Seventh EAP, annex, priority objective 2.
62Seventh EAP, annex, priority objective 8.
63Previous EAPs with the relevant sections or paragraphs on wastes: First EAP, ch 7;
Council Resolution of 17 May 1977 on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment [1977] OJ C139/1 (Second
EAP) title III, ch 3, s 2; Council Resolution of 7 February 1983 on the continuation and im-
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also highlights the importance of action on and prevention of waste by setting
out the following objectives: to reduce the amount of waste generated; to max-
imise the recycling and re-use; to link incineration to non-recyclable materials;
to limit landfilling to non-recyclable and non-recoverable waste; and to ensure
full implementation of the waste policy targets in all Member States.64 Indus-
trial symbiosis can again support these measures, including linking incineration
to non-recyclable materials, as the case studies illustrate (see Chapter 5).65
In the EREP policy recommendations, it was stated that
EU and Member States should foster industrial symbiosis by pro-
moting a pan-European network of industrial symbiosis initiatives,
under which facilitators could be connected to allow match-making,
including across borders and beyond the EU.66
The objective of EREP is to provide high-level guidance to the EU Commission,
Member States and private actors on the transition to a more resource-efficient
Europe by aiming to secure a doubling of resource productivity compared to
pre-2008 crisis resource trends.67
The EU Commission adopted its initial Circular Economy Package, including
the Waste Target Review, in July 2014. In this initial package, industrial sym-
biosis is listed as an example of a circular economy approach,68 where circular
plementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment
(1982 to 1986) [1983] OJ C46/1 (Third EAP) para 29; Council Resolution of 19 October
1987 on the continuation and implementation of a European Community policy and action
programme on the environment (1987-1992) [1987] OJ C328/1 (Fourth EAP) ch 5.2; Council
Resolution of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of policy and action in relation
to the environment and sustainable development [1993] OJ C138/1 (Fifth EAP) para 5-7;
European Commission, ‘On the Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Com-
munity “Environment 2010: Our future, Our choice” ’ (Communication) COM (2001) 31 final
(sixth EAP) ch 6.2.
64Seventh EAP, annex.
65For example, in Linköping and Norrköping Industrial Symbiosis (LNIS) incineration is a
key part of the industrial symbiosis.
66European Commission, European Resource Efficiency Platform: Manifesto and Policy
Recommendations (n 55) 7.
67ibid 14.
68European Commission, ‘Towards a Circular Economy: A Zero Waste Programme for
Europe’ (Communication) COM (2014) 398 final, 4.
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economy systems are described as keeping the added value in products for as long
as possible and eliminating waste, by using products again and again beyond
their end-of-life.69 In December 2014, the Commission withdrew this Package,
but committed to presenting a new package in 2015, which it did.70 The circular
economy was briefly discussed in Chapter 1 as industrial symbiosis can be con-
sidered a strategy that can achieve a circular economy (see Section 1.2.2). The
benefits of turning the EU into a circular economy are identified as: creating
local jobs and opportunities for social integration, lowering energy consumption
and carbon dioxide levels, and supporting the EU’s commitment to industrial
symbiosis.71 As part of the Circular Economy Package, the Commission adopted
a legislative proposal to review waste targets, also revised in 2015:72
• Common EU target for recycling 65% of municipal and 75% of packaging
waste by 2030;
• Reduce landfill to maximum of 10% of municipal waste by 2030;
• Ban landfilling of separately collected waste;
• Promote economic instruments to discourage landfilling;
• Simplify and improve definitions and harmonised calculation methods for
recycling rates;
• Concrete measures to promote re-use and stimulate industrial symbiosis;
and
• Economic incentives for producers to put greener products on the market
and support recovery and recycling schemes.
69European Commission, ‘Towards a Circular Economy: A Zero Waste Programme for
Europe’ (Communication) COM (2014) 398 final, 2.
70European Commission, ‘Closing the Loop - an EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy’
(Communication) COM (2015) 614 final.
71ibid 2.
72European Commission, ‘Circular Economy’ (17 March 2017) 〈ec.europa.eu/environment/
circular-economy〉 accessed 1 May 2017.
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Implementation of industrial symbiosis can help achieve these targets. The
2014 Package identified additional particular targets in relation to job creation
and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions as a result of implementing circular
measures (and specifically identifying industrial symbiosis),73 but the recasting
of the Circular Economy Package is however less concrete and includes no such
targets.
4.3.2 Extended producer responsibility
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) was first formulated and developed
by Lindhqvist in a 1990 report to the Swedish Ministry of the Environment.74
Lindhqvist stated that the concept entails the shifting of responsibility for waste
management from consumers and authorities, the traditional assignees, to the
producer of the products.75 In this way it is an embodiment of the polluter-
pays principle (see Section 4.2.1). This concept of shifting responsibilities was
not new,76 and is not new to EU waste law either. EPR has been seen, for
73In the 2014 Package, the targets predicted industrial symbiosis would create more than
180 000 direct jobs in the EU by 2030 in addition to the 400000 jobs that were estimated to be
created by the implementation of the waste legislation in force. The targets were also antici-
pated to satisfy between 10 and 40% of the raw material demand in the EU, and contribute to
the EU target of a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. European Commission,
‘Towards a Circular Economy: A Zero Waste Programme for Europe’ (Communication) COM
(2014) 398 final, 9; European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document
Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 2008/98/EC on waste, 94/62/EC on packag-
ing and packaging waste, 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, 2000/53/EC on end-of-life
vehicles, 2006/66/EC on batteries and accumulators and waste batteries and accumulators,
and 2012/19/EU on waste electrical and electronic equipment (Commission Staff Working
Document SWD 207 final 18, 2014).
74Thomas Lindhqvist and Karl Lidgren, ‘Modeller för Förlängt Producentansvar’ in Min-
istry of the Environment (ed), Fraan vaggan till Graven - Sex Studier av Varors Miljö-
paaverkan (Allmänna förl 1990); Thomas Lindhqvist, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility in
Cleaner Production: Policy Principle to Promote Environmental Improvements of Product
Systems’ (PhD thesis, Lund University 2000) ii.
75Lindhqvist (n 74) 29.
76For example: the German Minister of the Environment, Hans Töpfer, proposed an EPR
approach for the Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste in 1990 — Per Olof Busch
and Helge Jörgens, ‘Breaking the Deadlock - Voluntary Agreements and Regulatory Measures
in German Waste Management’ (ECPR, 2001, Grenoble, France); Xerox, a company offering
products including photocopiers, has recovered products since 1960s. This remanufacturing
system was formalized in the late 1980s and early 1990s — Wendy Kerr and Chris Ryan,
‘Eco-Efficiency Gains from Remanufacturing: A Case Study of Photocopier Remanufacturing
at Fuji Xerox Australia’ (2001) 9 Journal of Cleaner Production 75, 77.
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example, in the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive77 and the Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment Directive,78 and has resulted in significant economic and
environment benefits both in and outside EU.79
EPR was introduced in the WFD as
one of the means to support the design and production of goods
which take into full account and facilitate the efficient use of re-
sources during their whole life cycle including their repair, re-use,
disassembly and recycling without compromising the free circula-
tion of goods on the internal market.80
EPR means extending the responsibility of the natural or legal person who pro-
fessionally develops, manufactures, processes, treats, sells or imports products
(producer of product)81 — a similar definition is used by the OECD to support
its EPR project aimed at minimising municipal waste streams.82 What producer
responsibility entails and the length of it is not defined in the WFD, nor in its
accompanying guidance document.83 Instead, Member States may take legisla-
tive or non-legislative measures to define and implement EPR. An amendment
is proposed to amend Article 8(1) to add the following sub-paragraph at the
77Directive 2000/53/ECL of 18 September 2000 on end-of life vehicles [2000] OJ L269/34
(ELV Directive). The phrase ‘extended producer responsibility’ is not used. Instead the
concept is embodied by the responsibilities assigned in the Directive of collecting (art 5),
treating (art 6), and reusing and recovering (art 7).
78Council Directive 2012/19/EU of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic equipment
[2012] OJ L197/38 (WEEE Directive). Similarly to the End of Vehicles Directive, this makes
no reference ot ‘extended producer reference’ but refers to treatment (art 6) and recovery (art
7).
79In Connecticut — Product Stewardship Institute, Connecticut Extended Producer Re-
sponsibility Program Evaluation: Summary and Recommendations (January 2017). In Ger-
many — Environment Policy Committee, Extended Producer Responsibility Phase 2: Case
Study on the German Packaging Ordinance (Working Paper ENV/EPOC.PPC(97)21/REV2,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development May 1998).
80WFD, recital 27.
81WFD, art 8(1).
82For more information on the project see Section 4.1 and OECD, ‘Resource Productivity
and Waste’ (2016) 〈oecd .org/env/waste〉 accessed 8 August 2014. Its definition of EPR
is: ‘an environmental policy approach in which the producer’s responsibility physical and/or
financial, for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage phase or a product’s life cycle’
— OECD, Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments (OECD
2011) 18.
83European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37).
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end: ‘Such measures may also include the establishment of extended producer
responsibility schemes defining specific operational and financial obligations for
producers of products’.84 There is also a proposal to amend the WFD to add
Article 8a on general requirements for EPR schemes within Member States.85
The incentive of shifting the physical and financial burden to the producer pro-
vides the core rationale for EPR.86 This makes EPR a ‘next generation’ environ-
mental policy that relies on market incentives instead of command-and-control
mandates.87 One of the main advantages of EPR is that it can result in access to
specialised expertise regarding the product design and technology development,
and incentives for waste recovery and green design.88 It also provides flexibility
as the producer decides how to comply with EPR measures, and it results in dy-
namic policy schemes in order to respond to changes in market, production and
processing technologies.89 This reflexive nature of EPR incentivises the produc-
ers, instead of the local authority, to incorporate waste management into their
overall product strategies.90
84European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directives 2008/98/EC on waste’ (Communication) COM (2015) 595 final
15. Note that this is the wording following the first reading by EU Parliament (and adopted
by them on 14 March 2017) as part of the ordinary legislative procedure.
85ibid 16. Note that these proposals were amended in the first reading by EU Parliament
(and adopted by them on 14 March 2017) as part of the ordinary legislative procedure. See
European Parliament (n 14).
86Priscilla Schqart, ‘The Polluter-Pays Principle’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong,
and Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward
Elgar 2010) 248; Harri Kalimo and others, ‘Greening the Economy through Design Incentives:
Allocating Extended Producer Responsibility’ (2012) 21(6) EELR 274, 274.
87For example: Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders and Laggards: Next Gen-
eration Environmental Regulation (Greenleaf Publishing 2002) 198; Noah Sachs, ‘Planning
the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the
United States’ (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 51, 53.
88Reid Lifset, ‘Take it Back: Extended Producer Responsibility as a Form of Incentive-
Based Policy’ (1993) 21(4) Journal of Resource Management and Technology 163, 163; Thomas
Lindhqvist and Reid Lifset, ‘What’s in a Name: Producer or Product Responsibility’ (1997)
1(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 6, 7; Reid Lifset and Thomas Lindhqvist, ‘Trust, but Verify’
(2002) 5(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 9, 9; Reid Lifset and Thomas Lindhqvist, ‘Producer
Responsibility at a Turning Point?’ (2008) 12(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 144, 144;
Reid Lifset, Atalay Atasu, and Naoko Tojo, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility: National,
International and Practical Perspective’ (2013) 17(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 162, 162;
Kieren Mayers and Scott Butler, ‘Producer Responsibility Organizations Development and
Operations: A Case Study’ (2013) 17(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 277, 277.
89Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Trust, but Verify’ (n 88) 9; Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Producer
Responsibility at a Turning Point?’ (n 88) 144.
90Maria Lee, ‘New Generation Regulation? The Case of End-of-Life Vehicle’ (2002) 11(4)
European Environmental Law Review 114, 116; Alice Castell, Roland Clift, and Chris France,
‘Extended Producer Responsibility Policy in the European Union: A Horse or a Camel?’
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The concept of EPR resonates metaphorically with the concept of Industrial
Ecology (IE) as both seek to move from linear and unidirectional to cyclical
and closed loops,91 and it can also be considered a manifestation of industrial
symbiosis. Therefore it can be an incentive, albeit only where implemented by
a Member State. When a product, for which there exist national measures of
EPR, becomes waste, the producer may be able to sell this waste to another
organisation, which results in an industrial symbiosis exchange. In such cases,
the issue raised of when a material becomes waste, discussed in Sections 3.2.2
and 4.4.1, is important to determine when the producer is required to manage
the waste. Similarly, it needs to be established when the waste ceases to be waste
and becomes another organisation’s material as this is when the EPR of the
previous producer ends (see Section 3.2.2). A similar argument could possibly
be made for by-products as nothing in the WFD explicitly prevents EPR from
applying to by-products. Applying EPR to by-products is unlikely though,
as the guidance document accompanying the WFD uses products to refer to
‘primary’ products, that is the principal material produced, and production
residue, which includes materials not deliberately produced which may or may
not be waste. By-products fall in this latter category.92
Having established what EPR is and why it is relevant, how EPR can be im-
plemented is now addressed. EPR is applied through, for example, economic,
legal, and voluntary instruments.93 Examples of measures implementing EPR
(2004) 8(1-2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 4, 4; Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges,
Change and Decision-making (n 44) 230; Robert G Lee, ‘Marketing Products under the
Extended Producer Responsibility Framework: A Battery of Issues’ (2008) 17(3) RECIEL
298, 301; Sandra Cassotta, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility in Waste Regulations in a
Multilevel Global Approach: Nanotechnology as a Case Study’ (2012) 5 European Energy and
Environmental Law Review 198, 201; Kalimo and others (n 86) 274. For more on reflexive
law see: Gunther Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17(2)
Law & Society Review 239; William E Scheuerman, ‘Reflexive Law and the Challenges of
Globalization’ (2001) 9(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 81; Sanford E Gaines, ‘Reflexive
Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development’ (2002) 10 Buffalo Environmental Law
Journal 1.
91Lifset, Atasu, and Tojo (n 88) 162.
92European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37) 13.
93Lee, ‘New Generation Regulation? The Case of End-of-Life Vehicle’ (n 90) 116; Chris
van Rossem, Naoko Tojo, and Thomas Lindhqvist, Extended Producer Responsibility: An
Examination of its Impact on Innovation and Greening Products (Greenpeace International
2006).
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are provided in the WFD. They include: accepting returned products and the
waste that remains after those products have been used, the subsequent man-
agement of the waste and financial responsibility for such activities, or the obli-
gation to provide publicly available information as to the extent to which each
product is re-usable and recyclable.94 In Chapter 5 it is investigated whether
there are any national implementations of EPR relevant to industrial symbio-
sis are examined in Chapter 5. Lindhqvist distinguished between four types of
producer responsibility: physical responsibility, economic responsibility, liabil-
ity and informative responsibility.95 These help identify the most appropriate
mechanisms. He states that ownership, where the producer retains ownership of
his products throughout their lifecycle, is central to all these types of producer
responsibility (see Figure 4.1).96 Clift has also likened the implied relationship
resulting from EPR to leasing as the supplier retains responsibility for mate-
rial item.97 Property rights in relation to waste were examined in Chapter 3
and are revisited in Chapter 5. Physical responsibility is where the producer is
involved in physical management of the products and/or their effects through
development of technology or provision of services. Economic responsibility is
where a producer covers all or part of the costs (directly or by a special fee)
for managing the wastes at the end of the product’s life, for example, for the
collection, processing and disposal. Liability is where responsibility for envi-
ronmental damages caused by a product is borne by its producer. This may
encompass damages occurring at various stages in the life cycle including use
and final disposal. Finally, informative responsibility is where the producer is
required to provide information on the product and its effects in various life
cycle stages.98 These different types of responsibility are important to distin-
guish between and consider when assessing current national implementations in
Chapter 5, and when making observations in Chapter 6.
94WFD, art 8(1).
95Lindhqvist (n 74) 38-39.
96ibid 38-39.
97Roland Clift, ‘The ECTEL Trials’ (1997) 1(2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 3, 3.
98Lindhqvist (n 74) 38-39.
99Adopted from: ibid 38.
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Figure 4.1: Types of producer responsibility.99
There are concerns of EPR and issues that need to be resolved. For example,
EPR policies are likely to be implemented with increased cost to industry and
society, but the costs and potential savings are not defined.100 EPR may enhance
recycling, but also diminish existing initiatives on reuse (which is higher up the
waste hierarchy) or reduce any incentives of re-designing products.101 There are
also challenges of free-riders and government concerns about antitrust (anti-
competitive behaviour), and determining how responsibilities should be shared
along product chains.102 Practical issues include who will pay for historical
waste, that is those items that are already in use and were not designed for
EPR,103 and what happens to the EPR of products whose producers have gone
out of business.104 The extent to which these uncertainties have been resolved at
national level, and their effect on the potential incentive of EPR, are examined
in Chapter 5 where EPR mechanisms exist.
100Mayers and Butler (n 88) 287; Clift (n 97) 4.
101Mark Dempsey and others, Individual Producer Responsibility: A Review of Practical Ap-
proaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE Directive (Work-
ing Paper, INSEAD Collection 2010/71/TOM/ISIC, INSEAD 2010) 11; Lifset, Atasu, and
Tojo (n 88) 162 and 165.
102Clift (n 97) 4; Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Trust, but Verify’ (n 88) 9; Lifset and Lindhqvist,
‘Producer Responsibility at a Turning Point?’ (n 88) 144.
103Roland Clift and Chris France, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility in the EU: A Visible
March of Folly’ (2006) 10(4) Journal of Industrial Ecology 5, 5.
104Lifset and Lindhqvist, ‘Producer Responsibility at a Turning Point?’ (n 88) 144.
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4.3.3 Waste management and prevention plans
Articles 28 and 29 WFD set out requirements for the drawing up of national
waste management and prevention plans respectively.105 In the list provided
in Article 28(3) WFD concerned with what should be included in these plans,
industrial symbiosis would fall under ‘general waste management policies, in-
cluding planned waste management technologies and methods, or policies for
waste posing specific management problems’.106 These do not provide an in-
centive or barrier at EU level, but do provide a possible avenue for industrial
symbiosis to be incentivised at national level. The national implementations
of these articles, and whether these enable industrial symbiosis, are therefore
assessed in Chapter 5 for each of the case studies.
4.3.4 Integrated product policy and ecodesign
The EU IPP aims ‘to reduce the environmental impacts from products through-
out their life cycle, harnessing, where possible, a market driven approach, within
which competitiveness concerns are integrated’.107 The IPP thus works at two
levels: reducing the environmental impact of a product, which embodies the pre-
ventive principle, and attributing the costs of such environmental impacts ap-
propriately, which incorporates the polluter-pays principle (see Section 4.2.1).108
The IPP approach is based on five key principles: life cycle thinking, working
with the market, stakeholder involvement, continuous improvement, and a vari-
ety of policy instruments.109 Both the overall aim of the IPP and its principles
mirror those of industrial symbiosis.
105WFD, art 28(1) states that: Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities
establish, in accordance with Articles 1, 4, 13 and 16, one or more waste management plans.
WFD, art 29(1) states that Member States shall establish, in accordance with Articles 1 and
4, waste prevention programmes.
106WFD, art 28(3)(e).
107European Commission, ‘Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-cycle
Thinking’ (Communication) COM (2003) 302 final, 5-6.
108Rosalind Malcolm, ‘Integrated Product Policy - a New Regulatory Paradigm for a Con-
sumer Society?’ (2005) 14(5) European Environmental Law Review 134, 136.
109European Commission, ‘Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-cycle
Thinking’ (Communication) COM (2003) 302 final, 4-5.
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The ecodesign of products is ‘a crucial factor’ for EU strategy on IPP.110 The
Ecodesign Directive was recast in 2009111 and provides ‘a framework for the
setting of Community ecodesign requirements for energy-related products with
the aim of ensuring the free movement of such products within the internal
market’.112 Ecodesign is ‘the integration of environmental aspects into product
design with the aim of improving the environmental performance of the product
throughout its whole life cycle’.113 Industrial symbiosis is a potential strategy
to be used for ecodesign as it improves the performance of a product at the
start of its life cycle, through using another industry’s waste or by-products,
and then again at the end if the product is placed into an industrial symbiosis
exchange at the end of its life.
The Ecodesign Directive only applies to energy-related products, which are de-
fined as:
any good that has an impact on energy consumption during use
which is placed on the market and/or put into service, and includes
parts intended to be incorporated into energy-related products cov-
ered by this Directive which are placed on the market and/or put
into service as individual parts for end-users and of which the envi-
ronmental performance can be assessed independently.114
This has broadened the scope of previous incarnations, which had limited ecode-
sign to energy-using products.115 Threshold criteria are included in Article 15(2)
110European Commission, ‘Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-cycle
Thinking’ (Communication) COM (2003) 302 final, preamble 5.
111Previous directive: Council Directive 2005/32/EC of 6 July 2005 establishing a framework
for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-using products and amending Council Di-
rective 92/42/EEC and Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council [2005] OJ L191/29, amended by Council Directive 2008/28/EC of 11 March
2008 amending Directive 2005/32/EC establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign re-
quirements for energy-using products, as well as Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives
96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission
[2008] OJ L81/48.
112Ecodesign Directive, art 1(1).
113Ecodesign Directive, art 2(23).
114Ecodesign Directive, art 2(1).
115Rosalind Malcolm, ‘Ecodesign Laws and the Environmental Impact of our Consumption of
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of the Directive, these include: number of units traded per year, significant en-
vironmental impact, and significant potential for improvement of environmental
impact. There are also further limitations, including that the Directive does not
apply where other legislation addresses the issue116 and that the general crite-
ria in the Directive ‘create considerable latitude’,117 that result in the Directive
being favourable for industries.118 Malcolm states that in spite of this, there is
still:
potential, even if only as a reflexive effect of its imposition on man-
ufacturers to adopt life cycle-thinking, for making dramatic changes
in manufacturing industry and on the new products which will begin
to emerge.119
The effect of these limitations is that ecodesign is a limited incentive for indus-
trial symbiosis as it only relates to certain products, and even for those products
the impact is limited.
The proposals amending the 2008 WFD (see Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2) also in-
clude a proposal to
present a comprehensive review of Union ecodesign legislation in or-
der to broaden its scope to gover all main product groups, including
non-energy related product groups, and gradually to include rele-
vant resource-efficiency features in the mandatory requirements for
product design and to adapt eco-labelling provisions.120
This would address some of the issues highlighted above, and a review would
Products’ (2011) 23(3) Journal of Environmental Law 487, 495; Rosalind Malcolm, ‘Integrated
Product Policy: Products and their Impact on Energy’ (2011) 3(1) Journal of Law in the Built
Environment 48, 55.
116Ecodesign Directive, art 15(2)(c)(i).
117Malcolm, ‘Ecodesign Laws and the Environmental Impact of our Consumption of Prod-
ucts’ (n 115) 497.
118ibid 497.
119ibid 497.
120European Parliament (n 14) art 37a(d).
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provide an opportunity to include more substantial incentives in ecodesign for
industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.121
4.3.5 Other legislation
The main incentives applicable to solid, non-hazardous forms of waste considered
in this thesis have been presented in this section, but they are not an exhaus-
tive list of examples. Other examples of regulations and policies that provide
incentives, or the foundation for incentives at national level, are the Landfill
Directive122 and ecolabels.123 The aim of the Landfill Directive is to provide
‘for measures, procedures and guidance to prevent or reduce as far as possible
negative effects on the environment . . . and on the global environment’,124 which
both explicitly and implicitly support the aim of reducing the quantity of waste
being sent to landfill by imposing cost and administrative burdens. The Landfill
Directive could be amended to provide incentives by including waste manage-
ment strategies. National incentives, such as landfill tax, will be addressed in
the next chapter for the selected case studies.
Ecolabels are part of a voluntary EU scheme that produces labels on certain
products to enable consumers to choose those which have been recognised as
less harmful to the environment.125 Ecolabels provide an incentive for industrial
symbiosis as industrial symbiosis can result in products being less harmful to
the environment as a result of its benefits discussed in Chapter 1. It is only a
minor incentive as it is a voluntary scheme and industrial symbiosis only affects
121For other proposals and ongoing research on reviewing of ecodesign, see: Klaus Tonner
and Rosalind Malcolm, How an EU Lifespan Guarantee Model could be Implemented Across
the European Union (JURI Committee of the European Parliament 2017).
122Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste [1999] OJ L182/1
(Landfill Directive).
123Council Regulation (EC) No 66/2010 of 25 November 2009 on the EU Ecolabel [2010] OJ
L27/1 (Ecolabel Regulation). This repeals previous regulation on the EU ecolabel: Regulation
(EC) No 1980/2000 of 17 July 2000 on a revised Community eco-label award scheme [2010]
OJ L237/1.
124Landfill Directive, art 1(1).
125The ecolabel scheme ‘applies to any goods or services which are supplied for distribution,
consumption or use on the Community market whether in return for payment or free of charge’.
Ecolabel Regulation, art 2(1).
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a limited number of criteria for ecolabels.126 For example, industrial symbiosis
only affects two out of numerous criteria for fertilisers under the Commission
Decision of 3 November 2006 on the criteria for soil improvers.127
There are also particular incentives in relation to particular streams of waste,
such as the Packaging Waste Directive128 and End-of-Life Vehicles Directive.129
These are beyond the scope of this thesis as legislation and policies relevant to
all forms of waste form its focus (see Section 1.5).
4.4 EU barriers
This section focuses on the two main regulatory barriers of definitions and waste
requirements identified in industrial symbiosis literature.130 The majority of the
section covers the definitions in the WFD, as waste requirements require most
details to be set out in national legislation, and will therefore be examined in
Chapter 5.
126The criteria for ecolabels are established by Commission Decisions and vary according to
different product groups. General criteria that these decisions must comply with are set out
in Ecolabel Regulation, art 6.
127Commission Decision of 3 November 2006 establishing revised ecological criteria and the
related assessment and verification requirements for the award of the Community eco-label to
soil improvers [2006] OJ L325/28 (Soil Improver Decision). The two ways are: it affects the
information that needs to be provided on main input materials (those over 5% of volume) from
which product has been manufactured; and it affects the information that will be provided
on the ecolabel itself as to how the product promotes recycling of materials can be included.
Soil Improver Decision, annex, Ecological Criteria 8(e) and 9.
128Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste [1994]
OJ L365/10, as amended
129ELV Directive as amended.
130For example: Rosalind Malcolm and Roland Clift, ‘Barriers to Industrial Ecology: The
Strange Case of “the Tombesi Bypass”’ (2002) 6(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 4, 4; Dick
van Beers and others, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the Australian Minerals Industry: The Cases
of Kwinana and Gladstone’ (2007) 11(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 55, 67; Olli Salmi and
others, ‘Governing the Interplay between Industrial Ecosystems and Environmental Regula-
tion’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 119, 122; Artem Golev, Glen D Corder, and
Damien Giurco, ‘Barriers to Industrial Symbiosis: Insights from the Use of a Maturity Guide’
(2014) 19(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 141, 142; Maria Holgado, Dai Morgan, and Steve
Evans, ‘Exploring the Scope of Industrial Symbiosis: Implications for Practitioners’ (2016) 52
Sustainable Design and Manufacturing 169, 175.
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4.4.1 Waste Framework Directive definitions
The definitions of waste and by-product are vital as it determines the scope of
the WFD, which, as highlighted in the previous section, is central to EU law and
policy on waste. Waste as defined in the WFD also has a role in determining
the scope and application of other EU instruments directly concerning waste
management, such as the Landfill Directive,131 EU Waste Shipment Regula-
tion132 for only trans-frontier movements of waste, and waste is excluded from
the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals.133 In this way, the central definition of waste ensures compatibil-
ity of all EU waste instruments,134 and interpreting its meaning is crucial in
confronting the waste problem.135
The definition is also central to the definition of industrial symbiosis (see Sec-
tion 1.2), and therefore can provide the resource boundaries relevant to Design
Principle 1(a) (see Section 3.4.1). Simultaneously, the definition can also pose
as a potential barrier to industrial symbiosis.136 This section assesses the ex-
tent to which the definition is a barrier. The definitions of by-product and
end-of-waste are also examined as these provide possible avenues to overcome
or avoid the barrier that the definition of waste can pose. Examining these
three concepts of waste, by-product, and end-of-waste also enables a logical and
131Landfill Directive, art 2(a).
132Council Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste [2006] OJ
L190/1, art 2(1).
133Council Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European
Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC)
No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/
769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/
EC [2007] OJ L136/3, art 2(2).
134Gorka Gallego, ‘Waste Legislation in the European Union’ (2001) 10(12) European Envi-
ronmental Law Review 342, 349; Ilona Cheyne, ‘The Definition of Waste in EC Law’ (2002)
14 Journal of Environmental Law 61, 72.
135Scotford (n 32) 387.
136For example: Golev, Corder, and Giurco (n 130) 143. More generally, recyling companies
have also oftne found the definition of waste an obstacle to environmental protection — Lau-
rent Bontoux and Fabio Leone, The Legal Definition of Waste and its Impact on Waste Man-
agement in Europe (EUR 17716 EN, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies November
1997) 32; Eva Prongrácz and Veikko J Pohjola, ‘Re-defining Waste, the Concept of Ownership
and the Role of Waste Management’ (2004) 40 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 141,
142.
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systematic investigation of the subject of waste law and policy.137 Additionally,
definitions in law are important,138 especially in a system of regulatory control
where what can and cannot be controlled,139 and when, needs to be defined.
Definitions in the context of this thesis set out what is covered when by waste
law. They therefore have a role in the three components of control systems:
standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification.140 Defini-
tions set out what can be controlled and when, which affects what standards can
be set, what information is to be gathered, and what behaviour-modification is
required. Legal definitions should be sufficiently wide to cover what needs to
be controlled, while simultaneously adequately guiding behaviour and avoiding
over-regulation.141 Usually, fulfilling all these requirements is difficult,142 and
this is what much of the discussion focuses on. Definitions also matter outside
the law; Hempel states that definitions are ‘the most obvious, and perhaps the
only adequate, method of characterising a scientific concept’,143 and Martin and
Odell argue that a concept without a definition is not even a concept, ‘[i]t is
137Huntington Cairns, ‘A Note on Legal Definitions’ (1936) 36 Columbia Law Review 1099,
1100.
138James B Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (Little Brown and company 1898)
190; Ezra R Thayer, Legal Essays (Boston Book 1908) 220; Francis Lieber, Legal and Political
Hermeneutics (CC Little and J Brown 1838) 190. See also: H L A Hart, The Concept of Law
(3rd edn, OUP 2012) 13-17.
139Ilona Cheyne and Michael Purdue, ‘Fitting Definition to Purpose: The Search for a Sat-
isfactory Definition of Waste’ (1995) 7(2) Journal of Environmental Law 149, 149. See also:
John Thomas Smith II, ‘The Challenges of Environmentally Sound and Efficient Regulation of
Waste - the Need for Enhanced International Understanding’ (1993) 5(1) Journal of Environ-
mental Law 91. Smith states that an understanding of the definition issues is ‘a prerequisite
to the design and implementation of sensible and compatible national and international waste
management requirements.
140Standard-setting consists of a standard, goal, or set of values against which the actual
state of the system to be controlled can be compared. Information-gathering or monitoring
produces knowledge about the state of the system required for comparisons. Behaviour-
modification is needed to change the state of the system in order to align with the standard,
goal, or set of values. Christopher Hood and others, ‘Explaining Risk Regulation Regimes:
Exploring the “Minimal Feasible Response” Hypothesis’ (1992) 1(2) Health, Risk and Society
151, 151 and 154; Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin, The Government
of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (OUP 2004) 23-27; Colin Scott, ‘Regulation
in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’ in Jacint Jordana and
David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for
the Age of Governance (Edward Elgar 2005) 146-147.
141Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1972) 93 LQR 195, 198-199; Hood and
others (n 140) 155; Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (n 140) 23-27; Scott, ‘Regulation in the
Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’ (n 140) 146-147.
142Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 149.
143Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Prentice Hall 1966) 85.
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literally meaningless’.144
Economic, environmental, and social implications, such as certain regulatory re-
quirements and costs, may follow if a substance is classed as waste. As Pongrácz
and Pohjola state:
To conceptually describe waste is not the main purpose of these
definitions. The label “waste” does not necessarily mean that the
thing is an ultimate waste, rather, it means that it will be treated
as waste.145
The waste requirements can pose as disincentives and barriers for organisations
wanting to initiate and sustain industrial symbiosis.146 The requirements and
the extent to which they inhibit industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment
are discussed in this chapter where at EU level, and in Chapter 5 in relation to
specific national legislation.
Similarly to waste, by-product is a key component of the definition of industrial
symbiosis. The definition of by-product is also significant because the waste
requirements alluded to in the previous paragraph are avoided as they do not
apply if a substance or material is classed as a by-product.
Finally, the definition of end-of-waste is important as it determines when a
144James Martin and James J Odell, Object-oriented Methods: A Foundation (Prentice Hall
1998) 19.
145Prongrácz and Pohjola (n 136) 142.
146Frosch and Gallopoulous already recognised in their article popularising IE that some
waste regulation would make waste minimisation through IE more difficult than waste disposal
— Robert A Frosch and Nicholas E Gallopoulos, ‘Strategies for Manufacturing’ (1989) 189
Scientific American 152, 157. Malcolm and Clift called the burden of waste enforcement regime
‘another barrier to the application of industrial ecology principles’ —Malcolm and Clift (n 130)
6. David Pocklington states that ‘[a]ssigning the term ‘waste’ to [materials used in industrial
ecology] is illogical, because often the subsequent use of waste-derived materials demands
a greater degree of compositional certainty than necessary for more conventionally sourced
products, for example in the substitution of fossil fuels in some industrial processes’ — David
Pocklington, ‘How Sustainable is the Concept of “Waste”?’ (2002) 14(4) Environmental Law
and Management 208, 217. See also, for example: Pierre Desrochers, ‘Market Processes and
the Closing of “Industrial Loops”: A Historical Reappraisal’ (2000) 4(1) Journal of Industrial
Ecology 29, 30 and 40; John Tieman, ‘The Broad Concept of Waste and the Case of ARCO-
Chemie and Hees-EPON’ (2000) 9(12) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 327,
327-328; Prongrácz and Pohjola (n 136) 143.
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material which was classed as waste is no longer to be controlled under waste
law and policy. This is relevant to the discussion on property rights and how
these are affected in exchanges of waste and by-products in industrial symbiosis.
The following sub-sections investigate what can and cannot be controlled, and
when, in the EU regulatory and policy context by examining the definitions of
waste, by-product and end-of-waste.
Waste
The current definition of waste is in Article 3(1) WFD:
“waste” means any substance or object which the holder discards or
intends or is required to discard.
The core of this definition, ‘which the holder discards or intends or is required
to discard’, is transposed word per word in the national legislation of the case
studies. In Denmark, the definition of waste is implemented by the Waste Or-
dinance (Affaldsbekendtgoerelsen),147 in the Netherlands by the Environmental
Protection Act (Wet milieubeheer),148 in Sweden the definition of waste is de-
fined in the Swedish Environmental Code,149 and in the UK it is transposed by
the Environmental Protection Act 1990.150
147Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 1309 af 18.12.2012 om affald som aendret 2012 (Danish Waste
Ordinance) ch 2 s 2. Definition of waste (translation is author’s own): ‘Waste in this ordinance
is understood as any substance or object, see Annex 2, which the holder discards or intends
or is required to discard’.
148Wet milieubeheer van 13 juni 1979 1979 (Dutch Environmental Protection Act) art
1(1)(1). The only difference between this definition and the WFD is that in the WFD it
is defined as ‘any substance or any object’, while in the Act as ‘all substances, preparation or
objects’ (translation is author’s own).
149Miljöbalken SFS 1998:808 1998 (Swedish Environmental Code) ch 5 s 1. The original
definition in Swedish reflects the wording of the WFD in Swedish.
150Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 75(5): Waste ‘means anything that is waste within
the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on waste’. Waste is also defined in: Environmental Permitting (England and Wales)
Regulations 2016, SI 2016/1154, reg 2(1). This that that waste ‘is within the meaning of
Article 3(1) of the Waste Framework Directive’, subject to conditions including that it is not
excluded from the scope of that Directive. The Waste Framework Directive is defined as the
2008 WFD in ibid reg 3.
151
4. EU regulatory and policy context of industrial symbiosis
The current WFD is the second revision since its first implementation in 1975.151
Most of the case law on the definition of waste was decided before the most
recent 2008 WFD implementation. The relevance of this case law therefore
needs to be established. Under the first WFD in 1975,152 Article 1(a) stated
that waste is ‘any substance or object which the holder disposes of or is required
to dispose of pursuant to the provisions of national law in force’. The two main
differences with the current definition are that there is no reference to intention
and that the term dispose instead of discard is used. Vessoso and Zanetti153
is the only case decided under this 1975 definition considered in this thesis. It
is relied upon for guidance on characteristics of waste, rather than any aspect
related to the definitional differences between the current and 1975 definitions.
Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)154 in 1995
stated that their finding in the Vessoso and Zanetti judgment was not affected by
the 1991 amendments made to the 1975 WFD in Commission of the European
Communities v Federal Republic of Germany.155 In 1991, the definition was
amended to ‘any substance or object in the categories set out in Annex I which
the holder discards or intends or is required to discard’.156 The change of
the term ‘dispose’ in the 1975 definition to ‘discard’ in the 1991 indicates an
intended effect.157 Only the English version of the 1991 Directive changed the
verb used, implying that the change was for linguistic rather than substantive
reasons.158 Cheyne and Purdue consider the English dictionary definition of
discard to be narrower in scope than dispose, as discard is associated with the
151First revision of the WFD: Council Directive 75/442/EC of 15 July 1975 on waste [1975]
OJ L194/39 (1975 WFD) as amended by Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991
on waste [1991] OJ L78/32 (1991 WFD). Second revision of the WFD: Council Directive
2006/12/EC of 5 April 2006 on waste [2006] OJ L114/9 (2006 WFD).
1521975 WFD.
153Joined Cases C-206/88–C-207/88 Vessoso and Zanetti [1990] ECR I–1461.
154The distinction between CJEU and European Court of Justice is taken into consideration
but for this chapter the term CJEU will be used when referring to EU case law.
155Case C-422/92 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany
[1995] ECR I–1124, paras 22-23.
1561975 WFD as amended by 1991 WFD, art 1(a).
157Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 154-155; David Wilkinson, ‘Time to Discard the Concept of
Waste?’ (1999) 1 Environmental Law Review 172, 178-180.
158Ludwig Krämer, ‘The Distinction between Product and Waste in Community Law’ (2003)
11(1) Environmental Liability 3, 7. Chalmers believes that there is ‘no real reason’ for the
meaning of these two terms to be ‘substantially different’ — Chalmers (n 21) 261.
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reason for disposal being that the object is unwanted, whereas disposing suggests
a deliberate and thoughtful act, with intent to get rid of that object.159 Disposal
being defined as a waste operation in Article 1(e) in the 1991 Directive, and in
Article 3(19) of the current WFD (see Section 4.2.3), indicates that dispose and
discard are not meant to be interchangeable. The subsequent 2006 WFD did not
amend this definition.160 The only difference with the current definition is that
instead of being by reference to the purpose of the WFD,161 the definition was
restricted to substances and objects listed under Annex I. Cheyne and Purdue
stated that the advantage of such a list is that it can help avoid over-regulation,
however, it does require frequent updating in response to technological changes
and to prevent exploitation of loopholes.162 This difference does not prevent the
case law being relevant as the CJEU held that the list was insufficient and could
not be conclusively relied on to classify a substance as waste.163 Therefore, the
classification of waste still needed the support of other characteristics. It is
these characteristics identified in the case law that are examined in relation to
the 2008 WFD and industrial symbiosis. The definitional differences, therefore,
had limited effect on the actual interpretation of the concept, which has largely
remained unchanged and indicates that case law under previous WFDs can
be considered relevant. Furthermore, the European Commission guidance on
interpretation of the key provisions of WFD considers case law decided under
repealed directives relevant.164
The number of litigations on the definition of waste indicates the complexity
of waste regulations.165 The difficulty lies in finding a definition of waste which
159Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 155. Similarly, in German and French translation of dispose
and discard, discarding is a prerequisite for disposal of waste and the two could not or need not
coincide — Jürgen Fluck, ‘The Term “Waste” in EU Law’ (1994) 3 European Environmental
Law Review 79, 80.
1602006 WFD, art 1(a).
161Case C-9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus
[2002] ECR I–3533, paras 24 and 25; Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 149.
162Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 149.
163Case C-235/02 Saetti and Frediani [2004] ECR I–1005, para 3; Palin Granit (n 161) paras
22, 27 and 29.
164European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37). This guidance is not legally binding.
165Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (n 44) 216.
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is both workable and provides a high level of environmental protection.166 This
has been called ‘a very difficult if not impossible task’.167 Tromans has identified
five reasons why the translation of waste policy into workable law is difficult.168
First, waste can be a good that is traded,169 which can result in tension be-
tween the protection of the environment and the principle of free movement of
goods.170 Second, waste is a highly relative notion and affects public acceptabil-
ity of facilities handling that material171 — reflecting discussions in Section 1.1.2
of how waste can be perceived as pollution or a resource. Third, difficulty arises
in monitoring various statistics, such as how much waste is produced, recov-
ered and disposed of, as a result of inconsistent approaches to categorisations
of waste.172 Fourth, recycling policies introduced by some Member States have
the potential to cause difficulty with free movement of goods.173 Finally, waste
is a topic beyond the EU and needs to take into account, inter alia, the OECD
on transboundary movements, the Basel Convention and other conventions (see
Section 4.1).174 These difficulties may have contributed to there being no con-
clusive characteristics to determine whether a substance is waste. Instead, it has
to be decided on a case-by-case basis in light of all the circumstances as ‘there
neither is nor can be a comprehensive definition of the concept of waste’.175
166Jeremy Pike, ‘Waste Not Want Not: An (Even) Wider Definition of “Waste”’ (2002)
14(2) Journal of Environmental Law 197, 207; Pocklington, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box - the EU
Review of the Definition of “Waste” ’ (n 46) 204-205.
167Pike (n 166) 207.
168Tromans (n 3) 134-135.
169Katrien Steenmans, Rosalind Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, Commodification of Waste:
Legal and Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy
(Working paper, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies 2017-26, University of Oslo
2017).
170Tromans (n 3) 134; Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-
making (n 44) 215.
171Tromans (n 3) 134; Case C-195/05 Commission of the European Communities v Italian
Republic [2007] ECR I–11699, Opnion of AG Mazák, para 36. See also, inter alia, Palin
Granit (n 161) para 22.
172Tromans (n 3) 134-135. See also n 2 in Chapter 1.
173ibid 135.
174ibid 135.
175Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic (n 171) Opnion of AG
Mazák, para 2; Joined Cases C-418/97–C-419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd v Minister
van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, Vereniging Dorpsbelang Hees
and Others v Directeur van de dienst Milieu en Water van de provincie Gelderland [2000]
ECR I–4475, para 88; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 40. Salter states that the definition of
waste is ‘imprecise and open-ended’ — John R Salter, ‘The Meaning of “Waste” in European
Community Law’ (1997) 6(1) Environmental Law Review 14, 15; Krämer considers the notion
of waste not very precise and requiring a case-by-case examination — Ludwig Krämer, EU
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Case law indicates that waste should be interpreted widely rather than restric-
tively,176 evidenced and confirmed by the CJEU decisions on the components
of the waste definition and guidance on characteristics indicative of waste and
non-waste (discussed below). This broad interpretation conforms to the envi-
ronmental objectives of the WFD, the precautionary principle and the principle
of preventive action.177
The definition of waste in the WFD has been described as having both subjec-
tive and objective components.178 The subjective nature of the concept is that
waste is defined by reference to the actions (‘discards’ in Article 3(1) WFD)
or intentions (‘intends’ in Article 3(1) WFD) of the holder — it is these two
components on which case law has centred. The earliest key case on waste law
addressed the intention of the holder: in Vessoso and Zanetti, an Italian Mag-
istrates court referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on two questions
in relation to the 1975 WFD meaning of waste: (1) does waste exclude sub-
stances and objects that are capable of economic reutilisation; and (2) must
the holder disposing of a substance or object intend to exclude any further eco-
nomic re-use by others for the substance or object to be classed as waste? The
CJEU affirmed Advocate-General (AG)179 Jacobs’ opinion180 in the case and
Casebook on Environmental Law (Hart Publishing 2002) 380.
176Case C-457/02 Niselli [2004] ECR I–10875, para 45 seems to be more consistent with the
obligation to interpret the concept of waste under the WFD widely; ARCO Chemie (n 175)
paras 36 to 40; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 36; Palin Granit (n 161) para 29; Case C-
176/05 KVZ retec GmbH and Republik Österreich [2007] ECR I–1721, para 61; Case C-252/
05 Thames Water Utilities Ltd v South East London Division, Bromley Magistrates’ Court
[2007] ECR I–3903, para 28; Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA, Total
International Ltd [2008] ECR I–04501, paras 39 and 40. See also: Joined Cases C-241/12–C-
242/12 Shell Nederland Verkoopmaatschappij BV and Belgian Shell NV [2013] ECR I–821,
para 38.
177Tieman (n 146) 333.
178For example: Cheyne and Purdue (n 139) 152; Gerd Winter, ‘Substantive Criteria for
Environmental Protection’ in Gerd Winter (ed), European Environmental Law: A Compara-
tive Perspective (Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd 1996) 43; Cheyne (n 134) 62; Lee, EU
Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (n 44) 216. AG Mazák stated
that subjectivity is apparent from the definition in Commission of the European Communities
v Italian Republic (n 171) Opinion of AG Mazák, paras 37 and 73.
179AGs present opinions on the cases before it. The AG’s opinion is not legally binding.
Even if the CJEU reaches the same conclusion as the AG, it is not necessarily by the same
reasoning and therefore it cannot usually be said that the CJEU ‘follows’ the AG’s opinion.
180AG Jacobs in his opinion in Vessoso and Zanetti concluded that the definition of waste
‘has nothing to do with the intention of the person disposing of the substance’ — Vessoso and
Zanetti (n 153) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 22.
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held that the definition ‘draws no distinction according to the intentions of the
holder disposing [of any substance or object]’, ie the intention of the holder un-
derlying the disposal does not indicate whether a substance is waste or not.181
This has been reiterated in Van de Walle182 and Thames Water.183 A wide
reading of this judgment therefore indicates that recourse to any subjective el-
ements on the part of the holder of waste appears to be excluded.184 Instead,
the CJEU in Palin Granit held that an intention to discard the substance can
be inferred from objective indicators by having regard to all the factual circum-
stances and to the aim of the WFD.185 In this case the CJEU ruled that leftover
stone resulting from stone quarrying was waste taking in consideration the fac-
tual circumstances (see below). The 2003 Communication Towards a Thematic
Strategy on the Prevention and Recycling of Waste186 nonetheless acknowledges
that the concept of waste retains some degree of subjectiveness, which is likely
to result in some ambiguity.187 This has been evidenced in the recent Shell
case.188 Ultra light sulphur was shipped from a seller (Shell Nederland) to a
buyer (Belgian Shell NV). During the shipment, the sulphur was contaminated,
and the buyer exercised their contractual right to reject the product. The sul-
phur was shipped back to the Netherlands where it was re-blended and sold.
The question was whether this was waste, and it was held that it was not. One
of the main reasons for this decision was that the fact the buyer discarded it by
rejection did not determine the seller’s position as the seller intended to put the
product back on the market once re-blended: ‘the fact that Shell took back the
consignment at issue with the intention of blending it and placing it back on
the market is of decisive importance in the present case.189 That is, the CJEU
took into account the subjective element of ‘intent’ in the consideration of the
181Vessoso and Zanetti (n 153) para 11.
182Case C-1/03 Van de Walle and others [2004] ECR I–07613, paras 60-61.
183Thames Water Utilities (n 176) para 28.
184Chalmers (n 21) 262.
185Palin Granit (n 161) paras 24 and 25.
186European Commission, ‘Towards a Thematic Strategy on the Prevention and Recycling
of Waste’ (Communication) COM (2003) 301 final.
187ibid 39.
188Shell (n 176).
189ibid para 54.
156
4. EU regulatory and policy context of industrial symbiosis
circumstances, thereby highlighting the ambiguity and some inconsistency in
the case law.
The other main case law discussions have focused on the meaning of the term
‘discard’, as the definition and its scope turns on it.190 Discard can be inten-
tional or deliberate on the part of the holder, but it can also be unintentional,
involuntary or accidental.191 Discarding of a substance can even occur without
knowledge of the holder.192 The term discard must be interpreted in light of the
aim of the Directive.193 An Italian court asked the CJEU to clarify the meaning
of waste in Euro Tombesi.194 In the opinion of AG Jacobs in Euro Tombesi, he
set out what is referred to as the ‘Tombesi Bypass’, which states that materi-
als which were not disposed of and which did not require any form of recovery
before reuse should not be treated as waste, and once any necessary recovery
operation is complete a material ceases to be waste.195 This is called the bypass
as it circumvents defining ‘discard’. The CJEU did not affirm this approach
in its judgment and, instead, stated that the fact a substance is classified as a
reusable residue without any certainty of reuse does not remove that substance
from the scope of the WFD.196 In ARCO Chemie, the CJEU confirmed the
rejection of the Tombesi Bypass. A possible explanation for this is that the
CJEU wanted to prevent an overly-restrictive definition of waste, to prevent
potentially harmful materials escaping the waste regime.197
In addition to the interpretation of ‘intent’ and ‘discard’, the other main con-
tribution of CJEU case law on waste is that there is a consensus that there are
190For example: Case C-121/03 Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I–07569, para 57; Commis-
sion of the European Communities v Italian Republic (n 171) Opinion of AG Mazák, para 40;
Palin Granit (n 161) para 22 (and also Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 24); Saetti and Frediani
(n 163) para 33; Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 32) para 26; Chalmers (n 21) 260; Cheyne
(n 134) 64.
191Thames Water Utilities (n 176) para 28.
192Van de Walle and others (n 182).
193ARCO Chemie (n 175) paras 36-40, 73, 88 and 97; Palin Granit (n 161) para 24 and
Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 25.
194Case C-304/94 Euro Tombesi and others [1997] ECR I–3561.
195ibid Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 50-53.
196Euro Tombesi (n 194) paras 53 and 54, and Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 25; Palin Granit
(n 161) para 28.
197Pike (n 166) 204.
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no definitive or conclusive characteristics of waste. There are three main cases
that have contributed to the identification of (non-)indicators and relevant char-
acteristics when determining whether or not an object or substance is waste:
Vessoso and Zanetti, ARCO Chemie, and Palin Granit. The other case law has
mostly supported and reiterated the conclusions of the CJEU in these cases,
with only a few additions.
In the first key case chronologically on waste, Vessoso and Zanetti (see above
paragraph on ‘intent’), the CJEU had stated that whether the substance or
object is capable of economic reutilisation is inconclusive of whether it is waste,
which was later supported and reiterated by C-422/92,198 Inter-Environnement
Wallonie,199 ARCO Chemie,200 Palin Granit,201 KVZ,202 and Commune de
Mesquer.203 This was also supported and broadened by Euro Tombesi to a
residue being reusable also being inconclusive,204 which was again confirmed by
subsequent case law.205 In contrast, Vessoso and Zanetti ruled that the aim of
the WFD is relevant when determining whether an object or substance is waste
(which again was supported by later case law).206
In ARCO Chemie, the question was whether wood chips that had undergone
waste disposal and recovery operations were discarded. There were again a num-
ber of characteristics identified as inconclusive: substances that have undergone
recovery or disposal operations;207 the substance is capable of recovery;208 the
substance may be recovered in an environmentally responsible manner for use
as fuel without substantial treatment;209 and the method of treatment or use of
198Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany (n 155) para
22.
199Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 32) para 31.
200ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 65.
201Palin Granit (n 161) para 29.
202KVZ (n 176) para 61.
203Commune de Mesquer (n 176) para 40.
204Euro Tombesi (n 194) paras 47, 48, 53 abd 54.
205Palin Granit (n 161) paras 28 and 29; Niselli (n 176) para 53.
206Vessoso and Zanetti (n 153) para 12. This was supported by: ARCO Chemie (n 175)
para 37; Palin Granit (n 161) para 23; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 40.
207ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 49, and reiterated in Niselli (n 176) para 53.
208ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 65, and reiterated in Niselli (n 176) para 53.
209ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 65.
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substance.210 There were also a number of characteristics identifed as relevant
evidence when deciding whether or not a substance is waste: all the circum-
stances surrounding the object or substance,211 and that the residue is a result
of the recovery operation.212 The indicators that constitute evidence of waste
according to ARCO Chemie include that (1) the substance is commonly re-
garded as waste;213 (2) a common method of waste recovery is used;214 (3) it
is an unintended product;215 and (4) precautions must be taken before subse-
quent use of substance.216 No examples of evidence, which would indicate that
a substance or object is non-waste, were provided in ARCO Chemie.
In Palin Granit, leftover stone that resulted from stone quarrying was considered
waste. The stone was stored on an adjoining site awaiting subsequent use; of
the same composition as the rock from which it was quarried; not a danger to
human health nor the environment; intended to be used; and could be recovered
without processes or similar other measures. But, importantly, the stone was
not going to be used in its entirety and would be stored until further use was
certain. These two circumstances indicated that the substance was waste.217
The place of storage, conditions under which the stone was kept, the length
of time of storage,218 the composition of the substance,219 and the absence of
risk to human health or the environment220 were all held to be inconclusive.
Similarly to Vessoso and Zanetti and ARCO Chemie, Palin Granit provides
almost no examples of indicators of non-waste. The only example provided
of evidence that may indicate non-waste is when there is a high likelihood of
reusing waste combined with a financial advantage advantage to the holder in
210ibid para 64.
211ibid para 97, and reiterated in Palin Granit (n 161) para 24; KVZ (n 176) para 63.
212ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 95.
213ibid para 71.
214ibid para 69.
215ibid para 84, and reiterated by Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 34.
216ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 87, and reiterated by Palin Granit (n 161) paras 32 and 43.
217ibid para 40.
218ibid para 42.
219ibid paras 44-46.
220ibid paras 49-51.
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doing so.221 This has been supported by subsequent case law.222
There are two characteristics not mentioned in these three key cases. First,
according to Inter-Environnement Wallonie, whether a substance directly or
indirectly forms an integral part of an industrial production is considered in-
conclusive when determining whether a substance is waste or not (though note
this requirement in relation to ‘by-products’ discussed in the next section).223
This was a few years later supported by ARCO Chemie.224 Second, when a
substance is produced intentionally in the course of producing other fuels, and
meets the energy needs of the producer and of other industries, then it may be
evidence that the substance is not waste, according to Saetti and Frediani.225
Overall, most of the CJEU case law has identified inconclusive characteristics,
with only some highlighting relevant indcators of waste or non-waste. Table H.1
in Appendix H provides an overview of these indicators, as discussed in the above
paragraphs. Note that this table provides a non-exhaustive overview of CJEU
case law on waste, but only covers the key cases affecting the definition of waste
as identified in this thesis.
The current definition of waste and the relevant case law have three effects rele-
vant to industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment: (1) what can and cannot
be controlled is unclear; (2) when a material or substance becomes regarded as
waste lacks clarity; and (3) questionable whether the current approach actually
protects the environment. The first two effects support the conclusion that the
definition of waste is a barrier.
First, what can and cannot be controlled is unclear as there is no definition
of ‘discard’, and ‘waste’ has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. This
lack of clarity, for example when addressing whether the WFD is applicable to
221Palin Granit (n 161) para 37.
222Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 35; Niselli (n 176) para 46; KVZ (n 176) para 62.
223Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 32) para 25.
224ARCO Chemie (n 175) para 67.
225Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 47.
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certain substances or objects used as raw material or fuel in a manufacturing
process, has resulted in the definition of waste being identified as a barrier to
industrial symbiosis, and to its general field of IE.226 Uncertainty increases
the level of regulatory risk perceived by organisations contemplating industrial
symbiosis.227 The extent to which there is uncertainty and risk is, however,
debatable as the definition of waste has been cast very broad. If there is any
uncertainty whether a substance or material is waste, it should be treated as
waste as the definition is so broad (ie there is certainty in the uncertainty).
Another uncertainty as a result of the definition of waste is that it is unclear
at which point material first becomes regarded as waste (also relevant to the
property rights in waste discussion in Section 3.2). Under the definition, a ma-
terial becomes waste when it is discarded. The property rights implications of
the use of ‘discard’ are discussed in Section 3.2.1. There is, however, ‘consid-
erable dispute’ when this is the case.228 Krämer acknowledges that in ‘almost
all cases’, a case-by-case examination will result in deciding beyond reasonable
doubt when a material has been discarded.229 He provides the examples of plac-
ing furniture outside the home before the official collection of bulky waste takes
place, and placing bottles in a bottle bank, as examples of when a material
becomes waste.230 The point at which a material becomes waste is significant,
as this affects when waste law and policy begins to apply. It is also relevant in
terms of the theoretical framework. When a substance becomes waste affects
the property rights associated with waste. This therefore appears to be more
of a barrier than the previous factor. The extent of the barrier will be assessed
when exploring national implementation in Chapter 5 and in the observations
in Chapter 6.
226See n 146.
227For example: John Adams, Risk (UCI Press 1995) 3; Linda Botterill and Nicole Mazur,
Risk & Risk Perception: A Literature Review (04/043, Australian Government: Rural Indus-
tries Research and Development Corporation March 2004) 2-3.
228Krämer, ‘The Distinction between Product and Waste in Community Law’ (n 158) 9.
229ibid 10.
230ibid 11.
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Finally, Malcolm and Clift have summarised the effect of the case law on the def-
inition of waste within the context of industrial ecology by questioning whether
the current approach actually protects the environment, the aim of both general
EU environmental law and the WFD (see Section 4.2) as environmental risks
associated with the material itself or with its intended life cycle do not affect
classification as waste or product.231 Additionally, the legal definition of waste
may not protect the environment as the wide interpretation arguably results
in over-regulation, because some organisations identify the definition as a bar-
rier to their pursuit of industrial symbiosis (see Chapter 5), as a result of the
required waste management licensing set out in Section 4.4.2. On the other
hand, the definition arguably does protect the environment by embodying the
precautionary principle (see Section 4.2.3).
As a result of the uncertainties and possible barrier posed, the question is:
should the definition of waste be changed? Both Krämer and Pocklington have
acknowledged that there are shortcomings of the definition of waste, but that
changing the legislation would not make much sense as there would be a number
of unwanted knock-on effects.232 The questions instead should be: is the current
definition of waste achieving the WFD’s objective? Is the WFD currently pro-
tecting the environment and human health overall? How should the effectiveness
of whether the WFD is achieving its objectives be evaluated? This is linked to
Malcolm and Clift’s statement in the previous paragraph. By casting the def-
inition so wide, it implements the precautionary principles (see Section 4.2.3),
so that it covers any instances of uncertainty as a precaution. Despite this,
the current waste crises referenced in Chapter 1 may indicate that the WFD
is not yet fully achieving its objectives. Strategies such as industrial symbiosis,
231Malcolm and Clift (n 130) 6.
232Krämer stated that ‘[t]he definition of waste under EC law is more than 25 years old.
Thousands of national, regional and local legislative texts have been adopted which are aligned
to this concept of waste. It does not make much sense to change this legislation’ — Krämer,
‘The Distinction between Product and Waste in Community Law’ (n 158) 9; Pocklington,
‘Opening Pandora’s Box - the EU Review of the Definition of “Waste” ’ (n 46) 215 states that
in order ‘to achieve a significant improvement in the understanding and operation of the term
“waste”, likely that a number of unwanted knock-on effects will result’. See also: Stuart Bell,
‘Refining the Definition of Waste’ (1999) 1 Environmental Law Review 283, 295.
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embodying concepts of the circular economy, green economy and sustainable de-
velopment, may aid in achieving the objectives of the WFD. Therefore, whether
or not these three impacts manifest themselves and affect symbiotic exchanges,
and to what extent, is examined in Chapter 5 across the case studies. Based on
these findings, the definition of waste, and whether or not it should be amended,
is re-assessed (see Section 6.1.2).
By-products
Production processes can also output by-products. This is relevant to industrial
symbiosis as by-products can also be exchanged, and, unlike waste, by-products
avoid the barrier of having to comply with waste management permits and
other requirements. Drawing the line between waste and by-product appears
to be a recurrent struggle.233 The provision, Article 5 WFD, on by-products
codifies case law on when a material can be regarded as something which an
undertaking wishes to exploit rather than substance being discarded.234 Article
5(1) WFD defines a by-product as a ‘substance or object, resulting from a
production process, the primary aim of which is not the production of that
item, which may be regarded as not being waste’. Article 5(1) WFD then sets
out conditions that all have to be met in order for such a substance or object to
be classified as a by-product. The conditions are assessed within the context of
industrial symbiosis below, in order to consider whether the materials exchanged
in industrial symbiosis are possibly waste or by-products, though this has to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis.
(a) further use of the substance or object is certain235
In Palin Granit, the CJEU ruled that by-products are confined to situations
233Salmi and others (n 130) 122.
234European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37); Palin Granit (n 161); Saetti and Frediani (n 163); Niselli
(n 176) para 47.
235Based on Palin Granit (n 161) paras 36 and 37; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 36.
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where ‘the reuse of the goods, materials or raw materials is not a mere possibility
but a certainty’.236 The CJEU further stated that if additionally there is also a
financial advantage to the holder in reusing the substance, then the substance
must no longer be considered a burden which the holders intends to discard, but
as a genuine product.237 In Palin Granit, there was uncertainty surrounding the
proposed uses of the substance in question, leftover stone, and the impossibility
of reusing it in its entirety. This was held to support the conclusion that all the
stone, not merely the stone which would not be reused, was to be regarded as
waste.238
In Saetti and Frediani, the certainty of the substance in question, coke, being
used in its entirety and for the same purposes as the other refinery substances,
resulted in the coke not being considered waste.239 In AvestaPolarit Chrome
Oy, the CJEU distinguished between mining residues, which are used without
first being processed in the production process for the necessary filling in of
underground galleries, and other residues. The CJEU attached importance
to the fact that the filling was a necessary step in the actual mining process
and that the holder of these residues therefore needed them for his principal
activity.240 The use was certain so the mining residues which were being used
for the filling of the underground galleries were classed as by-products while the
other residues as waste.
The Commission Guidance to the WFD sets out examples of certainty of use
which are: existence of contracts between the material producer and subsequent
user; a financial gain for the material producer; a solid market (sound supply
and demand) existing for this further use; and evidence that the material fulfils
the same specifications as other products on the market.241 On the other hand,
236Palin Granit (n 161) para 36.
237ibid para 37.
238ibid para 40.
239Saetti and Frediani (n 163) paras 43 and 47; also cited in Palin Granit (n 161) para 36.
240Case C-114/01 AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy [2003] ECR I–8725, paras 35 to 37.
241European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37) 16-17.
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indicators that further use is uncertain include: there is no market for the
material; only part of the material is to be used, with the rest to be disposed
of (should be initially treated as waste); and the financial gain for the waste
holder is nominal compared to the cost of waste treatment.242 In the context
of industrial symbiosis, if the substance is to be exchanged then further use
becomes a certainty as there is likely to be a form of agreement in place to that
effect (see Chapter 5). In addition to this, there has been evidence of financial
advantages to symbionts in case studies, which further strengthens the argument
that this first condition would be met. This condition may however be a barrier
when not all material is being used, resulting in not meeting this criterion in
accordance with the decision in Palin Granit.
(b) the substance or object can be used directly without any further processing
other than normal industrial practice243
Subject to the other conditions being met, by-products should require no prior
processing, though at the same time it has to be considered that primary raw
materials usually require some processing before being used in production pro-
cesses.244 The latter is what is meant by ‘other than normal industrial practice’.
Examples provided in the guidance include filtering, washing or drying the ma-
terial, carrying out quality control, or adding materials necessary for further
use.245 Treatments usually considered recovery operations cannot be considered
normal industrial practice.246 Nash observed that this condition would result
in the CJEU defining ‘other than normal practice’ particularly broadly.247 For
industrial symbiosis, whether this condition is met will depend on the partic-
ular exchanges. Without knowledge of the technical details, it seems that this
242ibid 17.
243Based on Palin Granit (n 161) paras 36 and 37; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) paras 36 and
37.
244European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37) 17.
245ibid 18.
246ibid 18.
247Hazel A Nash, ‘The Revised Directive on Waste: Resolving Legislative Tensions in Waste
Management’ (2009) 21(1) Journal of Environmental Law 139, 149.
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condition could possible be met. For example, steam produced by a local power
station in Kalundborg is used without further treatment as a heat source by a
pharmaceutical company.248
(c) the substance or object is produced as an integral part of a production pro-
cess249
AG Alber, in his opinion in Mayer Parry, stated that the distinguishing feature
of a production process is that with some means of production and use of energy,
one or more starting materials, which can be raw materials or semi-finished
products, are transformed or joined together in such a way that a new product
is created.250 The new product is characterised by a ‘higher degree of processing
than the starting material’.251 The guidance provided on this criterion is that
if a material leaves the site or factory where produced in order to undergo
further processing, this may be taken as evidence that it is no longer part of
the same production process, and, therefore, does not meet the criteria and is
not classified as a by-product.252 The guidance also states that the cumulative
principle needs to be considered.253 This means that if the material leaves the
site or factory but it is still part of normal industrial practice, then it could still
possibly be classed as by-product.254 Whether a production residue in industrial
symbiosis will meet this condition depends on whether it is an ‘integral part’ of
a production process, which is not defined. This will have to be decided on a
case-by-case basis, but it seems likely that this could be argued.
(d) further use is lawful, ie the substance or object fulfils all relevant product,
environmental and health protection requirements for the specific use and will
248For example: Marian R Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’ (2000)
25 Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 313. Further detail on the Kalundborg
industrial symbiosis example is provided in Chapter 5.
249Based on Palin Granit (n 161) para 36; Saetti and Frediani (n 163) para 36.
250Mayer Parry (n 38) Opinion of AG Alber, para 152.
251ibid Opinion of AG Alber, para 152.
252European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37) 18.
253ibid 19.
254ibid 19.
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not lead to overall adverse environmental or human health impacts255
This condition of lawful use is self-explanatory. The guidance provides the ex-
amples of meeting the required technical specifications or if the material is not
specifically forbidden.256 The converse of these examples is unlawful. This cri-
terion also requires an assessment ensuring the use would not lead to adverse
environmental or human health impacts. In industrial symbiosis, exchanges
would not be carried out if unlawful, so whether it meets this condition is de-
pendent on the assessment of environmental and human health impacts. These
are context dependent and would be part of the assessment in the initiation
stage when evaluating the benefits (see Section 1.2).
Article 5(2) WFD allows for the adoption of criteria for specific substances
or objects to be regarded as a by-product instead of waste. This could be
beneficial to industrial symbiosis if it is a sufficiently common exchange. It is
highly improbable that the Commission would go through the adoption process
of criteria257 for substances which would have a limited impact.
Classification as by-products avoids the barriers to industrial symbiosis initia-
tion and sustainment of the definitions of waste. Whether or not substances in
symbiotic exchanges are by-products must be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
though there is nothing prohibitive in the criteria. Classifications as by-product
may be an incentive in terms of it preventing creation of waste and thereby
supporting the waste hierarchy (see Section 4.2.3).
The by-product criteria are transposed into the national law of the case studies.
In Denmark, the term by-product is not used in the Danish Waste Ordinance,
but the concept is still present as materials meeting the above criteria are not
classed as waste.258 In Sweden, the term by-product is included in the Swedish
255AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy (n 240) para 43: the issue of whether it is lawful to use a
by-product arose in AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy. The filling in of mining galleries with the
concerned substance, leftover rock, had to be lawful.
256European Commission, Guidance on the Interpretation of Key Provisions of Directive
2008/98/EC on Waste (n 37) 20.
257Set out in WFD, art 39(2).
258Danish Waste Ordinance, ch 2 s 2(2): ‘Waste does not include substances or objects
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Environmental Code, and the criteria are set out immediately following the
definition of waste. Whilst the Swedish definition of waste is word per word
the same as in the WFD in Swedish, the definition of by-product varies in the
wording used as it does not include first criteria of being certain of reuse.259
This does not have an effect in practice, because if reuse is not certain, then
the principle of Palin Granit applies (see previous section on ‘Waste’). In the
Netherlands, by-product is defined by reference to the WFD.260 Finally, in the
UK by-products are also defined by reference to the WFD.261
End-of-waste
If a substance or object is classed as waste within industrial symbiosis, there is
still an opportunity to overcome the barrier by ceasing to be waste if it meets
the end-of-waste criteria. Salmi and others consider there to be ‘significant pos-
sibilities for achieving the EU’s “end-of-waste” goals in industrial symbiosis’.262
They, however, fail to unpack and examine the criteria. Watkins and others
have identified the current end-of-waste criteria as unsupportive of industrial
symbiosis because of a lack of clarity for the development of potential symbiosis
resulting from a production process, the primary aim of which is not the production of that
substance or object, if (1) It is certain that the substance or object is further used, (2) the
substance or objective can be used directly without any further processing other than what
is normal industrial practice, (3) the substance or object is produced as an integral part of a
production process, and (4) further use is lawful, that is, the substance or object fulfills all
relevant requirements for product, environmental and health protection requirements for the
specific use and will not lead to overall adverse environmental or human health’ (translation
is author’s own).
259Swedish Environmental Code, ch 5 s 1: A substance or object shall be considered a by-
product rather than waste, if the substance or object (1) first arose in a production process
where the main objective is not to produce the substance or object, (2) can be used directly
without any further processing other than the processing which is normal in industrial practice,
and (3) will continue to be used in a manner that is acceptable to health and the environment
and which is not contrary to the law. (translation is author’s own).
260Dutch Environmental Protection Act, art 1(1)(6): ‘substantces, mixtures or materials
which are by-products within Article 5 of the Waste Framework Directive shall not be regarded
waste if those by-product comply with the criteria in that Article’ (extract from the article
— translation is author’s own).
261Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/988, reg 3(3): Terms which are
used but not defined in these Regulations and are used in the Waste Framework Directive
have the same meaning as in that Directive.
262Salmi and others (n 130) 121.
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products.263 As set out below, this thesis argues that the criteria do provide
an opportunity, but need further clarification to fully overcome the potential
waste barrier. The point at which waste ceases to be waste is also significant
for the property rights discussion (see Section 3.2). Article 6(1) WFD defines
end-of-waste and sets out the criteria:
Certain specified waste shall cease to be waste within the meaning of
[waste] when it has undergone a recovery, including recycling, opera-
tion and complies with specific criteria to be developed in accordance
with the following conditions:
a the susbtance or object is commonly used for specific purposes;
b a market or demand exists for such a substance or object;
c the substance or object fulfils the technical requirements for the
specific purposes and meets the existing legislation and stan-
dards applicable to products; and
d the use of the substances or object will not lead to overall ad-
verse environmental or human health impacts.
The criteria shall include limit values for pollutants where neces-
sary and shall take into account any possible adverse environmental
effects of the substance or object.
Similarly to the definitions of waste and by-products, the end-of-waste criteria
have been transposed into the national law of the examined case studies.264
Watkins and others did not identify how these criteria were unclear. A potential
uncertainty is in the first criterion as ‘commonly used’ is not defined. This raises
the question of what quantity of usage is necessary to meet this standard. For
263Gary Watkins and others, ‘Overcoming Institutional Barriers in the Development of Novel
Process Industry Residue Based Symbiosis Products - Case Study at EU Level’ (2013) 41
Minerals Engineering 31, 35 and 38.
264The end-of-waste criteria are transposed as a result of: Swedish Environmental Code, ch 5
s 1; Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, reg 3(2); Dutch Environmental Protection
Act, art 1(1)(6); Danish Waste Ordinance, ch 4 s 4(5).
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industrial symbiosis this criterion can pose a barrier because when exchanges are
first set up, they may not always be common usage yet. Another uncertainty is
the reference to ‘overall adverse environmental or human health impacts’ in the
final criterion. This can have several interpretations as a reuslt of the inclusion
of ‘overall’. Does this mean no adverse environmental or human health impacts
are allowed, or no adverse environmental or human health impacts are allowed
that are worse than those produced by the primary or raw materials used for its
production? The criterion also appears problematic as the aim of theWFD is the
protection of the environment and human health, and the word ‘overall’ seems
to imply that some adverse impacts would be allowed. This uncertainty could
perhaps be beneficial to industrial symbiosis, as with its benefits, industrial
symbiosis can have ‘overall’ positive environmental impacts.
Watkins and others propose further development of the end-of-waste legisla-
tion and criteria for symbiosis products, and more emphasis on the life cycle
approaches.265 This latter suggestion of focus on life cycle approaches reflects
Malcolm and Clift’s observation in the discussion on the definition of waste.
Currently, specific criteria have already been developed for iron, steel, and alu-
minium metals,266 glass cullet,267 and copper scrap,268 following research un-
dertaken by the Joint Research Centre (JRC). The criteria essentially require
the metal to undergo a recovery operation and meet a specified purity level.
The JRC has also conducted research on plastics, biodegradable waste, and
compost, streams on which the Commission may develop end-of-waste criteria
in the future.269 A similar approach for symbiosis products could be explored,
265Watkins and others (n 263) 37.
266Council Regulation (EU) No 333/2011 of 31 March 2011 establishing criteria determining
when certain types of scrap metal cease to be waste under Directive 2008/98/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L94/2.
267Commission Regulation (EU) No 1179/2012 of 10 December 2012 establishing criteria
when glass cullet ceases to be waste under Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council [2012] OJ L337/31.
268Commission Regulation (EU) No 715/2013 of 25 July 2014 establishing criteria deter-
mining when copper scrap ceases to be waste under Directive 2008/98/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council [2013] OJ L201/14.
269European Commission, ‘Waste Framework Directive: End-of-Waste Criteria’ (2016) 〈ec.
europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/end_of_waste.htm〉 accessed 21 August 2017.
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but this is unlikely as would need to be broad to cover an array of contexts —
this could arguably fall foul of the preventive principle (see Section 4.2.3).
The other significant factor of end-of-waste criteria is defining when waste ceases
to be waste (see Section 3.2 and discussion on definition of waste), that is when
a substance or material falls outside the ambit of the current system of control.
Pocklington considers that this WFD article implies that it is the production of
the secondary material or substance to a defined quality standard that triggers
the cessation of the ‘waste’ designation rather than its use.270 There is, how-
ever, still uncertainty about the precise point, which affects the property rights
discussion, and reduces the certainty that end-of-waste can reduce the barrier
of being classed as waste.
4.4.2 Waste requirements
The requirements that follow when a substance is classed as waste have often
been identified in the literature as being a barrier to industrial symbiosis.271
Two WFD requirements that may be barriers are permits and inspections. Ar-
ticle 23 WFD requires any establishment or undertaking intending to carry out
waste treatment to obtain a permit from the competent authority. Treatment
means ‘recovery or disposal operations, including presentation prior to recov-
ery or disposal’.272 Therefore, it is relevant to industrial symbiosis as it was
established under Section 4.2.3 that industrial symbiosis carries out recovery
if susbtances produced are classed as waste. Permits require information,273
and are likely to be time-consuming and costly, in part because the competent
authority has to maintain a register.274 The extent of the barrier depends on
270David Pocklington, ‘The Significance of the Proposed Changes to the Waste Framework
Directive’ (2006) 15(3) European Environmental Law Review 75, 82. This article was pub-
lished before the 2008 WFD was adopted, but the adopted version mirrored the proposed
changes of Article 6(1) WFD.
271For example: Malcolm and Clift (n 130) 4; Beers and others (n 130) 67.
272WFD, art 3(14).
273WFD, art 23(1).
274WFD, art 26.
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the particular national implementation, which is considered in the next chap-
ter. The Member States can remove this barrier as an exemption is possible for
recovery of waste.275 National rules have to specify ‘the types and quantities of
waste that may be covered by an exemption, and the method of treatment to
be used’.276 This exemption allows the wide definition of waste to differentiate
between the various legal consequences resulting from classification of waste.277
Depending on the national legislation, this exemption allows for the removal of
one of the barriers to industrial symbiosis.
Organisations involved in industrial symbiosis may be subject to inspections.
Article 34(1) provides for ‘appropriate periodic inspections by competent au-
thorities’.278 This could possibly be a barrier to industrial symbiosis as there
are likely to be costs involved for the symbionts, but it is necessary in order to
ensure the waste treatments occur to a proper standard.
Even though these waste requirements can be a barrier to industrial symbio-
sis, they can also be beneficial as they support the governance of industrial
symbiosis as a CPR. The waste requirements are a mechanism of monitoring
the waste, which is in line with Design Principle 5, and provide for possible le-
gal consequences,279 ie sanctions, which resonates with Design Principle 6 (see
Section 3.4.1).
4.5 EU external variables
The preceding sections in this chapter have covered the EU rules-in-use (ie reg-
ulations, policies, and property rights — see Section 2.3.5) relevant to industrial
275WFD, art 24(b).
276WFD, art 25(1).
277Tieman (n 146) 333.
278WFD, art 34(1): Establishments or undertakings which carry out waste treatment opera-
tions, establishments or undertakings which collect or transport waste on a professional basis,
brokers and dealers, and establishments or undertakings which produce hazardous waste shall
be subject to appropriate periodic inspections by the competent authorities.
279WFD, art 36.
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symbiosis. This section identifies the other external variables at EU level affect-
ing industrial symbiosis. Geographic location is not considered as explained at
the beginning of this chapter.
The EU represents the second largest world economy if the individual economies
of its Member States are combined. The link between economic conditions and
the environment is strong at EU level, as evidenced by policies such as the
Circular Economy Package (see Section 4.3.1) and its agricultural policies. The
environment is also a crucial focus of the EU in its own right, which is evident
from the amount of environmental regulations and policies. As a result of these,
the EU is often recognised as a global environmental leader and promotes itself
as such,280 highlighting its strong environmental focused community attributes.
Finally, beyond the third party role of providing a regulatory and policy context
affecting industrial symbiosis, there is also an EU network. Following the initial
recommendations of EREP (see Section 4.3.1), the European Industrial Sym-
biosis Association (EUR-ISA) was launched on 6 November 2013.281 This asso-
ciation brings together around ten established industrial symbiosis programmes
engaging more than 20000 companies across the EU.282 A benefit of this asso-
ciation is that it can facilitate communication and provide an opportunity for
knowledge exchange. These roles of the EU also demonstrates congruence with
Design Principle 8 (see Section 3.4.1).
280For example: John Vogler and Hannes R Stephan, ‘The European Union in Global Envi-
ronmental Governance: Leadership in the Making?’ (2007) 7(4) International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 389; Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Roche Kelly,
‘EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges’ (2008) 43(3)
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 35; Stefan Vogl, ‘Eu-
gen Ehrlich’s Linking of Sociology and Jurisprudence and the Reception of his Work in Japan’
in Marc Hertogh (ed), Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Hart Publishing 2009); R
Daniel Kelemen and David Vogel, ‘Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the
European Union in International Environmental Politics’ (2009) 43(4) Comparative Political
Studies 427; R Daniel Kelemen, ‘Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy’ (2010)
17(3) Journal of European Public Policy 335.
281International Synergies, ‘European Event to Support Industrial Symbiosis’ (2013)
〈international-synergies.com/media/industrial-symbiosis〉 accessed 2 August 2017.
282European Commission, Progress Report on the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe
(n 59) 10.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the current EU rules-in-use to inform the ISDF frame-
work (see Chapter 2) by identifying EU regulatory and policy incentives and
barriers for the initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis, and identi-
fied relevant design principles (see Section 3.4.1) throughout.283 The EU context
provides incentives for industrial symbiosis as the TFEU environmental objec-
tive of protecting the environment and human health, and the principles on
which EU environmental policies should be based, resonate with the environ-
mental and social benefits of industrial symbiosis of, for example, resource effi-
ciency and avoidance of waste management options of landfill and incineration,
which both have negative environmental and health implications. In particular,
the preventive principle is arguably supported by industrial symbiosis through
the incorporation of the waste hierarchy in the WFD.
The other main EU incentives for industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment
covered in this chapter are EU policies, EPR, and IPP and its manifestation in
ecodesign. Within EU policies, again it is those policies with similar economic,
environmental and social aims to industrial symbiosis that incentivise it. The
Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, EREP and the Circular Economy
Package support industrial symbiosis directly by specifically including it as an
example of a strategy to achieve the various aims. In the WFD, together with
the principles, EPR provides the main incentive for industrial symbiosis initia-
tion and sustainment as it resonates metaphorically with the concept of IE and
can be considered a manifestation of industrial symbiosis. Waste management
plans are not a direct incentive, but instead allow for a possible creation of an
incentive, which are examined in Chapter 5. The final incentive examined was
IPP and its manifestation in ecodesign. Industrial symbiosis is a possible strat-
egy to be used for ecodesign, which is a crucial factor of the EU strategy on
IPP. The common characteristics of these incentives therefore are that the aims
283These will be revisited in Section 6.2.
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resonate with the benefits of industrial symbiosis, and that industrial symbiosis
is a strategy that can be employed to achieve some of the EU’s policy aims.
Current barriers within the EU are as a result of uncertainties relating to the
concepts of waste and end-of-waste, and waste requirements. The uncertainties
of the concepts relate particularly to the points at which material becomes waste
and waste ceases to be waste. This results in it being unclear what can and
cannot be controlled, and when, which has implications for property rights in
waste (see Chapter 3). Despite some of the uncertainties related to the end-of-
waste concept, it does provide an opportunity to overcome the barrier of waste,
as does the concept of by-products.
In identifying these incentives and barriers, this chapter has set up the focus
for the next chapter. Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which incentives
and barriers manifest themselves, including in any national implementation of
the WFD, across the case studies. How any barriers can be overcome, and
how incentives can be enhanced, is discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter has
also identified how the EU regulatory and policy context embodies some of the
design principles (see Section 3.4.1), which can help develop and assess industrial
symbiosis as a CPR system. The design principles within the EU context are
revisited and linked with case study findings in Section 6.2.
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CHAPTER 5
Framing selected case studies within the ISDF
In order to explore how the law can enable initiation and sustainment of indus-
trial symbiosis (the overarching research question), Chapter 5 examines the cur-
rent roles and functions of regulation, policy, and property in enabling industrial
symbiosis at local and national level (the third research objective) across four
case studies (see Section 1.3). Additionally, it examines whether the European
Union (EU) regulations and policies identified in Chapter 4 as capable of driving
or inhibiting industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment in theory have the
expected impact and manifest themselves in practice. The four case studies are
industrial symbiosis networks located in Kalundborg in Denmark, Linköping
and Norrköping in Sweden, Peterborough in the United Kingdom (UK), and
Rotterdam in the Netherlands.1 The data for the case studies was collected
through: (1) a review of existing literature; (2) interviews with stakeholders;
(3) doctrinal analysis of environmental regulatory and policy frameworks; (4)
short communications with other relevant stakeholders involved in the networks;
and (5) site visits (see Section 1.4.1). This data was then analysed and trian-
gulated (see Section 1.4.2), and is now presented in this chapter.
Chapter 5 introduces the case studies alphabetically and examines them sepa-
rately, framed within the Industrial Symbiosis Development Framework (ISDF).
The ISDF facilitates interdisciplinary insights and ensures regulations, policies,
and property rights are examined within the wider context to avoid undue em-
phasis on any single component (see Chapter 2). The components are presented
1For case study selection criteria see Section 1.4.1.
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as drivers or barriers with the main focus on the rules-in-use for the different
government levels. In doing so, the questions set out for each of the ISDF com-
ponents in Chapter 2 are addressed. This approach, rather than presenting the
case studies across themes, is used as it tests and demonstrates the applicabil-
ity and value of the framework.2 After examining the case studies, Section 5.5
presents a brief discussion of some of the key observations. Section 5.6 concludes
the chapter.
5.1 Kalundborg, Denmark
The Kalundborg Industrial Symbiosis (KIS) is located in the municipality of
Kalundborg, situated on the north-western coast of the largest Danish island,
Zealand. It has the largest industrial cluster outside the Danish capital of
Copenhagen, and is about 100 kilometres west of Copenhagen.
KIS is the seminal example of industrial symbiosis, and is the source of the
phrase ‘industrial symbiosis’3 — and has been much studied in academic lit-
erature. This research still makes an original contribution to this vast body
of knowledge by looking at it from a regulatory, policy, and property rights
perspective. Within the literature on KIS it is often written that KIS only suc-
ceeded because of its unique context, and is thus difficult to duplicate.4 KIS
is investigated here nonetheless to identify the lessons learnt as ‘Kalundborg
provides a vision of what can be achieved locally, regionally, and globally’.5
2The key lessons learnt from the case studies are examined by comparing across themes in
Chapter 6.
3Nicholas Gertler, ‘Industrial Ecosystems: Developing Sustainable Industrial Structures’
(Masters thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1995) 24. See also Section 1.2.
4For example: Henning Grann, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis at Kalundborg’ in Deanna J
Richards (ed), The Industrial Green Game: Implications for Environmental Design and Man-
agement (National Academies Press 1997) 123; Symbiosis Centre, Kalundborg Symbiosis, 40th
Anniversary (Symbiosis Centre 2012) 6; Scott V Valentine, ‘Kalundborg Symbiosis: Fostering
Progressive Innovation in Environmental Networks’ (2016) 118 Journal of Cleaner Production
65, 65, 66 and 75.
5Grann (n 4) 123.
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Figure 5.1: Kalundborg Industrial Symbiosis.6
5.1.1 Action arena
In the 1960s and 1970s, private conversations between a few of the managers
of businesses located in Kalundborg resulted in symbiotic exchanges. In 1961
Statoil Refinery Denmark A/S, a private company, required water for their
refinery, resulting in a pipe between Statoil and the nearby lake Tissø. In 1972
Statoil and Gyproc A/S, a local private gypsum production company, agreed
that excess gas from Statoil’s production would be supplied to Gyproc to use
in their production of plasterboards. In 1973, DONG Energy A/S, a private
company with a local coal-fired power plant (Asnaes Power Plant), and Statoil
also entered into an agreement. Since then, more businesses have been gradually
linked into KIS. There are currently at least 13 key symbionts exchanging 28
resources.7 KIS is presented in Figure 5.1.
6Kalundborg Symbiosis, ‘Kalundborg Symbiosis 2015’ (2015) 〈symbiosis.dk/en/diagram〉
accessed 25 March 2017.
7This is the minimum number, as arguably further symbiotic exchanges exist. For example,
there is an H&M in Kalundborg where households can return clothing waste (for reuse, recov-
ery or recycling) as part of their H&M garment collecting initiative. For more information see:
H&M, ‘Sustainability: Look Good, Do Good, Feel Good’ (2017) 〈hm.com/garment-collecting〉
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5.1.2 Outcomes: benefits and limits
KIS has economic, environmental, and social benefits and limits. Despite es-
timated initial investment costs of $75.5 million to set up material and energy
exchanges for the 18 projects established up to and including 1998, there are
significant economic benefits.8 Total savings accumulated throughout the years
are likely to be around $160 million.9 These numbers vary slightly depending on
the source and as a result of inflation; the International Institute for Sustainable
Development states that average payback time is six years with savings totalling
$10 million per annum,10 while Domenech and Davies estimate annual savings
of $15 million and accummulated savings of around $ 310 million.11 Further
economic benefits include reduced raw material and waste disposal costs, and
new business opportunities.
Environmental benefits include, for example, annual estimated savings of 1 mil-
lion cubic metres surface water, 30000 tonnes of oil, 20000 tonnes of gypsum,
and 275000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions.12 Further general environmen-
tal benefits, such as reduced total resource and energy consumption, reduced
transport emissions, and waste diverted from landfill (and further reduction
in emissions as a result), were highlighted in Section 1.2. There are however
accessed 9 July 2017.
8UNEP, ‘Case Study/Kalundborg - 1 The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark’
in UNEP (ed), Environmental Management for Industrial Estates: Information and Training
Resources (UNEP 2003) 4.
9Noel Brings Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark - Industrial
Networking and Cleaner Industrial Production’ in Piet Lens and others (eds), Water Recy-
cling and Resource Recovery in Industry: Analysis, Technologies and Implementation (IWA
Publishing 2002) 274 states that this is the cost of 19 projects; Joergen Christensen, ‘The
Kalundborg Symbiosis: What, Who, When, How and Why?’ (March 2012, Guildford, UK) 12
refers to 18 projects. See also: UNEP, ‘Case Study/Kalundborg - 1 The Industrial Symbiosis
in Kalundborg, Denmark’ (n 8) 4; Noel Brings Jacobsen and Stefan Anderberg, ‘Understand-
ing the Evolution of Industrial Symbiotic Networks: The Case of Kalundborg’ in Jeroen van
den Bergh and Marco A Janssen (eds), Economics of Industrial Ecology: Materials, Structural
Change, and Spatial Scales (The MIT Press 2004) 319.
10International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Kalundborg’ (2013) 〈iisd . org /
business/viewcasestudy.aspx?id=77〉 accessed 15 May 2015.
11Teresa Domenech and Michael Davies, ‘Structure and Morphology of Industrial Symbiosis
Networks: The Case of Kalundborg’ (2011) 10 Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 79,
82 based on personal communication with Joergen Christensen in 2006.
12Erling Pedersen, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Kalundborg Region Denmark’ (December 2003)
〈teollinenekologia.fi/pdf/Rantas06/Pedersen.pdf〉 accessed 16 June 2014, 32; Christensen
(n 9) 11.
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environmental limits to KIS. Two key symbionts, Statoil and Dong Energy,
comprise an oil refinery and coal-fired power plant respectively. Such plants
can have numerous detrimental environmental impacts.13 Secondly, Denmark
is one of the EU countries that incinerates most waste in order to feed into their
district heating systems.14 The system is thus not set up to encourage waste
reduction and prevention, the top tier of the waste hierarchy, and instead aims
at the lower tiers (see Section 4.2.3).15
The main social benefit is job creation. As a result of industrial symbiosis,
knowledge of efficient utilisation of resources is also produced. This is important
as a cultural shift, arguably requiring knowledge, is needed for transitioning
towards circular economies.16
5.1.3 Initiation and sustainment
KIS emerged spontaneously without a plan, and was instead as a result of in-
dependent exchanges separately implemented by companies.17 Its origin can
13For example: AL Page, AA Elseewi, and IR Straughan, ‘Physical and Chemical Properties
of Fly Ash from Coal-fired Power Plants with Reference to Environmental Impacts’ in FA
Gunther and JD Gunther (eds), Residue Reviews, vol 71 (Springer 1979); Claire L Carlson
and Domy C Adriano, ‘Environmental Impacts of Coal Combution Residues’ (1992) 22(2)
Journal of Environmental Quality 227; Dara O’Rourke and Sarah Connolly, ‘Just Oil? The
Distribution of Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Production and Consumption’ (2003)
28 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 587; Helen Wake, ‘Oil Refineries: A Review
of their Ecological Impacts on the Aquatic Environment’ (2005) 62(1-2) Estuarine, Coastal
and Shelf Science 131.
14District heating is a system where heat in the form of hot water or stream is distributed
via a network of insulated pipes from one source to the end user. For example: RenoSam and
Ramboell, Waste-to-Energy in Denmark (2006) 4.
15The waste hierarchy is set out in: Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 1309 af 18.12.2012 om affald
som aendret 2012 (Danish Waste Ordinance) ch 4 s 12. The wording mirrors the wording of
the WFD. One notable distinction is that the Danish Waste Ordinance explicitly sstates that
the municipal treatment of waste has to be in accordance with the hierarchy.
16For example: Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Delivering the Circular Economy: A Toolkit
for Policymakers (2015) 31 and 41; Nicole van Buren and others, ‘Towards a Circular Econ-
omy: The Role of Dutch Logistics Industries and Governments’ (2016) 8 Sustainability 647,
661.
17Gertler (n 3) 7; Marian R Chertow, Weslynne Ashton, and Radha Kuppalli, The Industrial
Symbiosis Research Symposium at Yale: Advancing the Study of Industry and Environment
(Yale F&ES Publication Series 3, Yale University 2004) 26; Teresa A Domenech Aparisi, ‘So-
cial Aspects of Industrial Symbiosis Networks’ (PhD thesis, UCL 2010) 108; Domenech and
Davies, ‘Structure and Morphology of Industrial Symbiosis Networks: The Case of Kalund-
borg’ (n 11) 288. Christensen described it as ‘a “non-project” made by a “non-organisation” ’
— Christensen (n 9) 7. A similar sentiment is echoed by Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis
in Kalundborg, Denmark - Industrial Networking and Cleaner Industrial Production’ (n 9)
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be traced back to 1959 and 1961, when the power plant and refinery were re-
spectively commissioned, and has evolved since then. Participants in Kalund-
borg first recognised the environmental implications of the partnerships and ex-
changes in the late 1980s when a local school pointed it out, and subsequently
a network was actively pursued.18
Unsurprisingly, the particular drivers and barriers to initiate and sustain in-
dustrial symbiosis depend on the symbiont — they have been economic, envi-
ronmental, and regulatory, as well as related to time and corporate social re-
sponsibility branding.19 Only the drivers and barriers internal to symbionts are
discussed here, with most examined as part of the section on external variables
in Section 5.1.4.
The decisive initial driver has been economic for most symbionts; the aim was
for organisations to make investments to save costs.20 For example, the economic
factor was key in setting up a symbiotic exchange which prevented Gyproc A/S,
a private plasterboard manufacturer, from relocating to Spain,21 and allowed
DONG Energy to invest in a more efficient production process:
[DONG Energy] were forced to build a desulphurisation plant. Gy-
proc . . . produce plasterboard. So they were then in the same rotary
club, so they talked about it, and [a representative of DONG Energy]
665.
18Peter Knight, ‘A Rebirth of the Pioneering Spirit’ Financial Times (London, 14 November
1990), 15; Erich J Schwarz and Karl W Steininger, ‘Implementing Nature’s Lesson: The
Industrial Recycling Network Enhancing Regional Development’ (1997) 5 Journal of Cleaner
Production 47, 49; Marian R Chertow, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: Literature and Taxonomy’
(2000) 25 Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 313, 316.
19Based on analysis of interviews.
20Knight (n 18) 15; Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark - In-
dustrial Networking and Cleaner Industrial Production’ (n 9) 665; Noel Brings Jacobsen,
‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg: An Approach to Cleaner Industrial Production’
in Edward Cohen-Rosenthal and Judy Musnikow (eds), Eco-Industrial Strategies: Unleash-
ing Synergies Between Economic Development and the Environment (Greenleaf Publishing
2003) 270; Thomas Sterr and Thomas Ott, ‘The Industrial Region as a Promising Unit for
Eco-industrial Development - Reflections, Practical Experience and Establishment of Innova-
tive Instruments to Support Industrial Ecology’ (2004) 12(8-10) Journal of Industrial Ecology
947, 948; Christensen (n 9) 42.
21The interview participant stated that it was not until after this exchange had been es-
tablished that the representative from Gyproc revealed that they had actually been intending
to relocate to Spain where there was cheaper natural gypsum than in Denmark, until this
exchange made it financially viable again for them to stay.
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told [a representative from Gyproc] that “I would really like to take
the best technical solution. It’s a gypsum [the raw material for
producing plasterboard] producing desulphurisation plant, but it is
also the most expensive. On top of this, I have to pay to get rid
of this gypsum. Can you use it?” “Oh yes I can”. So they made a
contract and . . . [Gyproc] buy [the gypsum] from them, so instead of
paying to get rid of it [DONG Energy] had an income.
This resulted in the remainder of DONG Energy power stations also investing
in desulphurisation plants and supplying gypsum to Gyproc.
The economic aspect can simultaneously be the main barrier when there is
insufficient funding. Symbiotic opportunities are often identified, but
a lot of these companies probably will not do it without [funding],
because the business case is not very strong, and it’s a lot of hassle.
Even if the business case is strong, then it’s just, the business is going
well without the symbiosis, so why [initiate industrial symbiosis].22
Time is related to the economic barrier, as it requires resources in terms of
funding and individuals to investigate the opportunities. This is where third
party actors have played a major role in Denmark and can support industrial
symbiosis (see Section 5.1.4).
There has been increased recognition that the environmental benefits of indus-
trial symbiosis drive its initiation,23 but Gertler cautions placing too much em-
phasis on the environmental driver: ‘While the participating companies herald
the environmental benefits of the symbiosis, it is the economics which drives or
thwarts the development’.24 He does acknowledge that ‘[f]rom the perspective of
22Interview participant.
23Joergen Christensen as quoted in Knight (n 18) 15. See also Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial
Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark - Industrial Networking and Cleaner Industrial Produc-
tion’ (n 9) 665.
24Gertler (n 3) 25.
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public policy, however, the environmental and resource benefits should provide
the motivation to create incentives which encourage such cooperation’.25 Ac-
cording to the literature environmental idealism previously followed the initial
economic incentive,26 but one interview participant said that it has now shifted
to ranging from strictly economic to idealist perspectives.
Even though there are social benefits as a result of KIS, there have not yet been
any identified social drivers (see Section 5.1.2).
5.1.4 External variables
This section sets out the external variables for KIS.
Geographic location
The symbionts are mostly co-located, with a number of pipelines connecting
some of the symbionts. In KIS, one interview participant stated that:
geographical closeness is quite important. The system would never
have been developed here if the companies are not sort of in line
next to each other in the degree they actually do. But I think the
landscape has changed so much during the 40 years so that the
collaboration has been working, so now you can sort of also think in
other ways where distance is not a problem any longer.
This resonates with what was said in other interviews as well as with discus-
sions in Section 1.2.1 on geographic proximity initially being a requirement of
industrial symbiosis in part based on experiences from KIS. But, proximity is
no longer an essential condition. One example is the gypsum provided by other
DONG Energy power stations (see Section 5.1.3).
25Gertler (n 3) 25.
26Chertow, Ashton, and Kuppalli (n 17) 26; Christensen (n 9) 42.
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Economic conditions
Most of the discussions on the economic conditions in Kalundborg focus on the
economic contribution of KIS.27 In general, with the location of a number of
big companies (eg the Statoil refinery is the largest oil refinery in Denmark)28
and a port in Kalundborg, Kalundborg has a strong local economy.
Economic conditions internal to symbionts, such as payoff times and initial
investment required, are discussed in Section 5.1.2. Some of the leading scholars
on KIS have argued that as many of the organisations involved in KIS are
part of growing international companies with continually changing ownership
and decision-making structures, companies might not be as willing or likely
to invest in new symbiotic links ‘with low rates of return and high risks as
the local commitment and local trust-based relationships among the facilities
are weakened’.29 Such concerns were not discussed or expressed in any of the
interviews, so it remains to be seen whether these matters emerge and manifest
themselves as concrete issues.
Community attributes
Three community attributes are discussed in this section: (1) Denmark’s imple-
mentation of EU environmental laws and policies; (2) individuals’ perceptions of
industrial symbiosis; and (3) the values of individuals participating in industrial
symbiosis.30
Denmark has been an EU Member State since 1973. The Environmental Imple-
mentation Review (EIR) of EU environmental policy and legislation is a tool to
improve implementation of EU environmental law and policy across the Mem-
27For example: Jacobsen and Anderberg (n 9) 325-327; Noel Brings Jacobsen, ‘Industrial
Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark: A Quantitative Assessment of Economic and Environ-
mental Aspects’ (2006) 10(1-2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 239.
28Statoil ASA, ‘Denmark’ (2017) 〈statoil.com/en/where-we-are/denmark.html〉 accessed
11 July 2017.
29Jacobsen and Anderberg (n 9) 326.
30This aligns with the questions set out in Section 2.3.5.
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ber States, with country reports drafted every two years.31 This is discussed in
this section rather than the ‘Rules-in-use’ section as it provides an overview of
the environmental policies and regulations in the case study, which is one of the
community attribute questions identified in Section 2.3.5. The most recent re-
port on Denmark concluded that Denmark has a good knowledge base and good
practices in relation to policies promoting waste prevention, but that there is
an opportunity to move away from incineration to improve resource efficiency.32
Additionally, Denmark’s promotion of the circular economy was identified as a
point of excellence.33 This report in general highlights that there is a high level
of compliance with EU environmental policy and law in Denmark.
Local inhabitants of Kalundborg are confronted daily by industrial symbiosis in
that a number of pipelines for the exchanging of materials between organisations
are above ground and clearly visible when walking in some parts of the city.
These pipelines need to be above ground to facilitate maintenance and make it
cost-effective. Despite this and KIS being so central to the city and its economy,
many are often not familiar with the concept of industrial symbiosis and the
purpose of the pipelines above ground. These pipelines are instead considered
the norm as inhabitants expect other cities to also have these.
Communication, trust, and openness were key to initiating some of the symbiotic
exchanges34 — eg the first exchanges were facilitated by board members being
part of the same rotary club (see Section 5.1.3). The uncovering of the network
resulted in the formation of the Kalundborg Symbiosis Association comprising
public (KARA/NOVEREN, Kalundborg Utility, and Kalundborg Municipal-
31European Commission, ‘The EU Environmental Implementation Review: Common Chal-
lenges and How to Combine Efforts to Deliver Better Results’ (Communication) COM (2017)
63 final.
32European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— DENMARK (Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 39 final, 2017) 4.
33ibid 4.
34Interview participants. Also often emphasised in the literature, see for example: Gertler
(n 3) 17, 27, and 39; John Ehrenfeld and Nicholas Gertler, ‘Industrial Ecology in Practice:
The Evolution of Interdependence at Kalundborg’ (1997) 1(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology
67, 74-5; Weslynne Ashton and Ariana Bain, ‘Assessing the “Short Mental Distance” in Eco-
industrial Networks’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 70, 70.
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ity) and private company members (NovoNordisk, Novozymes, Gyproc, Statoil,
DONG Energy, Saxo Bank). Even though this Association has facilitated com-
munication, it has also resulted in a barrier:
You could say the association is a closed club [as] you cannot seek
membership; you cannot be integrated into that club just because
you are building up a new company in Kalundborg. You have to be
invited to join the association of the club.35
Yet, several examples exist where non-members of the Kalundborg Symboisis
Association exchange materials, so the barrier is not prohibitive. What is gener-
ally critical for industrial symbiosis is being willing to engage in ‘dialogue with
your neighbour’,36 which this closed Association does not necessarily facilitate.
Third parties instead have had pivotal roles in enabling such dialogue.
In addition to the above drivers and barriers, an Ellen MacArthur Foundation
report stated that ‘social factor barriers of capabilities and skills and custom
and habit are widespread’.37 These were not explored in this section as these
were not identified as barriers by any of the interview participants.
Rules-in-use
a) Regulatory. Industrial symbiosis is not directly regulated by Danish law.
There are nonetheless regulations that indirectly incentivise and inhibit indus-
trial symbiosis according to interview participants.38 One interview participant
stated that ‘there are a lot of myths . . . on the legislative barriers’ in practice,
and that there are not many. Interview participants when pressed could not
35Interview participant.
36Interview participant.
37Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Delivering the Circular Economy: A Toolkit for Policy-
makers (n 16) 99.
38This is also supported in the literature. For example: Gertler (n 3) 25; Chertow, Ashton,
and Kuppalli (n 17) 26; Jacobsen and Anderberg (n 9) 332; Cecilia Haskins, ‘Multidisciplinary
Investigation of Eco-Industrial Parks’ (2006) 4(9) Systems Engineering 313, 323; Judith L
Walls and Raymond L Paquin, ‘Organizational Perspectives of Industrial Symbiosis: A Review
and Synthesis’ (2015) 1(28) Organization & Environment 32, 33; Valentine (n 4) 74.
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identify any particular enabling laws, beyond the Danish rules on landfill,39 and
stated that the incentive is as a result of a general supportive environmental
legal context in Denmark. Denmark was the first country in the EU to intro-
duce a ban on landfilling waste suitable for incineration40 — there are separate
terms for landfill waste, which is waste not suitable for incineration or reuse
or recycling or recovery,41 and waste suitable for incineration42 in the legisla-
tion. Where waste can be sent to landfill, there is a tax,43 which interview
participants specifically identified as incentivising industrial symbiosis.
Simultaneously, taxation is also the most common barrier identified by interview
participants. In Denmark, companies have to pay tax on surplus heat produced
by companies, even if they want to use that waste heat themselves (or sell to
others) as stipulated by the Electricity Tax Act (Bekendtgoerelse af lov om afgift
af elektricitet).44 This tax has prevented some symbiotic exchanges:
Statoil could supply all the district heating because they have a lot
of surplus heat, but it is supplied from the power station. If they
[Statoil] should supply it, then the stream would go . . . to the utility
company, and they have to install a huge conversion station, so the
benefit is not there economically [as Statoil would] also have to pay
the tax.45
But, the barrier has been overcome in other exchanges not located in KIS. A
39Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 252 af 31.03.2009 om deponeringsanlaeg som aendret 2009 (Dan-
ish Landfill Act).
40RenoSam and Ramboell (n 14) 5.
41Danish Waste Ordinance, ch 2 s 3(18): ‘Landfill waste: Waste that is not suitable for
material use or for incineration’; ch 2, s3(38) defines material use as ‘Preparation for recy-
cling, recovery or reuse for other materials, or treatment for one of these recovery operations’
(translation is author’s own).
42Danish Waste Ordinance, ch 2 s 3(25) defines waste suitable for incineration as: ‘Waste
that is not suitable for waste use [see n 41] and which can be destroyed by incineration, without
the incineration resulting in the release of unacceptable pollutants’. This section also bans
the landfilling of waste which can be incinerated.
43Rates are set out in: Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 412 af 21.04.2017 om afgift af affald og
raastoffer 2017 (Danish Waste and Raw Materials Tax Act).
44Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 308 af 24.03.2017 om afgift af elektricitet 2017 (Danish Elec-
tricity Tax Act) s 11 para 9. This provision sets out the charges.
45Interview participant.
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company wanted to set up data centres in another area of Denmark. Such
data centres require a lot of cooling. The cooling process results in heated
water, which could feed into district heating systems. This would make these
cooling processes more economically attractive. The Danish Electricity Tax Act,
however, requires companies to pay a high tax on this, so the company stopped
negotiating and started looking outside Denmark. As this company would bring
jobs to the area, some representatives from the area:
asked the tax guys, is it possible to formulate [the tax] in another
way? Then they said “yes, it is”. They stated that instead of saying
we are producing cooling, then the temperature of the control system
is similar to a heat pump. If you are using a heat pumps, there are
special rules. Then you don’t have to pay tax . . . That was bending
the laws.46
This resulted in the company committing to building data centres which are
now in process. Further detail of this example is beyond the scope of this thesis
as heat is non-solid waste (see Section 1.5), but the example highlights a regula-
tory barrier. It also illustrates that there is flexibility to the Danish regulatory
system.47 This flexibility is advantageous as it can enable industrial symbiosis,
but simultaneously the literature states that ‘[t]here are disadvantages to the
Danish [flexible regulatory] system, including potentially lower levels of techni-
cal compliance and high transaction costs incurred in extensive consultations
around permitting’.48
The other regulatory issue mentioned by interview participants was the defini-
tion of waste. The definition of waste is implemented word per word the same
as the EU 2008 Waste Framework Directive (WFD)49 (see Section 4.4.1). The
46Interview participant. Descriptions of how the technologies vary in order to avoid the tax
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
47There is a potential argument here that this is an example of responsive regulation. This is
beyond the scope of this thesis. See for example: Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive
Regulation (OUP 1995).
48Ehrenfeld and Gertler (n 34) 76.
49Council Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on waste and repealing certain
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conception of waste as a barrier or not by interview participants is mixed. It
differs from company to company; some companies have found a way around the
definition to avoid the waste requirements, others do not consider it a barrier,
while others label materials as waste and comply with the waste requirements.
Critical to those companies struggling with the definition is the conceptualisa-
tion of waste:
that’s why we often call [exchanges of waste] process streams, so if
you take it directly out of process and into a new process, it doesn’t
have that label with waste and so it is much easier to process it.50
What was generally identified as a barrier in relation to the definition of waste is
that guidelines on regulations are not always sufficiently clear or have resulted in
uneven implementation of waste law or classification of waste across countries.
For example:
in [another country] this is considered just plastic, in Denmark it’s
considered waste. How can that be? Uneven implementation or
classification of waste across countries is something that companies
mention . . . And it costs a lot of money in Denmark, that isn’t the
same as [the other country], or the other way around. That’s ac-
tually quite a bit of a challenge, because if you want to make a
market for secondary resources, it has to work like a single market
like everything else in the EU.51
One possible option is to emphasise the concept of by-products. Currently,
this concept has no label or name in Denmark beyond it not being waste (see
Section 4.4.1). When referring to by-products during interviews, often the par-
ticipant did not understand the term. By assigning a label to the concept, this
Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (WFD).
50Interview participant.
51Interview participant.
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may aid communication of it and thereby increase awareness of the concept and
its benefits (see Section 4.4.1).
There are missed regulatory opportunities. Extended Producer Responsibil-
ity (EPR) was not mentioned by any of the interview participants, and this is
one of the drivers mentioned by interview participants in other case studies.52
The possible role of EPR in incentivising symbiotic exchanges is set out in Sec-
tion 5.2.4 in relation to Linköping and Norrköping Industrial Symbiosis (LNIS),
where it is identified as an explicit regulatory driver of industrial symbiosis.
b) Policy. There is a policy driver as a result of national regulation. The Danish
Planning Act (Planloven)53 requires municipalities to set out a Local Agenda 21
covering the municipality’s strategy and outlining how it will contribute to sus-
tainable development.54 Local Agenda 21s were recommended in Agenda 21,55
52EPR has been implemented into Danish law. For example, it applies to electrical equip-
ment as a result of Danish Waste Ordinance, ch 7 s 40(5)(2), which refers to Danish Electricity
Tax Act.
53Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 587 af 27.05.2013 om planlaegning som aendret 2013 (Danish
Planning Act).
54Danish Planning Act, ch 6a s 33a on Local Agenda 21 (author’s own translation): Para
1. Regional and municipal councils must before the end of the first half of the municipal and
regional election period publish a report on the strategy of the region’s respective municipal
contribution to sustainable development in the 21st century with information on how to work
holistically, cross-disciplinary and long-term, and how the population, businesses, organisa-
tions and associations will be involved in the work (local Agenda 21). Publication can be
exclusively digitally. Para 2. The strategy shall for the concerned region council include the
regional council’s policy objectives for future work with the following areas:
1. Reduction of environmental impact
2. Promotion of sustainable regional development
3. Involvement of the population and businesses in the local Agenda 21 work and
4. Promotion and cooperation between affected environmental, traffic, business, social,
health, education, cultural and economic issues.
Para 3. The strategy shall for the municipal council include the municipal councilâĂŹs policy
objective for future work in the following areas:
1. Reduction of environmental impact
2. Promotion of sustainable urban development and re-generation
3. Promotion of biodiversity
4. Involvement of the population and businesses in local Agenda 21-work and
5. Promotion of cooperation between affected environmental, traffic, business, social,
health, education, cultural and economic issues.
Para 4. The statement mentioned in para 1 shall simultaneously with the publication be sent
to the Environment Minister. Section 33b. The Environment Minister gives every 4 years a
report on local Agenda 21 work in regions and municipalities to a Parliamentary committee.
The report shall be provided in cooperation with the municipal organisations.
55United Nations, Agenda 21: The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio (United
Nations 1993) ch 28. This was adopted together with the Rio Declaration on Environment
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a non-binding United Nations resolution setting out an action plan to promote
sustainable development, to implement at different levels. Industrial symbiosis
was a key feature of Kalundborg Municipality’s policies to achieve its vision and
aims set out in its Local Agenda 21. On 18 December 2013 Kalundborg Munic-
ipality adopted the Kalundborg Municipality Plan 2013-2024 (Kommuneplan
2013-2024 ),56 replacing and subsuming the role of the previous Local Agenda
21. The Plan creates an overview of efforts and policies for achieving stipulated
policies. It is an important tool in helping transition ‘from vision to visible tar-
gets’.57 The vision of the Plan is: a well-run municipality where it is attractive
to live, establish, and run companies, and work.58 Key to the Municipality vision
are transparency, cooperation, and coherence, and it champions the idea that
the best solutions are built on cooperation between citizens, businesses, and
neighbouring municipalities.59 The Plan thereby mirrors the attributes high-
lighted as critical in the section on ‘Community attributes’. Cooperation has
been key from the start to the Plan — there was an opportunity to provide
feedback on the Plan through public consultation before it was adopted.
Some of the interview participants consider the plan to have had an impact
because:
over the last couple of years [the Kalundborg Municipality has] expe-
rienced a couple of companies who have been interested in building
up a new company in Kalundborg because they are very interested in
symbiosis and the access to resources that they have here in Kalund-
borg. And the fact that the idea of symbiosis supports the general
and Developmen, and the Statement of Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests
at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, in 1992 — see Section 1.1.1.
56Kalundborg Kommune, ‘Kommuneplan 2013-2024’ (2017) 〈kp2013 .kalundborg .dk〉 ac-
cessed 8 March 2017. This plan is being reviewed during 2017, and may be revised or replaced
as a result.
57Kalundborg Kommune, ‘Vision og Udvikling’ (14 January 2014) 〈kp2013.kalundborg.dk/
vision_og_udvikling.aspx〉 accessed 8 March 2017.
58Kalundborg Kommune, ‘Vision’ (4 May 2015) 〈kp2013 . kalundborg . dk / vision_ og_
udvikling/Vision.aspx〉 accessed 8 March 2017.
59Kalundborg Kommune, ‘Vision og Udvikling’ (n 57).
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green emissions or something like that. So yes, I think [the Kom-
muneplan] had an impact.60
In highlighting the benefits of KIS to the Municipality and companies located
therein, the Kommuneplan has been a marketing tool facilitating communica-
tion.
At national level, there is also policy support for industrial symbiosis both in
relation to the Danish government’s intermediary role (see section on ‘Third
parties’) and their waste policy. There are two national waste strategies: ‘Den-
mark Without Waste’61 covering initiatives for 2013 to 2018 and its continuation
‘Denmark Without Waste II’62 applying from 2015 to 2027. The first strategy
set out the waste policy goals, including for Danish households to recycle 50%
of their waste by 2022.63 One of the listed initiatives for new commercial oppor-
tunities to support households in this policy document is industrial symbiosis:
‘Promote industrial symbiosis in which enterprises link together their material
flows so that waste from one enterprise can become a resource for another en-
terprise’.64 It also refers to closed resources cycles, which industrial symbiosis
as a strategy can support.65 The second strategy continues this policy support
for industrial symbiosis. Programmes under the Fund for Green Business (see
section on ‘Third parties’) which promote green industrial symbioses are one of
the initiatives which the Danish Government will prioritise.66
A policy area that does not yet but could support industrial symbiosis is the
Danish Eco-Innovation Programme. This Programme is governed by the Dan-
ish Eco-Innovation Programme Act,67 which sets out the need for a four year
60Interview participant. This sentiment was also echoed by another interview participant.
61Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark, Denmark Without Waste: Recycle More,
Incinerate Less (The Danish Government 2013).
62The Danish Government, Denmark Without Waste — A Waste Prevention Strategy (The
Danish Government 2015).
63Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark (n 61) 12.
64ibid 38.
65ibid 37.
66The Danish Government (n 62) 18 and 52.
67Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 101 af 26.01.2017 om Miljoeteknisk Udviklings- og Demonstra-
tionsprogram som aendret 2017 (Danish Eco-Innovation Programme Act).
192
5. Framing selected case studies within the ISDF
strategy to be developed.68 One of the current strategies includes a focus on the
circular economy, with funding available for projects on cost-effective solutions
for the sorting and transporting waste for the purposes of reuse, recycling, and
recovery, and on high resource efficiency by better reuse, recycling, and recovery
of materials in production processes.69 These projects may help develop incen-
tives for industrial symbiosis, or uncover barriers that need to be addressed.
c) Property. The exchanges in KIS are controlled by contracts negotiated quite
commercially, most often between two partners at a time,70 and are governed
by the Danish Sale of Goods Act (Koebeloven).71 The contracts include prices
for the exchanges for a set period, payment terms, and mechanisms for future
changes (such as escape clauses and requirements for upgrading).72 Jacobsen
observed that controls used in KIS are very similar to regular contracts, except
that they have a greater level of detail.73 Waste has become a commodified good
that companies want to sell and are able to alienate others from (ie companies
have the power to transfer rights — see Section 3.1.2). Waste is thus currently
treated as private property. In Schlager-Ostrom terms the symbionts want to
be full owners (see Section 3.1.2).
In this case private property rights are not a barrier to industrial symbiosis.
It should, however, be noted that KIS provides an ideal industrial symbiosis
operation. It has evolved organically over time and in this case the lack of direct
68Danish Eco-Innovation Programme Act, ch 2 s 3(2): ‘The Board of Directors [of the
Programme] develops proposals for a four-year strategy for implementing the Eco-Innovation
Programme. The Board’s proposal for strategy must be approaved by the Minister’ (transla-
tion is author’s own).
69Miljoe- of Foedevareministeriet, ‘Udviklings-, Test og Demonstrationsprojekter, - 2017’
(2017) 〈ecoinnovation.dk/tilskud/soeger- du- tilskud-under-mudp/aktuelle- opslag/opslag-
mudp-2017/udviklings-test-og-demonstrationsprojekter-2017〉 accessed 15 August 2017.
70Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark - Industrial Networking
and Cleaner Industrial Production’ (n 9) 665.
71Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 140 af 17.02.2014 om koeb som aendret 2014 (Danish Sale of
Goods Act). Note that this Act is supported by other Danish contract law, which is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
72For example: Gertler (n 3) 48; Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Den-
mark - Industrial Networking and Cleaner Industrial Production’ (n 9) 665; Chertow, Ashton,
and Kuppalli (n 17) 26.
73Jacobsen, ‘The Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark - Industrial Networking
and Cleaner Industrial Production’ (n 9) 665.
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industrial symbiosis regulation and policy making in the first couple of decades
that symbiotic links were initiated is unusual. This has now changed and having
seen and understood benefits of industrial symbiosis they are taking a much more
directly involved approach in policymaking, but not in regulations. This is why
a Common-Pool Resource (CPR) approach is considered in Section 6.2 as it does
not necessarily require the privatisation of waste, and can arguably effectively
orient to sustainable development and environmental principles of non-linear
(ie circular) approaches embodied by industrial symbiosis. Additionally, CPR
emphasises the social dimension of treating waste, rather than the property and
contractual approaches.
Third parties
Critical to the initiation and sustainment of KIS is that ‘its participants allowed
and continue to encourage interaction’.74 This interaction is facilitated by third
parties, ie those not exchanging wastes and by-products: the Symbiosis Cen-
tre, Kalundborg Municipality,75 Danish Business Authority, Green Industrial
Symbiosis, and the EU.
The central third party to KIS is the Symbiosis Centre. The Centre was initially
an institute set up in the 1990s primarily for handling visitors, and comprised
just an office with a couple of employees. By the end of 2008 or 2009,76 the
Centre discussed with Kalundborg Municipality ‘the role the Centre should
have and play within the boundaries’77 of KIS. The current role of the Centre
is now to sustain KIS and ensure there is continuity in collaborations. The
Centre supports this by providing a physical space and support for the Board of
the Kalundborg Symbiosis Association (see previous section on ‘Community at-
74Raymond P Côté and E Cohen-Rosenthal, ‘Designing Eco-industrial Parks: A Synthesis
of Some Experiences’ (1998) 6 Journal of Cleaner Production 181, 185, emphasis added.
75The Municipality has both a symbiont role (in relation to district heating) as well as a
third party role (see following paragraphs).
76Interview participant estimate.
77Interview participant.
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tributes’). The Centre is less active in helping identify possible exchanges than
some third parties in other symbiotic networks, such as Opportunity Peterbor-
ough in Peterborough Industrial Symbiosis (PIS) (see Section 5.3).78 Instead,
its focus is on becoming the national knowledge centre on industrial symbiosis.
It does support other stakeholders, including the Danish Business Authority and
NIRAS, which is an international engineering consultancy (see below), in how
to develop industrial symbiosis. One of its motivations for this role is that it is
dependent on external funding (by the Municipality, national government, and
at times EU funding), and becoming the ‘go-to’ centre for industrial symbiosis
will attract more funding and investment.
The Kalundborg Municipality works closely with the Symbiosis Centre — it has
employees physically located at the Centre to support their operations, funds the
Centre, provides the secretary for the Association, and organises and hosts visits
(together with the Centre) by other stakeholders. The Municipality therefore
both supports it operations and engages with wider stakeholders.
The Danish Business Authority implements policies of the Ministry of Busi-
ness and Growth. The Danish Business Authority was a facilitator of industrial
symbiosis initiation through identification and funding as a result of one of its
recent initiatives, the Green Industrial Symbiosis national programme, which
it ran from 2013 to 2015. This programme aimed to promote competitive-
ness and resource efficiency through symbioses through a collaboration between
the five Danish regions, the Regional Municipality of Bornholm, the Danish
Business Authority, NIRAS, and the Kalundborg Symbiosis Centre. The pro-
gramme comprised a Task Force for Green Industrial Symbiosis, supported by
the Green Transition Fund and Fund for Green Business Development.79 This
78There are other examples in Denmark of a third party coordinating and managing indus-
trial symbiosis activities. For example, in the region of North Jutland there is the Network for
Sustainable Business, which has such coordination and management as one of its aims — State
of Green, ‘Green Industrial Symbiosis’ (2017) 〈stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/nbe-northern-
denmark/solutions/green- industrial - symbiosis〉 accessed 18 August 2017; State of Green,
‘Network for Sustainable Business Development’ (2017) 〈stateofgreen.com/en/profiles/nbe-
northern-denmark〉 accessed 18 August 2017.
79For more information on these funds see: Erhvervsstyrelsen, ‘Fund for Green Busi-
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Task Force was ‘more about identifying opportunities than about actually mak-
ing these opportunities happen’.80 The possible opportunities have been put
into a database.81 These identified opportunities were only for private compa-
nies. Where opportunities were identified, companies could apply to the Fund
for the investments required to initiate industrial symbiosis initiation, or to
develop the required technical, legal, or business knowledge. This programme
highlights one of the barriers related to funding. According to one of the inter-
view participants, the intention was that the programme should run until 2018,
but, as a result of a change in political leadership, this was shortened.
The main EU role identified by interview participants was funding. It is clear
from the EU rules-in-use that they provide support, and policy and regulatory
incentives.
The common role of these third parties is facilitating, particularly through do-
nating time and other resources to identifying and engaging with potential sym-
bionts unable to invest their own resources. The third parties in this way sup-
port the overcoming of funding barriers for some stakeholders, but many funding
barriers still remain.
5.2 Linköping and Norrköping, Sweden
The LNIS is located across the cities of Linköping and Norrköping (particularly
on Händelö island) in Östergötland County. Östergötland County is in central
Sweden and about 200 kilometres southwest of Stockholm.
Like KIS, LNIS has been the focus of literature,82 but to a lesser extent than
ness Development’ (2017) 〈groenomstilling . erhvervsstyrelsen . dk / fund - green - business -
development〉 accessed 18 August 2017; Nordic Innovators, ‘Green Transition Fund’ (2017)
〈nordicinnovators.com/green-transition-fund〉 accessed 18 August 2017.
80Interview participant.
81This database does not seem to be publicly available online. It is likely that this database
is internally available to the Danish Business Authority, and possibly those stakeholders that
were involved in the project.
82For example: Michael Martin, ‘Industrial Symbiosis for the Development of Biofuel Pro-
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KIS. There is generally a strong research community examining industrial sym-
biosis in Sweden — other symbiosis networks studied are the forest and wood
industry,83 and the Landskrona industrial symbiosis.84 Again like KIS, the orig-
inal contribution of this thesis to the existing body of work is the regulatory,
policy, and property rights perspective on LNIS.
5.2.1 Action arena
On Händelö island of Norrköping in Sweden, there is a symbiosis of material
and energy flows between several biofuels and bioenergy industries.85 This sub-
network of LNIS centres around E.ON, a private electric utility company. E.ON
provides steam to Lantmännen Agroetanol AB, a private company, for produc-
tion of ethanol and to the municipality of Norrköping, while the municipality
provides E.ON with waste to be incinerated in its combined heat and power
plant together with biomass from the paper industry. Stillage, which is a syrup,
from Agroetanol is used by Svensk Biogas in both Norrköping and Linköping.
This is how the two networks are linked. Biogas produced is used by all public
bus transport and taxis in Linköping and Norrköping.86 In Linköping, Tekniska
Verken is a central symbiont with a number of materials received and provided
by them.87 There are in total at least twelve main symbionts — Agroetanol,
duction’ (Tech. Licentiate thesis, Linköping University 2010); Leo Baas, ‘Planning and Un-
covering Industrial Symbiosis: Comparing the Rotterdam and Östergötland Regions’ (2011)
20 Business Strategy and the Environment 428; Michael Martin and Mats Eklund, ‘Improving
the Environmental Performance of Biofuels with Industrial Symbiosis’ (2011) 35 Biomass and
Bioenergy 1747.
83For example: Anna Wolf, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the Swedish Forest Industry’ (PhD
thesis, Linköping University 2007); Anna Wolf and K Petersson, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the
Swedish Forest Industry’ (2007) 4(5) Progress in Industrial Ecology - An International Journal
348; Leo Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Sym-
biosis and Renewable Energy’ (16th Annual International Sustainable Development Research
Conference, May 2010, Hong Kong).
84For example: Murat Mirata, ‘Industrial Symbiosis - A Tool for More Sustainable regions?’
(PhD thesis, Lund University 2005); Murat Mirata and Tareq Emtairah, ‘Industrial Symbiosis
Networks and the Contribution to Environmental Innovation: The Case of the Landskrona
Industrial Symbiosis Programme’ (2005) 13(10-11) Journal of Cleaner Production 993.
85Martin and Eklund (n 82) 1750.
86Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 3.
87See Martin (n 82) 27-29 for a detailed overview of LNIS.
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Figure 5.2: Linköping and Norrköping Industrial Symbiosis.89
Cleanway, E.ON, farmers, food industry, Municipalities of Linköping and Nor-
rköping, paper industry, Returpack, SCAN, Svensk Biogas, and Tekniska Verken
— exchanging at least twelve resources, including biogas, biomass, electricity,
fertiliser, fodder, heat, municipal wastes, organic wastes, PET bottles, slaughter,
stillage, and wastes.88 LNIS is represented in Figure 5.2.
5.2.2 Outcomes: benefits and limits
Similarly to KIS, LNIS has economic, environmental, and social benefits. The
economic benefits are the savings made by symbionts, which is one of the main
88The reason for stating at least echoes the rational given in n 7. Martin also acknowledges
that there are a number of symbiotic exchanges not shown on his diagrams (on which Figure 5.2
is in part based) — ibid 29.
89Adapted from: Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of In-
dustrial Symbiosis and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 4; Martin (n 82) 28-29; Martin and Eklund
(n 82) 1752.
198
5. Framing selected case studies within the ISDF
drivers for initiation (see Section 5.2.3). In relation to environmental advan-
tages, Baas estimates that the developed policies and activities in Östergöt-
land have resulted in a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared
to 1990.90 This is in part as a result of only 8% of heating in Linköping and
Norrköping being fuelled by fossil fuels and the remainder by renewable en-
ergy.91 There are also other (linked and separate) environmental benefits, such
as reduced wastes being sent to landfill and improved sustainability of ethanol
production.92 Job creation is the clear social advantage of LNIS, as the use of
biofuels is embedded into society because of LNIS. Other benefits are likely to
include improved health and well-being as a result of the economic and environ-
mental benefits (see Section 1.2).
Among the stakeholders in LNIS, there is however also an awareness of the
limits to the environmental benefits. Local and regional waste systems have
become so efficient that not enough waste is produced regionally (and Sweden
more widely) to support the systems relying on waste, particularly in relation
to combustible waste to incinerate for district heating. As a result, the waste
management systems rely in part on imported waste from the UK, Ireland, and
Norway to ‘feed’ their system, including LNIS.93 This shows effectiveness of the
Swedish system in preventing waste (the highest priority in the waste hierarchy
— see Section 4.2.3), but highlights its limits in that it is reliant on continued
production of waste (like KIS — see Section 5.1.2). One interview participant
views the import of waste positively in that it shows of ‘maturity’ in thinking
about waste as a transportable good. An additional limit identified is:
90Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 4.
91Interview participant.
92The ethanol is more sustainable according the EU sustainability criteria for biofuels,
because the gaseous carbon dioxide waste usually produced is instead produced in liquid form
in Agroetanol’s production process — Cleantech Östergötland, ‘Händelökombinatet’ (2017)
〈cleantechostergotland . se/miljoteknik/system/handelokombinatet〉 accessed 17 July 2017.
See also Section 1.2.
93Interview participant, but also subsequently confirmed by other sources, eg: Hazel
Sheffield, ‘Sweden’s Recycling is so Revolutionary, the Country has run out of Rubbish’ The
Independent (8 December 2016).
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we have the environmental side of the world saying we have to buy
less, we have to be better at resources, and 99% of the world say we
have to buy more, we have to consume more, we have to produce
more.94
This highlights how even though industrial symbiosis addresses resource effi-
ciency, it does not get to root of the consumer-driven society problem (see
Section 1.2.2). Finally, in the literature it is also recognised that the produc-
tion processes of symbionts in LNIS can be improved to increase environmental
benefits.95
5.2.3 Initiation and sustainment
Biomass links in the Östergötland region have been described as unplanned
industrial symbiosis links as a result of spontaneous development,96 but there is
simultaneously recognition that there are some intended approaches developed
in Östergötland.97 Similarly to how KIS started with the development of an oil
refinery and power plant, in LNIS it is attributed to the establishment of E.ON’s
combined heat and power plant in 1982.98
The motivations for pursuing symbiotic exchanges were described as follows:
we chose the process by looking at the overall environmental impact
and the overall economic impact, and looking at waste. When we
built our first waste incinerator, there were not so many who get
paid to receive waste. You need to have quite expensive equipment
94Interview participant.
95Michael Martin and others, ‘Quantifying the Environmental Performance of Integrated
Bioethanol and Biogas Production’ (2014) 61 Renewable Energy 109, 115.
96Baas, ‘Planning and Uncovering Industrial Symbiosis: Comparing the Rotterdam and
Östergötland Regions’ (n 82) 433.
97Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 5.
98Neil Mikkola, Linda Randall, and Annika Hagberg (eds), Green Growth in Nordic Regions:
50 Ways to Make it Happen (Nordregio 2016) 32.
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to take care of it. But the overall economic [benefit] was very good
at the time and we needed to build something new. So instead of
building a new coal [plant] or bio[mass] boiler, we believe biofuel can
be used for better stuff than just burning it, but waste you can’t do
so much about.99
This quotation is very revealing, and reflects the thoughts of other LNIS inter-
view participants as well. The motivations were mainly economic, even though
there is mention of environmental impacts. Another interview participant iden-
tified the particular role of community attributes and geographic location (as
discussed in Section 5.2.4) in initiating industrial symbiosis: ‘this combination
[of community attributes and geographic location] has somehow led to the sys-
tems being built up, not as a plan, but as an actual way of culture of how people
work’.100 The participant acknowledged that these drivers were supported by
commercial arguments. Additionally, one of the symbionts, E.ON, received a
huge investment, which helped drive the setting up of collaborations.
The first quotation also highlights the issue of how waste is currently conceptu-
alised. In LNIS, waste is considered to have value, but only in terms of feeding
incineration systems rather than as part of other reusing, recycling, or recovery
operations. This underscores the need to emphasise the limits of incineration
(see Section 1.1.1) and has also been identified as an issue by the EU (see Sec-
tion 5.2.4).
5.2.4 External variables
This section sets out the external variables for LNIS.
99Interview participant.
100Interview participant.
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Geographic location
LNIS is a clearer example than KIS to demonstrate that co-location is not re-
quired for industrial symbiosis, as the core network spans two cities — Linköping
and Norrköping — around 40 kilometeres apart. Additionally, the area does not
produce sufficient waste and therefore imports it from abroad to feed into the
symbiotic network (see Section 5.2.2). This is echoed by interview participants,
who state that industrial symbiosis is used ‘quite freely’ in that co-location is
not required. There is still co-location within LNIS; three of the five symbionts
(Agroetanol, Cleanway, E.ON, Returpack, and Svensk Biogas) are situated on
the island of Händelö just outside Norrköping allowing for the construction of
pipelines between the symbionts to transport wastes and by-products.
Geographic location was identified by an interview participant as an explanation
for some of the community attributes. Linköping and Norrköping are in close
proximity to nature, which has resulted in many individuals having an interest
in the outdoors. This interest together with the high level of education in the
area may explain some of the LNIS developments (see section on ‘Community
attributes’ below).
Economic conditions
Linköping has been described as a ‘Swedish economic success story’, in part as
a result of it being a hub in Sweden for technological growth during the last
forty years.101 Norrköping has a similarly strong local economy,102 with a local
101Sabrina Fredin, The Dynamics and Evolution of Local Industries — The Case of
Linköping, Sweden (CSIR Electronic Working Paper Series 2012/12, Center for Strategic
Innovation Research 2012) 6. See also: Magnus Klofsten, Dylan Jones-Evans, and Carina
Schärberg, ‘Growing the Linköping Technopole — A Longitudinal Study of Triple Helix De-
velopment in Sweden’ (1999) 24(2-3) The Journal of Technology Transfer 125; Leif Hommen,
David Doloreux, and Emma Larsson, ‘Emergence and Growth of Mjärdevi Science Park in
Linköping, Sweden’ (2006) 14 European Planning Studies 1331.
102Carina Johansson, Andrea Croner, and Dennis Nilsson, Swedish Municipality of Norrkop-
ing ‘AA+/A-1+’ Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable (S&P Global Ratings, 2016) 2.
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port that is a distribution hub for the whole Nordic region.103
Community attributes
Sweden joined the EU in 1995. According to the EU’s EIR, Sweden is a leader on
innovative environmental approaches, resulting in part in high level of recycling,
but opportunities remain to increase waste prevention and reduce amount of
incineration.104
Within Sweden generally, Baas argues that strong industrial symbiosis links are
found as a result of the historical attitude for caring for nature.105 In particu-
lar, he singles out the hundred-year-old slogan of allemansrätten, which means
everyone’s right or common right (also translated as the Right of Public Access
by the Swedish Environment Protection Agency).106 It is a practice protected
by the Swedish constitution107 — everyone shall have the right to access nature,
as long as common sense and ‘do not disturb, do not destroy’ approaches are
used.108
Baas also argues that trust is very important in Swedish society: ‘[t]he trust level
is very high, and lead to many links between government, industry and knol-
wedge centres to develop common solutions’.109 This is echoed by Hatefipour
103Port of Norrköping, ‘Port of Norrköping in Short’ (2017) 〈norrkopingshamn.se/en/om_
oss/tillgaenglighet〉 accessed 16 July 2017.
104European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— SWEDEN (Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 56 final, 2017) 4 and 10.
105Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 6.
106Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, ‘The Right of Public Access’ (2017) 〈www.
swedishepa.se/Enjoying-nature/The-Right-of-Public-Access〉 accessed 17 August 2017.
107The Swedish constitution comprises four laws: Successionsordning SFS 1810:0926 1810
(Swedish Act of Succession); Tryckfrihetsfördning SFS 1949:105 1949 (Swedish Freedom of
the Press Act); Kungörelse om beslutad ny regeringsform SFS 1974:152 1974 (Swedish Instru-
ment of Government); Yttrandefrihetsgrundlag SFS 1991:1469 1991 (Swedish Fundamental
Law on Freedom of Expression). There is a fourth law that sets out organisation and proce-
dures of the Riksdag (ie national legislature and supreme decision-making body of Sweden):
Riksdagsordning SFS 2014:801 2014 (Swedish Riksdag Act). Allemansrätten is covered in
Swedish Instrument of Government, ch 2 s 9: ‘Everyone shall have access to nature under
allemansrätten, regardless of what has been prescribed in this law’ (translation is author’s
own).
108Bo Ekman, ‘In Search of Common Sense’ in Nayan Chanda and Susan Froetschel (eds),
A World Connected: Globalization in the 21st Century (YaleGlobal Online 2012) 229.
109Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
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and others who highlight this attribute within the LNIS context by stating that
the ‘social-human dimension of industrial symbiosis such as trust and commu-
nications are the most key factors in cooperation between the participants at
the Händelö symbiotic network’.110 Linked to trust is the openness of Swedish
society:
when it comes to waste . . . treatment, because there is, as I have
seen it, a total openness. We can call whatever city and ask for
prices and how they think, how they have planned, which ones they
have deals with, who are doing what they should and who are not. A
total openness, and a willingness to make things better for everyone.
It’s really, it’s almost too good to be true really.111
This openness and trust has even extended to the sharing of contracts cover-
ing symbiotic exchanges with a researcher based at Linköping University, so
that reseearch can be undertaken on observations from these contracts. This is
in contrast with KIS, where the Symbiosis Centre (or any other third parties)
cannot see any of the contracts, even though trust and openness have been con-
sidered central factors there (see Sections 5.1.4). The trust is further highlighted
as the contracts in the food industry are not always up to date. A possible rea-
son given by one of the interview participants is that the local food industry
does not have to consider competition for these symbiotic exchanges.
Interview participants also highlighted two attributes of the local population.
First, the community has a high level of education, including people highly
skilled in Information, Communications and Technology (ICT), and general en-
gineers. Second, like KIS, the local population is unaware of the local system
and its environmental benefits.
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 6.
110Saeid Hatefipour, Leenard Baas, and Mats Eklund, ‘The Händelö Area in Norrköping,
Sweden. Does it Fit for Industrial Symbiosis Development?’ [2011] World Renewable Energy
Congress 3468, 3475.
111Interview participant.
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One difference highlighted between Linköping and Norrköping during the site
visits is the politically different ideologies between the municipalities that do
not align and almost seem contradictory to how waste is managed. Linköping
is considered more conservative, but in general the local authority owns waste
management operations. In contrast, Norrköping is politically more socialist,
but with more private owners of waste management operations.
One community barrier identified related to waste management is consumer
behaviour: ‘mostly I think the biggest problem to climb up the [waste hierarchy]
is people’s lack of time and interest’.112 This may be attributed to the onus on
individuals in sorting recycling.113 Though this limit is within the Swedish
context, where despite this barrier the recycling rate is one of the highest in the
EU, with only 1% of Swedish household waste sent to landfill.114
Rules-in-use
a) Regulatory. The regulatory driver identified by almost all interview partic-
ipants is the waste hierarchy (see Section 4.2.3).115 There are issues with the
hierarchy. As one interview participant articulated:
the waste goal is just that; it’s to climb up the waste hierarchy. So
it’s definitely a concern for us. But, the real difficult issue is to decide
if we are going to be on the lower three steps. That is really when
the question of waste, what to do with waste that comes into our
possession. And the upper steps are more on the consumer side, and
112Interview participant.
113This does not only affect Sweden. In Norway time was said to have negative effect on
household recycling efforts — Bente Halvorsen, ‘Effects of Norms and Opportunity Cost of
Time on Household Recycling’ (2008) 84(3) Land Economics 501, 511; Bente Halvorsen, ‘Ef-
fects of Norms and Policy Incentives on Household Recycling: An International Comparison’
(2012) 67 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 18, 20.
114Swedish Institute, ‘Quick Facts’ (2017) 〈sweden.se/quickfact/recycling-sweden〉 accessed
17 July 2017.
115The waste hierarchy is set out in Avfallsförordning SFS 2017:802 2017 (Swedish Waste
Ordinance) ch 15 s 10. The ordering mirrors the EU waste hiearchy, but the chosen wording
differs.
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that is not really an easy question to answer. Is it our job to make
people buy less? It’s so much politics . . . So, mainly we concern
ourselves with the lower steps, to be as good as we can on the issues
at hand.116
This highlights how industrial symbiosis does not focus on prevention. The main
barriers identified to progressing up the hierarchy are community attributes of
behaviour, lack of time, and lack of interest.
The second regulatory driver identified by interview participants is landfill tax
as set out in the Swedish Waste Tax Act.117 As the name of the Act implies,
it is known as waste rather than landfill tax. Waste tax is paid to the state by
establishments depositing or storing 50 tonnes or more of hazardous or other
waste per annum for more than three years.118 This incentive is the same as KIS
in that organisations want to avoid paying landfill tax, and industrial symbiosis
provides a potential strategy for this.
The final regulatory incentive explicitly highlighted by interview participants is
EPR. EPR for packaging waste was first introduced in 1994 in Sweden. The
current EPR stipulated in the Swedish Ordinance on Producer Responsibility119
requires waste producers to produce packaging that can be reused or recycled,
and to set up collection points for such packaging waste.120 This is an example
116Interview participant.
117Lag om skatt paa avfall SFS 1999:673 1999 (Swedish Waste Tax Act). Swedish law on
landfills generally is covered by: Förordning om deponering av avfall SFS 2001:521 2001
(Swedish Ordinance on the Landfill of Waste).
118Swedish Waste Tax Act, s 1: ‘Tax (waste tax) shall be paid to the state under this Act
on waste sent to a waste facility where 50 tonnes or more of hazardous or other waste is per
year deposited or stored for longer than three years. Waste tax shall also be paid for waste
arising in an installation where activities other than waste management are carried out, if 50
tonnes or more of hazardous or other waste is per year disposed of within the plant or stored
for more than three years.’ (translation is author’s own).
119Förordning om producentansvar för förpackningar SFS 2014:1703 2014 (Swedish Ordi-
nance on Producer Responsibility for Packaging).
120Swedish Ordinance on Producer Responsibility for Packaging, s 35: ‘the producer shall
ensure that the packaging manufactured, sold or imported by the producer is designed, man-
ufactured and marketed in such a way that the packaging is reusable or recyclable’ (extract
- translation is author’s own); Swedish Ordinance on Producer Responsibility for Packaging,
s 37: ‘When a producer commercially manufactures, sells or sends to Sweden packaging or a
product protected by or presented in packaging, the producer shall (1) provide a collection
point for packaging to ensure it is disposed of as required by this Ordinance, or (2) ensure
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of economic (as the producers have to invest to set up such collection points)
and physical responsibility (see Section 4.3.2). There is also an informative re-
sponsibility placed on the municipality as they have to inform households of the
obligation to separate packaging waste from other waste, what to separate, the
available collection points, how households can contribute to increased recycling,
and the outcome of the separation.121 In addition to packaging, EPR currently
applies to newspapers,122 electrical and electronic products,123 vehicles,124 and
batteries.125 The most relevant to LNIS is packaging as a result of symbionts
such as Returpack. In practice, EPR differs for small and large organisations:
most municipalities offer small organisations that produce small amounts of
waste collection points where they can deliver their packaging without charge,
while large organisations often contract and pay waste management operators
to collect and dispose of waste.126 There are opportunities that remain for leg-
islating EPR, with textiles identified by the Swedish Environmental Protection
Agency as a material which would result in considerable environmental bene-
fits.127 Textiles are used in some symbiotic exchanges (eg in PIS and Rotterdam
Industrial Symbiosis (RIS) for bags), so this could incentivise similar symbiotic
that any other authorised establishment permitted under section 38 to operate a collection
point is commited to taking care of the packaging when it becomes waste’ (translation is au-
thor’s own). Academic research on EPR and its effects on behaviour: Olle Hage, ‘Evaluating
the Swedish Producer Responsibility for Packaging Materials: Policy Design and Outcome’
(Tech. Licentiate thesis, Luleaa University of Technology 2010); Olle Hage, Patrik Söderholm,
and Christer Berglund, ‘Norms and Economic Motivation in Household Recycling: Empirical
Evidence from Sweden’ (2009) 53 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 155.
121Swedish Ordinance on Producer Responsibility for Packaging, s 58: ‘The municipality shall
inform households of: (1) the obligation under section 24a and 24b of the Waste Ordinance
(2011:927) to separate packaging waste from other waste; (2) how to separate; (3) available
collection points; (4) how households can contribute to increased material recycling; and (5)
the recycling results that the sorting contributes to. The municipality shall give the one
operating the collection point the opportunity to comment on the design of the information’
(translation is author’s own).
122Förordning om producentansvar för returpapper SFS 2014:1074 2014 (Swedish Ordinance
on Producer Responsibility for News and Pams (Graphic Papers)).
123Förordning om producentansvar för elutrustning SFS 2014:1075 2014 (Swedish Ordinance
on Producer Responsibility for Electrical Equipment).
124Förordning om producentansvar för bilar SFS 2007:185 2007 (Swedish Ordinance on Pro-
ducer Responsibility for Vehicles).
125Förordning om producentansvar för batterier SFS 2008:834 2008 (Swedish Ordinance on
Producer Responsibility for Batteries).
126Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, ‘From Waste Management to Resource Effi-
ciency: Sweden’s Waste Plan 2012-2017’ 6560 21. Note: in some cases these large organisations
receive money depending on the global value of waste.
127ibid 72.
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exchanges in Sweden.
The definition of waste was not a concern in LNIS, with all interview particpants
using the term waste. This is in contrast to KIS where participants referred to
resources rather than waste. This is likely as a result of the role of incineration
in LNIS. One interview participant did have an example of the definition of
waste being a barrier elsewhere in Sweden: in Helsingborg, a possible exchange
involving the reuse of waste was not pursued because of the legal classification
of the material as waste. The terms by-product and end-of-waste are covered in
the Swedish Waste Ordinance128 (see Section 4.4.1), but these labels were not
used or referred to by interview participants.
b) Policy. Local policies were identified as one of the main rules-in-use incen-
tives. This is in relation to the strong environmental commitment and waste
management operations.129 Norrköping also funded between 2010 and 2013 the
research programme ‘Sustainable Norrköping’ to identify how societal large tech-
nical systems can contribute to increased sustainable development by making it
easier for city residents to live and act more sustainable.130 Simultaneously, both
municipalities have a number of strategy documents, but none mention indus-
trial symbiosis nor circular economy. This is a missed opportunity to promote
and communicate the local network. This was also identified by one interview
participant as a missed opportunity at regional level, as the focus is on health-
care currently rather than the environment and setting out concrete strategies
for this. At national level, there is Sweden’s Waste Plan 2012-2017.131 This does
128Swedish Waste Ordinance.
129Linköping’s and Norrköping’s environmental policies include: Linköpings kommun,
Miljöpolicy för Linköpings kommun (Linköpings kommun February 2001); Norrköpings kom-
mun, Lokala hälsoskyddsföreskrifter för att skydda människor hälsa eller miljön inom Nor-
rköpings kommun (120/2003, Norrköpings kommun August 2003); Linköpings kommun, Ren-
haallningsordning 2006. Ändring av lokala föreskrifter för avfallshantering antagna av kom-
munfullmäktige i oktober 2011 (Linköpings kommun October 2011); Linköpings kommun,
Lokala föreskrifter enligt miljöbalken för Linköpings kommun (Linköpings kommun Novem-
ber 2015).
130Linkóping University, ‘Sustainable Norrköping’ (2015) 〈iei . liu . se / envtech/ forskning/
forskningsprojekt/hallbara-nkpg?l=en〉 accessed 19 August 2017.
131Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, ‘From Waste Management to Resource Effi-
ciency: Sweden’s Waste Plan 2012-2017’ 6560.
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not mention industrial symbiosis either, but has an overarching aim of greater
resource efficiency which industrial symbiosis can underpin (see Section 1.2).132
The experience of one interview participant is that there is often a conflict in
the implementation of policies:
sustainability and environmental officers need to be very creative
constantly to be able to implement the policies, while the guys work-
ing with economics or other things don’t have this challenge to be
creative . . . They can say ‘no, we’ve always done it this way, we’re
going to go on doing it the same way’ . . . Laws could make a real
difference here.133
This underscores the preference still being economic over environmental policy
implementation.
c) Property. The waste exchanges in LNIS are controlled by contracts, which
are governed by the Swedish Contracts Act134 and Sales of Goods Act135 (see
previous section on ‘Community attributes’).136 Waste is therefore treated as
private property, and this private property regime does not pose as a barrier
to reusing and recovering waste in industrial symbiosis. This is the same as in
KIS, and also mirrors KIS in that symbionts are full owner in Schlager-Ostrom
terms (see Section 3.1.2).
Third parties
Even though the industrial symbiosis in LNIS was initially spontaneous (see
Section 5.2.3), third parties have recently been key. This together with the
132ibid 10.
133Interview participant.
134Lag om avtal och andra rättshandlingar paa förmögenhetsrättens omraade SFS 1915:218
1915 (Swedish Contracts Act).
135Köplagen SFS 1990:931 1990 (Swedish Sales of Goods Act).
136Note that these Acts are supported by and within a context of wider Swedish contract
law beyond the scope of this thesis.
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collaboration between parties has been acknowledged in the literature:
[there exists] a strong link between the industry, government and
academia with respect to innovative approaches for applying renew-
able energy and industrial symbiosis plays a strong role at the macro
level in the Östergötland community.137
Such partnerships are also encouraged by Sweden’s Waste Plan.138
Cleantech Östergötland, an organisation comprising the municipalities of Linkö-
ping and Norrköping, and a network of industrial organisations, was established
in 2008 to promote the business opportunities and enhance competition for
clean technology companies139 in Östergötland.140 Cleantech ‘“markets” the in-
dustrial symbiosis concept as an umbrella for environmentally driven regional
development in Östergötland and defined it as business practice’.141 Its role
is that it acts as an intermediary to facilitate co-operation between different
societal actors’.142 It achieves this through organising breakfast seminars and
workshops.143
The different levels of governments — local, national, and EU — provide the
regulatory and policy contexts (as in all the case studies). Additionally, the
municipalities play an essential role in waste management. Municipality has re-
sponsibility for household waste recovered or discarded within their municipal-
ity.144 This includes a responsibility for collecting and transporting the waste145
137Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 1.
138Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, ‘From Waste Management to Resource Effi-
ciency: Sweden’s Waste Plan 2012-2017’ 6560, 10.
139These are companies that use processes, produce products, or provide services that reduce
negative environmental impact through eg energy efficiency and sustainable use of resources.
140Cleantech Östergötland, ‘Network Activities’ (2017) 〈cleantechostergotland.se/network-
activities〉 accessed 13 March 2017.
141Baas, ‘Planning and Uncovering Industrial Symbiosis: Comparing the Rotterdam and
Östergötland Regions’ (n 82) 433.
142Baas, ‘Östergötland: Towards a Sustainable Region on the Basis of Industrial Symbiosis
and Renewable Energy’ (n 83) 3.
143Cleantech Östergötland, ‘Network Activities’ (n 140).
144Miljöbalken SFS 1998:808 1998 (Swedish Environmental Code) ch 5 s 20.
145Swedish Environmental Code, ch 5 s 20.
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(except where covered by national government set producer responsibility reg-
ulations).146 It is therefore a symbiont, but also facilitates industrial symbio-
sis by collaborating within the Cleantech network. Municipalities also have
Geographic Information System (GIS) data, which can facilitate and support
industrial symbiosis development.147
In addition, Sverige Avfall, the Swedish waste management association, was
identfied as a supportive national actor:
[Avfall Sverige] produce information materials and guidelines. They
are lobbying organisations to watch the national political side of
things. They also have representatives who are sitting in Brussels
to speak for [actors involved in symbiotic exchanges amongst others]
on the European level.148
This illustrates how this third party helps integrate the different waste stake-
holders by facilitating communication across government levels. Sverige Avfall
have also funded industrial symbiosis research.149
The collaboration at the heart of LNIS and key to third parties is also embodied
by the Industrial Ecology Research Programme.150 This is a ten year research
collaboration, which started in 2009, between the Department of Management
and Engineering at Linköping University and Tekniska Verken. The aim of this
programme is to further explore synergies in materials, energy, waste, and by-
products between companies. The three particular research areas are: regional
industrial symbiosis, renewable resources in industrial symbiosis, and industrial
symbiosis and large technical systems. Much of the focus up to 2017 was on
146Swedish Environmental Code, ch 5 s 21.
147Saeid Hatefipour, ‘Facilitation of Industrial Symbiosis Development in a Swedish Region’
(Tech. Licentiate thesis, Linköping University 2012) 38 and 40.
148Interview participant.
149For more information on this research see: Sverige Avfall, Annual Report 2016 (2016) 15.
150Anders Carlsson, ‘The Industrial Ecology Research Programme 2009-2019’ (2013) 〈iei .
liu.se/envtech/forskning/forskningsprojekt/ierp〉 accessed 13 March 2017; Lovisa Staberg,
‘Energi’ (2015) 〈tekniskaverken . se / innovation/ forskning - och - utveckling/ energi〉 accessed
13 March 2017.
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mining of landfills, with the focus of the next two years up to 2019 on biofuel
strategies, internationalisation of environmental technologies, district heating
collaboration, and resource efficient biogas solutions.151 This programme will
potentially result in the initiation of additional symbiotic exchanges.
5.3 Peterborough, UK
PIS examined for the purposes of this thesis is located in the City of Peterbor-
ough, situated in Cambridgeshire. It is in the East of England, around 120 kilo-
metres north of London. Peterborough has a population of just over 183600,152
and is one of England’s fastest growing cities by population growth.153
PIS is not as evolved as KIS or LNIS, and has also not yet been described as
an industrial symbiosis system in academic scholarship. There has so far been
only a couple of references to the concept of industrial symbiosis in relation to
Peterborough in general interest articles online.154 One possible reason for this
is that developments in the City of Peterborough have been quite recent, and
the development of industrial symbiosis in Peterborough was not the specific
aim. Instead, PIS was the by-product of other policy aims as discussed in
Section 5.3.3.
151Linköping University, ‘The Industrial Ecology Research Programme 2017-2019’ (2017)
〈liu.se/en/article/industrial-ecology-research-program〉 accessed 19 August 2017.
152Based on the 2011 Census data available for download on: Office for National Statistics,
‘2011 Census, Population and Household Estimates for England and Wales - Unrounded Fig-
ures for the Data Published 16 July 2012’ (16 July 2012) 〈webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20160105160709/ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm:77-
274670〉 accessed 2 March 2017.
153Between 2002 and 2012 it was the fastest growing city — Centre for Cities, Cities Outlook
2014 (2014) 30. In the Centre for Cities City Outlooks reports since 2014 it has no longer
been on the top spot, but consistently been in top five — Centre for Cities, Cities Outlook
2015 (2015) 32; Centre for Cities, Cities Outlook 2016 (2016) 28; Centre for Cities, Cities
Outlook 2017 (2017) 32.
154For the particular PIS system discussed in this thesis: Seb Egerton-Read, ‘Building a
Smart City System in Peterborough’ (18 June 2015) 〈circulatenews.org/2015/06/building-a-
smart-city-system-in-peterborough〉 accessed 24 February 2017; The Building Centre, ‘Bags,
Peterborough DNA (Hessian Coffee Sacks, 2015)’ (5 September 2016) 〈buildingcentre.co.uk/
news/circularliving-17〉 accessed 24 February 2017. Industrial symbiosis has also been men-
tioned as NISP has in the past been active in Peterborough — see for example: Peterborough
Telegraph, ‘McCain Cleantech is a Global Example’ (27 July 2009) 〈peterboroughtoday.co.
uk/news/business/mccain- cleantech- is- a- global- example-1-136075〉 accessed 24 February
2017.
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5.3.1 Action arena
The focus is on one particular set of symbiotic exchanges within the City of
Peterborough, which meets Chertow’s 3-2 heuristic criteria.155 In April 2015,
Peterborough Reuse Limited, a private limited company, and Opportunity Pe-
terborough, a private not-for-profit company that is wholly owned by Peter-
borough City Council, visited Masteroast Coffee Company Limited, a private
limited roasting and packing facility based in Peterborough. As a result of this
meeting, a symbiotic system repurposing coffee sacks and unwanted clothing
into mainly retail bags and some log bags was initiated, and is still operative
and being sustained today. Currently, Masteroast gives more than 1400 hessian
and jute sacks156 (used to ship coffee beans from around the world to them) to
Peterborough Reuse every week. These sacks are then cleaned and processed
according to the coarseness of the sacks. The cleaned bags are sent to offenders
and ex-offenders to cut into the patterns required by Peterborough Reuse. The
cut materials are then turned into retail items and log sacks by a group of local
women. The finer bags are made into retail items, such as shopping bags, while
rougher coarse bags are used in tree planting, for making log sacks for the forest
industry, for riverbank reinforcement as part of flood protection schemes, and
for other various environmental river projects. The retail bags are lined with
excess fabric which is bought from local charity shops. These retail bags are the
bestselling products.157 There are thus three symbionts — charity shops, Mas-
teroast and Peterborough Reuse — exchanging two resources — hessian bags
and excess fabrics. This PIS is represented in Figure 5.3.
155As required by the case study selection criteria — see Section 1.4.1.
156In the remainder of this section only hessian bags are referred to, as these make up the
majority of the sacks received.
157This process is described on Peterborough Reuse’s website: Peterborough Reuse, ‘What
We Do’ (2016) 〈peterboroughreuse.co.uk〉 accessed 24 February 2017.
158Diagram is author’s own. Developed using the information presented in this section.
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Peterborough Reuse Masteroast 
Charity shops 
Households 
Probation service 
Retail industry 
Forest industry 
unwanted clothing 
excess fabrics 
hessian bags 
hessian bags 
hessian bags cut 
in patterns  
retail bags 
log sacks 
Figure 5.3: Peterborough Industrial Symbiosis.158
5.3.2 Outcomes: benefits and limits
PIS has economic, environmental, and social benefits. The symbionts, in ad-
dition to other stakeholders including offenders, ex-offenders, and local women
employed by Peterborough Reuse, all gain economic benefits. There is job
creation for these stakeholders, while Masteroast saves on landfill costs, Peter-
borough Reuse benefits from a free stream of materials (ie hessian sacks), and
the charity shops receive increased revenue. The latter benefit is as a result of
the sale of excess fabric to Peterborough Reuse being worth more than ragging,
for which the fabric would otherwise have been used. Rags are mostly sold and
exported overseas at a discount price.159
Job creation is also a social benefit both for the probation service and group of
local women. The link with the probation service was established as the Cam-
bridgeshire & Peterborough Probation Trust, a probation service that assists
offenders and ex-offenders in completing their community service and under su-
pervision work, needed to find suitable work for offenders and ex-offenders that
meet certain criteria, which the work provided by Peterborough Reuse does. In
159For example: Andrew Brooks, Clothing Poverty: The Hidden World of Fast Fashion and
Second-Hand Clothes (Zed Books Ltd 2015) eg 92, 93 and 200; WRAP, Valuing Our Clothes:
The True Cost of How we Design, Use and Dispose of Clothing in the UK (2016) 5, 9, 10
and 12.
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relation to the women, Peterborough Reuse worked with the UK Department
of Work and Pensions to set up a six week course for women in the City of Pe-
terborough to learn the skills required to produce the various bags. The course
has so far taught 60 predominantly long-term unemployed, recent migrant, or
stay-at-home women how to use a sewing machine and to work with patterns
to cut and sew various items. Recent figures state that 46 of those women have
been offered part-time work from home to produce the bags.160 In addition
to the women learning new sewing skills, they also build their confidence and
communication skills.
There are also a number of environmental advantages. In the first 18 months,
30000 hessian bags were diverted from landfill.161 By converting the sacks into
reusable retail bags, the number of plastic bags used by civil society is also
reduced. A full life-cycle assessment is required though to evaluate the extent
of particular environmental benefits,162 as the repurposing of the hessian sacks
into bags requires cleaning and transporting of the bags which may be an energy
intense process. In relation to the excess fabric, the carbon footprint of selling
fabrics to Peterborough Reuse is likely lower than sending it to their previous
main destination. Before, charity clothes had five main destinations: reuse in
the UK through re-sale in charity shops, landfill, overseas reuse, recycling, and
incineration. The statistics on these different destinations vary; the UK Char-
ity Retail Association estimates that more than 90% are reused and recycled,
and only 9% of clothing donated to charity shops is discarded as waste,163 while
Brooks estimates only 10-30% of clothing donated to UK charity shops is retailed
within the UK,164 and WRAP estimates that most (34%) is reused overseas,
followed by landfill (31%), then equal amounts are reused in the UK and re-
160Masteroast, ‘Peterborough Coffee Sack Recycling Scheme’ (6 September 2016)
〈masteroast.co.uk/latest-news/coffee-sack-recycling-scheme〉 accessed 6 March 2017.
161ibid.
162Life-cycle approaches are mentioned a number of times throughout Chapter 4.
163Charity Retail Association, ‘How Charity Shops Work’ (2015) 〈charityretail.org.uk/how-
charity-shops-work〉 accessed 14 February 2017.
164Brooks (n 159) 88.
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cycled (both 14%), and incineration is the least common option (7%).165 The
environmental benefits as a result of the work of Peterborough Reuse have been
recognised — it won the Peterborough Environment City Trust Green Award in
2014 and was highly commended in the Peterborough Telegraph Environmental
Achievement Award category in 2015.
The limits of PIS echo those of KIS and LNIS: there are dependencies and the
system relies on the production of waste.
5.3.3 Initiation and sustainment
In 2013 Peterborough came second in the Future Cities Demonstrator com-
petition and was awarded £3 million by the then Technology Strategy Board
(now Innovate UK) to test and implement part of their Peterborough DNA pro-
gramme.166 This programme had been developed in 2012 as a result of £50000
received by the Technology Strategy Board to fund a feasibility study to show
how Peterborough could improve the performance of their city through integra-
tion of city systems.167 The £3 million funding went to both Peterborough City
Council and Opportunity Peterborough to deliver the programme.
The Peterborough DNA programme was initially envisioned to comprise five
strands: Living Data, Peterborough Innovation Pool, Skills for Our Future,
Transporting Intelligence, and Sustainable City Metabolism. The latter strand
was particularly relevant to industrial symbiosis. One of the projects described
for this strand was waste metabolism to optimise the flow of material resources
and waste in the Fengate business cluster in Peterborough to support businesses
165WRAP, Valuing Our Clothes: The True Cost of How we Design, Use and Dispose of
Clothing in the UK (n 159) 12.
166Glasgow came first and was awarded £24 million, while Peterborough together with Bristol
and London were awarded £3 million each. Innovate UK, ‘City Councils’ Feasibilities Studies’
(2013) 〈connect.innovateuk.org/web/future-cities-special- interest-group/feasibility-studies〉
accessed 3 March 2017; Niraj Saraf, ‘Learning from Future Cities Demonstrators’ (29 October
2015) 〈innovateuk .blog .gov .uk/2015/10/29/ learning - from- future - cities - demonstrators〉
accessed 3 March 2017.
167Peterborough was one of 30 city councils to receive this funding — Saraf (n 166).
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in sharing resources, and reducing and reusing wastes.168 One of the programmes
set out to
investigate opportunities for inter-business waste reuse and alterna-
tive solutions for small business waste disposal . . . The ultimate aim
of this project is a city-wide waste reuse programme that achieves
a more continuous loop in the city’s use of material resources and
production of waste.169
This reuse and looping of waste and other resources by businesses is a require-
ment of industrial symbiosis (see Section 1.2). In the literature metabolism and
industrial symbiosis are acknowledged to be closely related concepts, and at
times used synonymously.170 Importantly, the Peterborough DNA programme
took a holistic and broad approach to the reuse of waste. Waste was not just
conceived as tangible materials, but in their view also includes
underutilised people, underutilised places and space, because in or-
der for a city to function and meet its potential, it is important that
all aspects of the city are utilised to the full benefits of the individ-
ual that might own them in some way and that anyone can benefit
from.171
The labelling of the strands of Peterborough DNA changed to Smart Business,
Living Data, Skills and Innovation. The main reason for changing the name
from Sustainable City Metabolism to Smart Business was because ‘no one . . .
168Charlotte Palmer, Future Cities Demonstrator Feasibility Study: Peterborough DNA
(23443-162343, Peterborough City Council 2012) 35.
169Palmer (n 168) 35.
170For example: Allan Johansson, ‘Industrial Ecology and Industrial Metabolism: Use and
Misuse of Metaphors’ in Robert U Ayres and Leslie W Ayres (eds), Handbook of Industrial
Ecology (Edward Elgar 2002) 73-75; John A Mathews and Hao Tan, ‘Progress Toward a
Circular Economy in China: The Drivers (and Inhibitors) of Eco-industrial Initiative’ (2011)
15(3) Journal of Industrial Ecology 435, 436. For a history of industrial metabolism see:
Marina Fischer-Kowalski, ‘Exploring the History of Industrial Metabolism’ in Robert U Ayres
and Leslie W Ayres (eds), Handbook of Industrial Ecology (Edward Elgar 2002) 16-25.
171Interview participant.
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understood [Sustainable City Metabolism] . . . except if there were academics.
. . . The concept of metabolism is quite specific . . . and people don’t grasp it’.172
This may also explain why the term industrial symbiosis is not used more in
relation to Peterborough in addition to industrial symbiosis not being the main
or sole aim as discussed in Section 5.3.1. The change of terminology also demon-
strates how the Peterborough DNA programme engaged with businesses from
the outset and integrated their input to help shape the programme.
[The Peterborough DNA programme] started by looking at urban
metabolisms, and working with the particular business community
in Fengate. But actually by listening to what businesses were saying,
it became more and more clear that a circular economy approach was
something that would help address their needs and also move the city
forward in a positive way. It’s not just about [Peterborough DNA]
will do that one, [instead] it’s actually emerged from the ground up
in the city.173
A circular economy approach became one of the main foci of the Smart Business
strand (and therefore Peterborough DNA) with focus on the reuse of resources
including waste.174 The Peterborough DNA demonstrator programme and its
ideas, approaches, and projects, are now being scaled up through the Future Pe-
terborough Programme.175 This programme is ‘built upon intelligence, listening
to the people living in our city, smart leadership and circular economy princi-
ples’.176 Additionally, Peterborough has the ambition to be the first circular city
in the UK, termed the Circular Peterborough Commitment.177
172Interview participant.
173Interview participant.
174For example: Steve Bowyer, Peterborough: Delivering a Truly Smart City (Opportunity
Peterborough 2014). In this brochure, one of the solutions listed for Smart Business is ‘Create
a circular economy — redesigning business processes to a virtuous cycle of manufacture and
reuse’ — ibid 2.
175Future Peterborough, ‘About Future Peterborough’ (2016) 〈futurepeterborough . com/
about〉 accessed 19 August 2017. The Peterborough DNA website now redirects to the Future
Peterborough website. Note that interviews were undertaken when the programme was still
the Peterborough DNA programme, so the references are still to this.
176ibid.
177The Environment Capital, ‘Peterborough Signs Circular Commitment: City Businesses
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As part of the Circular Peterborough Commitment, Share Peterborough has
been launched. Share Peterborough is a free, member only, online sharing com-
munity for Peterborough businesses. Businesses can post resources they have or
need.178 In order to test whether the concept of Share Peterborough would work,
Peterborough City Council and Opportunity Peterborough undertook Twitter
campaigns and hosted ‘Swap It’ workshops for businesses. Businesses put on a
board what they need, can share and throw away. Peterborough City Council
and Opportunity Peterborough then supported businesses in identifying possible
matches.179
The particular links within PIS actually came about as a result of the Innovation
strand. The founders of Peterborough Reuse, Pav Patel and Gary Graves, were
awarded £5000 from the Innovation Challenge Fund180 to launch Peterborough
Reuse. This illustrates how links existed across the strands of Peterborough
DNA, and that these strands did not exist in isolated siloes. The funding pro-
vided within the Innovation strand supported a business based upon circular
approaches which also falls under the Circular Peterborough Commitment and
the then Smart Business strand.
The initial driver for businesses to engage generally with the programme was
economic, but social and environmental dimensions quickly gained prominence.
The engagement with businesses included asking:
what are your challenges with this vision and how can [Peterborough
DNA] make this [circular economy] vision work for you? What are
Commit to Creating a Circular Economy by 2050’ (2016) 〈environmentcapital . tfhost .
co . uk / december - 2016 / latest - news / peterborough - signs - circular - commitment〉 ac-
cessed 6 March 2017; Future Peterborough, ‘Circular Peterborough Commitment’ (2016)
〈futurepeterborough.com/circular-city/circular-peterborough-commitment〉 accessed 19 Au-
gust 2017; Peterborough DNA, ‘Circular Economy’ (2017) 〈peterboroughdna.com/circular-
economy〉 accessed 6 March 2017; Share Peterborough, ‘About Us’ (2017) 〈sharepeterborough.
com/about-us〉 accessed 6 March 2017.
178Share Peterborough, ‘How it Works’ (2017) 〈sharepeterborough . com/how - it - works〉
accessed 3 March 2017.
179Information retrieved from interview participants.
180See Peterborough DNA, ‘Encouraging and Facilitating Entrepreneurial Activity in the
City’ (2017) 〈peterboroughdna.com/innovation〉 accessed 6 March 2017.
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the barriers? What are the incentives you would see? The main
answer at the time was the economic one, but quite quickly actually
the environmental and social benefits were highlighted.181
Some of the benefits that help drive PIS can apply to other businesses (see Sec-
tion 5.3.2), while others are specific to Peterborough Reuse, including the group
of women learning sewing skills. Many of the economic, environmental, and so-
cial benefits were mentioned by a number of interview participants, but the key
driver highlighted and elaborated on most was the social driver of community.
The interview participants stated that there was no sense of community in some
of the business clusters, including Fengate. The businesses did not know much
about their neighbours, including what business sectors they operate in and in
particular the people that work there. Businesses ‘realised that this is an issue
actually, because it can affect people, you know, productivity basically or even
efficiency at work in some occassions’.182 This interview participant acknowl-
edged that there is no evidence for this documented in, for instance, risk or
environmental health assessments, but that businesses nonetheless realised that
the social factor was ‘an underlying issue’:183
[O]ne of the things that was very apparent to [the Peterborough
DNA programme] when [they] started working with the businesses
is they really wanted to get to know each other and work out how
they could support each other better. That’s one of the reasons that
Share Peterborough is something they asked for, because they’ll get
to know if they want something they don’t have to go to Amazon,
they can buy that from somebody from across the road from them.
It is key to stress though that if proposals do not make economic sense then
regardless of the social or environmental benefits, they will not be pursued, as
181Interview participant.
182Interview participant
183Interview participant.
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emphasised by some of the interview participants. The social driver of com-
munity is also underpinned by economic reasons — businesses want to increase
effectiveness and reduce costs (eg through sending less to landfill and chapear
resources).
PIS is relatively new, so incentives and barriers specific to sustainment have not
yet been identified.
5.3.4 External variables
This section sets out the external variables for PIS.
Geographic location
Peterborough Reuse and Masteroast are located within five kilometres of each
other. As the rags originate from different places, there is no clear distance, but
generally the rags are sourced from shops local to Peterborough. The focus is
on local organisations to Peterborough (more so than in KIS and LNIS) and the
possible community and environmental benefits.
Economic conditions
In general, Peterborough’s economic conditions are positive and improving:
8000 new jobs have been created in the last six years; business creation is
43% above the UK average; it is one of the most innovative cities based on
the number of patents registered; it is cost-effective for businesses as it has easy
access to London and property costs below national average; and the growth in
gross value added (ie contribution to the economy of each individual producer,
industry or sector in the UK) is almost double the national level.184
184Opportunity Peterborough, Peterborough: Economic Intelligence Report (October 2016)
4-5.
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Opportunity Peterborough, a major stakeholder in initiating industrial symbio-
sis (see Section 5.3.3), was set up in 2005 as an urban regeneration company.
Their role has since developed into leading Peterborough’s economic develop-
ment. Their role includes ‘marketing Peterborough to businesses to attract
inward investment, engaging with local companies to support growth and de-
velopment’.185 It is clear that they see these symbiotic exchanges (though not
necessarily naming them as such) as an opportunity for improving economic con-
ditions for the city. The particular economic drivers and barriers to symbionts
have been discussed in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. Some of these are strongly
linked with environmental and social dimensions through policies as set out in
these sections as well as in the section on rules-in-use below.
Community attributes
Like the other case studies, the UK is an established Member State of the EU;
the UK joined the EU in 1973.186 The impact of its membership is that it ‘en-
sured environmental action was taken on a faster timetable and more throughly
than otherwise would have been the case’.187 In the EU’s EIR of the UK, there
are a number of areas identified for improvement: further initiatives are required
to limit landfilling of residual wastes to meet the proposed Commission target;
limited EPR systems are in place; and it is recommended that new economic
instruments are implemented to further the waste hierarchy.188 This illustrates
that the preferences of the UK are not as focused on waste law as Denmark.189
185Opportunity Peterborough, ‘Opportunity Peterborough’ (2017)
〈opportunitypeterborough . co . uk / about - opportunity - peterborough〉 accessed 10 July
2017.
186As a result of the vote in favour of the UK leaving the EU on 23 June 2016 and the
subsequent triggering of art 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C306/1 (Treaty of
Lisbon) on 29 March 2017, the UK may cease to be an EU Member State from 29 March
2019.
187Environmental Audit Committee, EU and UK Environmental Policy: Third Report of
Session 2015-2016 (House of Commons 2016) 3.
188European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— UNITED KINGDOM (Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 59 final, 2017)
8.
189See text to n 32. Note there are other environmental areas where the UK has points of
excellence that Denmark does not has — this thesis only focuses on waste law.
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On a local level, Peterborough has a history of environmental focus. In 1992
it was made one of four UK Environment Cities, leading to the set up of the
Peterborough Environment City Trust the following year. This Trust is an
independent environment charity which aims to help protect and enhance the
environment throughout Peterborough and beyond.190 There are also other
facts that demonstrate the presence of environmental values in Peterborough —
for example, Peterborough has one of the highest ratios in the UK of green space
per capita and has the largest development of zero carbon homes.191 The city’s
policies further emphasise the commitment to the environment, as discussed in
the section below.
Rules-in-use
a) Regulatory. The main regulatory incentive identified by some of the interview
participants, and also identified as a driver at EU level (see Section 4.3.5), is
landfill tax. Landfill tax is covered by Part III of the Finance Act 1996192 and
the secondary legislation provided for by this Act.193 The current amount of
tax charged on taxable disposal, which includes diposed waste,194 is £86.10 per
tonne.195 Though its importance should not be overstated as one participant
stated that ‘a bigger driver [than landfill tax] is the running out of landfill space’,
which is one of the environmental benefits achieved by Masteroast by diverting
190See http://www.pect.org.uk.
191Peterborough Environment City Trust, ‘Peterborough: Creating the UK’s Environment
Capital’ (2012) 〈pect . org . uk / working - with - us / local - communities / creating - the - uks -
environment-capital〉 accessed 19 August 2017; Opportunity Peterborough, Green Investment
Bank Peterborough (2015) 21-22.
192Finance Act 1996.
193Including: Landfill Tax Regulations 1996, SI 1996/1527; Landfill Tax (Prescribed Landfill
Activities) Order 2009, SI 2009/1929; Landfill Tax (Qualifying Material) Order 2011, SI 2011/
1017; Landfill Tax (Qualifying Fines) Order 2015, SI 2015/1385.
194Finance Act 1996, s 40. Charge to tax. (1) Tax shall be charged on a taxable disposal
made in England and Wales or Northern Ireland. (2) A disposal is a taxable disposal if —
(a) it is a disposal of material as waste, (b) it is made by way of landfill, (c) it is made at a
landfill site, and (d) it is made on or after 1st October 1996. (3) For this purpose a disposal
is made at a landfill site if the land on or under which it is made constitutes or falls within
land which is a landfill site at the time of disposal.
195ibid s 42: Amount of tax. (1) The amount of tax charged on a taxable disposal shall be
found by taking — (a) £86.10 for each whole tonne disposed of and a proportionately reduced
sum for any additional part of a tonne, (b) a proportionately reduced sum if less than a tonne
is disposed of.
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bags from landfill (see Section 5.3.2).
The only other regulatory incentive explicitly identified by a number of interview
participants was the plastic bag charge. The single use plastic bag charge in
England was introduced on 5 October 2015 pursuant to article 3 of the Single Use
Carrier Bags Charges (England) Order 2015/776.196 According to one interview
participant, Peterborough Reuse ‘spotted that opportunity before the 5 pence
tax came in . . . It was perfect timing in a sense — [the tax] came in and they
were launching the bags’.
The waste hierarchy (see Section 4.2.3) was only mentioned by one interview
participant, who stated that the waste hierarchy was ‘absolutely’ an incentive
because as you progress up the priority order, ‘you add value to the commod-
ity’.197 This is a missed opportunity, as it could be used as an explicit incentive
similar to the EU Circular Economy Package (see section on ‘Policies’ below)
in that it adds weight to the argument for circular approaches. The waste hi-
erarchy has been transposed into the UK by the Waste (England and Wales)
Regulations 2011.198 In section 12(1) of these Regulations, the hierarchy is set
out, followed by the permitted deviations in section 12(2) and (3).199 Most
of the hessian sacks were previously sent to landfill, and thus was the lowest
operation on the waste hierarchy as disposal (see Section 4.2.3). In PIS the
196Single Use Carrier Bags Charges (England) Order 2015, SI 2015/776, art 3: a Seller must
charge a minimum of 5 pence (including any VAT) for each single use carrier bag supplied
in a reporting year (a) at the place in England where the goods are sold, for the purpose
of enabling the goods to be taken away; or (b) for the purpose of enabling the goods to be
delivered to persons in England.
197Interview participant.
198Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/988.
199ibid reg 12: Duty in relation to the waste hierarchy. (1) An establishment or undertaking
which imports, produces, collects, transports, recovers or disposes of waste, or which as a
dealer or broker has control of waste must, on the transfer of waste, take all such measures
available to it as are reasonable in the circumstances to apply the following waste hierarchy as
a priority order — (a) prevention; (b) preparing for re-use; (c) recycling; (d) other recovery (for
example energy recovery); (e) disposal. (2) But an establishment or undertaking may depart
from the priority order in paragraph (1) so as to achieve the best environmental outcome
where this is justified by life-cycle thinking on the overall impacts of the generation and
management of the waste. (3) When considering the overall impacts mentioned in paragraph
(2), the following considerations must be taken into account — (a) the general environmental
protection principles of precaution and sustainability; (b) technical feasibility and economic
viability; (c) protection of resources; (d) the overall environmental, human health, economic
and social impacts.
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sacks are instead recycled, which is an operation higher on the hierarchy. Most
of the excess fabric was previously sold overseas. This was at least recovery,
and at most reuse. As part of PIS the excess fabric is recycled. This does not
necessarily affect the hierarchy, but there are other benefits including reduced
transport as discussed previously (see Section 5.3.2). This illustrates one of the
limits of the hierarchy.200
Similarly, EPR is insufficiently applied for the purposes of industrial symbio-
sis within the UK, which is also highlighted as a general opportunity in the
EIR.201 In the UK, producer responsibility laws cover packaging,202 electrical
and electronic equipment,203 batteries,204 and end-of-life vehicles.205 The EIR
recommendation is that more waste streams should be covered.206 This could
incentivise industrial symbiosis depending on the waste streams included.
All interview participants identified the definition of waste, and the attached
regulations, as an issue, but not necessarily a barrier as the definition has not
yet prevented initiation of any exchanges. The definition and accompanying
guidance are considered not always clear — waste regulations ‘are very grey,
and it depends on how you interpret them how that actually will impact you as
an organisation’.207 Therefore Peterborough City Council
requested the advice from the Environment Agency to say to them:
“Okay, so here is a scenario. We have industrial areas, a lot of man-
ufacturers in it, a lot of materials coming in, and a lot of materials
coming out as waste. How . . . to allow people to share what they
don’t want any more? Is it waste?” And basically the recommenda-
200See Section 4.2.3 for discussion of other limits.
201European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— UNITED KINGDOM (n 188) 8.
202Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/871.
203Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3113.
204Waste Batteries and Accumulators Regulations 2009, SI 2009/890.
205End-of-Life Vehicles (Producer Responsibility) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/263.
206European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— UNITED KINGDOM (n 188) 8.
207Interview participant.
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tion was [that] as long as you never name it waste, it’s okay.208
The terminology should however not be the issue. Instead, it should be the
content of the two definitions. The two resources in PIS are hessian bags and
excess fabric. Before, some hessian bags were kept for display. The remaining
bags were sent to landfill. The bags retained remain resources, while the others
sent to landfill are clearly waste as they are discarded (see Section 4.4.1). There
is a question whether the retained bags are stored waste according to Palin
Granit209 (see Section 4.4.1). The answer is no because, when the bags arrive,
they are part of the good Masteroast have purchased, as the costs of bags
are likely to be included in the total cost for the coffee beans and transport.
Masteroast keep the goods they want (ie coffee beans and some bags) and then
discard the remainder. This is the same as when household individuals buy
goods — the packaging is not waste as soon as it arrives in your home. In the
UK, the Environment Agency used to have a definition of waste panel which
decided whether a material in England constituted waste or not, but this panel
has now been shut down.210
The definition of waste, the potential consequences of waste regulations, and
the sanctions for breaching these regulations have contributed to Peterborough
City Council limiting their liability in their terms and conditions for users of
Share Peterborough:
9. Limitation of our [Peterborough City Council’s]211 duty. . . . 9.3.
We will not be liable to any user of Share Peterborough for any
loss or damage, whether in . . . statutory duty, or otherwise, even if
208Interview participant.
209Case C-9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus
[2002] ECR I–3533.
210Rob Preston, ‘EA Scraps Definition of Waste Panel’ Materials Recycling World (21 De-
cember 2016).
2113.1 of the terms and conditions states: ‘sharepeterborough.com is a site operated by Peter-
borough City Council (“We”). We are the local authority for Peterborough and our headquar-
ters is located at Town Hall, Bridge Street, Peterborough, PE1 1HG’ — Share Peterborough,
‘Website Terms and Conditions’ (2017) 〈sharepeterborough.com/terms-conditions〉 accessed
3 March 2017.
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foreseeable, arising under or in connection with
9.3.1 the exchange or sharing of services, skills, goods, assets, facili-
ties and/or physical spaces through Share Peterborough.212
No other regulatory issues or barriers were identified, but PIS stakeholders ex-
pect to ‘experience much more of that as we get going’.213 Part of the reason
for this is that ‘[r]egulation always comes in five or six steps after the strategy
and the main goal you want to achieve’.214
b) Policy. PIS is underpinned by a context of strong policy support for environ-
mental issues. Peterborough’s main strategic plan is the Sustainable Commu-
nity Strategy 2008-2021,215 authored by the Greater Peterborough Partnership.
This partnership comprises Peterborough City Council and representatives from
other public, private, faith, community, and voluntary sectors working together
to deliver the Sustainable Community Strategy. The four priorities are:216
1. Creating opportunities — tackling inequalities;
2. Creating strong and supportive communities;
3. Creating the UK’s environment capital;
4. Delivering substantial and truly sustainable growth.
Interview participants focused on the third ambition as the Peterborough DNA
programme helped support the city’s Environment Capital agenda, and offers
funding for companies to develop and test solutions that contribute to this
aim.217 The theme of the 2050 vision of creating the UK Environment Capital,
212ibid.
213Interview participant.
214Interview participant.
215Greater Peterborough Partnership, Sustainable Community Strategy Summary 2008-21:
Growing the Right Way for a Bigger and Better Peterborough (2008). For Peterborough City
Council’s other strategic priorities see: Peterborough City Council, ‘Strategic Priorities’ (2017)
〈peterborough.gov.uk/council/strategies - polices - and- plans/council - strategies/strategic -
priorities〉 accessed 5 March 2017.
216Greater Peterborough Partnership (n 215) 5.
217Peterborough DNA, ‘Encouraging and Facilitating Entrepreneurial Activity in the City’
(2017) 〈peterboroughdna.com/innovation〉 accessed 5 March 2017.
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which is particularly relevant within the industrial symbiosis context, is conserv-
ing natural resources and zero waste.218 The aim is to ‘minimise the creation of
waste, and will reuse or recycle materials where this is cost effective’.219 There
is thus a reciprocal relationship between these policies and PIS; the policies
support and give weight to PIS, but PIS equally supports the policies through
contributing to achieving the policy aims.
There are no particular national policy barriers, but more incentives are needed.
For example, the HM Government’s 2017 Green Paper setting out the Govern-
ment’s vision for a modern industrial strategy, developed by the Department for
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy,220 has very little focus on resource
efficiency of waste. Resource efficiency and waste management is only covered
as far as:
The Government will work with stakeholders to explore opportuni-
ties to reduce raw material demand and waste in our energy and
resource systems, and to promote well-functioning markets for sec-
ondary materials, and new disruptive business models that challenge
inefficient practice. This work will be supported by the Govern-
ment’s 25 Year Environment Plan which will set out a long term vi-
sion for delivering a more resource efficient and resilient economy.221
Better integration is needed between the environment and business instead of
this siloed approach. This may be covered in the impending Environment Plan,
but this has not yet been published following a number of delays.222 Industrial
218Peterborough City Council, Home of Environment Capital - Major Policy 2010 (2010)
2; Peterborough City Council, Creating the UK’s Environment Capital: Action Plan (2016)
2.
219Peterborough City Council, Home of Environment Capital - Major Policy 2010 (n 218)
2. For particular interim targets for this aim see: Peterborough City Council, Creating the
UK’s Environment Capital: Action Plan (n 218). Note that a survey on this latter action
plan was open until 12 February 2017, so this action plan may change or be adapted following
views and input from survey respondents.
220Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Building our Industrial Strategy
(HM Government 2017).
221ibid 91.
222For example: Robin Latchem, ‘Gove Resurrects Environment Plan’ Materials Recycling
World (21 July 2016).
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symbiosis is a way of bridging this environmental and business gap. Industrial
symbiosis used to be covered by a WRAP programme. WRAP is a consultancy
that works with the UK government to deliver practical solutions to improve
resource efficiency. The industrial symbiosis programme has however been dis-
continued as a result of lack of funding.223
Similarly to national level, EU policy was not identified as a key barrier or driver
by interview participants. Despite being highlighted as a possible key driver in
Chapter 4, the Circular Economy Package has limited impact.
When the Circular Economy Package was announced [Peterborough
City Council] referred to in as much as saying it’s not just [them]
talking about it now, Europe believe this is a really important area.
[Peterborough City Council] would use that as part of [their] con-
versation, part of [their] presentational work in discussions with key
stakeholders and give them a little overview of what is that was look-
ing to take place. But that would be as far as [Peterborough City
Council] would need to go with that level of detail really.
This view was echoed by other interview participants. Reasons identified by
interview participants for limited impact were that EU policy is not context
specific, and that it is focused on national government levels rather than local
authorities.
c) Property. As in KIS and LNIS, the symbiotic exchanges are mainly governed
by contracts224 and private property rights. There are however instances where
the property rights are unclear. Some of the excess fabrics that Peterborough
Reuse uses for lining its retail bags come from fabrics that individuals were
intending to discard, but which were not yet collected by waste management
223Personal communication with WRAP dated 7 March 2017.
224Sale of Goods Act 1979. Contracts are also governed by other domestic law — there
are for example Acts that restrict the ability of persons to exclude or limit certain liabilities,
misrepresentations etc, which are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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companies. This is a grey area of property rights: the owner of the excess
fabrics intends to discard the fabrics (so it is waste according to the definition
— see Section 4.4.1), and, even though they have not yet done the physical act
of discarding, they would not exercise their claim-right to nor their power to
exclude another other from the waste (see Section 3.2.1). In essence, they are
the full owner in Schlager-Ostrom terms, but only want to exercise their rights
as authorised claimants (as they cannot abandon the waste so they are still
responsible for its management, but they do not want to exercise their power
to exclude or alienate) (see Section 3.1.2).
Property rights were neither identified as a driver nor barrier to industrial sym-
biosis during the interviews, but there was one participant who identified its
potential and as a barrier to taking industrial symbiosis further (not discussed
with other participants because not comfortable with topic or no time left):
[Exploring property in the resource exchanges] is a good angle be-
cause it’s, I suspect, one of the main barriers actually for people to
move on. You only have responsibility if you are indeed the owner
of the material in the first place.
The interview participant thus implies that private property rights are necessary.
As the excess fabrics example illustrates, however, they are not always required
to enable the reuse, recovery or recycling of waste.
Third parties
The different levels of government — local, national and EU — all have key
roles in addition to the policy and regulatory contexts they provide. This is
recognised by interview participants, with one highlighting that part of the rea-
son for the need for all their participation is that they complement each other as
they are ‘working on different time frames’.225 The non-symbiont actors, Peter-
225Interview participant.
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borough City Council and Opportunity Peterborough, at local level are pivotal
as together they, inter alia, deliver the Future Peterborough programme, host
workshops, and manage online platforms (such as Share Peterborough). They
have thus provided and continue to provide tools, mechanisms, and support for
symbiotic links — even match-making in some instances such as the particular
PIS example discussed. The recurring theme across their activities is that they
encourage engagement and participation of businesses and other stakeholders,
such as academia and communities, in order to facilitate communication. These
have been and continue to be three key ingredients for PIS to continue. It is
unlikely that their hands-on approach of workshops can continue, as they are
expensive and time-consuming. This is why their focus has shifted to digital
platforms, so that Peterborough City Council and Opportunity Peterborough
can continue engaging various stakeholders but in a more hands-off and cost-
effective approach. It is vital for sustainment that they do remain involved,
as KIS is also reliant on the continuing support of the Symbiosis Centre (see
Section 5.1.4). The City Council also helps market the bags, and by raising
demand they help sustain PIS.
The only explicitly identified national level government role was funding. The
whole project and programme started because of Innovate UK funding, so ‘[y]ou
can effectively say this has all been funded by government’.226 What was identi-
fied as particularly helpful was that Innovate UK have not imposed themselves
and gave Peterborough the flexibility to do what works for their city. With
ongoing negotiations for Brexit227 and uncertainty as to the effect of Brexit on
environmental regulations, it will be seen how whether the waste regulations
are changed at national level.
Similar to the national level, one of the main contributions of the EU to PIS has
been policy support and funding — the EU RECOMMEND project228 awarded
226Interview participant.
227See n 186.
228For more information on this project see: INTERREG IVC, ‘About RECOMMEND’
(2012) 〈recommendproject.eu〉 accessed 7 March 2017.
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£15000 to Peterborough DNA’s Smart Business strand pursuits in the Fengate
area and the EU Innofun project229 awarded £40000 to its Innovation strand,
as well as outstanding funding applications.230 The other key contribution was
networking opportunities facilitated by the EU. There are limitations to the
current role of the EU including limited impact of policies (see previous section
on ‘Rules-in-use’) and more concrete support is needed:
The difficulty that we experience from the EU side is that the sup-
port is for ideas, but very little practical support to help establish
something that will actually work on the ground. What they actu-
ally did with the [European Innovation Partnership] work was create
more siloes by having areas that people wanted to focus on and then
you kind of got everybody all of a sudden siloed off again in smaller
groups, so it wasn’t overly helpful from that perspective.231
Another type of actor identified multiple times by stakeholders were networks.
Networks are valuable as cities can learn from each other — what works and
what does not work. Interview participants consider there to be a particular
opportunity for Peterborough, as it is often easier to scale up than scale down
ideas. This is advantageous to Peterborough as it often is in networks with big-
ger cities like New York, London, and Barcelona. Networks can also add weight
to arguments as cities can come together and highlight the work that needs to be
done, and the barriers that need to be addressed. There has been an increasing
role of city networks identified and discussed in the literature.232 In partic-
ular, a couple of the interview participants singled out the Ellen MacArthur
229The EU website on this project is no longer active.
230See Opportunity Peterborough, ‘Innofun’ (2014) 〈opportunitypeterborough . co . uk /
projects/innofun〉 accessed 7 March 2017; Peterborough DNA, ‘What We’ve Done so Far’
(2017) 〈peterboroughdna.com/demonstrators〉 accessed 7 March 2017.
231Interview participant.
232For example: Peter J Taylor, ‘New Political Geographies: Global Civil Society and Global
Governance through World City Networks’ (2005) 24(6) Political Geography 703; Michele
Acuto and Susan Parnell, ‘Leave No City Behind’ (2016) 352(6288) Science 873; Michele
Acuto and Steve Rayner, ‘City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or Forging (New) Lock-ins?’
(2016) 92(5) International Affairs 1147.
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Foundation.233 The Ellen MacArthur Foundation, established in 2010, aims to
accelerate the transition to a circular economy.234 Their Circular Cities Net-
work provides a knowledge exchange platform for cities to learn more about
the opportunities resulting from a circular economy.235 This resonates well with
the general work of the Foundation as it focuses predominantly on making the
business case for the circular economy.
Another actor that is relevant to the general context of industrial symbiosis
in the UK, but that has not been mentioned in relation to Peterborough is
the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP). NISP was set up by
International Synergies Limited, a private limited company. It has been de-
scribed as having the ‘reciprocal “top-down” influence of the UK Government
and “bottom-up” needs of the private sector’.236 It is a network that brings
together businesses to communicate about what wastes they produce and re-
sources they need (similarly to Share Peterborough). NISP operated actively in
the UK between 2003 and 2013,237 and now ‘is still continuing but to a lesser
degree’ as a result of the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) reducing its funding as part of austerity measures.238 At one point,
NISP’s network consisted of 15000 business members from companies across all
business sectors. International Synergies has exported the NISP model to more
than 25 countries.239 NISP is identified as a good practice example in the EU’s
EIR on the UK.240
233Interview participants also mentioned the Circular Cities Hub (Circular Cities Hub, ‘UCL
Circular Cities Hub’ (2016) 〈circularcities.wordpress.com〉 accessed 7 March 2017) and Knowl-
edge Transfer Network (Innovate UK, ‘Connecting People to Accelerate Innovation’ (2017)
〈ktn-uk.co.uk〉 accessed 7 March 2017).
234Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘About’ (2017) 〈ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/about〉 ac-
cessed 7 March 2017.
235Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘Circular Cities Network’ (2017)
〈ellenmacarthurfoundation . org / programmes / government / circular - cities - network〉 ac-
cessed 7 March 2017.
236Paul D Jensen and others, ‘Quantifying “Geographic Proximity”: Experiences from the
United Kingdom’s National Industrial Symbiosis Programme’ (2011) 55(7) Resources, Con-
servation and Recycling 703, 703.
237NISP, ‘NISP - Connecting Industry, Creating Opportunity’ (2017) 〈nispnetwork .com〉
accessed 3 March 2017.
238Interview participant.
239NISP (n 237).
240European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— UNITED KINGDOM (n 188) 5.
233
5. Framing selected case studies within the ISDF
5.4 Rotterdam, Netherlands
The RIS is located in the port city of Rotterdam. Rotterdam is the Netherlands’
second largest city and has Europe’s largest port. It is in the southeast of the
Netherlands, less than 100 kilometres south of Amsterdam.
RIS is in contrast to the other three case studies as it has not developed linearly.
RIS instead can be described as a reincarnation of a previous industrial symbiosis
project in Rotterdam (see Section 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Action arena
RIS is similar to the three other symbiosis case studies in that they all have
comprised development of independent projects that together become a network,
rather than the network being the goal from the outset. The individual projects
that make up RIS are:
1. Cirkelstad (ie Circular City): The Cirkelstad platform facilitates pub-
lic and private companies to return waste and materials from demolition
and renovation projects to the resource loop. For example, Oranje BV
produced sand-lime bricks from wall granules and currently reuses other
materials such as roof cladding, insulating materials, PVC, and concrete.
The main aim of Cirkelstad is to connect governmental, public and pri-
vate actors — ie to be a network where experiences are shared for circular
aims.241
2. Recycled Park: This is the project that is the main focus of RIS in this
thesis. WHIM Architecture and the Recycled Island Foundation launched
the Recycled Park Project.242 This project aims to catch plastic waste in
the New Meuse River in Rotterdam before it enters the North Sea. The
241More information about Cirkelstad available on: Cirkelstad, ‘About Cirkelstad’ (2017)
〈cirkelstad.nl/english〉 accessed 4 April 2017.
242WHIM Architecture, ‘Recycled Park’ (2017) 〈recycledpark.com〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
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plastic waste is then used to build a floating island on which there will be
a park for the Rotterdam community to use.
3. SCRAP XL: Stichting voor CReatief hergebruik AfvalProducten (Foun-
dation for the Creative Reuse of Waste Products) sells industrial waste
and residual material such as punchings, sawdust, and cutting waste, that
has been donated by a network of companies. This has been bought by
schools, artists, and others. In addition to selling, SCRAP designs and
builds stage sets, or for example hosts innovative birthday parties where
individuals can build items from provided waste materials.243
4. Stadsgas: Stadsgas BV (ie City Gas) collects and uses leftover food from
restaurants and consumers to produce biomass. Its ambition is to also
develop techniques to produce bioplastics from this collected leftover food,
and they are currently pursuing this aim together with partners.244
5. VerdraaidGoed: This exchange is similar to the concept in PIS. Bags
are made from residual materials such as old flags, promotion banners,
and shop window canvas drapes. Verdraaidgoed also manufactures other
items, such as stationary, through the upcycling of waste and residual
materials.245
6. Waste-2-Chemicals: Waste-2-Chemicals is a network of twelve part-
ners whose aim it is to develop technology to convert non-recyclable mu-
nicipal solid waste into renewable chemicals, such as synthesis gas and
methanol.246
These links and exchanges of waste and by-products are illustrated in Figure 5.4.
243More information about SCRAP is available on: SCRAP, ‘SCRAP Nieuws’ (2017)
〈scrapxl.nl〉 accessed 4 April 2017. Note that this website is only available in Dutch.
244More information about Stadsgas is available on: Stadsgas, ‘Stadsgas’ (2017) 〈stadsgas.nl〉
accessed 4 April 2017. Note that this website is only available in Dutch.
245More information about VerdraaidGoed is available on: VerdraaidGoed, ‘VerdraaidGoed’
(2014) 〈verdraaidgoed.nl〉 accessed 5 April 2017. Note that this website is only available in
Dutch.
246Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘Waste-to-Chemicals: Van Afval to Ammoniak’ (2017)
〈rotterdamclimateinitiative .nl/uk/city/ongoing - projects/waste - to - chemicals - van - afval -
tot-ammoniak?project_id=347〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
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Figure 5.4: Rotterdam Industrial Symbiosis.247 The dotted lines indicate that the project is still
being developed — ranging from the conceptual to testing stage.
In addition to these projects, there are also projects that use wastes (eg the
HAKA building),248 provide a millieu to discuss circular innovations (eg BlueCity),249
or aim to connect organisations to pursue symbiotic links (eg SuGu).250
5.4.2 Outcomes: benefits and limits
The general benefits and limits of RIS echo those of the other case studies,
and again there are some benefits specific to the individual projects. Most
projects highlight and focus on the outcomes advantageous to the environment,
for example: VerdraaidGoed cites reduction of plastic carrier bags and of waste
247Developed based on discussions with interview participants and the information available
on the circular economy projects in Rotterdam. Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘Ongoing
Projects: Circular Economy’ (2017) 〈rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/city/ongoing-projects〉
accessed 4 April 2017.
248Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘HAKA Building: Reuse for Sustainable Renovation’
(2017) 〈rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/city/ongoing- projects/haka- building- reuse- for-
sustainable-renovation?project_id=340〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
249BlueCity, ‘BlueCity’ (2017) 〈bluecity.nl〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
250SuGu, ‘SuGu: We Make’ (2017) 〈%7Bwww.%7Dsuguclub.com〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
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in general;251 Cirkelstad aims to reduce the amount of demolition waste sent to
landfill; Recycled Park wants to minimise the amount of plastic waste that ends
up in the North Sea; and Stadsgas reduces food waste (see Section 5.4.1). Similar
to the other case studies, there are also linked economic and social benefits.
Many of the projects result in local employment by bringing more business to
the area, thereby likely to result in local economic growth and social advantages.
As many of these projects are new and still developing, the benefits have not yet
been quantified, or the information has not been made publicly available. This
is an area requiring further research through, for example, life-cycle assessments
to ensure that these options are sustainable.
5.4.3 Initiation and sustainment
There have been several phases of industrial symbiosis in Rotterdam. Initially,
there was the INdustrial EcoSystem (INES) Project from 1994 to 1997,252 in-
spired by KIS. This first project was a collaboration between universities and
companies to assess the feasibility of Industrial Ecology (IE) projects rather
than their implementation. Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), located
near Rotterdam, and Erasmus University Rotterdam, located in Rotterdam,
were asked by 69 companies to show them how IE could work for them:253
‘Interest was very big by the companies. Usually the interest is low for such ex-
ploratory projects, but in this case 80% of companies were interested’.254 This
collaboration led to the identification of 15 possible IE projects in addition to
some already existing symbiotic exchanges that just had not been labelled as
such yet. Out of the 15, three were selected and worked out in theory until
251Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘HAKA Building: Reuse for Sustainable Renovation’
(2017) 〈rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/city/ongoing- projects/haka- building- reuse- for-
sustainable-renovation?project_id=340〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
252A detailed overview of initiation of the first three projects is detailed in Leo Baas and
Gijsbert Korevaar, ‘Eco-industrial Parks in the Netherlands: The Rotterdam Harbor and
Industry Complex’ in Jan Harmsen and Joseph B Powell (eds), Sustainable Development in
the Process Industries: Cases and Impact (Island Press 2011) 60-76.
253ibid 60.
254Interview participant.
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implementation.
The INES project was then granted an extension and re-labelled the INES
Mainport Project between 1999 to 2002. This Project still did not result in
implementation, but instead company knowledge about the individual projects
increased. Key lessons learnt during this time were that there is a need for
acknowledgement, commitment, vision, trust, and a long-term programme to
make industrial symbiosis happen, as well as a need to reinforce of the sense of
urgency — ecologically, economic, and socially — from time to time to avoid
the project becoming dormant.255
Finally, the INES project was included in the R3: Sustainable Enterprises
project between 2003 and 2010 together with the Sustainable Rijnmond and
Energy 2010 programmes. INES faltered under this umbrellla project, and was
hardly known to R3.256
Since 2007 the focus has been on the Rotterdam Climate Initiative — this Ini-
tiative is a new development rather than a direct replacement of INES as there
is no indication or evidence that the Initiative was aware of INES as a result of
the latter’s limited momentum and visibility (especially under the R3 project
discussed in the previous paragraph). The Rotterdam Climate Initiative is the
umbrella framework under which the Port of Rotterdam Authority, Deltalinqs,
DCMR Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond, and the City of Rotterdam
collaborate to deliver a sustainable world port city. The particular overarching
objectives are ‘clean air, more green spaces, dry feet, cleaner energy at lower
costs, and job creation in the city as well as in the port and industrial com-
plex’.257 Importantly, the projects outlined in Section 5.4.1 are not as a result
of the Initiative. Instead, they are some of the ongoing projects that fit within
the scope of the Initiative and are now displayed on the Rotterdam Climate Ini-
255Leo Baas, ‘Aan de Slag met Ambities en Ervaringen’ (Cradle to Cradle in Venlo, January
2008, Venlo, the Netherlands).
256Baas and Korevaar (n 252) 67-68.
257Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘Rotterdam: A Sustainable World Port City’ (2017)
〈rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/uk/about-rci/rci-at-a-glance〉 accessed 17 August 2017.
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tiative website. One of these projects was Recycled Park. This project started
with a proposal, followed by research undertaken on project feasibility, and is
currently in the piloting stage. At the time of interviewing participants in RIS
(in March 2017), three litter traps had been developed and placed in river, and
are piloting 15m2 of recycled park to evaluate the current development method-
ology. The goal is to have eight plastic litter traps in the river, and to develop
an initial floating island of 190m2 in the Rotterdam area.
Similarly to the other case studies, many of the projects, including Cirkelstad,
were only initiated and pursued once proven to be profitable. The common
barrier therefore for projects to overcome was the financial barrier — internal
or external initial investment is required for these projects. The founder of
Recycled Park was motivated by environmental benefits of reducing the amount
of plastic litter ending up in the North Sea (see Section 5.4.2), but again the
project was not pursued until financially viable. In order to generate interest
and funding, Recycled Park mainly focused on the social benefits:
the main objective [was] to stop these plastics which are currently
still running through our city and which ends up in our sea . . . be-
cause when they’re in the sea, it’s much more complicated and ex-
pensive — more expensive — to get it out of the open water. But
also to find a tactic for a durable reuse of the plastics. [Recycled
Park] had to draw the conclusion that it would not help . . . to say
[that you] have to do something about this problem because it is
a big environmental issue, as then you start having everybody say
that it’s not their responsibility. In [Recycled Park’s] case it really
helped that could convince in the innovative part of the project, say-
ing, “well, if [Recycled Park] retrieve the plastics then you can have
this beautiful recycled park in the Winter”. And that really helped
to start things going.258
258Interview participant.
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This highlights another common barrier: the identification and setting up of
collaborations to pursue these projects. These collaborations are critical for
accumulating resources including funding and technical knowledge.
As RIS is relatively new, with many of the projects still in the initial stages
of development, one of the concerns is whether the projects will be sustained.
For some projects the defining issue will be whether the project generates the
expected profits so that its sustainment is economic. In the case of the Recycled
Park, it is unclear from the interviews how revenue is expected from the Recycled
Park. It seems that it will continue, at least in the short-term, to rely on
funding from the local government. There may be some development here as in
2015 students of Rotterdam University of Applied Sciences presented possible
business plans for Recycled Park.259 One common occurring dimension of the
various projects, including the Recycled Park, is the intention to replicate the
exchange models in other places. This may be how Recycled Park intends to
create revenue, by outsourcing its technologies for turning plastic litter into a
floating island to be used by local communities.
5.4.4 External variables
This section sets out the external variables for RIS.
Geographic location
All the projects are located in Rotterdam. Some of the projects, such as Ver-
draaidGoed and Recycled Park, are similar to PIS in that they are focused on
the local community and environment, while other organisations, such as those
involved in the Waste-2-Chemicals network, are driven by economic factors of
being located in the port city of Rotterdam.
259Recycled Park, ‘Nieuws’ (2017) 〈http://recycledpark.com/nieuws.html〉 accessed 17 Au-
gust 2017.
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Economic conditions
Like Peterborough, Rotterdam is cost-effective for cities as it has one of the
lowest costs of doing business compared to international cities.260 Additionally,
Rotterdam has strong economic conditions, in part as a result of it being Eu-
rope’s largest port city, and it has strong economic values in relation to urban
generation.261 One of the key foci of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative is on
economic impacts, particularly economic growth and job creation.262
Community attributes
The Netherlands was one of the founders of the EU’s predecessor, the European
Economic Community, in 1957. According to the EIR it has
long been a forerunner in environmental policy, both in terms of
tackling environmental pressures and in organising effective envi-
ronmental governance in partnership with regional and local admin-
istrations, with business and civil society.263
The community approach in the Netherlands thus embodies the collaborative
approaches that have been a key factor in KIS, LNIS, and PIS. It is acknowl-
edged at the same time that there are still some challenges and more action that
the government can take, including introducing new waste policies to promote
prevention, and make reuse and recycling more attractive.264
260KPMG, Competitive Alternatives: KPMG’s Guide to International Business Location
Costs (2016) 22.
261For example: Ariënne Mak and Paul Stouten, ‘Urban Regeneration in Rotterdam: Eco-
nomic and Social Values’ (2014) 21(1) European Spatial Research and Policy 101, 120.
262Rotterdam Climate Initiative, ‘Rotterdam Climate Initiative’ (2017)
〈rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl〉 accessed 11 July 2017.
263European Commission, The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report
— THE NETHERLANDS (Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 52 final, 2017)
4.
264ibid 9.
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On a local level, Lenhart argues that ‘Rotterdam was one of the first cities to
“put sustainability on the map” ’.265 One of the reasons for this local focus on
sustainable development is to compensate for the port activities.266
Rules-in-use
a) Regulatory. Despite high environmental law implementation, most inter-
view participants consider there to be no clear regulatory incentives. There
are nonetheless enabling regulations. For VerdraaidGoed producing bags from
residual materials, the plastic carrier bags ban in Dutch retail stores supports
their business,267 as in PIS (see Section 5.3.4). There is also legislation on
landfill, EPR268 — this EPR is economic, informative, and physical for waste
packaging like LNIS (see Section 4.3.2)269 — and the waste hierarchy,270 which
have been identified as regulatory incentives in some of the other case studies.
The former is actually known as a waste (rather than landfill) tax in the Nether-
lands (like in LNIS). Establishments have to pay waste tax if they landfill or
incinerate waste, but not if they recycle waste.271 This is therefore an incentive
to pursue industrial symbiosis. These highlight missed opportunities, as by de-
265Jennifer Lenhart, ‘Urban Climate Governance: The Role of Local Authorities’ (PhD
thesis, Wageningen University 2015) 100.
266Eelco den Boer and G Verbraak, Environmental Impacts of International Shipping: A
Case Study of the Port of Rotterdam (Working Paper ENV/EPOC/WPNEP/T(2009)6/
FINAL, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development February 2010) 5. See
also Lenhart (n 265) 100.
267Regeling beheer verpakkingen van 18 december 2015 nr IENM/BSK-2015/242582 2015
(Dutch Packaging Waste Management Regulation) art 2.
268On electric and electronic equipment: Regeling afgedankte elektrische en elektronische
apparatuur van 3 februari 2014 nr IENM/BSK-2014/14758 2014 (Dutch Disposal of Electric
and Electronic Equipment Regulation). On packaging: Besluit beheer verpakkingen van 27
oktober 2014 2014 (Dutch Packaging Decision). On batteries and accumulators: Regeling
beheer batterijen en accu’s 2008 van 9 september 2008 nr K&K 2008088170 2008 (Dutch
Batteries and Accumulators Regulation).
269In the Netherlands, packaging producers are responsible for sorting the separation, the
physical makeup meeting certain requirements, and reporting - Dutch Packaging Decision, art
5, 6(1), 6(2), 6(4), and 8.
270Set out in Wet milieubeheer van 13 juni 1979 1979 (Dutch Environmental Protection Act)
ch 10 art 10(4)(1). This mirrors the exact wording of the waste hierarchy as set out in the
WFD (see Section 4.2.3), except the lowest tier refers to ‘safe disposal’ (emphasis added)
rather than just disposal.
271Wet belastingen op milieu grondslag van 23 december 1994 1994 (Dutch Environmental
Taxes Act) ch IV art 28(1): The tax in the case of (a) landfilling wastes: e13,11 per 1.000kg;
(b) incinerating wastes for other instances than set out in (c): e13,11 per 1,000kg’ (translation
is the author’s own).
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veloping these or making them more explicit, symbionts will be aware of current
enablers and it may also result in the pursuit of symbiotic exchanges by other
organisations.
One regulatory barrier was identified in relation to Recycled Park: building
application regulations. Building applications are both regulated at national
level272 and local level.273 The main source of the barrier is the time, resources,
and knowledge required to apply for building permits. This is where the Mu-
nicipality of Rotterdam was critical as they provided the requisite expertise (see
section on ‘Third parties’).
In general the definition of waste has not been perceived as a barrier. All inter-
view participants are aware of the discussions but, similarly to the other case
studies, the approach depends on the particular organisation. Some adopt a
general approach of treating all materials as resources. As discussed in relation
to PIS (see Section 5.3.4), this does not address the definitional issue but ig-
nores it. Others do not consider it an issue as they contract organisations with
expertise on the topic:
No, [the definition of waste] was not an issue. Probably because
we’re working with the professionals who already have taken the
licence or permits for their account.274
The waste requirements that apply include notifying and reporting specific waste
related activities — in particular the collection of construction waste, which is
relevant for Cirkelstad275 — as well as waste operators storing waste are required
to stipulate the measures taken to store waste, which may also be relevant to
272Bouwbesluit 2012 van 29 augustus 2011 2012 (Dutch Buildings Decree 2012).
273Bouwverordening Rotterdam 2010 2010 (Rotterdam Building Regulation 2010).
274Interview participant.
275Besluit melden bedrijfsafvalstoffen en gevaarlijke afvalstoffen van 7 oktober 2004 2004
(Decree Notification Waste and Hazardous Substances) s 2 art 2(2)(a)(4) on the collection:
‘If the categories of Dutch Environmental Protection Act, art 10(40) apply, the obligation
applies to the person as defined in Dutch Environmental Protection Act, art 10(37) that has
an establishment sorting construction and demolition waste with a storage capacity of more
than 50m2 (translation is author’s own).
243
5. Framing selected case studies within the ISDF
those symbionts who store waste awaiting use.276 One example was provided of
a symbiotic exchange elsewhere in the Netherlands to illustrate how the issue
can be bypassed:
there was someone who produced tomatoes. You had another man
who would like to use the stems of the tomatoes for producing boxes
to contain tomatoes when they were out in the shops, so an ecological
product and you use that spare part [ie the stems] that no one uses
for anything anyway. But, it was waste because the man produced
tomatoes and not tomato plants. [There is a taskforce that] help[s]
companies individually. They found out that the man that produced
tomatoes should reregister and . . . and now produce tomato plants,
because then the stem would also be part of the product, and he
could give it to the other man without it being waste. So sometimes
there are these ways of coming around.277
Though not explicitly identified, the plastic litter highlights the issue with end-
of-waste criteria (see Section 4.4.1). The plastic litter is waste as it has been
discarded. In using it for a floating island the question is whether it ceases to be
waste: plastic litter is not commonly used for floating islands, and it is debatable
whether one organisation wanting plastic litter means the necessary market
or demand exists. The other two criteria are complied with because the use
complies with the necessary rules (evidenced by receiving planning and building
permission) and the use of plastic litter avoids overall adverse environmental or
276Regeling omgevingsrecht van 30 maart 2010 nr BJZ2010008979 2010 (Dutch Environmen-
tal Law Regulation) ch 4 s 4(1)(f)(2): ‘In the application for a permit to establish or operate
an establishment, the applicant shall provide the following information and information: the
measures or facilities for the storage of waste in the establishment’ (translation is author’s
own).
277Interview participant. For more information on this example see: SOLIDUS SOLU-
TIONS, ‘Solid Board made of Tomato Plants wins Packaging Europe Sustainability Awards
2016’ (2016) 〈solidus - solutions . com/en/news/news/massiefkarton - uit - tomatenplanten -
winnaar- packaging- europe- sustainability- awards- 2016〉 accessed 12 March 2017; Bio Base
Greenport West-Oostland, ‘Projecten’ (2017) 〈biobasewestland.nl/?page_id=182〉 accessed
12 March 2017. This idea has expanded to other countries, including Canada and France:
SOLIDUS SOLUTIONS, ‘Canadian and French Companies Introduce Packaging from Tomato
Plants’ (2016) 〈solidus - solutions . com/en/news/news/ canadian - and - french - companies -
introduce-packaging-from-tomato-plants〉 accessed 12 March 2017.
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human health impacts by avoiding the plastic litter going into the North Sea,
as plastic in the sea can be detrimental both to the environment and human
health.278 There could thus be an argument that the plastic litter remains
waste, and therefore the required permits to store and manage waste should be
applied for,279 as a recovery of waste is not sufficient for waste to cease being
waste.280
b) Policy. One interview participant did not consider there to be any policy
incentives, while another acknowledged that policies do play a role: ‘[t]he role
of policy is there, but working out what it is, is different from realising that it
is there’.281 In general, the interview participant considered the introduction of
policies and particular environmental management systems as having changed
the attitudes of companies.
The relevant local policy is the ‘Rotterdam Programme on Sustainability and
Climate Change 2015-2018’.282 This sets out the overall vision for Rotterdam to
be ‘the inspiring example to other delta cities around the world going through
a sustainability transition’.283 This vision has three overarching aims, one of
which is that the city ‘aim[s] to build a strong and innovative economy’.284 One
of the key ways to achieve this aim is ‘by using our waste as a resource for
manufacturing new products and generting energy’.285 The City of Rotterdam
278For example: José GB Derraik, ‘The Pollution of the Marine Environment by Plastic De-
bris: A Review’ (2002) 44(9) Marine Pollution Bulletin 842; Murray R Gregory, ‘Environmen-
tal Implications of Plastic Debris in Marine Settings — Entanglement, Ingestion, Smothering,
Hangers-on, Hitch-hiking and Alien Invations’ (2009) 364 Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B 2013; Carolyn Barry, ‘Plastic Breaks Down in Ocean, After All — and Fast’
National Geographic (20 August 2009).
279The permitting scheme is set out in: Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht van 6
november 2008 2008 (Dutch General Environmental Law Act).
280see the discussion of Euro Tombesi(Case C-304/94 Euro Tombesi and others [1997] ECR
I–3561) and ARCO Chemie(Joined Cases C-418/97–C-419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd
v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, Vereniging Dorpsbe-
lang Hees and Others v Directeur van de dienst Milieu en Water van de provincie Gelderland
[2000] ECR I–4475) in Section 4.4.1.
281Interview participant.
282City of Rotterdam, Making Sustainability a Way of Life for Rotterdam: Rotterdam Pro-
gramme on Sustainability and Climate Change 2015-2018 (2015).
283ibid 14.
284ibid 14.
285ibid 14 and 53. The other two aims are: (1) green, healthy, and resilient city, and (2)
cleaner energy at lower costs.
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has for this purpose introduced the ‘Roadmap Circular Economy Rotterdam’
which describes the city’s circular vision.286 There is also a national policy
support for industrial symbiosis: the current national policy aim relevant to
waste is to develop a circular economy in the Netherlands by 2050.287 At all
levels including EU level, the circular economy as a policy is used as a ‘marketing
tool’ to attract funding.288
c) Property. The plastic litter in the river has been abandoned, which is not
permitted under the 2008 WFD (see Section 3.2.1).289 But, there is no method
of identifying who owns the plastic bottles in the river. The plastic waste is
thus considered res nullius. In the case of the Recycled Park, the absence of
property rights has been a driver of industrial symbiosis. If there had been
private property rights, this may have been a deterrent to the project so it is
the absence of property rights that has enabled the project to develop over the
past few years. In this case, Recycled Park is an authorised user of the plastic
litter in Schlager-Ostrom terms together with everyone else in the world (see
Section 3.1.2). Through its environmental motivation to reduce the amount of
plastic litter and the labour of transforming the plastic into a floating island
(linking to the Lockean argument — see Section 3.2.2), Recycled Park becomes
the authorised claimant. Recycled Park could become a proprietor or full owner,
but the aim is for the island to be communal in that everyone has the privilege
to enter the island.
Similarly, there is waste involved in the other projects such as SCRAP XL and
VerdraaidGoed. The property rights are different as the wastes in these ex-
286City of Rotterdam, Roadmap Circular Economy Rotterdam (2016).
287Government of the Netherlands, A Circular Economy in the Netherlands by 2050 (Gov-
ernment of the Netherlands 2016) 5. The circular economy is one of three focus areas of
the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment: Government of the Netherlands, ‘Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment’ (2017) 〈government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-
infrastructure-and-the-environment〉 accessed 21 August 2017.
288Interview participant.
289Note that littering is also against the law. Dutch Environmental Protection Act, ch 10(25)
states that regulations may be made to prevent littering. For Rotterdam the unlawfulness
of littering is set out in: Afvalstoffenverordening Rotterdam 2009 van 1 january 2009 2009
(Rotterdam Waste Regulation 2009) para 4.
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amples have been explicitly given to these companies (or a waste management
company who in turn has donated the wastes to these companies). There may
have been a proprietor or full owner — depending on what the individual re-
sponsible for the waste chooses — who used their power to transfer. These
companies transform the product through the labour and are full owners that
intend to sell.
Instead of donating wastes, in some cases the wastes may also be sold as private
property. Such exchanges are set out in contracts.290
Third parties
Similarly to the three previous case studies, there are a number of third parties
involved that have been mentioned in reviewing the other ISDF components.
One interview participant explicitly acknowledged that symbiotic processes of-
ten require an intermediary. The interview participant elaborated that the role
of these intermediaries is not to point out what companies must do, but instead
highlight what is possible. In RIS, the key third parties are universities and the
local authority. Recycled Park has collaborated with TU Delft, Rotterdam Uni-
versity, and Wagening University & Research. Wageningen University helped
with the initial analysis of the first three batches of plastic litter and the ini-
tial research on recycling this litter, while TU Delft and Rotterdam University
helped mostly with the engineering part of the plastic floating island.
The other key third party is the local authority of Rotterdam. Through INES,
local authority gained experience on using and exchanging resources, and work-
ing with partners.291 For the Recycled Park, the municipality has provided
funding, expertise, and their network with whom the Park can share knowledge
and experiences, or use to attract further funding. The connections provided
290These contracts are governed by Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code of the Nether-
lands) Boek 7, Bijzondere overeenkomsten. Note that there is a whole area of Dutch contract
law, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
291Lenhart (n 265) 101.
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included an engineer, an ecologist, and an individual to help with their building
application.
Other levels of government have also had a role mainly in relation to funding.
The national government subsidised components of this funding, while the EU
provides funding opportunities on a larger scale. At the local level, the latter is
not considered very helpful by interview participants. They argue that in order
to apply for EU funding it is necessary to ‘pre-fund’ the application preparation,
as it is a time-consuming process, and the projects are too small to warrant this.
Like in PIS, Recycled Park also pursues forming networks in order to share
knowledge and attract funding. Interestingly, Recycled Park has not linked up
with other circular economy projects in Rotterdam, but has focused on col-
laborating more widely both within and beyond the Netherlands. For example,
listed collaborators on their website include HEBO Maritiemservice (a maritime
service provider), InnovationQuarter (the regional development agency for the
South Holland province in the Netherlands), and Thames21 (an organisation
working with companies across Greater London to improve rivers, canals, and
other waterways).292
Another stakeholder mentioned by the interview participants was the C40 Cities
Climate Leadership Group, a network of megacities committed to addressing cli-
mate change,293 which Rotterdam joined in 2007. According to one of interview
participants, the general feeling in the Port when Rotterdam joined this network
was that this third party interference was detrimental:
The Port had gone from public to private, and the Port was reluctant
about C40 as it was back to the traditional “thou shall do this” in
terms of emissions reductions and so on. This resulted in the loss
of the Committee [that had been set up to implemented IE],294 and
292For a full list of collaborators see: WHIM Architecture (n 242).
293C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, ‘C40 Cities’ (2017) 〈c40.org〉 accessed 12 March
2017.
294This committee is not discussed elsewhere in this thesis, as there is no information available
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companies returning to the past approach of looking at each other
to see how and whether the other companies are achieving their
commitments.295
The interview participant stated that policies are necessary to create certain
conditions for industry to progress, but that in their opinion joining the C40
network was an example of actually removing these conditions. Lenhart how-
ever argues that joining the C40 network resulted in climate strategies being
prioritised that built on past efforts such as INES.296 According to interview
participants, the C40 network is no longer considered to be a barrier, nor is it
considered to provide support.
5.5 Discussion
The particular roles of regulations, policies, and property rights (ie rules-in-use)
are unpacked in the next chapter, Chapter 6, but these exist within a wider
context as highlighted by the ISDF in Chapter 2. This section focuses on the
critical observations that have emerged from the four case studies.
First, the ISDF itself has been tested by applying it to case studies. The ISDF
was effective: different dimensions of industrial symbiosis were explored and
uncovered within a wider context without undue influence assigned to any par-
ticular component, while still highlighting those of particular importance as
identified by interview participants.
The external variables of the ISDF highlighted the limits of the case study selec-
tion (see Section 1.4.1). All four case studies have strong economic conditions,
supportive environmental community attributes — both in general and in rela-
tion to implementing EU communities — and symbionts are in general in close
on it beyond that the interview participant stated such a committee existed.
295Interview participant.
296Lenhart (n 265) 103.
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proximity to each other. In relation to the latter geographic component, prox-
imity and co-location were not deemed necessary or essential in any of the case
studies, but it is likely that the reality of the feasibility, economics, and benefits
of symbiotic exchanges favour proximity.
Even though the driver traditionally has been economic and is still the ultimate
decider of whether exchanges will be initiated and sustained, many of the in-
terview participants in the two more recent symbiotic networks were primarily
motivated by environmental and social factors — the Recycled Park in RIS and
Peterborough Reuse in PIS — with a shift towards stronger environmental mo-
tivations observed in KIS. The economic factor was instead key for motivating,
engaging with, and marketing to other stakeholders. This is where third parties
are often critical: to provide funding or support in seeking funding.
In addition to them helping overcome economic barriers, third parties have in
general been critical in the initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis,
and in some cases providing while in others using regulations and policies to
support and underpin their actions. Third parties are therefore an additional
key focus of the next chapter (see Section 6.3).
The case study comparison has also uncovered some other possible areas beyond
the scope of this research. For example, the examined symbionts are often pri-
vate companies. The interview participants identified that there are generally
different incentives and barriers for private and public companies involved in
industrial symbiosis, which is why the Green Industrial Symbiosis national pro-
gramme in KIS only focused on private companies. These effects are however
beyond the scope of this thesis. Across all the case studies, companies are iden-
tified as either public or private to facilitate possible further research. There are
also cross-cutting themes such as innovation. In each of the four case studies,
some of the stakeholders perceive themselves as innovative and forerunners. Ad-
ditionally, there are trends in buzzwords in and ‘packaging’ of policies — some
more prominent than others. It remains to be seen whether circular economy is
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such a term, or whether or not it is as enduring as sustainable development.
The case studies have thus highlighted that it is a complex puzzle of components
that drive and inhibit industrial symbiosis development. The overviews of the
case studies and short discussion presented here have only skimmed the surface
of the complexities.
5.6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this chapter for the purposes of the thesis research
question has been the identification of lessons learnt in what does and does not
enable industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment based on the empirical
findings from four selected case studies. This chapter provided a contextual
overview by examining all components of the ISDF (see Chapter 2). The action
arenas were set out, followed by their outcomes, which were generally economic,
environmental, and social benefits. All benefits were often related to the drivers
for initiation and sustainment in at least one of the case studies, with the eco-
nomic benefits the ultimate determining factor in whether or not to initiate
and sustain symbiotic exchanges. Additionally, most case studies have strong
economic conditions, supportive environmental community attributes, and most
exchanges are closely located to each other.
The key findings in this chapter in relation to the rules-in-use ISDF component
are that, first, there is only indirect regulation affecting industrial symbiosis
in each of the case studies. According to interview participants, the regula-
tory incentives in KIS are landfill taxes, in LNIS are landfill taxes as well as
the waste hierarchy and EPR, in PIS are landfill taxes in addition to plastic
bag charges, and in RIS are plastic bag charges. Across all four case studies,
interview participants are aware of the issues and discussions related to the
definition of waste, but it has generally not been a prohibitive barrier to symbi-
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otic exchanges. Only a few regulatory barriers were identified: certain taxes in
KIS and building application regulations in RIS. Second, policies are generally
supportive of industrial symbiosis. In KIS there is local support for industrial
symbiosis through highlighting the benefits of applying the concept in local pol-
icy documents. Similarly, in PIS there is direct support for waste exchanges,
but the term is not explicitly used. In LNIS and RIS the main focus is on sus-
tainable development and achieving a circular economy respectively, resulting
in generally favourable policy contexts. Third, there is no absolute support for
a particular property rights regime. Property rights are dominant in KIS and
LNIS, as well as present in PIS and RIS. Additionally, there are examples of res
nullius property in RIS (— in theory there is an owner, but in practice there
is no way of identifying this owner, and the plastic litter is thus considered res
nullius), and some grey areas in PIS. Finally, third parties were identified as
being critical in underpinning these rules-in-use: third parties use the existing
rules-in-use to highlight the value of industrial symbiosis to possible symbionts,
and support organisations in initiating and sustaining industrial symbiosis.
The next and final substantive chapter further unpacks these lessons learnt and
observations on rules-in-use (see Section 6.1) and third parties (see Section 6.3)
across the case studies, and sets out the relevant implications for industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment. These observations are compared with the
expected drivers and barriers of industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment
as set out in Chapters 3 and 4.
252
CHAPTER 6
Enabling industrial symbiosis: observations
This chapter combines the contributions of all previous chapters to answer the
overarching research question of how the law can enable initiation and sus-
tainment of industrial symbiosis (see Section 1.3). Essentially, the first three
research objectives explored in the previous chapters are combined to address
how waste can be managed through property rights, regulations, and policies
to enable industrial symbiosis (the fourth research objective). The previous
chapter, Chapter 5, explored the lessons learnt from the selected case studies
within the Industrial Symbiosis Development Framework (ISDF), which was in-
troduced and set out in Chapter 2. This chapter compares these lessons and sets
out the key observations and possible (context-dependent) recommendations for
enabling industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment. First, the focus is on
property rights, regulations, and policies, ie the particular rules-in-use foci of
this thesis (see Sections 1.3 and 2.3.5) in Section 6.1. In order to form rec-
ommendations, these are compared to the anticipated effects of property rights
and European Union (EU) regulations and policies as examined in Chapters 3
and 4 respectively. In the next section, Section 6.2, the practical application
and benefits of Common-Pool Resource (CPR) theory are set out, which was
highlighted as a key theory to explore in practice in Chapter 3. The final set of
observations in Section 6.3 addresses the role of third parties to support waste
management — a key lesson learnt in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.5) — and uses
New Collaborative Governance (NCG) theory to inform this discussion. Impor-
tantly, at times these three sets of observations overlap and reinforce each other.
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Where this is the case this is highlighted. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.1 Rules-in-use
This section covers property rights, regulations, and policies. The principal
conclusion from the examination of the three components is that there should
not be reliance on a single instrument (or rule) in order to enable initiation and
sustainment of industrial symbiosis. What instead is needed is a mix of rules.
This resonates with findings of recent literature on the importance of instrument
mixes to aid environmental protection.1 The particular characteristics of this
mix are set out below.
Some of the drivers and barriers in the Peterborough Industrial Symbiosis (PIS)
discussed in the following sub-sections are likely to be affected by the withdrawal
of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU (Brexit).2 These effects are beyond
the scope of this thesis, as much uncertainty remains in relation to UK envi-
ronmental legislation post Brexit. In Section 5.3 on PIS, it was identified how
many of the EU regulatory incentives and barriers (including the definition of
waste and waste hierarchy) have been implemented into national law, but the
question is whether some of the relevant legislation will be repealed or amended
following Brexit. The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill3 proposes to retain
EU-derived domestic legislation, transpose directly-applicable EU law into the
1Also called regulatory pluralism. For example: Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair,
‘Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection’ (1999) 21(1)
Law & Policy 49; Rui Santos and others, ‘Stakeholder Participation in the Design of Envi-
ronmental Policy Mixes’ (2006) 60 Ecological Economics 100; Michael Howlett and Jeremy
Rayner, ‘Design Principles for Policy Mixes: Cohesion and Coherence in “New Governance Ar-
rangements”’ (2007) 26(4) Policy and Society 1; Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra, and Manuel
Laranja, ‘Reconceptualising the “Policy Mix” for Innovation’ (2011) 40(5) Research Policy 702;
Peter Grabosky, ‘Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of Non-State Actors
in the Regulatory Process’ (2013) 7(1) Regulation & Governance 114; Benjamin van Rooij,
Rachel E Stern, and Kathinka Fürst, ‘The Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Un-
derstanding China’s New Environmental Actors’ (2014) 20(1) Regulation & Governance 3.
2The relevance of Brexit to this thesis has also been addressed in Section 1.4.1 in relation
to case study selection and in Section 5.3.4 (in ‘Community attributes’ and ‘Third Parties’)
on PIS.
3European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (Repeal Bill).
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law of the UK, and continue certain rights, powers, obligations etc.4 Therefore,
in the immediate short-term, Brexit will have no effect on the regulatory incen-
tives and barriers in PIS, but will reduce the some of the policy incentives (eg
circular economy), unless there are similar policies already in place in the UK.
6.1.1 Property rights
Across the case studies, private property regimes have been most prominent.
In the explored waste exchanges in Kalundborg Industrial Symbiosis (KIS),
Linköping and Norrköping Industrial Symbiosis (LNIS), and PIS Blackstonian
absolute private dominion principles are in operation (ie the wastes and by-
products are mainly subject to private property rights) (see Section 3.2.1). The
assignment of such rights has contributed in those instances to the value of waste
being recognised through attribution of a monetary value, resulting in com-
modification of waste within a traditional trading model.5 Despite this, there
is no one-size-fits all approach to the property rights, as the case studies have
demonstrated that there are also examples of other property regimes supporting
symbiotic exchanges. The excess fabric in PIS (see Section 5.3.4) and unowned
plastic waste in Rotterdam Industrial Symbiosis (RIS) (see Section 5.4.4) are
res nullius. Neither the private nor unowned approach has generated a model
which has been adopted in a widespread fashion. Different property solutions
— private or public (whether communal or state) ownership — therefore remain
4Repeal Bill, s 2(1): ‘(1) EU-derived domestic legislation, as it has effect in domestic law
immediately before exit day, continues to have effect in domestic law on and after exit day’;
Repeal Bill, s 3(1): ‘Direct EU legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day,
forms part of domestic law on and after exit day’; Repeal Bill, s 4(1): ‘Any rights, powers,
liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures which, immediately before exit
day — (a) are recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 2(1) of the
European Communities Act 1972, and (b) are enforced, allowed and followed accordingly,
continue on and after exit day to be recognised and available in domestic law (and to be
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly)’. See also: European Communities Act 1972.
5For further discussions on the commodification of waste see: Katrien Steenmans, Rosalind
Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, ‘Commodification of Waste: Legal and Theoretical Approaches
to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy’ (Life-cycle Based Management and
Reporting for Sustainable Business, November 2016, Oslo, Norway); Katrien Steenmans, Ros-
alind Malcolm, and Jane Marriott, Commodification of Waste: Legal and Theoretical Ap-
proaches to Industrial Symbiosis as Part of a Circular Economy (Working paper, University
of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies 2017-26, University of Oslo 2017).
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options.6 Further research is required on the effects of communal ownership of
waste in practice (see Section 7.2).
An additional observation is that not all theorised property issues have mani-
fested themselves in practice. The possible difficulty in identifying the precise
point in time at which a material becomes waste, or ceases to be waste, and
when waste is transferred (see Sections 3.2 and 4.4.1) was not identified as a
barrier in any of the case studies. This does not imply that these are never
issues, only that these questions were not issues within these particular case
studies.
In examining the property rights across the case studies, the adoption of the
Schlager-Ostrom taxonomy (see Section 3.1.2) contributed to the understanding
of the case studies. In particular, the classes of users proved useful in identifying
the motivations of symbionts. RIS provides the clearest example of this: the
developers of Recycled Park take res nullius property (plastic litter) and develop
it in such a way that they could argue the plastic litter has become private
property (see Section 5.4.4). The developers however only intend to exercise
their ability as an authorised claimant, rather than as a full owner or proprietor,
in order to ensure maximal social benefits. Similarly, the taxonomy has provided
a common vocabulary7 to identify motivations of symbionts and intended uses
of exchanged waste and by-products in the other case studies.
6.1.2 Regulations
Regulations were identified as both drivers and barriers of industrial symbiosis
initiation and sustainment across selected case studies in Chapter 5. This section
recommends how the recurring drivers can be continued and enhanced, and how
to overcome common identified barriers.
6See Section 3.2.1 for theoretical implications of these approaches.
7As expected and intended — see introductory paragraph of Section 3.1.2. This section
also sets out the rationale for applying it to both civil and common law systems.
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As set out in both Chapter 4 at EU level and Chapter 5 for the case studies,
there are no specific industrial symbiosis-focused regulations. The recommenda-
tion is not to introduce such regulations, as there is no evidence in the examined
case studies that indicates such measures would support industrial symbiosis ini-
tiation and sustainment, and no interview participants deemed direct industrial
symbiosis regulations essential or necessary. A possible reason for not having
or wanting such regulations is that industrial symbiosis is context specific —
its networks depend on, for example, the available organisations, and their pro-
cesses and waste streams as evidenced across the four selected case studies (see
Chapter 5). Regulating industrial symbiosis therefore would require sufficiently
wide regulations to cover a wide variety of contexts and organisations, yet be
simultaneously specific and tailored to address particular issues that may arise
in industrial symbiosis networks.8 This would be difficult, and could also be
restrictive for innovative industrial symbiosis development. Instead, wider in-
direct EU and national regulations have facilitated industrial symbiosis (see
Chapter 5) with the principles discussed in Section 4.2 supporting the protec-
tion of the environment and human health, while the regulations also support
and enable other sustainable development and circular economy strategies. This
is a key benefit because industrial symbiosis is one of the strategies to achieve
possible economic, environmental, and social benefits, but not the main or only
strategy (see eg Section 1.2.2 or Section 4.3.4).
The most effective regulations for industrial symbiosis initiation and sustain-
ment across the selected case studies are indirect incentives that provide favour-
able contexts, in particular by making industrial symbiosis an economically
viable and attractive strategy. This has previously been recognised in Indus-
trial Ecology (IE) literature,9 with this thesis contributing to these discussions
8For example: Darren Sinclair, ‘Self-regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond
False Dichotomies’ (1997) 19(4) Law & Policy 529, 552.
9For example: Albena Bossilkov, Rene van Berkel, and Glen Corder, Regional Synergies for
Sustainable Resource Processing: A Status Report (Centre for Sustainable Resource Process-
ing June 2005) (based on desk-based research); Teresa A Domenech Aparisi, ‘Social Aspects
of Industrial Symbiosis Networks’ (PhD thesis, UCL 2010) (based on empirical research on
NISP, KIS, and Sagunto in Spain); Frank Boons, Wouter Spekkink, and Yannis Mouzaki-
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as it examines additional contexts and adds, particularly doctrinal, detail and
analysis (see Section 1.4.2).
The main regulatory incentives identified were economic (market-based) policy
instruments, in particular landfill taxes (explicitly identified in KIS, LNIS, and
PIS) and plastic bag charges (explicitly identified in LNIS and RIS). This is
an unsurprising finding as one of the main general drivers and barriers was eco-
nomic; industrial symbiosis has to make business sense or else it is not (and will
not) be pursued. Landfill tax can be considered a pollution tax, which has been
defined as ‘a payment for each unit of pollutant discharged into the environment
or for each unit of environmental damage’.10 In this case it is an example of the
former type of pollution tax: payment by waste holders for waste discharged
into the environment. It is therefore a tax internalising the cost for waste pollu-
tion,11 and is thus an example of a Pigovian (or Pigouvian) tax. Pigou argued
that producers of negative externalities should be taxed (and that positive ex-
ternalities should be subsidised).12 Such a tax is therefore an embodiment of
the polluter-pays principle (see Section 4.2.1). Others, most significantly Coase
who states that the Pigovian approach may ‘lead to results which are not nec-
essarily, or even usually, desirable’,13 have argued that there are issues with
tis, ‘The Dynamics of Industrial Symbiosis: A Proposal for a Conceptual Framework Based
upon a Comprehensive Literature Review’ (2011) 19(9-10) Journal of Cleaner Production 905
(focuses on policy frameworks based on literature review of previously undertaken empirical
research); BT Teh and others, ‘Determinant Factors of Industrial Symbiosis: Greening Pasir
Gudang Industrial Park’ (8th International Symposium of the Digital Earth, August 2014,
Sarawak, Malaysia) (in relation to an industrial symbiosis network in Malaysia); MD Farhadur
Rahman, Kamrul Islam, and Kazi Nazrul Islam, ‘Industrial Symbiosis: A Review on Uncover-
ing Approaches, Opportunities, Barriers and Policies’ (2016) 2(1) Journal of Civil Engineering
and Environmental Sciences 11 (based on a literature review).
10JP Barde, ‘Environmental Policy and Policy Instruments’ in H Folmer, H Landis Gabel,
and H Opschoor (eds), Principles of Environmental and Resource Economics - a Guide for
Students and Decision Makers (Edward Elgar 1995) 209.
11Waste was described as an externality in Section 1.1.2.
12Arthur C Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan and Co 1920); William Nordhaus,
‘Energy: Friend or Enemy’ (2011) LVIII The New York Review of Books 29, 30. See also for
example: Alain Anderton, Economics (3rd edn, Longman 2006) 121; Kabelo Moeti and others,
Public Finance Fundamentals (Juta & Co 2007) 23. Note that some argue that Pigou did
not advocate taxes on externalities, for example: Nashid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes, ‘On
Pigou’s Theory of Economic Policy Analysis’ (2012) 2(2) OEconomica 123.
13Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3(1) The Journal of Law and
Economics 837, 2. See Section 1.1.2 on Coase theorem. Coase theorem was developed through
criticising Pigovian taxes; Coase refers to Pigou across his first 41 pages of his seminal paper
out of 44 pages total — ibid 1-41.
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Pigou’s examination: (1) negative externalities do not necessarily generate in-
efficient results;14 (2) even if inefficient, Pigovian taxes do not guarantee an
efficient result; and (3) transaction cost theory rather than externality theory
is important.15 Within the context of this thesis, some of these arguments are
valid. For example, waste is arguably a negative externality (see Section 1.1.2)
but as a result of industrial symbiosis networks, waste can give efficient results,
and the existence of landfill taxes does not mean that reducing waste is more
cost-effective as implementing the process to reduce waste may be costly. Coase
theorem was introduced addressing shortcomings of Pigovian taxes, but this
theorem has limitations as well as discussed in Section 1.1.2. These issues are
complicated further by literature that argues that Coase theorem can be used
to justify some elements of Pigou’s examination, and that Pigovian taxes when
there is Coasian bargaining is Pareto improving.16 Pareto improvement is when
there is net welfare gain (even if just a single person is helped), without harming
anyone, as a result of an economic action. Pigovian taxes have also recently been
identified as useful in relation to CPRs where there are no assigned property
rights17 and as an alternative institution to privatisation,18 therefore address-
ing the same issues that this thesis seeks to address (see Section 3.3). The
economic literature is still developing on these topics, but is mentioned here as
it highlights that there are an array of options available in addition to the other
14In basic terms, efficiency means that the value of goods produced is equal to the oppor-
tunity cost.
15For example: Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (n 13) 1-41; John VC Nye, ‘The Pigou
Problem’ (2008) 3 Regulation 32, 32-37. Note that the importance of the issues vary — Harold
Demsetz, ‘The Core Disagreement Between Pigou, the Profession, and Coase in the Analyses
of the Externality Question’ (1996) 12 American Economic Association 565, 565-566.
16For discussions on how Coase theorem can justify Pigovian taxes, see for example:
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W Schmitz, ‘Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian
Taxation?’ (2007) 74 Economica 573; Ian A MacKenzie and Markus Ohndorf, Coasean Bar-
gaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation: Revisiting the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey
Theorem (Working Paper, School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 515, University of
Queensland 2014); Ian A MacKenzie and Markus Ohndorf, ‘Coasean Bargaining in the Pres-
ence of Pigouvian Taxation’ (2016) 75 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
1.
17MacKenzie and Ohndorf, Coasean Bargaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation: Re-
visiting the Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem (n 16) 3 and 10; MacKenzie and Ohndorf,
‘Coasean Bargaining in the Presence of Pigouvian Taxation’ (n 16) 2, 3 and 9.
18Timothy C Haab and John C Whitehead, Common Pool Resources (Timothy C Haab and
John C Whitehead eds, Greenwood 2014) 81; Jason Delaney and Sarah Jacobson, ‘Payments
or Persuasion: Common-Pool Resource Management with Price and Non-price Measures’
(2016) 65(4) Environmental and Resource Economics 747, 748-770.
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rules-in-use, CPR theory, and third party incentives discussed in the remainder
of this chapter. The conclusion of this discussion is therefore that landfill taxes
can be increased, which may reduce the amount of waste produced by provid-
ing an economic incentive,19 and this in turn may incentivise organisations to
look for strategies to reduce their amount of waste produced and sent to landfill
(or to ensure they are instead producing by-products). Importantly, increased
taxation does not guarantee industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment as
taxes offer flexibility; individual entities can still pay any increase instead of
implementing other strategies.
Despite not guaranteeing an outcome of increased implementation, taxes are
advantageous because they provide an incentive to reduce pollution, abatement
costs are minimised, and they provide a revenue for government20 — landfill
taxes currently contribute to the state budgets in all four case studies.21 But,
there is a negative distributive impact because landfill taxes are more harsh on
waste-heavy industries.22
In addition to landfill taxes, plastic bag charges were also identified as a driver.
This is clearly not a general driver, but focuses on a specific waste stream (mate-
rials suitable for carrier bags) and aims to prevent the creation of another waste
stream (plastic carrier bags). Charges are payments for which a service is given
in return (eg the charge for municipal waste collection), while a tax is added to
the government budget without a direct service given in return.23 Charges either
aim to incentivise a producer or consumer behavioural change by increasing the
19For example: Thomas C Kinnaman and Don Fullerton, ‘Garbage and Recycling with
Endogenous Local Policy’ (2000) 48 Journal of Urban Economics 419, 435; Thomas C Kin-
naman, ‘Policy Watch: Examining the Justification for Residential Recycling’ (2006) 20(4)
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 219, 23-26; Stefano Carattini, Andrea Baranzini, and
Rafael Lalive, Is Taxing Waste a Waste of Time? Evidence from a Supreme Court Decision
(Working Paper 227, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
February 2016) 2-3.
20Patricia PAAH Kandelaars, Economic Models of Material-Product Chains for Environ-
mental Policy Analysis (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999) 31.
21Christian Fischer, Mathias Lehner, and David Lindsay McKinnon, Overview of the Use
of Landfill Taxes in Europe (Working Paper 1/2012, European Topic Centre on Sustainable
Consumption and Production April 2012) 11.
22Kandelaars (n 20) 31.
23ibid 31-32.
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price of products or raise revenues for the purpose of specific (environmental)
uses or for general use.24 In both the Netherlands and England, the aim of plas-
tic bag charges is to change the behaviour of consumers and result in reduced
use of plastic carrier bags. In England, the charge is currently kept by retailers,
but most choose to donate the revenue from the charge to charitable causes.25
In the Netherlands, the use of the charges is unclear. Similarly to how increased
landfill tax may reduce the amount of waste sent to landfill particularly by in-
dustries, variable charging could be introduced (or increased where it already
exists) to reduce the amount of household waste produced. Such schemes are
in place in, for example, Sweden, but not in England as there local authorities
are prohibited from variable charging as a result of the Environmental Protec-
tion Act 1990.26 This has been identified as a barrier in the UK as variable
charging schemes have been found to be very effective across the EU — though
there are disadvantages as variable charges can result in increased fly-tipping.27
The potential issue of increasing charges in a context like LNIS is that waste
already has to be imported as a result of the low amount of waste produced
by Swedes (see Section 5.2.2). An increased charge may increase the imports
required. This debate raises issues in itself, as the waste hierarchy promotes the
prevention of waste (see Section 4.2.3), but LNIS is reliant on it.
The common disadvantage to implementing charges and taxes is that both are
likely to be unpopular at first, but research has shown that once implemented,
perception of effectiveness and fairness changes and is better understood.28
24Kandelaars (n 20) 31.
25For example: Claudia Cahalane, ‘Plastic Bag Charge: Where Will the Money Go?’ The
Guardian (1 October 2015).
26Environmental Protection Act 1990, s 45(4): No charge shall be made for the collection
of household waste except in cases prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State;
and in any of those cases — (a) the duty to arrange for the collection of the waste shall not
arise until a person who controls the waste requests the authority to collect it; and (b) the
authority may recover a reasonable charge for the collection of the waste from the person who
made the request.
27Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Reducing the Reliance on Landfill
in England (National Audit Office 2006) 56; IG Husaini and others, ‘European Household
Waste Management Schemes: Their Effectiveness and Applicability in England’ (2007) 51
Resources, Conservation and Recycling 248, 262.
28Carattini, Baranzini, and Lalive (n 19) 25.
261
6. Enabling industrial symbiosis: observations
Additionally, there are other regulations that are not consistently identified
across the case studies as enabling industrial symbiosis, but can be used nonethe-
less to incentivise industrial symbiosis. This is where third parties can con-
tribute, as the incentives are present but ‘dormant’, so third parties can ac-
tively highlight such incentives — see Section 6.3. First, Extended Producer
Responsibility (EPR) currently applies in some form to certain waste streams
in all case studies (see Section 5). EPR on additional types of waste could be
developed to incentivise symbiotic exchanges. Another opportunity is that EPR
is currently mainly present in the form of physical, economic, and informative
responsibility (see Section 4.3.2 on these responsibility types), but not always
simultaneously. This is an area of further research: the effects of different com-
binations of responsibility on industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment
should be explored. For this, further case studies are required (see Section 7.2).
Secondly, the waste hierarchy provides another opportunity. In LNIS its im-
portance was emphasised by almost all interview participants. One of the first
steps should be to integrate the hierarchy more clearly into policy documents
encouraging circular economy and resource efficiency strategies, instead of only
outlining the hierarchy. The motivations, possible resultant benefits, and its
rationale should be emphasised.
Finally, a key regulatory issue addressed in all four case studies is the waste
definition as defined in the Waste Framework Directive (WFD).29 There is no
consensus in practice on whether or not this definition is a barrier to symbiotic
exchanges. Additionally, the use of the term waste is approached differently
by symbionts within each case study. The term waste is used and applied in
RIS and LNIS without any issues by the symbionts themselves, but in both
cases interview participants are aware of difficulties that have arisen in other
contexts within the Netherlands and Sweden respectively. In PIS the term is
avoided by some third parties, yet it was not actually considered a barrier by
29Council Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 June November 2008 on waste and repealing certain
Directives [2008] OJ L312/3 (WFD).
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some of the symbionts themselves. Finally, in KIS it has not prevented any
exchanges from materialising, but it was still identified as a barrier to industrial
symbiosis of which symbionts are aware. This is somewhat contradictory in KIS,
because if it is not inhibiting or preventing symbiotic exchanges, then arguably
it is not a barrier. At times, the issue of waste thus appears as a recurring
labelling problem in the case studies, with some interview participants clearly
sensitive to and avoiding the label of ‘waste’. At the legal and philosophical
coalface, however, the issues surrounding the conceptualisation of waste underlie
this persistent semantic difficulty. This is related to labelling theory, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.30 Despite some qualms about the definition of
waste by some interview participants, the recommendation is not to change the
definition for the reasons set out in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4.1) and because
it has not prevented symbiotic exchanges in the examined case studies.
The recommendation instead is that by-products and end-of-waste criteria (see
Section 4.4.1) should be more widely publicised and relied upon, as the general
observation across the case studies is that these criteria are insufficiently known
and used. One method of achieving this is by increasing reference to the criteria
in policy documents advocating for circular economy and resource efficiency
strategies. Both criteria have some issues. Some of the uncertainties in practice
are outlined in Section 5.4.4 (in the sub-section ‘Rules-in-use’) in relation to
RIS. The main issue and preventive criteria of by-products in relation to the
examined case studies is that all the substance needs to be used for it to be
considered a by-product (see Section 4.4.1). For example, the hessian sacks in
PIS could potentially be considered by-products if all of them were being reused
— the only process involved in preparing them is cleaning the sacks which is
a normal industrial practice, the sacks are an integral part of the production
process of coffee as they are required for transporting the coffee beans, and the
30Labelling theory addresses the effects and influence of labels on individuals and their
behaviour. See for example: Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled
Identity (Prentice Hall 1963); Howard Becker, Outsiders (Free Press 1973); Michael Petrunik,
‘The Rise and Fall of “Labelling Theory”: The Construction and Destruction of a Sociological
Strawman’ (1980) 5(3) The Canadian Journal of Sociology 213.
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change of the sacks into retail bags and other uses has not been shown to have
overall adverse environmental and human health effects. A life-cycle assessment
would be needed to confirm the latter. A possible way of circumventing this issue
would be if the same material could both be waste in part and by-product in
part. This would however give rise to a number of issues, particularly in relation
to monitoring and waste permits (eg if the amount that is used varies, as then
the amount of waste varies). This does not currently seem an appropriate option
as a result of the precautionary principle (see Section 4.3.1).
Overall, the regulations are not as preventive and prohibitive of industrial sym-
biosis initiation and sustainment as the literature sometimes seems to suggest.31
There are a number of regulatory incentives that together with the policies dis-
cussed in the next section provide a facilitative regulatory and policy context.
This section has also not provided an exhaustive review of enabling and preven-
tive regulations, as the focus of this thesis has been limited to waste law (see
Section 1.5).
6.1.3 Policies
Across all the case studies the key point in relation to policies is that local poli-
cies have the most and clearest impact. The approaches in local policy vary: in
KIS and PIS there is a direct relationship between the policies and symbiotic ex-
changes, while in LNIS and RIS the development has been complementary and
in parallel to each other. In KIS the existing practice of industrial symbiosis
has helped shape and influence the local policies, and in PIS the policies have
established the local authority agenda that resulted in the particular symbiotic
31For example: Dick van Beers and others, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in the Australian Minerals
Industry: The Cases of Kwinana and Gladstone’ (2007) 11(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology
55, 67; Olli Salmi and others, ‘Governing the Interplay between Industrial Ecosystems and
Environmental Regulation’ (2012) 16(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 119, 122; Artem Golev,
Glen D Corder, and Damien Giurco, ‘Barriers to Industrial Symbiosis: Insights from the Use
of a Maturity Guide’ (2014) 19(1) Journal of Industrial Ecology 141, 142; Maria Holgado,
Dai Morgan, and Steve Evans, ‘Exploring the Scope of Industrial Symbiosis: Implications for
Practitioners’ (2016) 52 Sustainable Design and Manufacturing 169, 175.
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exchanges being pursued.32 In both these case studies, the policy documents are
used as a marketing and communication mechanism to highlight and commu-
nicate the economic, environmental, and social benefits of industrial symbiosis.
In LNIS and RIS, the policies complement and provide indirect policy support
for the symbiosis networks, but there the policies have not informed the ex-
changes nor vice versa. This highlights that specific tailored policies (as in KIS
and PIS) are not required conditions for an enabling policy environment for
industrial symbiosis.
The supportive effect of national and EU level policies is also recognised by
interview participants. Industrial symbiosis is explicitly mentioned in some EU
policy documents as a supporting strategy for overarching sustainable devel-
opment, resource efficiency, and circular economy strategies. The validating
effect of the inclusion of industrial symbiosis in such documents is an important
strategy, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. The EU and local policies are along-
side national policies on waste management and prevention, as required by the
WFD (see Section 4.3.3). Only the Danish plan explicitly refers to industrial
symbiosis. There is thus an opportunity in the other case studies to develop
more explicit national policy support by including it in their vision for waste
management, though this has not been identified as essential nor has its absence
prevented industrial symbiosis.
The effect of the mix of policies is that there is a clear agenda to implement re-
source efficient and circular strategies, which complement EU and national reg-
ulations. Overall, the different policy levels support and advocate for the recon-
ceptualisation of waste as a resource by addressing the importance of reusing,
recycling, and recovering waste. This can be complemented and supported by
32These observations are possible areas of further research on the roles of local actors and
governments in relation to agenda-setting in policy. For example: B Guy Peters, ‘Agenda-
Setting in the European Community’ (1994) 1(1) Journal of European Public Policy 9; Thomas
A Birland, ‘Angeda Setting in Public Policy’ in Frank Fischer, Gerald J Miller, and Mara
S Sidney (eds), Handbook of Public-Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods (CRC
Press 2007); Xinsheng Liu and others, ‘Understanding Local Policymaking: Policy Elites’
Perceptions of Local Agenda Setting and Alternative Policy Selection’ (2010) 38(1) Policy
Studies Journal 69.
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a CPR approach (see Section 6.2). The policies can thus be considered a step
towards addressing possible labelling theory concerns (see Section 6.1.2).
6.2 CPRs and design principles
The use of regulation and policy mixes, and property rights to enable industrial
symbiosis initiation and sustainment can be underpinned by CPR theory as
proposed in Section 3.4; CPRs can have any types of property rights associated
with it, and regulations and policies may be needed to support governance of
CPRs.
The case studies and their action arenas can be framed as CPR systems.33 First,
all the resource units are clearly subtractable: once the materials including
gypsum, waste, and biomass in KIS (see Section 5.1), slaughter, biomass, and
household wastes in LNIS (see Section 5.2), hessian sacks and excess fabrics
in PIS (see Section 5.3), and plastic litter, and domestic and organic wastes
in RIS (see Section 5.4) have been used, then they are no longer available for
anyone else to use. They are all also non-excludable in that other organisations
cannot be stopped from using these goods in their production process.34 Any
of the entities can thus be an authorised user if willing to negotiate a contract
where the goods are subject to private property rights. In the case of the excess
fabrics in PIS and plastic litter in RIS, there are no attached property rights, so
they are also non-excludable in that the whole world is at least an authorised
user. The PIS and RIS examples also illustrate that where there is no property,
the non-exclusion characteristic seems more evident,35 which would be similar
for public (communal or state) property. With such property, everyone in the
community or part of the state would be authorised users. It could also be
33See Section 3.4 for an explanation of CPRs.
34This mirrors the reasoning used by Salmi and others in their research in describing the
resources units in their case study as part of a CPR system — Salmi and others (n 31) 125.
See Section 3.4.
35The key word is ‘seems’ as the other symbiotic goods can also be described as non-
excludable, as set out in this paragraph.
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argued that some of the benefits of industrial symbiosis are subtractable. For
example, job creation is subtractable in that as soon as an individual has been
offered a job, that job is no longer available to other individuals. The job is
also non-excludable as other individuals cannot be prevented from applying for
that job. Other benefits cannot be described as CPRs, such as the improved
economic conditions, because this is clearly not subtractable and is also non-
excludable. Even if an individual is not contributing to industrial symbiosis, he
or she may will still benefit from the effects of an improved local economy. Such
benefits are usually public goods.
As evident from the previous paragraph, no change is required to frame the
wastes and by-products as CPRs, because CPRs are defined using inherent char-
acteristics. What is instead needed is the re-labelling and reconceptualisation
of symbiotic wastes and by-products as CPRs to support the required cultural
shift (see Section 3.2.2): as Reich noted, ‘it is culture that makes a diamond
valuable and a pebble worthless’.36 The label of CPR can clarify the purpose
of the wastes as materials to extract or consume.37 This is not necessary for
by-products, as ‘product’ within the term has this effect. This re-labelling can
address some of the related labelling theory issues discussed in Section 6.1.2.
This is supported by Gerber and others:
CPR institutions strengthen the coherence of resource regimes to the
extent that they constitute social institutions which can facilitate the
“mediation process,” ie the transformation of the collective identity,
self-perception and, therefore, behaviour of policy target groups in
36Charles Reich, ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73(5) Yale Law Journal 733, 739.
37Jonathan Rosenbloom, ‘Defining Nature as a Common Pool resource’ in Keith H Hirokawa
(ed), Environmental Law and Contrasting Ideas of Nature: A Constructivist Approach (Cam-
bridge University Press 2014) 48. Rosenbloom identified four further effects of labelling re-
sources as CPRs: ‘(2) limits the value of nature to an economic quantification of the natural
resource to the exclusion of other environmental or social benefits, (3) recognizes that natu-
ral resources may be depletable, (4) confines management of natural resources to traditional
property law doctrines and assumes preservation of natural capital can be achieved principally
through anthropocentric management, and (5) accounts for externalities and transboundary
impacts’.
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the direction defined by the stated policy objectives.38
In this case, the transformation required is the perception of waste as a resource
(instead of pollution) in order to incentivise less waste to be ‘wasted’ and instead
reused, recycled, and recovered — and thereby also changing the meaning of the
word wasted as used in the context of this sentence. Regulations and policies can
help support this reconceptualisation (see Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 respectively).
The other benefits discussed in Chapter 3.4 of redefining resources as CPRs in
industrial symbiosis are: reliability of flows, costs, and clear definitions. These
benefits are not apparent from the examined case studies. Reliability of flows
depends on the source — eg whether Masteroast will keep suppling Hessian bags
in PIS or people continue to litter plastic in the river in RIS. Costs also vary
across the case studies — some were free (eg plastic litter in LNIS and some
excess fabric in PIS), while others have a monetary value that is negotiated (eg
gypsum and fly ash in KIS). Finally, definitions of wastes and by-products are
not necessarily clarified as a result of applying CPR theory. This is evident from
the mixed perceptions of the definitions across the case studies despite all case
studies being CPR systems.
The final critical benefit identified in Section 3.4.1 are the design principles.
Most of the design principles are subtly present across all case studies, but they
are not always the dominant condition, and two require further investigation.
Based on the evidence, it is hard to deduce causation that the industrial sym-
bioses exist as a result of the design principles, but this research does conclude
that the principles apply in the context of the management of the four man-
made CPR systems examined in this thesis, which is what this thesis set out to
38Gerber and others identify two additional benefits: ‘one of the main conditions for the
perpetuation of CPR institutions is their capacity to organize their activities around a col-
lective problem defined as such by a policy; [and] the integration of CPR institutions in the
political-administrative arrangement contributes to the reinforcement of the functional and
territorial coordination between payers, decision makers and beneficiaries in regional and local
institutional regimes’ — Jean-David Gerber and others, ‘The Role of Common Pool Resource
Institutions in the Implementation of Swiss Natural Resource Management Policy’ (2008) 2(2)
International Journal of the Commons 222, 222.
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test as stated in Section 3.4.1. Each of the principles are reviewed below within
the context of the case studies and at EU level:
1. Defined user and resource boundaries: These are set out for each case
study in their respective ‘Action arena’ sections in Chapter 5. Both users
and resources are defined clearly within the case studies as a result of EU
law and its definitions (see Sections 4.2.1 and 4.4.1), and possibly also as
a result of either contracts or property rights. A contract will stipulate
the parties involved and what the resource is. For the plastic litter in RIS,
it is the property rights that define the users: everyone has access to the
litter, but then when labour is used to convert it into a floating island,
this changes according to Locke’s labour argument (see Section 3.2.2).
2. Congruence with local conditions: Rules for exchanges are stipulated in
contracts between organisations. These contracts are likely to be tailored
to the particular characteristics of the resource. Additionally, EU and na-
tional waste laws apply (as well as international laws beyond the scope of
this thesis — see Section 4.1), together with local policy and strategy docu-
ments. These contain provisions that provide for local congruence, such as
the exemption in the EU waste hierarchy (see Section 4.2.3). Additionally,
the case studies provide examples of where local policies address particular
environmental and social conditions: the Kalundborg Municipality Plan
2013-202439 explicitly incorporates the attributes of the local community
(see Section 5.1.4); in LNIS the local social conditions of openness and
trust have been central to and reflected in the industrial symbiosis prac-
tices (see Section 5.2.4); the Future Peterborough Programme40 has been
been developed using local feedback (see Section 5.3.3); and the Rotter-
dam Programme on Sustainability and Climate Change 2015-201841 has
39Kalundborg Kommune, ‘Kommuneplan 2013-2024’ (2017) 〈kp2013 .kalundborg .dk〉 ac-
cessed 8 March 2017. This plan is being reviewed during 2017, and may be revised or replaced
as a result.
40Future Peterborough, ‘About Future Peterborough’ (2016) 〈futurepeterborough . com/
about〉 accessed 19 August 2017.
41City of Rotterdam, Making Sustainability a Way of Life for Rotterdam: Rotterdam Pro-
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numerous references to the port. This design principle provides a clear ex-
ample of the need for rules to adapt to changing conditions. In LNIS, for
example, industrial symbiosis was in part initiated to manage waste, but
now that insufficient waste is produced locally (and needs to be imported),
the system has not adapted (see Section 5.2.4).
3. Appropriation and provision: The particular economic, environmental,
and social benefits and outcomes of symbiotic networks are difficult to
estimate because much of the data is not openly available, but the few
estimates that are known indicate that benefits are proportional to inputs.
The outcomes for the case studies are discussed in Sections 5.1.2, 5.2.2, 5.3.2,
and 5.4.2. At EU level, the polluter-pays principle can be considered a
manifestation of this design principle (see Section 4.2.1), supported by
recital 45 WFD which refers to proportionality.42
4. Collective-choice arrangements: Symbionts can modify operation rules
through renegotiating contracts, and there is also arguably scope for col-
lective action at EU level.43 As industrial symbiosis is not regulated di-
rectly, there are no direct top-down rules that symbionts cannot change.
Some symbionts have additionally been able to influence local policies,
such as in KIS (see Section 5.1.4).
5. Monitoring of users and resources: This is one of the design principles
that requires further research as the assessment of the monitoring of EU
and national regulations and policies is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Monitoring of users and resources occurs on a number of levels. There is
general monitoring of the rules-in-use implemented by the Member States,
provided for in the WFD (see Section 4.4.2) and evidenced by the publica-
gramme on Sustainability and Climate Change 2015-2018 (2015).
42WFD, recital 45: ‘Member States should provide for effective, proportionate and dissua-
sive penalties to be imposed on natural and legal persons responsible for waste management’.
43This is beyond the scope of this thesis. For example: Justin Greenwood and Mark As-
pinwall (eds), Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the New Politics of
Associability (Routledge 1998).
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tion of the EU EIR.44 Monitoring is also required for the implementation
of, for example, EPR and IPP (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4). There is
also monitoring at national level. This is evidenced in part by the fines
issued by national and local agencies in relation to waste across the four
case studies.45 Additionally, as a number of exchanges are governed by
contracts, there are likely to be monitoring mechanisms in place of the
resource by the contracting parties, to ensure that the goods received are
of the required standard to be used in the other organisation’s production
process.
6. Graduated sanctions: This design principle is linked to the previous design
principle: monitoring may result in sanctions where breaches are identi-
fied. The fines mentioned in relation to the previous design principle are
examples of sanctions, and are in all cases dependent on the particular
breach.46 Additionally, there is also a graduation in the range of sanc-
tions in that local, national, or EU level action can be taken.47 This design
principle needs to be investigated further within the industrial symbiosis
context, as even though sanctions fall under the rules-in-use component
of the ISDF, these are beyond the scope of this thesis.
7. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: The low-cost mechanisms are commu-
nication and dialogue, as these are encouraged and facilitated by third
parties (see Section 6.3). These were vital in, for example, LNIS to avoid
conflict (see Section 5.2.4). In contrast, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
44The Environmental Implementation Review (EIR) of EU environmental policy and leg-
islation is a tool to improve implementation of EU environmental law and policy across the
Member States, with country reports drafted every two years. European Commission, ‘The
EU Environmental Implementation Review: Common Challenges and How to Combine Efforts
to Deliver Better Results’ (Communication) COM (2017) 63 final. See Chapter 5.
45In England the penalties are set out in Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, SI
2011/988, reg 42; in Sweden in Miljöbalken SFS 1998:808 1998 (Swedish Environmental Code)
ch 29.; in Denmark in Bekendtgoerelse af lov nr 1309 af 18.12.2012 om affald som aendret
2012 (Danish Waste Ordinance) ch 19 and its accompanying annexes; in the Netherlands in:
Wet milieubeheer van 13 juni 1979 1979 (Dutch Environmental Protection Act) ch 18.
46For the national levels of fines see references in n 45. At EU level see Section 4.4.2.
47For infringement cases of EU waste law and proposed fines see: European Commission,
‘Infrigement Cases’ (2017) 〈ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/press_en.htm〉 accessed
22 August 2017.
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pean Union (CJEU) case law discussed in Chapter 4 provides examples of
formal conflict-resolution.
8. Minimal recognition of rights to organise: Local and national governments
have permitted industrial symbiosis systems to develop on their own, and
similarly at EU level (see Section 4.5). Local and national governments are
involved in KIS, LNIS, PIS, and RIS, but not to govern or organise specific
exchanges (see Sections 5.1.4, 5.2.4, 5.3.4, and 5.4.4 respectively). Instead
they facilitate, manage knowledge of, and champion industrial symbiosis
(see Section 6.3).
9. Nested enterprises: None of the symbiotic exchanges exist in isolation.
LNIS provides a clear example in that it comprises two connected networks
across Linköping and Norrköping. Others are also connected to systems
outside the local environment — for example the gypsum received by
Gyproc from other DONG energy plants in KIS. Additionally, the local
context is also nested in the wider national and EU contexts, as evidenced
by discussing relvant law at EU and national level in Chapters 4 and 5
respectively. The nestedness is also evident from another angle. Each of
the ISDF components themselves are part of other systems, such as each
policy or regulation is as a result of the rules and variables of legal systems.
These examples all illustrate how industrial symbiosis systems are nested
enterprises.
As demonstrated by the review of the principles, the design principles are man-
ifested at EU, national, and sub-national level. This is summarised and repre-
sented diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. In contrast, property rights only help
operationalise Design Principle 1, but can affect the operationalisation of the
other design principles. This is presented in Figure 6.2.
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1. Defined user and 
resource boundaries 
2. Congruence with local 
conditions 
3. Appropriation and 
provision 
4. Collective-choice 
arrangements 
5. Monitoring of users and 
resources 
6. Graduated sanctions 
7. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
8. Minimal recognition of 
rights to organise 
9. Nested enterprises 
RELEVANT EU WASTE 
REGULATIONS & POLICIES 
EXAMPLES 
Polluter-pays principle (art 
14(1) WFD; art 191(2) TFEU) 
Definitions 
•  Waste (art 3(1) WFD) 
•  Waste holder (art 3(6) WFD) 
•  Waste producer (art 3(5) 
WFD) 
•  By-products (art 5 WFD) 
•  End-of-waste (art 6 WFD) 
Waste hierarchy – art 4 WFD 
Enforcement and proportionate 
penalties (recital 45 and art 36 
WFD) 
EIR; Ecolabels (Ecolabel 
Regulation); IPP (Ecodesign 
Directive) 
CPR DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Eg CJEU case law 
NATIONAL & SUB-
NATIONAL EXAMPLES 
EU institutions are arguably 
collective-choice arrangements 
 
Eg flexibility in EU WFD in 
relation to penalties to be 
implemented at national level 
Eg EU policies supportive of 
industrial symbiosis: 2011 
Roadmap to a Resource 
Efficient Europe; 2012 
European Resource Efficiency 
Platform; 2015 Circular 
Economy Package 
EU level is one of the layers 
that results in industrial 
symbiosis being ‘nested’ in 
multiple layers of governance 
Eg Kalundborg 
Symbiosis Association 
in KIS 
Eg Future Peterborough 
Programme in PIS 
Eg plastic litter for 
floating islands in RIS 
Eg symbionts in KIS 
have been able to 
influence local policies 
Eg provisions set out in 
Swedish Environmental 
Code for LNIS 
Eg provided for in the 
Dutch Environmental 
Protection Act for RIS 
Eg local trust, 
communication and 
dialogue are key in 
LNIS 
Local and national 
governments in KIS, 
LNIS, PIS, and RIS 
facilitate, manage 
knowledge, and 
champion industrial 
symbiosis 
National and sub-
national regulations and 
policies provide 
additional layers of 
governance 
Figure 6.1: Design principles and examples of their manifestations at EU, national and sub-
national levels.
273
6. Enabling industrial symbiosis: observations
1. Defined user and 
resource boundaries 
2. Congruence with local 
conditions 
3. Appropriation and 
provision 
4. Collective-choice 
arrangements 
5. Monitoring of users 
and resources 
6. Graduated sanctions 
7. Conflict-resolution 
mechanisms 
8. Minimal recognition 
of rights to organise 
9. Nested enterprises 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property regimes define the users: 
•  Communal: every member of defined community can use the waste 
(ie non-community members are excluded) 
•  No-property (res nullius): everyone can use the waste (ie no one is 
excluded) 
•  Private: individuals (ie legal persons) can use the waste and exclude 
others from using it 
•  State: holds property rights in waste and can allocate the use of waste 
to individuals (ie state decides who to include and exclude) 
Eg Locke’s labour theory means that 
‘mixing’ of labour when recovering waste 
can result in private property, and this new 
product may be of value (see Section 3.2.2) 
 
EU EPR rules that affect this principle can 
be assigned using property rights (see 
Section 4.3.2) 
CPR DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
These design principles are 
affected by the type of 
property regime (eg who is 
responsible), but are not 
present as a result of them 
Property rights affect the appropriation rules 
- the most appropriate property rights 
regime for industrial symbiosis  depends on 
local conditions (see Section 6.1.1) 
Eg may have monitoring if EPR applies (see 
Design Principle 3 and Section 4.3.2) as in 
LNIS and RIS 
Eg individuals can affect operational rules if 
waste is communal property and they are 
part of that community 
Recognition depends on the rights (see 
Design Principle 1) 
Property rights add another layer to the 
‘nestedness’ 
Descriptions / examples of how design principles  
can be affected by property rights 
Eg may be difficult to penalise for 
abandonment of waste as last waste holder 
may be difficult to identify (see Section 
3.2.1 and plastic litter in RIS) 
CJEU case law examples so far are only of 
legal persons with private property rights 
Figure 6.2: Design principles and examples of how they are affected by property rights.
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6.3 Third parties
Each of the four case studies have several third parties that are critical in sup-
porting the industrial symbiosis network. At least one of them is always specific
to the local context and located there — eg in the UK there is the National
Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) at national level and Opportunity Pe-
terborough at local level for PIS, and in Denmark there is the Danish Busi-
ness Authority at national level and the Symbiosis Centre at local level for
KIS. These third parties rely upon collaboration and engagement with poten-
tial future and current symbionts for initiation and sustainment. The roles of
third parties are primarily as facilitators, knowledge managers, and ‘champi-
ons’. First, third parties facilitate industrial symbiosis through different forms
of communication and information exchanges. For example, in KIS the Sym-
biosis Centre hosts meetings with symbionts thereby sustaining KIS, while in
LNIS and RIS academic institutions research possible exchanges and their pos-
sible implementation in practical terms, and in PIS Opportunity Peterborough
supported the set up of an online platform, thereby supporting the initiation of
symbiotic exchanges. The latter method of compiling an inventory of compa-
nies and wastes available has been identified as a very useful industrial symbiosis
tool.48
A significant requisite of facilitating communication is managing knowledge as
evident from the above paragraph. The area of knowledge management and
exchange — the process whereby knowledge is generated through data and in-
formation collection, analysis, and dissemination — by organisations is another
area of research in itself.49 Essentially, third parties facilitate knowledge man-
48Saeid Hatefipour, Leenard Baas, and Mats Eklund, ‘The Händelö Area in Norrköping,
Sweden. Does it Fit for Industrial Symbiosis Development?’ [2011] World Renewable Energy
Congress 3468, 3473.
49For example: TH Davenport, ‘Some Principles of Knowledge Management’ (1994) 1(1)
Strategy and Business 34; J Liebowitz (ed), Knowledge Management Handbook (CRC Press
1999); H Lee and B Choi, ‘Knowledge Management Enablers, Processes, and Organizational
Performance: An Integrative View and Empirical Examination’ (2003) 1(20) Journal of Man-
agement Information Systems 179.
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agement processes for the purpose of developing industrial symbiosis networks.
The facilitation also entails engagement with stakeholders beyond symbionts
and potential symbionts. Third parties in both KIS and PIS are keen to engage
with other cities (eg through city networks) in order to become a knowledge
centre. In RIS there is also an ambition to outsource its knowledge on convert-
ing plastic into a floating island to other cities once the concept has been proven
to work. The motivation for this is social in wanting to disseminate knowledge
about how others can achieve similar economic, environmental, and social bene-
fits, as well as economic, as being such a knowledge centre can generate income
through consulting and attract funding. This links to their championing role.
Third parties champion industrial symbiosis by marketing the local industrial
symbiosis to attract interest and funding, and increase awareness. In KIS, PIS,
and RIS the local authority was a key champion by, for example, attending
conferences and including information about the symbiosis network on their
respective websites. In LNIS, Linköping University has been the more prominent
actor in raising awareness of LNIS by attending conferences and publishing in
academic literature.50 Through championing industrial symbiosis, these actors
also facilitate the exchanges by communicating the concept and opportunities to
others, which may lead to initiation of further waste and by-product exchanges.
In both their championing, knowledge management, and facilitator roles, the
third party roles are underpinned by the importance of communication.
The pivotal role of third parties in supporting industrial symbiosis despite not
being part of the action arena reinforces that the ISDF components are not
distinct as represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.3 (see Chapter 2). These
overlaps were also discussed in Section 2.3.
The other underlying theme of third parties is that there are many different types
of actors involved at different levels: actors exist at the local, national, and EU
governance levels, but also include charities (eg Ellen MacArthur Foundation
50See Section 5.2 for some of the literature.
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— see Section 5.3.4), the private sector (eg International Synergies Limited —
Section 5.3.4), and academic institutions (eg in LNIS and RIS). With the dif-
ferent levels of government involved, there are both top-down and bottom-up
ongoing processes.51 Industrial symbiosis has been initiated at the local level
in all four case studies. In PIS the initiation was as a result of local govern-
ment policies, while in the other three case studies the existence of industrial
symbiosis has influenced and complemented local policies. The concept of in-
dustrial symbiosis itself was developed at local level (specifically in KIS - see
Sections 1.2 and 5.1.3), and would not have featured at EU level if there had
not been a bottom-up approach. Simultaneously, there are top-down policies,
including the Circular Economy Package (see Section 4.3.1), Integrated Prod-
uct Policy (IPP) (see Section 4.3.4), and national plastic carrier bag charges
(see Sections 5.3.4 and 5.4.4), which affect industrial symbiosis development.
These case studies therefore illustrate the importance of combining the two
approaches.52
The multi-level, multi-actor nature of industrial symbiosis is typical of NCG.53
NCG is ‘arguably an important emerging intellectual movement in legal, public
policy, and social science scholarship’.54 The recent growth in NCG literature55
51For a discussion on top-down versus bottom-up approaches see, for example: Yohannes
Mariam, Environmental Sustainability and Regulation: Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Regula-
tion (Working Paper, MPRA 413, University of Munich 2001); Jeffrey L Rachlinski, ‘Bottom-
Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking’ (2006) 73 The University of Chicago Law Review 933.
52The combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches has been investigated in other
research areas, see for example: Riccardo Crescenzi and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, ‘Reconciling
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Development Policies’ (2011) 4(43) Environmenta and Planning A
773; Peter JS Jones, ‘Marine Protected Areas in the UK: Challenges in Combining Top-Down
and Bottom-Up Approaches to Governance’ (2012) 3(38) Environmental Conservation 248.
53NCG is also sometimes referred to as new governance or new environmental governance.
For example: Susana Borrás and Kerstin Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of Co-ordnation
and New Governance Patterns in the EU’ (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 185;
Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer, ‘New Governance in the European Union: A Theo-
retical Perspective’ (2004) 42 JCMS 121; Simon Hix, ‘The Study of the European Union
II: The “New Governance” Agenda and its Rival’ (2011) 5 Journal of European Public Pol-
icy 38; Cameron Holley, Neil Gunningham, and Clifford Shearing, The New Environmental
Governance (earthscan 2012).
54Bradley C Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471, 478.
55The increasing growth is evidenced by the increasing number of publications and references
to NCG. See the other references in this section, as well as, for example: Andrew Jordan,
Rïdiger KW Wurzel, and Anthoy R Zito, ‘“New” Instruments of Environmental Governance:
PAtterns and Pathways of Change’ (2003) 12 Environmental Politics 3; Borrás and Jacobsson
(n 53); Eberlein and Kerwer (n 53); Hix (n 53).
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has been attributed to the dissatisfaction with traditional regulation,56 and the
vagueness and impreciseness of what innovations NCG entails.57 The rationale
for exploring third parties within the framing of NCG theory is that the theory
helps develop understanding of the characteristics of their roles. An additional
benefit is that NCG is used in relation to resources,58 and it provides a link
between CPR theory and waste management.
Before unpacking NCG and the link it provides, the development of and ra-
tionale for NCG is considered as it clarifies why it should be considered as a
possible regulatory framework for symbiotic exchanges. Several factors explain
the emergence and application of NCG. First, there have been an increasing
number of complex, uncertain, and irreducibly diverse problems that do not
allow for uniform solutions. In order to address these problems, there has been
a shift away from traditional top-down regulation as these would be ineffective
and result in inaction.59 Similarly, symbiotic networks do not allow for uniform
approaches as the exchanges are complex,60 and bottom-up approaches have
been critical and more dominant than traditional top-down regulations in initi-
ating industrial symbiosis (see Section 6.1.2 and start of this section). Second,
NCG development can be considered a response to the emerging realisation that
the best policy is not necessarily regulation or deregulation. NCGs supports
the alternative view of using available mechanisms to meet policy objectives,61
56David M Trubek and Louise G Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Com-
plementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2006) 13 Colum.J.Eur.L. 1, 15.
57Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473.
58For example: Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal, ‘Environmental Governance’
(2006) 31 Annual Review of Environment and Resources 297; Cameron Holley and Neil Gun-
ningham, ‘Natural Resources, New Governance and Legal Regulation: When Does Collabo-
ration Work’ (2011) 24 New Zealand Universities Law Review 309.
59Bradley C Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and
Dynamism’ (2002) 21 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189, 201; Joanne Scott and David
M Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’
(2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 1, 6-7; Noel Brings Jacobsen, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in
Kalundborg, Denmark: A Quantitative Assessment of Economic and Environmental Aspects’
(2006) 10(1-2) Journal of Industrial Ecology 239, 251; Neil Gunningham, ‘The New Collabo-
rative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law
and Society 145, 159.
60Braden R Allenby, Industry Ecology: Policy Framework and Implementation (Prentice
Hall 1999) 133.
61Scott and Trubek (n 59) 6; Orly Lobel, ‘Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research’
(2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 498, 499 and 502.
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which resonates with the observation that policies, regulations, and property
rights have provided the legal underpinning for industrial symbiosis, without
direct regulation in industrial symbiosis (see Section 6.1). The third reason is
that new developments within public and administration may have influenced
NCG,62 but this is beyond the scope of this environmental law thesis. Fourth,
NCG encourages social dialogue, which arguably increases legitimacy63 and can
address some of democratic deficit problems.64 Communication has been key
to industrial symbiosis development as discussed earlier. Finally, one of the
contextual reasons for NCG development is that NCG accepts diversity, allows
flexibility, and can facilitate decentralised experimentation.65 Similarly, the suc-
cess of symbiotic exchanges depends ‘greatly’ on context and requires flexibility
to allow for contextual factors.66
Despite an increasing interest in NCG, there is no single universally agreed-
upon definition. Karkkainen described it both as ‘a broad family of innovative
modes of public governance’,67 and a school of thought with not necessarily,
but broadly, compatible and possibly competing thoughts rather than ‘a single
thought’.68 Similarly vague, Lobel stated that it is ‘both a theory and a set of
practical legal approaches [which] cannot be captured, even if schematically, by a
unified set of prescriptions’.69 As a result of this vagueness, many other scholars
have defined NCG by what it is not:70 NCG is not the traditional command-
62Scott and Trubek (n 59) 7.
63What legitimacy exactly means is a much debated topic in the literature: Giandomenico
Majone, ‘The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems’ (1999) 22(1) West European
Studies 1; Robert J Chaskin, ‘Fostering Neighbourhood Democracy: Legitimacy and Account-
ability within Loosely Coupled Systems’ [2003] Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 161;
Joanna Howard and David Sweeting, ‘Addressing the Legitimacy of the Council-Manager Ex-
ecutive in Local Government’ (2007) 33(5) Local Government Studies 633; Julia Black, ‘Con-
structing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’
(2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137.
64Scott and Trubek (n 59) 8 and 18.
65ibid 8.
66For example: Jacobsen, ‘Industrial Symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark: A Quantitative
Assessment of Economic and Environmental Aspects’ (n 59) 251. See also case study evidence
in Chapter 5.
67Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 472.
68ibid 496.
69Lobel (n 61) 500-501.
70For example: Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law
and Constitutionalism’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance
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and-control, fixed-rule approach.71 Therefore, the prefix ‘new’ in NCG signals a
transition away from the traditional approaches towards a more decentralised,
consensual, and polycentric approach,72 rather than indicating a novel approach.
With the varying descriptions and approaches to its definition, NCG is instead
often captured by its characteristics. There is again no single defining character-
istic, but a list of common, non-exhaustive, and non-discrete characteristics that
can be compiled through a review of NCG literature: multi-party participation
and collaboration; multi-level integration; flexibility and revisability; contextu-
alisation; decentralisation; deliberation; transparency; and accountability. Not
all characteristics have to be present in order to be classed as a NCG approach.
The argument will however be more persuasive with multiple characteristics
present.73 An explanation of the characteristics is set out below together with
an examination of whether and how they apply to industrial symbiosis and third
parties.
Multi-party participation and collaboration covers inclusiveness of and collab-
oration between a diverse range of participants, including public, private, and
non-governmental stakeholder participants.74 The aim of such collaboration is
in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2006); Neil Walker, ‘EU Constitutionalism and New
Governance’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU
and the US (Hart Publishing 2006); Bridget M Hutter, ‘Understanding the New Regulatory
Governance: Business Perspectives’ (2011) 33 Law & Policy 459.
71For example: Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473; Búrca and Scott (n 70) 2; Gunning-
ham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation’
(n 59) 146. Scott and Trubek defined NCG in relation to the EU as any major departure
from the Classic Community Method — Scott and Trubek (n 59) 1. The Classic Community
Method reflects the traditional approach as it is defined by Trubek, Cottrell and Nance as
providing ‘more or less uniform rules that are binding on Member States, are justifiable and
include sanctions for non-compliance’ — David M Trubek, Patrick Cottrell, and Mark Nance,
‘“Soft Law”, ”Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds),
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2006) 77.
72Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of
Regulation’ (n 59) 146.
73Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Gov-
ernance: The Localization of Regulation’ (n 59) 146.
74Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473; Búrca and Scott
(n 70) 3; Trubek and Trubek (n 56) 3; Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental
Governance: The Localization of Regulation’ (n 59) 146; Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment
Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Environ-
mental Law 179, 203; Holley, Gunningham, and Shearing (n 53) 4 and 70.
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to progress towards a mutually negotiated and agreed goal.75 This collabora-
tion should be sustained, as often the achievement of many objectives requires
time.76 This characteristic is present in industrial symbiosis as a result of the
multi-actor third parties engaging in a range of activities to facilitate communi-
cation between current and potential symbionts, as well as with local, national,
and sometimes EU and international government levels. This multi-party par-
ticipation results in monitoring (CPR design principle 5) to an extent: in order
to engage stakeholders and facilitate communication, monitoring of the current
situation is required.
Multi-level integration requires integration and interaction between actors at
different levels,77 for example, between government and private actors or be-
tween different levels of government, and often follows on from the previous
characteristic. This characteristic is distinguished though because it also implies
more power-sharing between different levels than in traditional legislation and
regulation, resulting in a polycentric, heterarchical, and consensual approach.78
Again, this is a key characteristic of how symbiotic networks are developing as
a result of the third parties involved. If power is understood as the degree of
control or influence entities have,79 then in all case studies there are examples
of different third parties having some power. All case studies have local author-
ities with control to fund some of the symbiotic projects, as well as set local
policies, together with the national level government that sets national policies
(and in some cases also provides funding). Additionally, there are examples in
each of either third party private actors or research institutions that have been
able to influence the direction of symbiotic exchanges. Finally, the symbionts
75Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as An-
tidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473; Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environ-
mental Governance: The Localization of Regulation’ (n 59) 146; Gunningham, ‘Environment
Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (n 74) 203.
76Holley, Gunningham, and Shearing (n 53) 144.
77Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6.
78Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Gov-
ernance: The Localization of Regulation’ (n 59) 146.
79C40, Arup, and UCL, Powering Climate Action: Cities as Global Changemakers (C40
and Arup 2015) 6.
281
6. Enabling industrial symbiosis: observations
themselves have the ultimate control in determining whether or not to pursue an
exchange. The multi-levelness captures the element of nested enterprises (CPR
design principle 9).
The flexibility and revisability characteristic facilitates an adaptive and dynamic
approach, flexible norms, and an ability to adjust to new information.80 Some
scholars suggest that this flexibility and revisability allows for continuous eval-
uation, review, and improvement of the adopted mechanisms and approaches
based on the best currently available information.81 This adaptiveness results
in a ‘complex web’ of continuous feedback loops, assessments, and readjust-
ments of policy measures as a result of new learning.82 As industrial symbiosis
is contextual, approaches are flexible as it depends on feasibility; there is not
one approach to industrial symbiosis with wide policy targets and economic
instruments rather than symbiosis-centred targets (see Section 6.1). This in-
corporates the approach that Scott and Trubek advocate: there should be less
reliance on ‘hard law’ and more dependence on ‘open-ended standards, flexi-
ble and revisable guidelines, and other forms of “soft law” ’ in order to achieve
flexibility and revisability.83 Hard law is a term generally interpreted as mean-
ing legally binding instruments (ie the regulations discussed in the industrial
symbiosis context), while soft law in contrast generally denotes any instruments
which are not legally binding (ie the policy documents discussed in the indus-
trial symbiosis context).84 Flexibility is important as a result of context. In
order to allow for contextualisation, the process has to be pragmatic, and build
80Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism’
(n 59) 201; Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473; Búrca
and Scott (n 70) 3; Trubek and Trubek (n 56) 500-501. A further characteristic of policy
experimentation (see Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Búrca and Scott (n 70) 3; Trubek and
Trubek (n 56) 3) could be considered under this heading as the flexibility of the NCG approach
allows for experimentation.
81Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism’
(n 59) 201; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473; Lobel (n 61) 500-501; Búrca and Scott (n 70)
3.
82Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism’
(n 59) 202-203.
83Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6.
84Seminal definitions are found in, for example, Andrew T Guzman and Timothy L Meyer,
‘International Soft Law’ (2010) 2(1) Journal of Legal Analysis 171.
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on and create local knowledge.85 Again, third parties examined facilitate this as
they are local, and recognise that knowledge is needed about local possible and
current symbionts. These characteristics enabled by third parties help ensure
congruence with local conditions (CPR design principle 2).
Decentralisation entails policy-making being left to the lowest possible level,86
resulting in a more bottom-up approach in contrast to traditional regulation.87
This is supported by the emergence of a governance structure which is more
focused on coordination and/or exchanges between constituent parts as a re-
sult of multi-level integration, collaboration and participation.88 How industrial
symbiosis upholds this is evident from the leadership by local levels in initiating
industrial symbiosis, as well as the role of private partners (eg in LNIS and RIS),
as discussed earlier in this section.
Deliberation includes collective and consensus-oriented dialogue,89 which adds
to the ‘democratic legitimisation’90 of the NCG approach (and resonates with
design principle 4). Such an approach can result in improved problem-solving
and negotiation capabilities.91 Such approaches can avoid conflicts (related to
design principle 7). Dialogue between symbionts is facilitated by third parties,
as reiterated a number of times in this section.
Transparency has been advocated as a characteristic by fewer scholars than
some of the other characteristics, such as multi-level participation.92 It can be
85Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473-474; Búrca and Scott
(n 70) 3; Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization
of Regulation’ (n 59) 146.
86Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6.
87Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473.
88Búrca and Scott (n 70) 3.
89Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 473-474; Gunningham,
‘Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (n 74) 203.
90Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6.
91Scott and Trubek (n 59) 5-6; Karkkainen, ‘New Governance in Legal Thought and in
the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping’ (n 54) 486-487; Trubek
and Trubek (n 56) 3; Gunningham, ‘Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting
Architectures’ (n 74) 211.
92Transparency is only listed in: (Búrca and Scott [n 70] 3; Gunningham, ‘The New Collab-
orative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation’ [n 59] 146; Gunningham,
283
6. Enabling industrial symbiosis: observations
achieved through information-sharing and openness.93 This was a characteristic
specifically highlighted in KIS and LNIS (see Sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.4 respec-
tively), but as a result of the symbionts rather than the third parties. Third
parties can effect and improve transparency by improving communication and
through knowledge management, which they facilitate as reiterated numerous
times throughout this section.
Finally, there is vertical and horizontal accountability.94 Similarly to trans-
parency, it is not a common characteristic covered by NCG scholarship. Trubek
and Trubek advocate for it through the use of benchmarks, peer review, and in-
dicators.95 Accountability of neither symbionts nor third parties was examined
in this thesis.
The discussion of NCG characteristics has illustrated that the characteristics
of third party participation helps underpin some of the CPR design principles.
The argument is however not that these characteristics and principles are equiv-
alent, but they do seem to reinforce each other within the context of the four
case studies. Design principles 1, 3, 6, and 8 are not addressed through the
characteristics, but are present in the symbiotic networks as a result of the rules
implemented by some of the third parties and symbionts (see Section 6.2). This
highlights again how all three sets of observations are interlinked. Overall, third
party participation results in NCG characteristics which underpin the enabling
conditions for industrial symbiosis across the four case studies.
‘Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ [n 74] 203).
93Búrca and Scott (n 70) 3.
94Jody Freeman and Daniel A Farber, ‘Modular Environmental Regulation’ (2005) 54 Duke
Law Journal 795, 904; Holley, Gunningham, and Shearing (n 53) 101. Note that account-
ability is often discussed together with legitimacy, and that it also does not have a clear
definition — see n 63. See also: Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A
Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447; Carol Harlow and Richard
Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007)
13(4) European Law Journal 542.
95Trubek and Trubek (n 56) 3.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the key observations from the case studies and set
out some recommendations based on these. This chapter concluded that a reg-
ulatory and policy mix has been supportive of industrial symbiosis initiation
and sustainment across the case studies, instead of one clear approach. This
mix includes a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches ensuring a
context-specific approach while still having a wider supportive framework. Sec-
ond, there is no most suitable property regime, as both private and res nullius
property rights have enabled symbiotic exchanges. No evidence was uncovered
on communal and state owned property in the case studies, so further research is
required. Third, CPR theory is valuable within the industrial symbiosis context
to explore facilitative conditions, and can support and trigger the reconceptual-
isation of waste as a resource. Finally, third parties are the critical component
in the case studies. Depending on the specific third party, they implement or
help use the regulatory and policy context to incentivise development of sym-
biotic networks. Additionally, they facilitate communication and knowledge
management at all stages of symbiotic projects to identify available wastes and
by-products, link up potential symbionts, and support sustainment of existing
symbioses. Overall, the current characteristics reflect NCG approaches as a
result of the involvement of third parties.
The next chapter, Chapter 7 is the final chapter and concludes this thesis by
providing an overview of the key outcomes and contributions of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The starting argument for this thesis is that within the current context of waste
and resource crises it is necessary to treat waste as a resource. One possible
waste and resource management strategy believed to have high potential for
impact, but not yet widely implemented, is industrial symbiosis, as discussed
in Chapter 1. This thesis examines one dimension shaping the implementation
of this industrial symbiosis strategy currently underexplored: the role of law.
The overarching research question investigated in this thesis was therefore (see
Section 1.3): How can the law enable initiation and sustainment of industrial
symbiosis? The particular focus was on regulations, policies, and property rights
that either drive or inhibit industrial symbiosis. This examination was guided
by a combination of theoretical framings: the Industrial Symbiosis Development
Framework (ISDF) set out in Chapter 2, as well property rights and Common-
Pool Resource (CPR) theories set out in Chapter 3. These framings and their
critical mechanisms were explored at supranational European Union (EU) level
in Chapter 4, and through a national and local level using a multi-case study
approach, supported by interviews and doctrinal approaches, in Chapter 5. The
four case studies investigated were industrial symbiosis networks in Kalundborg
in Denmark, Linköping and Norrköping in Sweden, Peterborough in the United
Kingdom (UK), and Rotterdam in the Netherlands.
This thesis draws five main conclusions. First, there is no direct nor explicit
regulation on industrial symbiosis. This is however not necessary as indirect
regulation, such as landfill tax, plastic bag charges, and the waste hierarchy,
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can incentivise industrial symbiosis. Second, direct policies, particularly at lo-
cal and EU level, are critical, both in marketing industrial symbiosis as well as
in supporting the reconceptualisation of waste as a resource. The latter is par-
ticularly key in transitioning towards normalising symbiotic exchanges. Third,
property rights are a critical legal dimension in the management of resources and
waste, but there is no one-size-fits-all property regime for industrial symbiosis.
Fourth is therefore a recommendation to redefine waste as a CPR. Finally, par-
ties not directly participating in symbiotic exchanges are critical to increase the
initiation and sustainment of industrial symbiosis. Their roles underpin all of
the preceding observations and conclusions as these parties facilitate industrial
symbiosis through setting or interpreting the regulatory and policy context,
engaging current and potential symbionts, allocating funding, and knowledge
management.
The remainder of this chapter concludes this thesis by first setting out contri-
butions, then further research, and final remarks.
7.1 Contributions
In Chapter 1 it was set out that in order to examine the overarching research
question, the following objectives investigating some of the relationships between
industrial symbiosis, waste, property regimes, and regulatory and policy systems
have to be achieved (see Section 1.3):
1. Development of an evaluation tool to assess the drivers and barriers of
industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment.
2. Investigation of the property rights in waste.
3. Exploration and evaluation of the current roles and functions of regulation
and policy in enabling industrial symbiosis at local, national and supra-
national level.
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4. Examination of how waste is and can be managed to enable industrial
symbiosis.
These objectives led to a set of primary contributions, which are set out below.
A key limitation affecting each of the five contributions is derived from analysis
and interpretation of four case studies. Their transferability to other contexts
remains to be tested and validated. Other constraints on the scope and resultant
conclusions of this thesis were outlined in Section 1.5.
Development of the ISDF for investigating and comparing industrial
symbiosis networks.
To structure the research and thereby answer the first research objective, an orig-
inal analytical framework, the ISDF, was developed in Chapter 2. This frame-
work is based on the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD)
and a literature review. It comprises four sets of interacting components: ex-
ternal variables (ie rules-in-use, community attributes, economic conditions,
geographic location, and third parties) acting as mechanisms (ie drivers or bar-
riers) for industrial symbiosis (ie symbionts that initiate and sustain resource
exchanges), resulting in outcomes (ie limits and benefits). As a law thesis, the
key focus throughout was on the rules-in-use external variable. This was de-
fined in Chapter 2 for the purpose of this thesis as covering regulations, policies,
and property rights. The next three chapters tested and validated the frame-
work. First, as theoretical expansion and corroboration, Chapter 3 explored the
theoretical implications of property rights in waste. Next, Chapter 4 focused
on regulations and policies at EU level as ISDF driving and inhibiting mech-
anisms. Last, Chapter 5 empirically corroborated the influence of the three
external variables on the outcomes of industrial symbiosis across each of the
case studies.
The utility of the ISDF is that it supports systematic assessment of regulations,
policies, and property rights without assigning undue importance to any sin-
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gle component by placing them within the wider context of other influencing
variables. This framework can be used across different disciplines to investigate
other industrial symbiosis networks, either to focus on rules-in-use or any of the
other components.
Identification of property rights in waste.
The second contribution made is the identification of different property rights
in waste and their implications. These were not yet explored in the literature.
The anticipated implications of property rights on waste for the purposes of
industrial symbiosis were discussed in Chapter 3. Their practical realisations
then examined across the empirical case studies in Chapter 5. Combined, these
discussions led to the recommendation in Chapter 6 that selection of a suitable
property regime to enable industrial symbiosis must remain context dependent.
There is both evidence of private property and res nullius property1 in the sym-
biotic exchanges of waste and resources. In examined cases, private property
resulted in commodification of waste, while res nullius property resulted in some
parties using their own initiative and using their own labour to create something
of value. Neither approaches demonstrably results in more widespread imple-
mentation of industrial symbiosis. It is argued that more research is needed on
the effects of state and communal ownership of waste in practice to clarify their
suitability as property regimes for industrial symbiosis. In a state ownership
structure (usually in a municipal form), individuals are allocated use rights of
various types, or even limited management or control rights, though not prop-
erty rights in the sense that such rights would be personal to holders and not
transmissible. Such a property regime gives rise to a number of uncertainties,
including what responsibilities and duties the state would have in relation to
waste. It is theorised that communal property could have the effect that well-
intentioned individuals would intervene with others’ waste to ensure that it is
1Even though someone somewhere owns eg the plastic litter in RIS as waste cannot be
abandoned as discussed in Section 3.2.1, there is no way of identifying the owners — see
Section 5.4.4.
289
7. Conclusion
managed properly in terms of re-using, recovering, and recycling waste in an
environmentally responsible manner. Other individuals would have no right to
complain — though it is acknowledged that communal property could equally
result in detrimental environmental impacts as well.
Identification of enabling regulations and policies.
In Chapter 4 enabling and inhibiting regulations and policies at EU level were
identified. This was followed by the identification of enabling and inhibiting
regulations and policies at national and local level in Chapter 6. Until now, no
in depth comprehensive overview has existed for the industrial symbiosis com-
munity. It was concluded that general policy support for industrial symbiosis
exists through the setting of specifically circular economy and resource efficiency
goals. In terms of regulations, from the perspective of symbionts, economic in-
struments provide the clearest incentives. Overall, it is a mix of regulations
and policies, with complementary bottom-up and top-down approaches, that is
enabling.
Opportunities remain for further development of regulatory and policy instru-
ments to enable industrial symbiosis. Specifically, the waste hierarchy and wider
implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) approaches to more
material streams could incentivise symbiotic exchanges. Furthermore the in-
creased use of by-product and end-of-waste criteria could overcome barriers to
industrial symbiosis. The latter would address some of the experienced issues
that relate to the definition of waste identified in Chapter 4, and constructively
address the current mixed perceptions by symbionts.
Application of CPR theory to manage waste.
This thesis applied CPR theory within a new context: waste management.
Though the connection has been made by other scholars, the specific applica-
tion had not yet been explored. In this thesis, CPR theory informs how waste
is currently managed by identifying the conditions, through design principles,
relevant to man-made CPR waste systems. Some scholars argue that the value
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of CPR theory is that it circumvents challenges of the definition of waste. This
thesis rejects this proposition. Instead, this thesis demonstrates how CPR the-
ory can enable the reconceptualisation of waste as a resource which is critical
to transition to a society where waste is viewed and treated as valuable.
Identification of third party roles.
All the case study evidence indicates that third parties are key to initiating
and sustaining industrial symbiosis. Though their existence and significance
has been highlighted in preceding studies, little work explored in greater depth
the multiple roles these third parties could take.
This thesis identified the following set of roles across the case studies: third
parties facilitate engagement, knowledge management, communication, and col-
laboration between current and potential symbionts, as well as champion the
concept to attract interest and funding. In some cases the third parties are the
providers of the funding that allowed a symbiotic exchange to develop. Third
parties either develop the policies and regulations supportive of industrial sym-
biosis, or are supported by policies in their work, and highlight regulatory and
policy drivers in their engagement with stakeholders to underline some of the
benefits of industrial symbiosis.
Additionally, the multi-level multi-actor nature of third parties is typical of
emerging New Collaborative Governance (NCG) perspectives. This thesis sets
out how NCG characteristics underpin third party roles and enable them to
effect some of the CPR design principles.
7.2 Further research
A number of research areas remain unexplored in relation to the research ques-
tion that are beyond the scope of this thesis and were highlighted throughout
this thesis. These include the comparative roles of public and private compa-
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nies (see Section 5.5), labelling theory (see Section 6.1.2), trends in buzzwords
(see Section 6.1.3), the cultural shift required in reconceptualising waste (see
Section 6.2), and knowledge management processes (see Section 6.3). Beyond
these, the following areas for further research are suggested:
• Unpacking communal and state owned waste in practice.
Case studies with examples of communal and state owned waste should
be identified and investigated to determine the possible implications for
industrial symbiosis. The rationale for this is set out in Section 7.1.
• More evidence for comparison both within and beyond the EU.
One of the limits of the selected case studies is that they are all four north-
western established EU Member States (see Section 1.4.1). Case studies
across other parts of the EU would provide an interesting comparison —
particularly newly joined EU Member States to see how implementation of
EU law affected any existing industrial symbioses. Furthermore, compar-
isons with international case studies would also help understand contex-
tual factors. Taiwan and South Korea, for example, have well-established
EPR, recycling auditing, and are also in the top five recyclers worldwide.2
Such case studies would allow the comparing and contrasting of more var-
ied approaches (rather than those all under harmonised EU waste law).
Case studies could also be used to test and validate the ISDF, as well as
CPR theory, in other industrial symbiosis contexts.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to supplement case study data with
quantitative data. Such data would provide another dimension by provid-
ing an overview of trends in perceptions. For example, symbiont represen-
tatives could be surveyed on the expected impacts of different rules-in-use,
such as the property rights regimes, the waste hierarchy, and EPR.3 Such
2Eunomia, Recycling - Who Really Leads the World? Identifying the World’s Best Mu-
nicipal Waste Recyclers (2017) 7 and 8. This discounts discrepancies in reporting between
different countries.
3Surveys have been undertaken previously on some of these topics, but in different contexts.
For example, Product Stewardship Institute, Connecticut Extended Producer Responsibility
Program Evaluation: Summary and Recommendations (January 2017).
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a survey would also test the findings in this thesis.
• Development of regulatory theories for addressing resource and
waste crises.
In Chapter 6, NCG theory was used to explain some of the trends in char-
acteristics across the case studies. Responsive regulation was also briefly
mentioned as a side note in relation to the Danish regulatory system (see
Section 5.1.4). Regulatory theories could be used to further explain and
inform approaches to industrial symbiosis initiation and sustainment, par-
ticularly those that have an element of self-organisation or self-governance,
such as voluntarism, smart regulation, and self-regulation.4
7.3 Final remarks
The resource and waste crises are likely to become more prevalent in the foresee-
able future; consumption remains unsustainably high resulting in the production
of huge amounts of waste, while resource scarcities are projected to grow. Ap-
proaches, including industrial symbiosis, to address these issues and treat waste
as a resource will therefore continue to be critical (though waste and by-product
exchanges may not always be labelled as industrial symbiosis even if they are in
essence part of such a network). By highlighting opportunities and challenges
in using regulations, policies, and property rights in different ways to initiate
and sustain industrial symbiosis, this thesis contributes to the development of
4For more on voluntarism see for example: Peter Grabosky and Neil Gunningham, ‘The
Agricultural Industry’ in Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky, and Darren Sinclair (eds), Smart
Regulation (Clarendon Press 1998); Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulatory Plu-
ralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection’ (1999) 21(1) Law & Policy 49.
On smart regulation: Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky, and Darren Sinclair (eds), Smarter
Regulation (Clarendon Press 1998); Robert Baldwin, ‘Is Better Regulation Smarter Regu-
lation?’ (2005) 3 Public Law 485; Timothy Eccles and John Pointing, ‘Smart Regulation,
Shifting Architectures and Changes in Governance’ (2013) 1(5) International Journal of Law
in the Built Environment 71. On self-regulation: Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Un-
derstanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001)
54(1) Current Legal Problems 103; Sanford E Gaines and Clíona Kimber, ‘Redirecting Self-
Regulation’ (2001) 2(13) Journal of Environmental Law 157. Note that there are similarities
and overlaps between these theories.
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the current landscape of regulation and policy for enabling the use of waste as
a resource.
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Incentives and Barriers of Waste and By-Product Exchanges between 
Industries 
  
Introduction 
 
This is a PhD research project by Katrien Steenmans from the School of Law, 
University of Surrey. 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in this research project. Before you decide, you 
need to understand why the interview and research is being done and what it will 
involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. Talk 
to others about the study if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information. 
  
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This study seeks to explore how regulation and policy can be used to initiate and 
sustain the physical exchange of waste and by-products between industries and 
other organisations in order to achieve economic, environmental and social benefits 
(known as industrial symbiosis). The study focuses on identifying incentives and 
barriers, followed by recommendations as to how regulation and policy can enhance 
incentives, overcome barriers, and create new incentives where necessary. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
 
You have been invited to take part because you have identified yourself, or been 
identified, as having knowledge of the incentives and/or barriers experienced by 
industries or organisations wanting to participate in waste or by-product exchanges 
that result in economic, environmental and social benefits. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, you do not have to participate. If you choose not to take part, there will be no 
disadvantages, and you will hear no more about it. Even if you sign the consent form 
and participate, you can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. If you withdraw 
during the interview, you can request that any data concerning you be permanently 
destroyed. 
 
What will my involvement require? 
 
The most important thing to know is that you will be participating anonymously. This 
means that none of the information or opinions you give will be linked to your name in 
any published or public setting. 
 
I would like to interview you face-to-face. It will take approximately 45-60 minutes of 
your time. I will, with your permission, audio record the interview so I can transcribe 
your conversation into written text after the interview. The audio files will be 
permanently deleted once I have transcribed the interview. 
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I will give you a hard copy of this document (Information Sheet) to keep. I will also 
give you the Participant Consent Form, which I will ask you to read and sign before 
beginning the interview. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
 
There are no known risks or disadvantages of taking part, as we strive to protect your 
confidentiality. I will send you the transcript of the interview before the analysis to 
allow you to ensure that you have not been misrepresented. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
It is unlikely that you will benefit directly but it is hoped that you will be able to reflect 
on the role of regulation and policy in enhancing incentives and overcoming barriers 
encountered in participating, or deciding against doing so, in industrial symbiosis. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
 
I will transcribe the audio recording of the interview, if an audio recording has been 
consented to. The transcript will then be sent to you, if you have requested and 
consented to this, for you to ensure that you have not been misrepresented. The 
transcript will be stored electronically on a secure server run by the Principal 
Investigator. It will not have your name on it, but instead will include a pseudonym 
and the industrial symbiosis location to which the interview relates. Data will be 
stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
I will analyse the data collected from the interview and compare it with data collected 
from other interviews. This data will be stored for a minimum of 10 years following 
completion of the project, in accordance with University of Surrey regulations. I will 
publish these results in academic papers, at academic conferences, and in my PhD 
thesis. 
 
If you are interested in the findings of this research, please contact me on 
k.steenmans@surrey.ac.uk and I can provide you with a summary of your findings. 
The findings will be summarised in July 2015. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with 
during the course of the study will be addressed; please contact Katrien Steenmans, 
Principal Investigator on +44 07868370637 or k.steenmans@surrey.ac.uk. You may 
also contact the Head of School, Mr Rob Jago on +44 01483686207 or 
r.jago@surrey.ac.uk. 
  
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All of the information you give will be anonymised so that those reading reports 
from the research will not know who has contributed to it. 
 
Data will be stored securely in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Contact details of researcher and supervisor 
 
Katrien Steenmans   Email: k.steenmans@surrey.ac.uk 
PhD Researcher   Tel: +44 07868370637 
 
Rosalind Malcolm   Email: r.malcolm@surrey.ac.uk 
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Professor of Law   Tel: +44 01483682852 
 
Address: School of Law, University of Surrey, Guildford GU27XH, United Kingdom 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from 
the University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
APPENDIX B
Interview schedule
Instructions to interviewer: The term ‘organisation’ may be substituted for: in-
dustry; company; . . . depending on the interview subject. Similarly, it will be
gauged from communicated prior to the interview whether the interview partici-
pant is familiar with the term industrial symbiosis. If the interview participant
uses a different term to describe the same phenomenon, that term will be used
instead.
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed about my research on industrial sym-
biosis. My aim in the research is to provide recommendations as to how regula-
tion and policy can be used to enable the initiation and sustainment of industrial
symbiosis. For this, I am particularly interested in identifying incentives and
barriers encountered in case studies.
The interview should take no longer than an hour.
I would also like to audio record this interview. Do you consent to this? Would
you like me to send you the transcript when it is ready for approval?
Do you have any questions before we start the interview?
Instructions to interviewer: If questions, answer these. If no questions, this is
the point at which the audio recorder will be turned on (if consented) and the
interview will commence.
368
B. Interview schedule
Interview questions
Note: the questions and their phrasing varied depending on the interview partic-
ipant — eg if interviewing a third party, then would not ask about the distance
between organisations. As it also was a semi-structured interview, not all ques-
tions were always asked, and follow-up questions were often asked.
1. Involvement
Can you tell me about how your organisation is involved with industrial sym-
biosis?
What is exchanged?
How far is the organisation(s) you exchange waste or by-products with?
Who owns the resources exchanged?
How are the exchanges managed? — Through bilateral agreements? Contracts?
2. Initiation
When your organisation set up industrial symbiosis, what support did you re-
ceive from other institutions, if any?
What did your organisation want and expect from engaging in industrial sym-
biosis?
How did your organisation become involved in industrial symbiosis?
When did your organisation start using industrial symbiosis?
How did your organisation initially become aware of industrial symbiosis?
What precautions has your organisation taken against the risks of industrial
symbiosis, such as those of quality of the exchanges and security of supply?
(a) Incentives
Why did your organisation become involved in industrial symbiosis?
Was there a main driver/a defining incentive?
How important were the different incentives/motivations?
Were there any particular policies or legislation that encouraged your organisa-
tion to become involved in industrial symbiosis?
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Were there any regulatory incentives?
Were there any policy incentives?
(b) Barriers
What were the challenges or difficulties your organisation experienced when set-
ting up industrial symbiosis?
Were there any particular policies or legislation that posed a challenge or barrier
when your organisation was planning or setting up the industrial symbiosis?
How do you think such challenges could be avoided?
Were there any regulatory barriers?
Were there any policy barriers?
3. Sustainment
Have your expectations of industrial symbiosis been met?
Do you know of any benefits your organisation has achieved by engaging in in-
dustrial symbiosis beyond the benefits for your organisation?
Will you continue engaging in industrial symbiosis?
(a) Incentives
What are the drivers of continuing industrial symbiosis?
Are there any regulatory incentives for sustaining industrial symbiosis?
Are there any policy incentives for sustaining industrial symbiosis?
(b) Barriers
Are there any continuing challenges or difficulties of maintaining the industrial
symbiosis?
How do you think such challenges could be avoided?
Are there any regulatory barriers for sustaining industrial symbiosis?
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Are there any policy barriers for sustaining industrial symbiosis?
4. Recommendations
Finally, what would your advice be to other organisations contemplating engag-
ing in industrial symbiosis?
Debrief
Thank you for all your help. This has been incredibly useful. I have no further
questions. Is there anything else you would like to bring up, or ask about, before
we finish the interview?
Instruction to interviewer: Once the interview subject has nothing else to add,
turn off audio recorder. If the interview subject says anything in the informal
conversation after the interview (when sound recording is turned off), I will ask
the interview subject for permission to report those topics that emerge in the
informal conversation after the interview.
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UniS 
	  
Ethics Committee  
Interview	  Consent	  Form	  
	  
Incentives	  and	  Barriers	  of	  Waste	  and	  By-­‐Product	  Exchanges	  between	  Industries	  	  This	  form	  is	  to	  be	  completed	  independently	  by	  the	  participant	  after	  reading	  the	  Information	  Sheet	  and/or	  having	  listened	  to	  an	  explanation	  about	  the	  research.	  The	  boxes	  next	  to	  the	  statement	  allow	  the	  participant	  to	  initial	  those	  statements	  that	  they	  agree	  to	  as	  well	  as	  allowing	  them	  to	  leave	  any	  boxes	  empty	  where	  they	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  consent.	  	  	  This	  study	  has	  been	  reviewed	  and	  received	  a	  favourable	  ethical	  opinion	  (FEO)	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Surrey	  Ethics	  Committee.	  	  
• I	  the	  undersigned	  voluntarily	  agree	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  interview	  on	  incentives	  and	  barriers	  of	  waste	  and	  by-­‐product	  exchanges	  between	  industries	  (also	  known	  as	  industrial	  symbiosis).	  	   	  	  
• I	  have	  read	  and	  understood	  the	  Participant	   Information	  Sheet	  provided	  (Version	  1,	  6/1/15).	   I	  have	  been	  given	  a	  full	  explanation	  by	  the	  investigator	  of	  the	  nature,	  purpose,	  location	  and	  likely	  duration	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  of	  what	  I	  will	  be	  expected	  to	  do.	  I	  have	  been	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  questions	  on	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  study	  and	  have	  understood	  the	  advice	  and	  information	  given	  as	  a	  result.	  	  
	  
	  
• I	   understand	   that	   all	   personal	   data	   relating	   to	   volunteers	   is	   held	   and	   processed	   in	   the	   strictest	  confidence,	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  UK	  Data	  Protection	  Act	  (1998).	  I	  agree	  that	  I	  will	  not	  seek	  to	  restrict	   the	  use	  of	   the	  results	  of	   the	  study,	   including	   the	  use	  of	  excerpts	   from	  the	   interview,	  on	   the	  understanding	  that	  my	  anonymity	  is	  preserved.	  	  
	  
	  
• I	  understand	  that	  I	  am	  free	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  interview	  at	  any	  time	  without	  needing	  to	  justify	  my	  decision	  and	  without	  prejudice.	  	   	  	  
• I	  give	  permission	  for	  the	  interview	  to	  be	  recorded	  using	  audio	  recording	  equipment.	  	   	  	  
• I	  give	  permission	  to	  being	  sent	  the	  transcript	  of	  the	  interview.	   	  
	  
• I	  give	  permission	  to	  the	  researcher	  to	  quote	  the	  interview	  in	  published	  work.	   	  
	  	   	  	   Name	  of	  volunteer	  (BLOCK	  CAPITALS)	   	   	  	  	  	  	  ........................................................	   	  	  Signed	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ........................................................	   	  	   Date	   	   ......................................	   	  	   	  	  Name	  of	  researcher/person	  taking	  consent	  (BLOCK	  CAPITALS)	  	   ........................................................	   	  	  Signed	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ........................................................	   	  	   Date	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ......................................	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Research Integrity & Governance 
Office (RIGO) 
Senate House  
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH UK 
 
T: +44 (0)1483 68 9103/2051 
F: +44 (0)1483 68 3791 
 
ethics@surrey.ac.uk 
www.surrey.ac.uk 
 
University Ethics Committee  
 
26 February 2015 
 
 
Dear Ms Steenmans 
 
UEC ref: EC/2014/160/FBEL 
Study Title: Incentives and Barriers of Waste and By-Product Exchanges between Industries 
 
On behalf of the Ethics Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the submitted protocol and supporting documentation. 
 
Date of confirmation of ethical opinion: 26th February 2015 
 
The final list of documents reviewed by the Committee is as follows: 
 
Document  Version Date 
Cover letter from researcher in response to queries from UEC, sent 11 
Feb 2015 
 11 Feb 2015 
Protocol Cover Sheet  Sub. 
11 Feb 2015 
Detailed protocol 2 11 Feb 2015 
Participant Information Sheet 2 11 Feb 2015 
Interview Consent Form 2 11 Feb 2015 
Risk Assessment 2 11 Feb 2015 
Summary 1 06 Jan 2015 
Standard correspondence letter 1 06 Jan 2015 
Initial contact to identified potential participants 1 06 Jan 2015 
Interview Schedule 1 06 Jan 2015 
Research Insurance Proforma 1 06 Jan 2015 
Public Liability Insurance Certificate  14 Jul 2014 
 
This opinion is given on the understanding that you will comply with the University's Ethical Principles 
& Procedures for Teaching and Research. 
Ms Katrien Steenmans 
School of Law 
Faculty of Business, Economics and Law 
 
 If the project includes distribution of a survey or questionnaire to members of the University 
community, researchers are asked to include a statement advising that the project has been reviewed 
by the University’s Ethics Committee. 
 
If you wish to make any amendments to your protocol please address your request to the Secretary of 
the Ethics Committee and attach any revised documentation. 
 
The Committee will need to be notified of adverse reactions suffered by research participants, and if 
the study is terminated earlier than expected with reasons.  Please be advised that the Ethics 
Committee is able to audit research to ensure that researchers are abiding by the University 
requirements and guidelines. 
 
You are asked to note that a further submission to the Ethics Committee will be required in the event 
that the study is not completed within five years of the above date. 
 
Please inform me when the research has been completed. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Dr Sophie Wehrens 
Research Integrity and Governance Officer, Research & Enterprise Support 
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E. Interview codes for data analysis
Table E.1: Interview codes for data analysis.
Category Code Sub-code
Development Initiation, sustainment
External variables Third parties Branding, communication, funding, knowl-
edge, skills, networks
Regulations Drivers, barriers, waste hierarchy, EPR
Policies Drivers, barriers, circular economy
Property
Economic context
Geographic context
Economic context Driver
Social context Trust, barrier
Action arena Symbionts Public companies, private companies
Outcome Benefits, limits
Scale Local, national, EU Role, drivers, barriers, funding
Concept Waste, by-product, resource Barrier
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APPENDIX F
Literature review codes for developing ISDF
NOTE: All reviewed journal articles are listed below. The irst time an article
is mentioned, they are referenced (using footnotes).
ACTION ARENA
• Development
Ehrenfeld and Gertler (1997);1 van Berkel, Willems and Lafleur (1997);2
Baas (1998);3 Chertow (2000);4 Desrochers (2000);5 Geng and Côté (2003);6
Korhonen and Snäkin (2003);7 Baas and Boons (2004);8 Deutz and Gibbs
(2004);9 Heeres, Vermeulen and deWalle (2004);10 Mirata (2004);11 Roberts
(2004);12 Sterr and Ott (2004);13 Gibbs, Deutz and Proctor (2005);14 Ko-
rhonen and Snäkin (2005);15 Mirata and Emtairah (2005);16 van Berkel,
van Beers and Bossilkov (2006);17 Gibbs and Deutz (2007);18 Massard
and Erkman (2007);19 Tudor, Adam and Bates (2007);20 van Beers and
others (2007);21 Wolf, Eklund and Söderström (2007);22 Zhu and oth-
ers (2007);23 Baas (2008);24 Chertow, Ashton and Espinosa (2008);25 van
Berkel, Fujita, Hashimoto and Geng (2009);26 Yang and Feng (2008);27
Yuan and Shi (2009);28 Costa and Ferrão, ‘A Case Study of Industrial
Symbiosis Development Using a Middle-out Approach’ (2010);29 Costa
and Ferrão, ‘Crossroads Between Resource Recovery and Industrial Sym-
biosis Networks’ (2010);30 Costa, Massard and Agarwal (2010);31 Mattila,
Pakarinen and Sokka (2010);32 Shi, Chertow and Song (2010);33 Yang and
Lay (2010);34 Hatefipour, Baas and Eklund (2011);35 Sokka and others
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(2011);36 Chertow and Ehrenfeld (2012);37 Mattila and others (2012)38
• Symbionts
Graedel (1996);39 Martin and others (1996);40 Ehrenfeld and Gertler (1997);
Schward and Steininger (1997);41 Keckler and Allen (1998);42 Chertow
(2000); Korhonen, ‘Co-production of Heat and Power’ (2001);43 Korho-
nen, ‘Regional Industrial Ecology’ (2001);44 Korhonen and Snäkin (2003);
Deutz and Gibbs (2004); Heeres, Vermeulen and de Walle (2004); Mi-
rata (2004); Roberts (2004); Sterr and Ott (2004); Chertow and Lom-
bardi (2005);45 Korhonen and Snäkin (2005); Mirata and Emtairah (2005);
Jacobsen (2006);46 van Berkel, van Beers and Bossilkov (2006); Ashton
(2007);47 Chertow (2007);48 Fang, Côté and Qin (2007);49 Geng, Haight
and Zhu (2007);50 Salmi (2007);51 van Beers and others (2007); Wolf, Ek-
lund and Söderström (2007); Zhu and others (2007); Baas (2008); Cher-
tow, Ashton and Espinosa (2008); Karlsson and Wolf (2008); Park and
others (2008);52 Yang and Feng (2008); van Berkel, Fujita, Hashimoto
and Geng (2009); Yuan and Shi (2009); van Berkel and others (2009);53
Costa and Ferrão, ‘Crossroads Between Resource Recovery and Indus-
trial Symbiosis Networks’ (2010);Geng, Tsuyoshi and Chen (2010);54 Mat-
tila, Pakarinen and Sokka (2010); Posch (2010);55 Shi, Chertow and Song
(2010); Baas (2011);56 Domenech and Davies (2011);57 Hatefipour, Baas
and Eklund (2011); Liu and others (2011);58 Salmi and others (2011);59
Sokka and others (2011); Sokka, Pakarinen and Melanen (2011);60 Ash-
ton and Bain (2012);61 Chertow and Ehrenfeld (2012); Mattila and others
(2012); Eckelman and Chertow (2013);62 Watkins and others (2013);63
Penn and others (2014)64
• Exchanges
Graedel (1996); Ehrenfeld and Gertler (1997); Schward and Steininger
(1997); Baas (1998); Keckler and Allen (1998); Chertow (2000); Desrochers
(2000); Korhonen, ‘Co-production of Heat and Power’ (2001); Korho-
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nen, ‘Regional Industrial Ecology’ (2001); Korhonen and Snäkin (2003);
Baas and Boons (2004); Deutz and Gibbs (2004); Heeres, Vermeulen and
de Walle (2004); Mirata (2004); Roberts (2004); Sterr and Ott (2004);
Chertow and Lombardi (2005); Korhonen and Snäkin (2005); Mirata and
Emtairah (2005); Jacobsen (2006); van Berkel, van Beers and Bossilkov
(2006); Ashton (2007); Chertow (2007); Fang, Côté and Qin (2007); Geng,
Haight and Zhu (2007); Salmi (2007); van Beers and others (2007); Wolf,
Eklund and Söderström (2007); Zhu and others (2007); Baas (2008); Cher-
tow, Ashton and Espinosa (2008); Karlsson and Wolf (2008); Park and
others (2008); Yang and Feng (2008); van Berkel, Fujita, Hashimoto and
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ANNEX I
DISPOSAL OPERATIONS
D 1 Deposit into or on to land (e.g. landfill, etc.)
D 2 Land treatment (e.g. biodegradation of liquid or sludgy discards in soils, etc.)
D 3 Deep injection (e.g. injection of pumpable discards into wells, salt domes or naturally occurring repositories, etc.)
D 4 Surface impoundment (e.g. placement of liquid or sludgy discards into pits, ponds or lagoons, etc.)
D 5 Specially engineered landfill (e.g. placement into lined discrete cells which are capped and isolated from one
another and the environment, etc.)
D 6 Release into a water body except seas/oceans
D 7 Release to seas/oceans including sea-bed insertion
D 8 Biological treatment not specified elsewhere in this Annex which results in final compounds or mixtures which are
discarded by means of any of the operations numbered D 1 to D 12
D 9 Physico-chemical treatment not specified elsewhere in this Annex which results in final compounds or mixtures
which are discarded by means of any of the operations numbered D 1 to D 12 (e.g. evaporation, drying,
calcination, etc.)
D 10 Incineration on land
D 11 Incineration at sea (*)
D 12 Permanent storage (e.g. emplacement of containers in a mine, etc.)
D 13 Blending or mixing prior to submission to any of the operations numbered D 1 to D 12 (**)
D 14 Repackaging prior to submission to any of the operations numbered D 1 to D 13
D 15 Storage pending any of the operations numbered D 1 to D 14 (excluding temporary storage, pending collection,
on the site where the waste is produced) (***)
EN22.11.2008 Official Journal of the European Union L 312/23
(*) This operation is prohibited by EU legislation and international conventions.
(**) If there is no other D code appropriate, this can include preliminary operations prior to disposal including pre-processing such as,
inter alia, sorting, crushing, compacting, pelletising, drying, shredding, conditioning or separating prior to submission to any of the
operations numbered D1 to D12.
(***) Temporary storage means preliminary storage according to point (10) of Article 3.
ANNEX II
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
R 1 Use principally as a fuel or other means to generate energy (*)
R 2 Solvent reclamation/regeneration
R 3 Recycling/reclamation of organic substances which are not used as solvents (including composting and other
biological transformation processes) (**)
R 4 Recycling/reclamation of metals and metal compounds
R 5 Recycling/reclamation of other inorganic materials (***)
R 6 Regeneration of acids or bases
R 7 Recovery of components used for pollution abatement
R 8 Recovery of components from catalysts
R 9 Oil re-refining or other reuses of oil
R 10 Land treatment resulting in benefit to agriculture or ecological improvement
R 11 Use of waste obtained from any of the operations numbered R 1 to R 10
R 12 Exchange of waste for submission to any of the operations numbered R 1 to R 11 (****)
R 13 Storage of waste pending any of the operations numbered R 1 to R 12 (excluding temporary storage, pending
collection, on the site where the waste is produced) (*****)
ENL 312/24 Official Journal of the European Union 22.11.2008
(*) This includes incineration facilities dedicated to the processing of municipal solid waste only where their energy efficiency is equal
to or above:
— 0,60 for installations in operation and permitted in accordance with applicable Community legislation before 1 January 2009,
— 0,65 for installations permitted after 31 December 2008,
using the following formula:
Energy efficiency = (Ep - (Ef + Ei))/(0,97 × (Ew + Ef))
In which:
Ep means annual energy produced as heat or electricity. It is calculated with energy in the form of electricity being multiplied by
2,6 and heat produced for commercial use multiplied by 1,1 (GJ/year)
Ef means annual energy input to the system from fuels contributing to the production of steam (GJ/year)
Ew means annual energy contained in the treated waste calculated using the net calorific value of the waste (GJ/year)
Ei means annual energy imported excluding Ew and Ef (GJ/year)
0,97 is a factor accounting for energy losses due to bottom ash and radiation.
This formula shall be applied in accordance with the reference document on Best Available Techniques for waste incineration.
(**) This includes gasification and pyrolisis using the components as chemicals.
(***) This includes soil cleaning resulting in recovery of the soil and recycling of inorganic construction materials.
(****) If there is no other R code appropriate, this can include preliminary operations prior to recovery including pre-processing such as,
inter alia, dismantling, sorting, crushing, compacting, pelletising, drying, shredding, conditioning, repackaging, separating, blending
or mixing prior to submission to any of the operations numbered R1 to R11.
(*****) Temporary storage means preliminary storage according to point (10) of Article 3.
ANNEX III
PROPERTIES OF WASTE WHICH RENDER IT HAZARDOUS
H 1 ‘Explosive’: substances and preparations which may explode under the effect of flame or which are more
sensitive to shocks or friction than dinitrobenzene.
H 2 ‘Oxidizing’: substances and preparations which exhibit highly exothermic reactions when in contact with other
substances, particularly flammable substances.
H 3-A ‘Highly flammable’
— liquid substances and preparations having a flash point below 21 °C (including extremely flammable liquids),
or
— substances and preparations which may become hot and finally catch fire in contact with air at ambient
temperature without any application of energy, or
— solid substances and preparations which may readily catch fire after brief contact with a source of ignition
and which continue to burn or to be consumed after removal of the source of ignition, or
— gaseous substances and preparations which are flammable in air at normal pressure, or
— substances and preparations which, in contact with water or damp air, evolve highly flammable gases in
dangerous quantities.
H 3-B ‘Flammable’: liquid substances and preparations having a flash point equal to or greater than 21 °C and less than
or equal to 55 °C.
H 4 ‘Irritant’: non-corrosive substances and preparations which, through immediate, prolonged or repeated contact
with the skin or mucous membrane, can cause inflammation.
H 5 ‘Harmful’: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may
involve limited health risks.
H 6 ‘Toxic’: substances and preparations (including very toxic substances and preparations) which, if they are inhaled
or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may involve serious, acute or chronic health risks and even death.
H 7 ‘Carcinogenic’: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin,
may induce cancer or increase its incidence.
H 8 ‘Corrosive’: substances and preparations which may destroy living tissue on contact.
H 9 ‘Infectious’: substances and preparations containing viable micro-organisms or their toxins which are known or
reliably believed to cause disease in man or other living organisms.
H 10 ‘Toxic for reproduction’: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate
the skin, may induce non-hereditary congenital malformations or increase their incidence.
H 11 ‘Mutagenic’: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled or ingested or if they penetrate the skin, may
induce hereditary genetic defects or increase their incidence.
H 12 Waste which releases toxic or very toxic gases in contact with water, air or an acid.
H 13 (*) ‘Sensitizing’: substances and preparations which, if they are inhaled or if they penetrate the skin, are capable of
eliciting a reaction of hypersensitization such that on further exposure to the substance or preparation,
characteristic adverse effects are produced.
H 14 ‘Ecotoxic’: waste which presents or may present immediate or delayed risks for one or more sectors of the
environment.
EN22.11.2008 Official Journal of the European Union L 312/25
(*) As far as testing methods are available.
H 15 Waste capable by any means, after disposal, of yielding another substance, e.g. a leachate, which possesses any
of the characteristics listed above.
Notes
1. Attribution of the hazardous properties ‘toxic’ (and ‘very toxic’), ‘harmful’, ‘corrosive’, ‘irritant’, ‘carcinogenic’, ‘toxic to
reproduction’, ‘mutagenic’ and ‘eco-toxic’ is made on the basis of the criteria laid down by Annex VI, to Council
Directive 67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions
relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances (1).
2. Where relevant the limit values listed in Annex II and III to Directive 1999/45/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (2) shall apply.
Test methods
The methods to be used are described in Annex V to Directive 67/548/EEC and in other relevant CEN-notes.
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(1) OJ 196, 16.8.1967, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 200, 30.7.1999, p. 1.
ANNEX IV
EXAMPLES OF WASTE PREVENTION MEASURES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 29
Measures that can affect the framework conditions related to the generation of waste
1. The use of planning measures, or other economic instruments promoting the efficient use of resources.
2. The promotion of research and development into the area of achieving cleaner and less wasteful products and
technologies and the dissemination and use of the results of such research and development.
3. The development of effective and meaningful indicators of the environmental pressures associated with the
generation of waste aimed at contributing to the prevention of waste generation at all levels, from product
comparisons at Community level through action by local authorities to national measures.
Measures that can affect the design and production and distribution phase
4. The promotion of eco-design (the systematic integration of environmental aspects into product design with the aim
to improve the environmental performance of the product throughout its whole life cycle).
5. The provision of information on waste prevention techniques with a view to facilitating the implementation of best
available techniques by industry.
6. Organise training of competent authorities as regards the insertion of waste prevention requirements in permits
under this Directive and Directive 96/61/EC.
7. The inclusion of measures to prevent waste production at installations not falling under Directive 96/61/EC. Where
appropriate, such measures could include waste prevention assessments or plans.
8. The use of awareness campaigns or the provision of financial, decision making or other support to businesses. Such
measures are likely to be particularly effective where they are aimed at, and adapted to, small and medium sized
enterprises and work through established business networks.
9. The use of voluntary agreements, consumer/producer panels or sectoral negotiations in order that the relevant
businesses or industrial sectors set their own waste prevention plans or objectives or correct wasteful products or
packaging.
10. The promotion of creditable environmental management systems, including EMAS and ISO 14001.
Measures that can affect the consumption and use phase
11. Economic instruments such as incentives for clean purchases or the institution of an obligatory payment by
consumers for a given article or element of packaging that would otherwise be provided free of charge.
12. The use of awareness campaigns and information provision directed at the general public or a specific set of
consumers.
13. The promotion of creditable eco-labels.
14. Agreements with industry, such as the use of product panels such as those being carried out within the framework of
Integrated Product Policies or with retailers on the availability of waste prevention information and products with a
lower environmental impact.
15. In the context of public and corporate procurement, the integration of environmental and waste prevention criteria
into calls for tenders and contracts, in line with the Handbook on environmental public procurement published by
the Commission on 29 October 2004.
16. The promotion of the reuse and/or repair of appropriate discarded products or of their components, notably through
the use of educational, economic, logistic or other measures such as support to or establishment of accredited repair
and reuse-centres and networks especially in densely populated regions.
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Table H.1: Overview of EU case law on waste covered in Section 4.4.1. This table therefore does not provide an exhaustive overview of all EU case law on waste.
Case Characteristic May May Incon Rele Supported by
indicate indicate -clusive -vant
waste non-waste
Vessoso and Zanetti (para 11) Intention of holder underlying the X Van de Walle (paras 60-61)
disposal Thames Water (para 28)
Vessoso and Zanetti (paras 12 and 13) Substance capable of economic X C-422/92 (para 22)
reutilisation Euro Tombesi (paras 47 and 48)
Inter-Environnement Wallonie (para
31)
ARCO Chemie (para 65)
Palin Granit (para 29)
KVZ (para 61)
Commune de Mesquer (para 40)
Vessoso and Zanette (para 12) Aim of the WFD X ARCO Chemie (para 37)
Palin Granit (para 23)
Saetti and Frediani (para 40)
Euro Tombesi (paras 53 and 54) A reusable residue X Palin Granit (paras 28 and 29)
Niselli (para 53)
Inter-Environnement Wallonie (para
25)
Directly or indirectly forms integral
part of an industrial production
X ARCO Chemie (para 67)
ARCO Chemie (para 49) Substances undergone recovery or dis-
posal operations
X Niselli (para 53)
ARCO Chemie (para 65) Substance capable of recovery X Niselli (para 53)
ARCO Chemie (para 71) Commonly regarded as waste X
ARCO Chemie (para 65) Substances may be recovered in an en-
vironmentally responsible manner for
use as fuel without substantial treat-
ment
X
ARCO Chemie (para 69) Common method of waste recovery X
ARCO Chemie (para 64) Method of treatment or use of a sub-
stance
X
ARCO Chemie (para 84) Unintended product X Saetti and Frediani (para 34)
ARCO Chemie (para 87) Precautions before subsequent use of
substance
X Palin Granit (paras 32 and 43)
ARCO Chemie (para 95) Result of recovery operation X
ARCO Chemie (para 97) All circumstances X Palin Granit (para 24)
KVZ (para 63)
Palin Granit (para 37) High likelihood of reusing waste and X Saetti and Frediani (para 35)
financial advantage to holder in doing Niselli (para 46)
so KVZ (para 62)
Palin Granit (para 40) Uncertainty surrounding proposed uses
of leftover substance
X
Palin Granit (para 40) Impossibility of reusing substance in its
entirety
X
Palin Granit (para 42) Place of storage, conditions under
which kept, length of time
X
Palin Granit (paras 44-46) Composition of substance X
Palin Granit (paras 49-51) Fact that does not pose any real risk to
human health or the environment
X
Saetti and Frediani (para 47) Produced intentionally / in the course
of producing other fuels and meets en-
ergy needs and those of other industries
X
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